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The Taiwan Strait is heating up, as Mainland Chinese netizens, generals, and politicians increasingly talk about 'forceful' rather than 'peaceful' reunification. While Xi Jinping and Chinese nationalists desperately desire Taiwan's reunification, Trump's isolationist "America First" rhetoric has only encouraged reckless Chinese thinking about forcing reunification, and the Taiwanese remain largely passive, unable to confront an overwhelming threat. Wishful thinking in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington is increasing the odds of miscalculation. The 2020 presidential elections in Taiwan and the United States, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade war, furthermore, bode ill for peace in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese Christians in the 1920s faced pressure from a new republic that demanded the loyalty of its citizens despite lacking a proper knowledge of the meaning of the term. Progressive Christians associated with the YMCA soon launched the Citizenship Education Movement in 1924 as they tried to combine Christian virtue with China's broader national demands. While their association of modern citizenship with virtue cultivation was not new, these Christians did attempt something unique, which was to define a good citizen as a world citizen, whose belief in God meant one is loyal ultimately to certain universal values instead of the nation-state. As the Movement continued, the relationship between one's devotion to these higher values and that to the Chinese nation-state remained a complex and often competitive one. Although the Movement ended largely with the end of its visionary, Yu Rizhang, its momentum was harnessed by the Nationalist Party in the New Life Movement. The latter, however, omitted the language of God and universal values at the same time as it injected the nation-state, and the Party in particular, as the sole receiver of loyalty and granter of privilege. Thus the decade-long history of the YMCA's Citizenship Education Movement testifies to the association between one's religious devotion and an internationalist understanding of citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This response to Ashish Rajadhyaksha's essay reflects on the following themes: state promises made and broken, comparing India and China, and science fiction as national redemption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2016, the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump's electoral victory once again brought xenophobic nationalism into the world spotlight. Surprisingly, in the United Kingdom and the United States, a dramatic increase in wealth inequality impelled the working poor to cling more tightly to nationalism. In recent times, China has also witnessed this correlation of resurgent nationalist aspirations and an increasing gap between rich and poor. In light of these international developments, the primary objective of this study is to explore how China's increasing inequality is influencing Chinese nationalism. The question of whether the Chinese youth who agonize over the trend of wealth inequality has paradoxically grown more attached to Chinese nationalism is also intriguing. Based on structural equation modeling, the estimated results show that, conversely, the increase in economic inequality in China has led to a decline in Chinese nationalism. In particular, disaffected Chinese youth with higher education who suffer from increasing economic disparity have been reluctant to embrace nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular nationalism remains strong in China. What drives this strong nationalistic sentiment? This is the key question this study attempts to answer. The authors are particularly interested in the connection between domestic politics and outward nationalist feelings among Chinese urban residents, specifically the relationship between democratic orientation and regime support on the one hand and nationalist feelings on the other. Descriptive findings from random survey data on Chinese urban residents in 34 Chinese cities reveal that democracy-oriented Chinese urbanites tend to show stronger nationalistic feelings. A large volume of literature on the relationship between democratic value and nationalistic sentiments, however, generally suggests that people with more liberal democratic values tend to be less nationalistic. How should one, then, reconcile and explain this seemingly contradictory relationship in China? Upon further research, the study finds that system support is a confounding factor affecting Chinese urban residents' nationalistic sentiments. People with more nationalistic feelings tend to be those who show less support for the current system in China. Popular political discontent with the Chinese domestic system may very well have a spill-over effect on Chinese people's nationalist feelings toward the outside world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The influence of war and the military on the politics of Republican China has become a prominent emphasis of scholarship. Three recent books display the multiple ways in which conflict, particularly against Japan, shaped both Republican China and its successor, the People's Republic of China, highlighting—among other insights—the significance of contingency. This essay discusses the following works. Kwong Chi Man. War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria: Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique during the Northern Expedition. Studies on Modern East Asian History. Leiden: Brill, 2017. 