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New and enhanced processes will not be the only drivers toward a sustainable chemical industry. Implementing climate policies will impact all components of the chemical supply chain over the following decades, making improvements in energy generation, material extraction, or transportation contribute to reducing the overall impacts of chemical technologies. Including this synergistic effect when comparing technologies offers a clearer vision of their future potential and may allow researchers to support their sustainability propositions more strongly. Ammonia and methanol production account for more than fifty percent of the CO2 emissions in this industry and are, therefore, excellent case studies. This work performs a prospective life cycle assessment until 2050 for fossil, blue, wind, and solar-based technologies under climate policies aiming to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C, 2 °C, or 3.5 °C. The first finding is the inability of fossil-based routes to reduce their CO2 emissions beyond 10% by 2050 without tailored decarbonisation strategies, regardless of the chemical and climate policy considered. In contrast, green routes may produce chemicals with around 90% fewer emissions than today and even with net negative emissions (on a cradle-to-gate basis), as in the case of methanol (up to −1.4 kg CO2-eq per kg), mainly due to the contributions of technology development and increasing penetration of renewable energies. Overall, the combined production of these chemicals could be net-zero by 2050 despite their predicted two to fivefold increase in demand. Lastly, we propose a roadmap for progressive implementation by 2050 of green routes in 26 regions worldwide, applying the criterion of at least 80% reduction in climate change impacts when compared to their fossil alternatives. Furthermore, an exploratory prospective techno-economic assessment showed that by 2050, green routes could become more economically attractive. This work offers quantitative arguments to reinforce research, development, and policymaking efforts on green chemical routes reliant on renewable energies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decarbonization policies require public support to be implemented and to remain in legislation. Examinations of public support for climate policies tend to focus on a small number of policy instruments and/or use hypothetical instead of real policy proposals. Here, we address these criticisms by examining public support across four distinct policy instruments – command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary – using sixteen policy proposals by UK political parties and government institutions. In addition to assessing UK national policy support, we also explore regional differences. Using a representative sample of the UK population (N = 1,911), we find that, at a national level, individuals preferred instruments shown to be less effective in reaching net-zero: information-based and voluntary policies. Our results indicate that the extent to which individuals believe in the free market, their environmental worldviews and political party support as well as their age are all correlated with policy support. We find stark regional differences where, compared to individuals living in Greater London, those living in the remainder of the country were 32% and 30% less likely to support command-and-control and market-based policies, respectively (among other regional differences). Regional variations in free-market beliefs and population density partly explain differences in policy support. We propose policymakers focus on place-based initiatives to increase support for decarbonization policies that are more effective in reaching net-zero and on improving the perception of market-based and command-and-control policies through positive framing and policy bundles. The majority of the UK public supports all climate policy instruments (command-and-control, market-based, information-based, and voluntary) regardless of their stringency. More stringent decarbonization policies (command-and-control and market-based instruments) received less public support compared to more lenient policies (information-based and voluntary). Population density as a structural factor helps to explain regional variation and points to the crucial role of improving public infrastructure, particularly in more rural areas. Free-market beliefs are associated with regional and individual variations in support and stress the need for overcoming ideological barriers. Income was found to influence support for less stringent (e.g. information-based) instruments, but was not associated with support for regulatory and market-based instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several decades, modal shift within the freight transport sector has been promoted by policy makers as an important basis for achieving lower transport emission targets. Even though the literature on mode choice is well established, there is less consensus about the volume of freight with the potential to shift and, more importantly, the actual contribution of freight modal shift to achieving less climate and air pollution impacts. The climate contribution of freight modal shift can be increasingly questioned, as decarbonization is taking place at increasing rates within road freight transport. In this paper, the role of modal shift policies in realizing climate objectives is scrutinized by focusing on the case of Sweden, which serves to illustrate some general insights. We highlight how modal shift is often analyzed and discussed in isolation, even though it forms an important part of a policy mix in which it may contribute to achieving climate objectives. Treating modal shift as an objective in its own right may render less effective and cost-efficient policy instruments. • The climate contribution of freight modal shift is increasingly questioned. • The role of modal shift policies in realizing climate objectives is scrutinized by focusing on the case of Sweden. • Modal shift is often analyzed and discussed in isolation. • Treating modal shift as an objective in its own right may render policy instruments less effective and cost-efficient, [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the primary contributors to climate change. Addressing and mitigating climate change necessitates the effective management and utilization of renewable energy consumption, which poses a substantial challenge for the forthcoming decades. This study explores the dynamic effects of service value added (SVA) and renewable energy on environmental quality, particularly focusing on CO2 emissions. Unlike previous studies, we employ a non-parametric modeling approach to uncover the time-varying influence of service sector growth on CO2 emissions. Specifically, we apply the local linear dummy variable estimation (LLDVE) method to a panel of the 17 highest-emitting nations over the period 1980–2021. Our study uncovers a non-linear relationship between CO2 emissions and SVA. From 1980 to 2003, we observe a negative