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Post-earthquake inspection is required by many dam safety regulations. Typically, based on the magnitude of the earthquake, the guidelines define an area within which dams should be inspected. The areas are established on ground-motion relations derived for the western United States. In eastern North America (ENA), the attenuation is slower with distance from the earthquake epicentre, and as a consequence the inspection area should be significantly larger than that recommended by the current guidelines. We review the state of knowledge on earthquake damage to dams, the factors used to define post-earthquake inspections, and the earthquake characteristics used to define the guidelines. We recommend new radii of inspections for dams applicable in ENA, including the Province of Quebec. Derived from historical earthquake information, the proposed new radii of inspections are twofold to sixfold larger than the 1988 guidelines of the International Commission on Large Dams. It is also suggested that a half-magnitude unit be added to every magnitude “rapidly” released by seismological organizations to include the intrinsic uncertainty in magnitude values and types. Our proposed approach is only one avenue that dam owners can follow to comply with dam safety regulations. Irrespective of the avenue chosen, however, this paper emphasizes the need for dam owners to consider the lower ground motion attenuation in ENA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Located some 90 km north of the town of Sept-Îles, Quebec, the Sainte-Marguerite-3 (SM-3) hydroelectric project was one of the most ambitious in eastern North America in recent years. The project included the construction of a 171 m high dam that created a 140 km long reservoir, some 120 m deep near the dam toe. Although the reservoir is located in a weakly seismic area of the Canadian Shield, reservoir-induced earthquakes occurred. A first event (mN 1.3) was recorded in September 1999, ~17 months after the reservoir started filling. Between October 2000 and March 2001, four additional events were detected by the Canadian National Seismograph Network, the largest being mN 1.7. During a field survey that took place between July and October 2001, 276 events of magnitude mN ≤ 1.2 were detected within 30 km of a three-component seismograph. Single-station locations, confirmed by agreement between P phase and S phase azimuths, were determined for 182 events. Most earthquakes fall in four areas with estimated focal depths mostly shallower than 2 km. Since the field survey completion, more events have taken place, but the largest one is mN 2.2 as of March 2006. This paper presents a detailed analysis of the reservoir-triggered events, together with a summary of seismic hazard evaluation of the dam site, the seismic parameters selected for dynamic analysis, and the selection of the design earthquake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]