327 pp. $119.00 (cloth). | Hans van de Ven. China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China. London: Profile Books, 2017; repr. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018. 352 pp. $35.00 (cloth). | Peter Worthing. General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 316 pp. $110.00 (cloth), $31.99 (paper). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the challenges and possibilities facing democratic citizenship education in China. It starts by taking on the increasing political repression under Xi's regime and how it is marginalizing or silencing democratic discourses. Then it examines the rising economically-driven populist nationalism in China, and how it complicates the democratic pursuit. Next, the paper looks into the dominant Chinese cultural tradition, Confucianism, its antidemocratic tendencies and alliance with authoritarian forces. The paper concludes with a discussion of potential ways to combat the roadblocks and resistances to democratization. It emphasizes a more nuanced understanding of both China's historical trajectories and present aspirations, seeking possibilities for democratic breakthrough. It also proposes educational and curricular reform, deconstructing official moral education and introducing cultivation in civic virtues, for example, to promote democratic citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most participants in the Sino-Christian theology movement are not affiliated with the church. This state of affairs naturally raises the question whether what scholarship arises is really a kind of theology or merely writings on public and/or political issues with reference to Christian themes. And yet the movement is more influential than the church in the Chinese public realm in terms of its ability to produce a Christian voice. The purpose of this article is first to examine the historical development of Sino-Christian theology over the past several decades. Some particular themes of this movement are then explored. These themes are intertwined with the discussion of polytheistic values, nationalism, and self-identity in times of cultural conflict: all of these matters are of wide public concern. There are evident tensions within the Sino-Christian theology movement: the intention is to show points of difference can be transformed and become a creative drive behind the construction of a new kind of theology in the Chinese public realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid increase in recent years of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) has prompted growing scholarly interest in its economic and political implications for host countries. However, relatively little attention has been paid to how concerns over the rise of China may shape public attitudes towards such investment. This article tests the link between threat perception and preferences for FDI in the United States. We argue that, due to heightened geopolitical concerns and nationalism, perceptions of the China threat negatively affect how the American public views the impact of incoming Chinese FDI. Using a survey experiment, we show that respondents are indeed less likely to support Chinese FDI when primed with information that highlights the security and economic threats posed by China than when they receive no such priming. Furthermore, causal mediation analyses reveal that the treatment effects of security and economic threats are mediated by respondents' concerns about the challenges that Chinese FDI poses to national security as well as to American economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been widely recognized that women in Western countries are marginalized in the sports field, and sports media is one of the institutions that strengthens such trivialization. However, there are very few studies investigating women in sports in countries outside of Europe and the USA. The aim of this study is to review how sportswomen are portrayed in sports media in China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. East Asian media is congruous in its disparities regarding quantity of coverage between domestic athletes and abroad athletes, between sportsmen and sportswomen, and between international events and local events. Narratives and commentary focus on nationalism, appropriate femininity, non-sports related aspects of sportswomen's lives, and the dual identities of sportswomen. Some slight differences regarding quantity, narratives and commentary exist between the four countries. In its current state, scholarly research on media images of sportswomen is contradictory and too limited. Overall, more studies regarding how sportswomen are represented in East Asian media are needed, with further considerations of social media and media autonomy while making essential connections to social and cultural contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The official China Dream of the Great revival tells a story of China reversing "humiliation" by Western powers and returning to its premodern, rightful place