correlation. However, starting from 2005 to 2020, we witness a shift towards a positive correlation, indicating a rise in energy consumption within the service sector. The results indicate that significant emitter economies have yet to achieve sustainability, with the service sector continuing to contribute to pollution. Addressing this issue necessitates more robust climate change policies and increased investment in clean energy, specifically targeting the service sector, including buildings and transport. • The dynamic effects of service value added on CO2 emissions are investigated for the 17 highest-emitting nations. • A non-parametric approach known as local linear dummy variable estimation is applied. • The study verified the existence of the environmental Kuznets curve. • A nonlinear relationship between CO2 emissions and the service value added is revealed. • Robust climate policies are needed, emphasizing more clean energy investments in services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against this background, our contribution discusses the effects of this double regulation and provides a clear policy recommendation for the future of EU and German climate policy in the transport and buildings sectors. However, two other groundbreaking climate policy decision in the EU and Germany have passed with much less commotion: the implementation of the German heating and transport fuels emissions trading system (ETS) in 2021 and the 2022 decision of the EU to add a similar ETS to its climate policy instrument mix. In early 2023, far-reaching decisions on climate policy were made in both the EU and Germany. [Extracted from the article]

Background: Sustained elevated concentration of GHGs is predicted to increase global mortality. With the Australian health sector responsible for 7% of the nation's GHG emissions, the benefits and costs of various decarbonisation trajectories are currently being investigated. To assist with this effort, we model the impact earlier decarbonisation has on temperature-related mortality. Design: We used DICE-EMR, an Integrated Assessment Model with an endogenous mortality response, to simulate Australian GHG trajectories and estimate the temperature-related mortality impact of early decarbonisation. We modelled a linear decline of the Australian health sector's and economy's GHG annual emissions to net-zero targets of 2040 and 2050. Main outcome measure: Deaths averted and monetary-equivalent welfare gain. Results: Decarbonisation of the Australian health sector by 2050 and 2040 is projected to avert an estimated 69,000 and 77,000 global temperature-related deaths respectively in a Baseline global emissions scenario. Australian economy decarbonisation by 2050 and 2040 is projected to avert an estimated 988,000 and 1,101,000 global deaths respectively. Assuming a low discount rate and high global emissions trajectory, we estimate a monetary equivalent welfare gain of $151 billion if the Australian health sector decarbonises by 2040, only accounting for the benefits in reducing temperature-related mortality. Conclusions: Earlier decarbonisation has a significant impact on temperature-related mortality. Many uncertainties exist and health impacts other than temperature-related mortality are not captured by this analysis. Nevertheless, such models can help communicate the health risk of climate change and improve climate policy decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a leading industrialized block of Member States and a global trendsetter of climate policy and law, the EU has a particular responsibility to rapidly decarbonize. With energy forming 75% of current emissions and decarbonization being driven in part by mass electrification, transitioning the EU's power system from predominantly fossil fuel-based to being principally powered by renewable energy sources (RES) ('the Transition') is a key first step. Particularly on the necessary speed of fossil fuel phase-out, however, the Transition is falling short of 1.5°C compatibility. Here, we advocate for a justice-driven, holistic approach to the Transition, with appreciation for the interconnectivity of the four major pillars of environmental, social, economic, and governance justice. Promoting governance as an integrated justice dimension offers a more robust and comprehensive framework for decision-making across different legislative levels. To demonstrate how this framework could deliver a more effective and equitable Transition, we apply it across sixteen 'Rules', under these four pillars. Each is designed for EU-wide transposition and the implementation by Member States as a means of filling a gap in the EU's legislative framework, including the newly released 'Fit for 55' proposals package. We consider directly and comprehensively the interaction between new rules and existing and proposed EU legislation, the synergies across pillars, the compromises which might be necessitated, and the limitations of our high-level approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the effects derived from the application of local policies and measures on the update of the circulating vehicle fleet of the city of Madrid in terms of greenhouse gases and urban pollutants emissions. The identification of said effects has been possible thanks to the use of Vehicle Fleet Characterization Studies (VFCS), which have been applied to Madrid for the last 10 years. It explores the evolution of several indicators, such as fleet age or urban emissions, through the analysis of the results obtained in the VFCS performed in 2013, 2017 and 2022. These studies help decisively in the evaluation of traffic emissions, thus being a compelling tool in the elaboration of the urban inventories. They constitute a cornerstone in the assessment of the city environmental issues and the decision-making process to reduce the environmental impact and minimize transport-related problems. The results show that the renovation of the fleet has diminished the emission of nitrogen oxides and particulate matter, improving the air quality. However, the emissions of carbon dioxide stay almost unaffected, which suggests that the climate change policies should be oriented towards the decarbonization of the road traffic, mainly by switching to electric vehicles or low-carbon fuels. [Display omitted] • Vehicle fleet characterization as a useful analysis to develop local policies • Analyzing effects of local environmental policies or designing new ones • Emissions reduction: 42 % for NO x , 48 % for PM 2.5 and 8 % for CO 2 (average fleet) • Hybrids and low-emitting fuels have increased its presence in a combined 16 % • Air quality has greatly improved, but the impacts on climate change are still high [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The use of command-and-control target policies for climate governance is crucial in achieving China's "dual carbon" goals. We investigate the impact of multi-target policy on county-level carbon emissions, using the generalized difference-in-differences model for the gradual implementation at different phases of multiple policies. We find