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India's demographic trends portend moderately rapid ageing of the population. This, combined with the limited coverage of pension and health care programmes in terms of population, types of risks covered, and benefit levels has led to greater urgency in extending the coverage and reform directions of the current pension and health care programmes. This article analyses three pension and health care initiatives in India directed at the workers and their families engaged in the informal sector. The first initiative, India's National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP), undertaken in 1995 provides budget-financed transfers targeted at older persons. It is funded by the Union government but implemented by the state governments. The second initiative, called Swavalamban, was started in 2010, but has been subsumed under Atal Pension Yojana (APY), in the 2015-16 budget. Both are voluntary co-contributory initiatives aimed at providing access to retirement income to low-income individuals (government co-contributing with the individual). Unlike Swavalamban, the APY initiative has provisions for minimum guaranteed pension benefits, with contributions required by the members adjusted accordingly. Effectiveness in increasing enrollment and in sustaining contributions over a longer period will impact on the extent of retirement income security obtained by the members. The third initiative, Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), is insurance-based and aims to provide hospital care to low-income households. The article argues that for improving outcomes of these initiatives, more effective implementation, greater fiscal resources, and an integrated and systemic approach which is aided by technology-enabled platforms such as Aadhaar, will be needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inclusive growth is the new popular slogan animating development initiatives across the globe. Embracing the common rhetoric of rights discourses, the Indian government is investing heavily in novel welfare schemes for empowering poor people on the assumption that granting them access to the official market will put them on track for upward mobility and economic progress. In this article I use a case study of a massive slum relocation scheme in the Indian capital of Delhi to challenge this presumption. Resettlement is promoted as a way to accommodate the poor in the legal city. While it makes available desired commodities, its implementation is a complex process of renegotiating the divide between licit/illicit forms of urban habitation. Importantly, the bureaucratic procedures that create legal entitlements depend on the illicit, informal, and illegal domain that they aim to supplant. Thus, the new official suburbs emerge through the activity of people who flout the rules to meet the government target. Rather than a categorical shift from illegal to legal inhabitants of the city, resettlement re-creates urban citizenship as a form of tolerated encroachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The article discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guaranteeing tenure security to the households living in informal settlements (slums) has not seen any progress in urban India. This is because the policymakers have failed to see land tenure status as a continuum from insecure tenure to a legal status. In general, the poor in the cities move from informal to quasi-legal ( de facto) tenure through various processes, and then to legal tenure ( de jure) in cases of a public policy intervention that confers property title on them. In the absence of such a policy, the urban poor and low-income migrants can seek to consolidate their urban citizenship through political citizenship in an electoral democracy, through welfare interventions by the state and above all, through their own subversions of urban legalities. This article first illustrates the existence of a continuum of tenure status in informal settlements in Ahmedabad City. It explains the factors that give a slum settlement a particular level of tenure status; and then through quantitative data, links the level of tenure security to social protection outcomes. The article shows that through small public actions, it is possible to improve access of the urban poor to social protection measures and that it is not necessary to leapfrog to extending property rights to the dwellers of these informal settlements. It is essential to realise that if land titles are given in a society where other rights are not present, the poor will not be able to retain them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective To determine the effectiveness of a sanitation campaign that combines "shaming" (i.e. emotional motivators) with subsidies for poor households in rural Orissa, an Indian state with a disproportionately high share of India's child mortality. Methods Using a cluster-randomized design, we selected 20 treatment and 20 control villages in the coastal district of Bhadrak, rural Orissa, for a total sample of 1050 households. We collected sanitation and health data before and after a community-led sanitation project, and we used a difference-in-difference estimator to determine the extent to which the campaign influenced the number of households building and using a latrine. Findings Latrine ownership did not increase in control villages, but in treatment villages it rose from 6% to 32% in the overall sample, from 5% to 36% in households below the poverty line (eligible for a government subsidy) and from 7% to 26% in households above the poverty line (not eligible for a government subsidy). Conclusion Subsidies can overcome serious budget constraints but are not necessary to spur action, for shaming can be very effective by harnessing the power of social pressure and peer monitoring. Through a combination of shaming and subsidies, social marketing can improve sanitation worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]