at the center of world affairs. However, since ethnically targeted violence in Ürümqi in 2009, leading thinkers and policy makers ask how they can avoid a "nightmare" of frontier insecurity derailing dreams of international power. This article uses a postcolonial approach to critically analyze tensions between ethnic inclusion and exclusion in visual and textual narratives from a Xinjiang regional exhibition that celebrated the PRC's sixtieth anniversary. It asks who is included and excluded in these visions of China's rise? How does China domestically refract insecurity from experiences of a colonial world order that constructs it as inferior? The event tells a story of the history and future of a powerful rising state but expresses deep insecurities that domestic cultural difference is an obstacle to China's global power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on archival sources in Britain, Singapore, Malaysia, and the United States, this article explores late-colonial anxieties about the influence of Chinese nationalism in Malaya (and especially among students in Chinese-medium schools) in the lead up to self-government in 1957. It demonstrates that the colonial fear of communism in Malaya was not always synonymous with the fear of cultural influence from "new China" and that the "rise of China" in the mid-1950s was viewed as a challenge to colonially sanctioned programs for "Malayanization." More importantly, in exploring some of the ways in which the colonial state mobilized anti-communist cultural workers from Hong Kong to help counter the perceived threat from China, the article argues that more focus should be placed on the role of colonial agency in shaping "Sinophone" cultural expression in Southeast Asia during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is home to the world's largest audience for e‐sports, or competitive videogames. While competitive videogames have become popular within a borderless, digital environment, the e‐sports fan base has a decidedly nationalist element to it. This article argues that new forms of digital nationalism are part and parcel of normal discourse within the Chinese competitive videogames environment. Through a case study of one specific competitive videogame, this article shows how nationalist narratives are enacted by the community itself at the grass roots, creating bottom‐up forms of nationalism. Combining digital fieldwork with offline interviews and observations, the study sheds light on new forms of nationalist expression appearing online in China. It focuses in particular on memes and how these serve as micro expressions of nationalism, maintaining and reinforcing nationalist narratives originating within state discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Here, the aesthetic theory of Gao Ertai ... is examined as a form of resistance to the state-driven collectivization of subjective experience. It is argued that in post-1949 China aesthetics constitutes a discursive realm in which the experience of beauty confronts the collective sublime at the root of PRC nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nationalists were the internationally recognized government of China during the war against Japan, and Beijing's memorialization of that conflict always has been complicated by this inconvenient fact. In the early 1930s, Japan embarked on an implausibly ambitious strategic enterprise: conquering enormous amounts of Chinese territory and a vast population and incorporating them into an imperial system centered on Tokyo. [Extracted from the article]

Chinese leaders often invoke the feelings of the Chinese people in international disputes. However, most survey research on Chinese public opinion on international affairs has looked at measures of nationalist identity rather than beliefs about foreign policy and evaluations of the government's performance. Five surveys of Chinese citizens, netizens, and elites help illuminate the attitudes that the Chinese government grapples with in managing international security policy. The results suggest that Chinese attitudes are more hawkish than dovish and that younger Chinese, while perhaps not more nationalist in identity, may be more hawkish in their foreign policy beliefs than older generations. Netizens and elites are even more inclined to call on the Chinese government to invest in and rely more on military strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Winston Churchill once said, 'it is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.' However, negotiations are particularly difficult when they are enmeshed in public opinion precommitments. The sharpest crisis between China and Vietnam in the last 30 years concerned the placement of a Chinese oil rig into contested waters in 2014. This study analyses the Chinese and Vietnamese propaganda efforts surrounding the crisis as examples of the instrumental use of propaganda in managing domestic public opinion on diplomatic crises. The article argues that despite very different approaches to public diplomacy during the crisis, both states were primarily concerned with avoiding escalation and ending the confrontation. The authors show how propaganda function as a pacifying device in dealing with rising domestic nationalism when executing a moderate foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Triad