that the Carbon Intensity Reduction Target (CIRT) and Total Energy Consumption Target (TECT) policies promote carbon reduction, while the Energy Intensity Reduction Target (EIRT) policy has less reliable outcomes. In the eastern and central regions, the initial phase of carbon reduction is primarily propelled by the EIRT policy, subsequently transitioning to the dominant influence of the CIRT policy. In the later phase, carbon reduction in the eastern region is predominantly attributed to the CIRT policy, whereas in the central region, it results from the combined effects of the EIRT, CIRT, and TECT policies. In the western region, early policies have an insignificant impact on carbon reduction, and the later-phase effects shift from being primarily influenced by the EIRT to being predominantly influenced by the CIRT. Additionally, neglecting the impact of other policies with similar targets during the same period may lead to overestimation of the effects of EIRT and TECT and underestimation of the effect of CIRT. • Command-and-control target policies are crucial for China's "dual carbon" goals. • The effectiveness of climate policies varies by timing and region. • Carbon intensity reduction targets consistently reduce emissions. • Combining multiple policies effectively cuts carbon emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scale of the decarbonisation challenge and the short timeframes over which action is required demand urgent action. This paper is set within the surface transport sector, now the largest sector of emissions with the slowest pace of change in many advanced liberal economies. It focuses on the strategies and actions of local government which is recognised to be a central player in catalysing change. Our evidence is derived from the actions of two UK local areas which claim to be at the forefront of the decarbonisation challenge. The paper focuses on the role of funding and financial mechanisms in addressing the climate crisis. In the face of an established pattern of austerity and hollowing out of local government we explore how deep transformation is being envisaged. We find a recursive set of issues which derive from a dependence on funding from outwith. This dependence means that despite comprehensive overarching strategies and goals the funding available is the core of the strategy. This means that the nature of the funds, such as the requirement for experimentation, innovation or private sector leverage, defines direction. In turn, and to maintain success in attracting funds, there is an emphasis on presenting 'premium spaces of ambition' with little evidence of attention to broader systemic change. This duality is openly recognised. This paper advances a wider point that greater emphasis should be placed on the 'financialisation' of climate policy and the reality rather than the rhetoric of change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role that private actors play in accelerating or preventing progressive climate policy and true decarbonization is a core research interest of global environmental politics. Yet scholars have struggled to measure the political behavior of multinational firms due to lack of transparency about their activities and inconsistency in reporting requirements across jurisdictions. In this research note, we present a new data source—firms' earnings calls—that scholars might use to better understand the political behavior of major multinational polluters. To illustrate the value of earnings calls as a data source, we construct an original data set of all earnings calls made between 2005 and 2019 by major oil and gas firms. We then code these transcripts, demonstrating that although firms can be classified as more or less pro-climate, there is little evidence of the industry's public acceptance of decarbonization. These unique data could permit researchers to explore important questions about climate politics, the evolution of private governance, and the relationship between policy and firms' political behavior. Moreover, we suggest extensions of our approach, including other multinational industries that are amenable to this type of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the world's largest fossil fuels exporter, Russia is one of the key countries for addressing global climate change. However, it has never demonstrated any significant ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper applies ideational research methodology to identify the structural differences in economic, political, and social normative contexts between industrialized fossil fuel importing economies and Russia that lead to the fundamental gap in motivations driving decarbonization efforts. Russia is unlikely to replicate the approach to the green transition and climate policy instruments of energy-importing countries. In order to launch decarbonization in Russia, interested stakeholders need to frame climate policies in Russia differently. Specifically, the framing must address the priority of diversification as a means to adapting the national economy to a new green landscape, the combination of diverse channels for decarbonization, the promotion of energy-efficiency, closer attention to climate-related forest projects, and linkage of climate change with other environmental problems. Moreover, considering Russia's emissions as a part of the global economic system and shifting from a simplistic national focus on GHG emissions reduction would help coordinate policies through dialogue between exporters and importers of fossil fuel energy-intensive goods, which is essential for the global movement towards a net-zero future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrial policy has begun to move into the center of debates on climate policy. This represents a shift away from climate policy as we know it—as classic environmental policy. Industrial policy and environmental policy differ in their policy goals, policy instruments, and distributional effects, one primarily concerned with economic development, the other with cutting greenhouse gas emissions. This raises questions about policy interactions between industrial and environmental policy in broader climate policy mixes and how these affect global decarbonization. This article identifies complementary and conflictual dynamics between industrial policy and environmental policy in both domestic and international climate politics. It shows how green industrial policy can advance climate goals and cooperation but can also present challenges to deepening climate cooperation and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Developing an understanding of policy interactions is central to leveraging the potential of industrial policy to accelerate global decarbonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's centrality to global mitigation efforts makes it an important point of inquiry in studies of climate governance. However, we understand little of how climate change has been institutionalized in India's decision-making processes. We capture the emergence and decline of climate institutions over three decades, showing how political conditions have shaped institutional form. The politics of opportunism has animated institutional development. It resolves the tension between India's global leadership ambitions and a deeply entrenched, equity-focused narrative frame that rejects incurring large mitigation costs. Climate institutions have therefore been layered upon existing bodies and processes to create room for the organic, bottom-up growth of policies that meet development objectives while promoting mitigation. While this structure limits polarization around climate action, it also inhibits strategic intent, particularly because strong cross-governmental institutions have been unable to take root. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an analysis of the origins and effects of UK climate governance. It is centrally concerned with the relationships between politics and climate institutions, both in how political conditions have shaped the emergence of climate governance, and in how the resulting institutions subsequently structure climate politics. The analysis brings out three key themes. First, a focus on the CCA can overlook the enduring importance of the parallel climate governance architecture provided by the European Union. Second, it is important to see UK climate governance within a wider political and institutional context, as these results of this context, especially tensions between ambition and instability, have influenced its evolution. Third, this design, and other aspects of the evolution of UK climate governance framework, have in turn had implications for the strengths and weaknesses of the framework and how it has met key governance challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change poses an existential threat to our planet – but does it require wholesale reorganization of our political institutions? As diverse contributions to this special issue describe, countries have restructured government agencies or developed new institutions to oversee climate reforms. Yet, few such transformations have occurred in the United States, one of the world's most important cases. Instead, US climate institutions emerged when new mandates and policymaking routines were layered onto existing political institutions. This has had the cumulative effect of creating substantial US climate policymaking capacity in the absence of institutional innovation. When climate proponents have controlled the US presidency, they have mobilized this capacity to center climate change throughout the US executive branch. By contrast, opponents have quickly dismantled climate policy mandates and routines after gaining power. The result has been an unstable variety of climate governance in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a large body of scholarship has analysed the nature and dysfunction of Australian climate policy over the past generation, there has been little examination of how the Australian state has reorganised itself institutionally to create and execute climate policy. Filling this gap, I explore the evolution of federal climate institutions since the early 1990s, describing how they have fared in the midst of Australia's highly polarized political debate around climate, as well as how they have facilitated and constrained Canberra's ability to develop effective climate strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global south countries, including China, have faced a challenging dilemma of reducing carbon emissions while maintaining rapid economic growth. The low-carbon city pilots (LCCPs) policy in China is a demonstration of how state power intervenes and commands national low-carbon development through voluntary policy tools. Our study, based on panel data of 331 cities from 2005 to 2019, evaluates the policy effect of all three batches of LCCPs and presents an analysis of time-varying effects through batch decomposition and synthetic difference-in-difference models. The study found that implementing low-carbon policies can significantly reduce total carbon emissions and carbon emissions per capita. However, the reduction in carbon emissions per unit of GDP is insignificant, and the policy effect varies according to the batches and their characteristics. The reduction effects in the first and second batches, as well as the insignificance or even increasing effects of the third batch, may be due to carbon leakage between different batches of LCCPs. Overall, this research provides novel and quantitative evidence on low-carbon development in China, making theoretical and empirical contributions to the field, and expanding econometric assessment methods to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental and climate change policies. [Display omitted] • The overall and heterogeneous effect of three batches LCCPs in China was assessed. • LCCP could reduced carbon emissions by 6.5% and emissions per capita by 7.3%. • The reduction effect on carbon intensity is insignificant. • The third batch of LCCPs significantly increased emissions by 2.31 million tons. • The impact of LCCPs varies maybe due to industrial transition and carbon leakage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a CIB analysis and a CGE model to develop decarbonization scenarios for the European power market. Our CIB analysis reveals qualitative scenarios that differ in the level of political (stringency of climate policy) and physical collaboration (transmission grid expansion). The CGE model quantifies those scenarios for further usage in the power market model EUREGEN to analyze related distributional effects across heterogeneous countries as well as between consumers and producers. EUREGEN predicts that consumers experience considerably higher electricity prices in the future in all scenarios, whereas producers observe higher rents. Electricity prices are lowest in the least collaborative future. Producer rents in turn are highest in the most collaborative one. Patterns hugely differ by country, making 13 countries to profiteers of the least collaborative future and 12 countries to profiteers of the most collaborative one. Only 3 countries profit from medium collaboration. Countries that profit from the most collaborative future experience substantially higher producer rents. Countries that profit from the least collaborative one in turn experience lowest electricity prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes four basic points about movement toward a low carbon economy in Canada: first, that it is important for political leaders, policy analysts, and researchers to approach the issue in terms of a transition to a carbon-emission–free society; second, that in Canada the development of regional pathways to a low-carbon economy is crucial; third, that we need ‘‘green development strategies’’ if we are to maximize the opportunities presented by this transition; and finally, that we should think about low-carbon politics as well as low-carbon economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ambitious 2050 decarbonization strategy of the European Union (EU) must implement and reconcile several economic, social, and technological targets, such as continuous prosperity, growth, and increases in energy production and reductions in fossil fuel (FOS) intensity. These dimensions are included in a modified Kaya identity that, consequently, becomes a considerably useful accounting identity to analyze convergence among the EU member states toward a carbon neutrality target. Surprisingly, no comprehensive analysis of the convergence of the growth of all Kaya components toward the decarbonization target among the EU countries and the rest of the world has been conducted thus far. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing the first comprehensive evidence for the simultaneous convergence process of FOS reduction for all the Kaya components from 1990 to 2018. A balanced panel data is used in the study. The results reveal that there is evidence of σ -absolute and conditional β -convergence process for several groups of EU countries. Furthermore, to provide policy recommendations, we simulate alternative scenarios to assess when the target levels of decarbonization can be reached, providing relevant policy implications for the credibility of the 2050 EU policy regarding climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to understand how the UK government's headline climate change targets are translated into action at the local level in the transport sector drawing on the findings of research in two English regions. In doing so, these headline targets are identified as a symbolic meta-policy that results in little action on the ground and which challenges established conceptions of policy implementation. Both the 'meta' and 'symbolic' aspects of the policy offer part of the explanation for the lack of substantive action on the ground. As a meta-policy, the headline targets across government require the elaboration of other policies at other levels such as targets for government departments and local authorities, but these are largely absent, leaving the meta-policy without teeth. Over time, these headline targets have developed into a symbolic policy, serving political goals but having little practical effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responsibility for climate change lies at the heart of societal debate over actions to address it. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change established the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' among nations, suggesting that industrialized nations that had produced the greatest share of historic emissions bore particular responsibility for preventing dangerous interference with the climate system. But climate responsibilities can be attributed in other ways as well. Here, we explore the conceptual territory of responsibility. We consider the distinctive responsibilities of the major investor-owned producers of fossil fuels, assessing the actions these companies took and could have taken to act upon the scientific evidence of climate change. We conclude that major investor-owned fossil energy companies carry significant responsibility for climate change. It is still possible for these companies to effectively contribute to a solution. Significant progress in reducing emissions and limiting climate change could be achieved if companies 1) unequivocally communicate to the public, shareholders, and policymakers the climate risks resulting from continued use of their products, and therefore the need for restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the 2 °C global temperature target; 2) firmly reject contrary claims by industry trade associations and lobbying groups; and, 3) accelerate their transition to the production of low-carbon energy. Evidence from history strongly suggests that a heightened societal focus on their climate responsibilities will be needed to hasten such a transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Great interest has been in unilateral climate policies, given present difficulty of establishing stable global coordinated agreements. In this paper, we investigate underlining factors explaining large differences in performances, when the same carbon emission reductions are achieved in different abating countries. To this end, we develop a new multi-country general equilibrium model, incorporating six countries (or world regions), two goods, six production inputs, capital mobility, energy mobility and international trade. Meanwhile, we adopt two performance indicators, with carbon leakage representing environmental efficiency and carbon emission abatement costs revealing cost-effectiveness. Our findings are as follows. Firstly, there are large differences in performances among these unilateral climate policies, as evidenced by large differences in leakage rates and carbon emission abatement costs. Secondly, the new global climate treaties to replace the Kyoto Protocol should be able to induce more carbon emission reductions in countries with low carbon emission reduction costs, since such setting contributes to global cost savings. Finally, developed countries have high carbon emission abatement costs compared with large developing countries (China and India in this paper), implying that there should be trade-off mechanisms between efficiency and equity regarding how to allocate carbon emission reductions among countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accompanying the boom in the global economy, CO 2 emissions have soared over the past several decades, with the developing world exhibiting higher emission growth rates than the developed world. Emissions transfers between regions, which represent a significant fraction of total emissions, are assumed to be a primary factor contributing to this difference. It is important to understand these transfer figures and the resulting consumption-based emissions in order to evaluate the emissions drivers and establish climate policies. Existing studies, however, have merely estimated figures over a 20 years span (post-1990) using a traditional input–output analysis (IOA) framework. To broaden the data coverage (to pre-1990) of these transfer figures and to further analyze their impacts on total emissions in the long term, a new model called the Long-term Consumption-based Accounting model (LCBA), which is directly based on statistics, is developed to span the period from 1948 to 2011. The results are consistent with the magnitudes and trends of existing studies over the validation (post-1990) period. We use Monte Carlo methods to calculate upper and lower bounds on the LCBA for each country and year, and find that 3 existing time series are almost fully included within these boundaries from 1990. Furthermore, the LCBA model is succinct enough to be easily expanded for future GHG estimations or to analyze other ecological footprints related to “the flow of materials”. It can be assumed that the soaring emissions transfers will seriously jeopardize the current climate policies such as Kyoto Protocol. The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) under which all parties are legally bound will require a consumption-based accounting method together