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Developments and consequences of school profiling in general-education schools in selected European countries and perspectives for implementation in Germany - The development of a school programme, e.g. by way of forming a profile in the field of music or sports, is part of everyday school life in many European state and private schools today and even statutory in some countries and states. This paper focuses on the background and the significance of this development in school politics but also on the potential and the challenges which come with the profile formation of schools on an individual as well as systemic basis. Furthermore, the author introduces and discusses examples for the profile formation of schools and classes by looking at concrete projects. After that, recommendations are given for school programme work in individual schools. The focus is especially on German-speaking countries such as Germany, Austria and Switzerland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a report for the conference "Welche Antike? - Konkurrierende Rezeptionenen des Altertums im Barock," (Which Antiquity? - Competing Receptions of the Ancient World in the Baroque Period). The conference was given by the Wolfenbüttel Committee for Baroque Research, which took place in April 2006. Papers were presented by Mara Wade, "Die Kontroverse im Norden oder die (Re)-Präsentation der Monarchie: Dänemark 1634 als Fallstudie;" Nils Büttner, " Aurei saeculi imago: Konkurrierende Antikebilder im politischen Konflikt;" and Isabella Woldt, "Antikerezeption und Sarmatismus in der Residenzarchitektur des polnisch-litauischen Großreiches im Barockzeitalter," among others.

Comparisons as a Bridge between History and Philosophy of Science. Both in history and philosophy of science, comparisons are looked upon with considerable skepticism. A widespread syndrome of casuitis, i.e., the tendency of historians of science to produce extremely narrow and local studies that do not present a case for any broader thesis of interest to philosophers, has widened the gulf between history and philosophy of science. This may be somewhat surprising to sociologists, philosophers, or general, legal and cultural historians, who have been using comparisons successfully for a long time–albeit not always without controversy. In the first part of this paper, I assess the status of comparisons in science studies, in order to explain why their systematic use is not nearly as natural as might elsewhere be expected. This critical section is followed by a very brief outline of the prerequisites for fruitful comparison as formulated by general and sociological historians in their detailed methodological discussions. To these are added some necessary conditions from the perspective of modern history of science. In the third part I present four examples of such systematic comparisons taken from my own research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsibility Without Understanding? How the Debate on the Ethics of Genetic Engineering Depends on Its Philosophy of Science. The main thesis in this paper is that bioethics has no own criteria to judge the chances and risks of genetic engineering. But if we distinguish (1) between different types of genetic, (2) between genetic engineering as a set of methods for experimentation and genetic engineering as an industrial technique and (3) reconstruct the metaphors and the terminology in general, which are used by biologists describing their practice, it is possible to formulate such criteria. As the distinction between nature and culture is the result of human actions (not drawn by nature) and the communication about these actions and distinctions in a given cultural context, the criteria are the result of a discourse, in which not only biologists, but all members of a society argue about the reproduction and structuration of their society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses some aspects of the relationship between Feyerabend and Kuhn. First, some biographical remarks concerning their connections are made. Second, four characteristics of Feyerabend and Kuhn's concept of incommensurability are discussed. Third, Feyerabend's general criticism of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is reconstructed. Forth and more specifically, Feyerabend's criticism of Kuhn's evaluation of normal science is critically investigated. Finally, Feyerabend's re-evaluation of Kuhn's philosophy towards the end of his life is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]