and other secret societies have been mutual aid groups, personal networks amongst Chinese, organised criminal gangs, as well as associated with patriotism. The perceived patriotism of triads originated in the support of some for the restoration of the Ming Dynasty and overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty. The association of triads with patriotism continued as triad and secret societies used regimes for advantage and regimes likewise used them when in need of support. The Nationalists (Kuomintang), the Communists, and even the British have worked with or used triad or other secret societies when the need has arisen. The pretext of patriotism is a central factor in the durability of triad and secret societies in China. This article seeks to explain the frequent association of triad societies with patriotism and why this has contributed to the durability of the criminality of triads that overlooks their long-term criminality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalist discourse has long been an important apparatus in modern politics. This paper showed a sharp, yet subtle departure of the Chinese government in its current manipulation of nationalism. Instead of the hardcore revolutionary rhetoric, the new phase of nationalist discourse incorporated many elements of Confucianism to better consolidate the communist regime. Using the 2015 military parade as an example, this paper analyzed how the Chinese central government evoked sentiments and consciousness of nationalism by utilizing and interweaving Confucianism elements of family value, benevolent (Ren), propriety (Li), equilibrium, and harmony into the party-state's official nationalist discourse. Significance of such organized endeavors in political discourse is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outbreak of the Korean March First Movement in 1919 was followed by intensive reporting and commentary in Chinese media, presenting striking images of the brutality of the Japanese colonizers, the resolve for independence among the Korean people, and the concept of national self-determination. The March First Movement provided the Chinese people with a vivid example of the transformation of the abstract concept of "universal principles" into the practice of "national self-determination," and strengthened consciousness of "national independence" among the Chinese people. Over the ensuing two or three decades, the "March First Movement" gradually seeped into the Chinese nationalist movement and discourses on national liberation, playing the role of "the neighbor as mirror," and continuing to provide both positive inspiration and negative reference points for the Chinese people following the path of national independence. This linkage and interaction between "weak nations" aids in understanding the modern Chinese nationalist movement, as well as the mechanisms for development of the national independence movements among colonized peoples which swept across the globe in the early 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay challenges the 'methodological territorialism' and 'methodological nationalism' prevalent in recent studies of imperial biographies, examining the role of the German Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (1801–1851) in establishing a transnational form of free-trade imperialism in China. A native of Prussia and a missionary by training, Gützlaff was first posted in the Netherlands East Indies before associating himself with British interests on the China coast. However, his loyalty was not limited to one imperialist power. In the 1840s, Gützlaff promoted German trade with China, and at certain points of time he also supported American as well as Scandinavian interests. In addition to making a name for himself as a cultural broker and promoter of free trade and diplomatic representation, he also became involved with various forms of imperialism, from the more fluid commercial variant to the more formalised power structures of territorial rule. The case of Gützlaff therefore lends itself to a reflection about the permeable and shifting boundaries of empires. Moreover, it calls for a reassessment of German imperialism in the period before 1871, showing how Germany's involvement with 'Western' global expansion was palpable and not merely confined to the realm of colonial fantasy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The "China Dream" is a native imagination of a great renewal of the Chinese nation. Mao Zedong had a dream to save the nation and promised the Chinese people utopian socialism tomorrow at the cost of sacrifices that needed to be borne today. Deng Xiaoping brought in economic reforms so that the Chinese people could dream of becoming rich. Xi Jinping's China Dream has focussed upon China's sphere of influence extending beyond its regional space. While Xi Jinping's "China Dream" revolves around connectivity and infrastructure, using shades of affirmative, assertive and aggressive nationalism, as necessary, his Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is likely to affect over 68 countries, 65% of the world's population, and 40% of global GDP. At the regional level, China's 55-km-long Zhuhai-Macau-Hong Kong Bridge is geared to transform the political geography of the South China Sea sub-region. This paper attempts