with the territorial one in order to achieve an equitable agreement. However, more researches are still needed to facilitate the use of these figures to better support decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have only two of the eleven original members of the Western Climate Initiative implemented a cap-and-trade system? This article compares the implementation of cap-and-trade in California and Quebec versus in New Mexico and British Columbia. Ideas around the reality of anthropogenic global warming and the legitimacy of cap-and-trade created favorable context in three jurisdictions, although institutions condition the expression of these ideas in the policy-making process. Since parliamentary institutions concentrate power, elite consensus is more important in Canada, while in the United States public opinion plays a more significant role. However, ideational factors shaped by political institutions do not explain differences in cap-and-trade implementation. Growth in shale gas production, welcomed in British Columbia and New Mexico but resisted by Quebec and marginal in California, further explain different outcomes. Ideas, mediated by institutions, are the necessary prerequisites for action, while material factors influence policy instrument choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article theorizes about the implications for domestic climate politics of three distinct roles countries play in the global carbon supply chain: fossil fuel producer, manufacturer of carbon-intensive goods, and final consumer. Because international responsibility is assigned to territorial emissions, countries at either end of the global supply chain effectively evade environmental responsibility by shifting fossil fuel combustion to manufacturing countries. In so doing, they lessen the political challenges of reducing domestic emissions. Although exporters of carbon-intensive goods are reluctant to disadvantage local producers, importers can craft policies that both reduce territorial emissions and create local jobs. Ironically, fossil fuel exporters can emerge as leaders in reducing their own territorial emissions, a finding illustrated by case studies of British Columbia and Norway. The conclusion argues that shifting responsibility for carbon emissions to the point of either final consumption or fossil fuel extraction could facilitate an international climate agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key dimension of the debate about policy innovation is the extent to which new policies achieve significant and lasting effects on the problems they purport to address. However, little is known about such effects. We break new ground by investigating how far current evaluation practices in a policy system with relatively ambitious climate policies – the European Union – identify the most effective (carbon-reducing) policies. We find that a small number of policy instruments are projected to deliver the lion’s share of emission reductions. Setting aside the special case of emissions trading, these instruments are not particularly innovative. If significant practical and political obstacles can be addressed, more (detailed) evaluations could enhance the evidence base and also the political prospects for delivering deeper emissions cuts through to 2050. An evaluation perspective could also offer a very different way to consider policy innovation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academics and practitioners have responded to the gridlock in the international climate-change regime by more actively exploring the ability of individuals and/or groups of states to fill in the associated ‘governance gaps’ by engaging in policy innovation at the level of the nation state, including its regional and local emanations. Here, we draw together the findings of a collection that, for the first time, explores policy innovation at this level from three key perspectives: the source of new policy elements (‘invention’), their wider entry into use (‘diffusion’), and their projected and/or real effects (‘evaluation’). After critically reviewing the findings of the contributions from these perspectives, we explore new directions for definitional, conceptual-theoretical, and empirical work in this field. Finally, we explore how a more systematic analysis of policy innovation dynamics can inform a much fuller understanding of climate policy and governance across different sites and scales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To determine whether innovations in policy concerning climate-change mitigation are symbolic or truly radical in the sense of ‘tipping’ existing policy portfolios towards a new instrumental logic, we study policy innovations in the context of pre-existing policy portfolios and analyse the associated dynamics over time. Our analysis is facilitated by a new measurement of policy output, the Index of Climate Policy Activity. This new approach sheds light on the relative importance of policy innovations in complex policy portfolios, and serves as a blueprint for further analyses of the politics of policy innovation. Empirically, we analyse policy innovations within the policy portfolios of energy production in Austria, Germany, and the UK between 1998 and 2010. We find high stability in the instrumental logic but substantial change in policy settings and calibrations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seeking to develop a novel understanding of how climate policy innovation (CPI) emerges and spreads, we conceptualise three types of CPIs – genuinely original, diffusion based, and reframing based – and relate these to the sociotechnical transitions literature, particularly the multi-level perspective (MLP) that explains change through interaction between ‘niche’, ‘regime’, and ‘landscape’ levels. Selected climate-related transport policies in Finland, Sweden, and the UK are used to illustrate five hypotheses that connect these concepts from the MLP to particular types of CPI. ‘Original’ policy innovation may be uncommon in contexts with major sunk investments such as transport, principally because sociotechnical regimes tend to be resistant to political pressures for change originating at the same level. Nonetheless, the MLP posits that regimes are subject to influence by pressures originating at both niche and landscape levels. Given that policy reframing is relatively common, it may offer a key entry point for CPI in the short to medium term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governance of climate change is in flux. In the understandable rush to explore what is filling the governance gaps created by gridlock in the international regime, scholars risk under-appreciating the capacity of states to engage in policy innovation at national and sub-national levels. Based on a review of existing concepts and theoretical explanations for (in)action at this level, we make the case for adopting a more holistic approach to understanding policy innovation, covering the source of new policy elements (‘invention’), their wider entry into use (‘diffusion’), and their projected