to contextualise the notion of the contemporary "China Dream" and deconstruct the implications of Xi Jinping's aggressive "infrastructure diplomacy" upon Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial nationalism has received little attention in the literature on Chinese nationalism. Nor has China been a focus of the emerging literature on comparative financial nationalism. This is surprising as financial matters were central to modern Chinese nationalism when it began to take shape in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, and financial nationalism remains influential in contemporary China, which has undoubtedly become a major actor in the international financial system today. Our exploration of Chinese financial nationalism seeks to begin to fill this gap in both sets of literature. This article examines three areas of concern shared by Chinese financial nationalists past and present: currency, foreign financial institutions in China, and international borrowing/lending. We find that, as China's position in the international power hierarchy has evolved, the nature of financial nationalism has changed, from a largely inward and defensive orientation to an increasingly outward orientation. Our study also reveals diverse strands of thinking among Chinese financial nationalists, both now and in the earlier historical era, according to whether they hold a zero-sum or positive-sum conception of international financial relations. The case of China shows the richness of financial nationalism and highlights the importance of a nuanced understanding of this phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, nationalism that took root in the era of globalization under the thirdgeneration leadership of Jiang Zemin is principally meant to address the internal threats challenging party legitimacy and stability and not to resist the foreign enemies, as was the goal in the twentieth century. This is because internal stability is considered prerequisite to harness the potentials of globalization. Paradoxically therefore, nationalism and globalization, that are antithetical forces, go hand in hand in China. Under the current leadership, both the forces of nationalism and globalization are underscored in Xi Jinping's dream project- the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Notably, the success of BRI is contingent on the persistence of globalization externally. But the rising trends of de-globalization in the West do not augur well for the BRI that has been envisaged to not only meet the demands of a slowing economy but to expand China's global footprints, and thereby, fulfil the China Dream. Therefore, a sense of insecurity pervades Chinese nationalism. This 'insecure' nationalism under Xi Jinping is engendering a belligerent turn to Chinese foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps the first thing to note about a forum on the subject of 1919 in Asia is how awkwardly the spatial frame of "Asia" maps onto the international history of that moment. To be sure, the postwar international conjuncture, which I have elsewhere called the "Wilsonian Moment," had a revolutionary impact across Asia, perhaps more so than in any other world region outside of Europe. As the three preceding essays in this forum note, that year was a waypoint, and sometimes a launching pad, for a rush of novel or renewed revolutionary discourses, connections, and mobilizations in China, India, and Korea, as it was in other parts of Asia and of the world. These were all propelled by the accumulated material and ideological transformations of the years of war, transformation that imbued the moment with revolutionary potential and gave contemporaries a sense that the international order, its power structures and its norms of legitimacy, were uniquely malleable, amenable to concerted action. Indeed, 1919 was a moment in which the very idea of "Asia"—its spaces, the identities they attached to, and the solidarities that ran across and beyond it—was reimagined in ways that at once stitched it together and rent it apart. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the critical acclaim of Sino-French literature in recent years, an increasing number of Chinese presses have solicited translations of prize-winning novels written in French by authors of Chinese descent. Yet as the work of authors like François Cheng, Shan Sa, Ya Ding and Dai Sijie travels from French into Chinese, it also undergoes a transformation via the politics of translation and publication in China. This essay exposes the inner workings of translation between French and Chinese, as well as the politics that colour its publication and reception between France and China. The act of translating these works back into their authors' native tongue signals a return to the national paradigms the writers initially sought to evade by writing in French. Translation here functions as a form of aggression, a forced return home that ultimately breaks with the poetic ethos that animates the original creative works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract A large body of research documents cross-cultural differences in manual and non-manual pointing. These findings have often been explained as being due to pragmatic, linguistic, cultural, and bodily constraints. The current study narrowed the plausible range of candidates for explaining the pointing preferences, focusing specifically on manual availability. We examined pointing preferences by administering a referential communication task in two types of communities which share a national identity, geographic environment, ethnicity, cultural background, and language and yet vary in their degree of hand availability: farming and herding communities in southwestern China. Our findings show that farmers, who emphasize the use of manual labour in intensive subsistence farming, were more likely to use non-manual pointing in the task than herders, who demonstrate a higher degree of manual availability in the rearing of animals. This research has implications for how the availability of the hands in economic activities may have lasting consequences on cultural pointing practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multiple and complex questions lie behind the Tibetan dissent against the PRC such as - what are the protestors really demanding, political freedom or cultural rights? Does religion play a role behind the protests? Does the growing number of Han and Hui settlers in Tibet's cities exacerbate the protest? Do forced sedentrasiation policies fuel the protest? Is economic deprivation a driving factor behind the protest? In other words, there are issues linked to the larger problem of governance in China's borderlands. Also, there are equally significant issues pertaining to the cultural preservation and identity issues of the Tibetans. While the identity and cultural issues are common for all minority regions of Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, the governance issue is not common for all the regions of China. These questions apply more generally to the governance of China's border regions and are not specific to Tibet. Question then arises if the Tibetan protest is merely the result of China's policy failure in Tibet or it is rooted in the deeper assertion of Tibetan identity and demand for independence from China. This paper explores the protest and uprisings in Tibet from the 1950s to the present and has identified the continuities and changes in the nature, pattern, goals and the causes of the protests over the last 60 years. The paper then examines the implication of these protests on the future of the Tibetan resistance movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recent decades, historians of modern East Asia generally considered Asianism to be an imperialistic ideology of militant Japan. Although Japanese expansionists certainly used the term and its concept in this way in the 1930s and 1940s, earlier proponents of Asianism looked upon it as a very real strategy of uniting Asian nations to defend against Western imperialism. Showing that Chinese intellectuals considered different forms of Asianism as viable alternatives in the early days of the Republic of China, this article examines a number of discussions of Asianism immediately following the 1911 Revolution. Concentrating on newspaper articles and speeches by intellectuals Ye Chucang and Sun Yat-sen, I show the international aspirations of the Guomindang elite at this crucial point in the construction of the Chinese nation. Despite the dominance of discourse on the nation state, these intellectuals advocated different Asianist programmes for strategic purposes within the first two years of the Republic, dependent on their very different relationships with Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China as a victim rather than a proponent of modern colonialism is an essential myth that animates Chinese nationalism. The Chinese statist project of occupying, minoritizing and securitizing different ethno-national peoples of Central Asia, such as Uyghurs and Tibetans, with their own claims to homelands, is a colonial project. Focusing on China's securitized and militarized rule in Xinjiang and Tibet, the article will argue that the most appropriate lens through which this can be understood is neither nation-building nor internal colonialism but modern colonialism. It argues that the representation of Uyghurs and Tibetans as sources of insecurity not only legitimizes state violence as a securitizing practice but also serves contemporary Chinese colonial goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates upon a cultural logic of overseas Chinese nationalism. Around the early twentieth century, some bourgeois members of overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Seas mobilised Confucianism as an ethno‐symbol. The latter helped the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie to counter the quest for greater secularisation and to confront the surge of anti‐imperialist movements. The implications of this research include to recentre the role of overseas Chinese in China's modern transformation; to decentre the May Fourth agendas in the understanding of overseas Chinese nationalism; and to situate overseas Chinese nationalism in an extraterritorial space, which includes the Confucian zone created in the dialogical connections between Confucian intellectual elites (such as Zheng Xiaoxu and Chen Huanzhang) and overseas Chinese bourgeois networks that converged in Hong Kong and spread transnationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation of science to science fiction in the history of Chinese