and/or real effects (‘evaluation’). The analytical and methodological challenges that arise from integrating these three perspectives are systematically explored and integrated into a new analytical framework used in the other contributions to this volume to explore more fully the politics of invention, diffusion, and evaluation in specific areas of mitigation and adaptation policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of adopting policy ideas is extremely complex and requires a close examination of the political context in which the idea is learned, articulated, contested, adapted, and accepted by agents, both individual and collective. Why and how was the world's first urban scheme of mandatory reduction of total emissions adopted in Tokyo and not elsewhere? What might cause diffusion of this idea in other urban areas? One key explanation behind the idea adoption is a policy evolution of trial-and-error lessons about effective policy design, desirable policy goals, and politically feasible judgments. This study finds that both agency effects and structural opportunities of policy adoption in the case of Tokyo's cap-and-trade are too specific to result in a more coherent diffusion of ideas, policies, and practices in other urban areas. Although there is a sign of diffusion of Tokyo's cap-and-trade throughout Japan, it is more likely to derive from mimicking behaviors than from learning. The policy transfer of Tokyo's cap-and-trade requires the continuous learning of adaptive capacity to make it better fit to locally specific conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past decade, a growing body of research has examined the role of cities in addressing climate change and the institutional and political challenges which they encounter. For the most part, in these accounts, the infrastructure networks, their material fabric, everyday practices and political economies, have remained unexamined. In this paper, it is argued that this is a critical omission and an approach is developed for understanding how urban responses to climate change both configure and are configured by infrastructure networks. Central to any such analysis is the conception of how and why (urban) infrastructure networks undergo change. Focusing on urban energy networks and on the case of London, the paper argues for an analysis of the ‘urban infrastructure regimes’ and ‘experiments’ through which climate change is governed. It is found that climate change experiments serve as a means through which dominant actors articulate and test new ‘low-carbon’ logics for urban infrastructure development. It is argued that experiments work by establishing new circuits, configuring actors in new sets of relations and through these means realising the potential for addressing climate change in the city. At the same time, experiments become sites of conflict, a means through which new forms of urban circulation can be confined and marginalised, leaving dominant energy regimes (relatively) intact. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses debates concerning climate change as of early 2014. It examines forecasts and climate models utilized by the United Nations International Panel on Climate Change (UN IPCC), increased carbon emissions and the economic value of carbon dioxide, and climate policy. The article also discusses deforestation, demand for kerosene, and government policies concerning green growth.

This paper explores the political economy of the 'just transition' to a low carbon economy. The idea of a 'just transition' increasingly features in policy and political discourse and appeals to the need to ensure that efforts to steer society towards a lower carbon future are underpinned by attention to issues of equity and justice: to those currently without access to reliable energy supplies and living in energy poverty and to those whose livelihoods are affected by and dependent on a fossil fuel economy. To complicate things further this transition has to be made compatible with the pursuit of 'climate justice' to current and future generations exposed to the social and ecological disruptions produced by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. Here we seek to identify and analyse the immensely difficult political trade-offs that will characterise collective attempts to enact and realise a just transition. We explore procedural and distributional aspects of energy politics and practice in particular as they relate to the just transition: energy access for those who do not have it; justice for those who work within and are affected by the fossil fuel economy; and attempts to manage the potential contradictions that might flow from pursuing energy and climate justice simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a novel inventory method called Dynamic Hybrid Multi-Region Inventory analysis (DHMRI), which integrates the EEMRIOA and Integrated Hybrid LCA and applies time-dependent environmental intervention information for inventory analysis. Consequently, DHMRI is able to quantify the change in the environmental footprint caused by a specific policy while taking structural changes and technological dynamics into consideration. DHMRI is applied to assess the change in the total CO2 emissions associated with the total final demand caused by the climate policy in Taiwan to demonstrate the practicality of this novel method. The evaluation reveals that the implementation of mitigation measures included in the existing climate policy, such as an enhancement in energy efficiency, promotion of renewable energy, and limitation of the growth of energy-intensive industries, will lead to a 28% increase in the total CO2 emissions and that the main driver is the export-oriented electronics industry. Moreover, a major increase in the total emissions is predicted to occur in Southeast Asia and China. The observations from the case study reveal that DHMRI is capable of overcoming the limitations of existing assessment tools at macro-level evaluation of environmental policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The quantity of primary energy needed to support global human activity is in large part determined by how efficiently that energy is converted to a useful form. We estimate the system-level life-cycle energy efficiency (EF) and carbon intensity (CI) across primary resources for 2005-2100. Our results underscore that although technological improvements at each energy conversion process will improve technology efficiency and lead to important reductions in primary energy use, market mediated effects and structural shifts toward less efficient pathways and pathways with multiple stages of conversion will dampen these efficiency gains. System-level life-cycle efficiency may decrease as mitigation efforts intensify, since low-efficiency renewable systems with high output have much lower GHG emissions than some high-efficiency fossil fuel systems. Climate policies accelerate both improvements in EF and the adoption of renewable technologies, resulting in considerably lower primary energy demand and GHG emissions. Life-cycle