science fiction has been closely linked to both the influence of Western science and to ideals of progress, nationalism, and empire. But when we turn to China's long history of philosophical speculation, a rather different story needs to be told. This article examines the ways in which the indigenous Chinese sciences have fed into fiction, and considers the consequences for our understandings of the genre of science fiction itself and its broader social and historical contexts, as well as relationships between modernity, progress, and science in a non-Western, but globally crucial, context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's most prominent dissident, the late Liu Xiaobo, criticized the Chinese Communist Party's efforts "to promote what he considered a toxic mixture of traditional culture and modern patriotism." He worried more about "a mentality of world domination" characterized by a "thuggish outlook." Quoted in Orville Schell and John Delury's (2013) book Wealth and Power, this statement reveals the culmination of some 150 years of nation-building, which now encapsulates what is probably the strongest and potentially most explosive primordial nationalism in the region since Imperial Japan. This article examines the sources of Chinese nationalism and gauges the extent to which Chinese nationalism contributes to cooperation or confrontation in China's foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims at investigating the role of the expanding overseas Chinese state in the construction of 'Chineseness' among Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Ghana. It focuses especially on the manifestation of the ideology of Chinese nationalism in the migrants' living experience. Data analyzed in this study are primarily drawn from extensive interviews with private entrepreneurs, employees of Chinese state-owned enterprises and Chinese Embassy officials in Ghana. Besides, this study is supplemented by a content analysis of archive data collected from media reports, policy documents, online forums and social media. This study reveals that as an unintended consequence, private entrepreneurs enjoy tangible benefits from the expanding presence of overseas Chinese state in Ghana. Strategies and policies implemented by the Chinese government and its overseas representatives aiming at engaging Chinese diasporas also contribute to spreading nationalism and building a deterritorial Chinese identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the consequences of nationalist unrest? This paper utilizes two original datasets, which cover 377 city-level anti-Japanese protests during the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Island crisis and the careers of municipal leaders, to analyse the downstream effects of nationalist unrest at the subnational level. We find both political and economic consequences of China's 2012 protest demonstrations against Japan. Specifically, top Party leaders in cities that saw relatively spontaneous, early protests were less likely to be promoted to higher office, a finding that is consistent with the widely held but rarely tested expectation that social instability is punished in the Chinese Communist Party's cadre evaluation system. We also see a negative effect of nationalist protest on foreign direct investment (FDI) growth at the city level. However, the lower promotion rates associated with relatively spontaneous protests appear to arise through political rather than economic channels. By taking into account data on social unrest in addition to economic performance, these results add to existing evidence that systematic evaluation of leaders' performance plays a major role in the Chinese political system. These findings also illuminate the dilemma that local leaders face in managing popular nationalism amid shifting national priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese Communist Party is confronted with a growing gap that separates the rhetoric about socialism and party rule from the individualism and materialism caused by capitalism and opening up to the outside world. In response, the Party has developed strategies that draw on an understanding of the dedication to the Party that is specifically religious, yet does not require belief, conviction, or faith in a doctrine. These strategies revolve around the Leninist concept of 'party spirit', which, paradoxically, has been turned into a commodity that can be produced, supplied, and consumed. Drawing on insights from the anthropology of pilgrimage, tourism, and religion, this article discusses these strategies in the context of party cadre education and so‐called 'red tourism'. The article concludes that the Party is shaping its evolution from an infallible bearer of ideological dogma to a sacred object of worship as part of a new 'communist civil religion'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the promotion of national identity through higher education and graduate employment . It mentions the economic development of China and the government policy related to higher education in China. The author argues that the policy of the government to promote national identity has failed as a result of policy coordination, policy interpretations and implementation. The government that has rolled out policies to attract foreign students is also offered.

Using a mixed-methods approach, this article surveys and compares how Chinese youth view China’s rise with how their Asian counterparts do. The quantitative analysis uses data from the Asian Student Survey to identify the differences in perception of China’s rise between Chinese and Asian youth. Qualitative interviewing is undertaken to probe and assess the reasons behind the gap. The results show that Chinese youth are more optimistic about political stability and nationalism accompanying China’s rise. Nevertheless, they are open to acknowledge a variety of social problems in the wake of economic growth. With regard to China’s international influence, most Chinese youth have a firm faith in China’s peaceful rise, but they also perceive threats from other countries that are normally ignored in the China threat thesis. Chinese youth tend to attribute the negative evaluations of China among Asian counterparts to external reasons rather than see them as reflections of China’s ‘problematic’ foreign policy. Interview materials show why and how Chinese foreign policy is justified among Chinese young people. They open a door for outsiders to understand Chinese public opinion toward international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the history of international mobility of students from China to other countries over the century and a half from 1870 to the present day. Different motivations, goals, courses, and knowledge are considered, together with how the purposes of individuals have matched national policy. Implications for the future development in a globalized context are briefly considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines language ideologies underlying the media representation of Chinese citizens speaking multiple foreign languages. It argues that a figure of good citizenship is being articulated via valorization of multilingual competence that is grounded both in the newly cherished moral values of neoliberal globalization – entrepreneurship, reflexivity and flexibility – and in the traditional moral values of patriotism and contribution to society. Such configuration of citizenship departs from the nationalist monoglot language ideology, and yet demonstrates a flexible nationalism that links multilingual competence to personal welfare and social harmony. This study shows the importance of paying attention to the dynamic interplay between social class, nationalism, and neoliberal globalization in our analysis of language and citizenship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the Southeastern Scenic Tours project, which was funded by the Nationalist government and undertaken soon after the Nationalist Party (Guomindang) had consolidated its power in the early 1930s. Drawing from newspapers, magazines, catalogs, and other material published in the Republican period, this paper looks closely at the travel routes, itineraries, and documentation that accompanied the project and examines in particular its visual representations of Chinese scenic sites, investigating how the development of transportation and the commoditization of scenic sites have been interwoven with traditional landscape aesthetics and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the relationship of war to the general revolutionary history of China. Analysis of China's twentieth century nationalist revolution; Period of political and military complexity, 1912-1928; May Thirtieth Incident and the May Thirtieth Movement.

Reviews the papers `Army as Bureaucracy: Japanese Militarism Revisited,' and Arthur Waldron, `War and the Rise of Nationalism in Twentieth-Century China.' Essential and distinctive elements of the Western way of war; Militarization as vital part of modernity.

The 'niangpao' phenomenon has recently elicited heated discussion in China. However, existing studies related to it mainly focus on the field of showbiz or personal care (cosmetics and beauty) rather than news discourse. To address this niche, a specialised corpus of 174 Chinese English-language news stories (156,774 words) from the years 2012 to 2022 was created to examine this phenomenon by employing corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis. The findings show that the semantic preferences of 'neologism', 'attributes of social actor', and 'social action' with seven different semantic prosodies surrounding the node 'niangpao' are prominent, which indicate anti-niangpao and pro-niangpao discourses with ideological implications for nationalism and gender nonconformity. These results provide insights into the linguistic representations of the 'niangpao' phenomenon in Chinese English-language newspapers, the contentious ideologies that emerge from these representations, and how changing gender politics shape and are influenced by the State media in a consumption-based economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In I China's Good War i , Mitter explores how the Chinese government and ordinary people memorized, demonstrated, and narrated World War II in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Mitter, Rana (2020) China's Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism. [Extracted from the article]

It appears that nationalism has been on the rise in China in recent years, particularly among online communities. Scholars agree that the Chinese government is facing pressure from online nationalistic and pro-democracy forces; however, it is believed that of the two, nationalistic views are the more dominant. Online nationalism is believed to have pushed the Chinese government to be more aggressive in diplomacy. This study challenges this conventional wisdom by finding that online political discourse is not dominated by nationalistic views, but rather by anti-regime sentiments. Even when there is an outpouring of nationalist sentiment, it may be accompanied by pro-democracy views that criticize the government. By analysing more than 6,000 tweets from 146 Chinese opinion leaders on Weibo, and by decomposing nationalistic discussion by specific topic, this study shows that rather than being monolithically xenophobic, nationalists may have differing sets of views regarding China's supposed rivals. Rather than being supportive of the regime, nationalists may incorporate liberal values to challenge the government. Nonetheless, this liberal dominance appears to provoke a backlash of nationalism among certain groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at Chinese nationalism in the 20th century and foreign imperialism in the country. Topics include writer Lu Xun's views on preventing the more advanced countries from exploiting China's corrupt culture in order to rule over our corrupt populace; seizure of the non-Han regions of the country by the Communists under Mao Zedong's leadership; and internationalization of China.