EF and CI of useful energy provide a useful metric for understanding dynamics of implementing climate policies. The approaches developed here reiterate the necessity of a combination of policies that target efficiency and decarbonized energy technologies. We also examine life-cycle exergy efficiency (ExF) and find that nearly all of the qualitative results hold regardless of whether we use ExF or EF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries around the world respond to global warming and its consequences with various policy instruments. In the economic literature, policy instruments have typically been analysed with respect to efficiency, but little effort has been expended to understand public preferences for these instruments. In an internet-based choice experiment to address this shortcoming, Swedes were asked to choose between two alternative hypothetical policy instruments, each of which reduces CO2 emissions by the same amount. The hypothetical policy instruments were characterized by a number of specific attributes. By varying the levels of each of the attributes, respondents indirectly reveal their preferences for these attributes. Half of the respondents are faced with choices labelled 'tax' and 'other', and the other half are faced with unlabelled choices (hypothetical instruments). The results show that Swedes tend to dislike the term 'tax' and show a preference for instruments with a positive effect on environment-friendly technology and climate awareness. A progressive-like cost distribution is preferred to a regressive cost distribution, and the private cost is negatively related to the choice of policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper synthesizes the results from the model intercomparison exercise among regionalized global energy-economy models conducted in the context of the RECIPE project. The economic adjustment effects of long-term climate policy are investigated based on the cross-comparison of the intertemporal optimization models ReMIND-R and WITCH as well as the recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R. A number of robust findings emerge. If the international community takes immediate action to mitigate climate change, the costs of stabilizing atmospheric CO concentrations at 450 ppm (roughly 530-550 ppm-e) discounted at 3% are estimated to be 1.4% or lower of global consumption over the twenty-first century. Second best settings with either a delay in climate policy or restrictions to the deployment of low-carbon technologies can result in substantial increases of mitigation costs. A delay of global climate policy until 2030 would render the 450 ppm target unachievable. Renewables and CCS are found to be the most critical mitigation technologies, and all models project a rapid switch of investments away from freely emitting energy conversion technologies towards renewables, CCS and nuclear. Concerning end use sectors, the models consistently show an almost full scale decarbonization of the electricity sector by the middle of the twenty-first century, while the decarbonization of non-electric energy demand, in particular in the transport sector remains incomplete in all mitigation scenarios. The results suggest that assumptions about low-carbon alternatives for non-electric energy demand are of key importance for the costs and achievability of very low stabilization scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can near-term public support of renewable energy technologies contain the increase of mitigation costs due to delays of implementing emission caps at the global level? To answer this question we design a set of first and second best scenarios to analyze the impact of early deployment of renewable energy technologies on welfare and emission timing to achieve atmospheric carbon stabilization by 2100. We use the global multiregional energy-economy-climate hybrid model REMIND-R as a tool for this analysis. An important design feature of the policy scenarios is the timing of climate policy. Immediate climate policy contains the mitigation costs at less than 1% even if the CO concentration target is 410 ppm by 2100. Delayed climate policy increases the costs significantly because the absence of a strong carbon price signal continues the carbon intensive growth path. The additional costs can be decreased by early technology policies supporting renewable energy technologies because emissions grow less, alternative energy technologies are increased in capacity and their costs are reduced through learning by doing. The effects of early technology policy are different in scenarios with immediate carbon pricing. In the case of delayed climate policy, the emission path can be brought closer to the first-best solution, whereas in the case of immediate climate policy additional technology policy would lead to deviations from the optimal emission path. Hence, technology policy in the delayed climate policy case reduces costs, but in the case of immediate climate policy they increase. However, the near-term emission reductions are smaller in the case of delayed climate policies. At the regional level the effects on mitigation costs are heterogeneously distributed. For the USA and Europe early technology policy has a positive welfare effect for immediate and delayed climate policies. In contrast, India looses in both cases. China loses in the case of immediate climate policy, but profits in the delayed case. Early support of renewable energy technologies devalues the stock of emission allowances, and this effect is considerable for delayed climate policies. In combination with the initial allocation rule of contraction and convergence a relatively well-endowed country like India loses and potential importers like the EU gain from early renewable deployment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the regional distribution of climate change mitigation costs in a global cap-and-trade regime. Four stylized burden-sharing rules are considered, ranging from GDP-based permit allocations to schemes that foresee a long-term convergence of per-capita emission permits. The comparison of results from three structurally different hybrid, integrated energy-economy models allows us to derive robust insights as well as identify sources of uncertainty with respect to the regional distribution of the costs of climate change mitigation. We find that regional costs of climate change mitigation may deviate substantially from the global mean. For all models, the mitigation cost average of the four scenarios is higher for China than for the other macro-regions considered. Furthermore, China suffers above-world-average mitigation costs for most burden-sharing rules in the long-term. A decomposition of mitigation costs into (a) primary (domestic) abatement costs and (b) permit trade effects, reveals that the large uncertainty about the future development of carbon prices results in substantial uncertainties about the financial transfers associated with carbon trade for a given allocation scheme. This variation also implies large uncertainty about the regional distribution of climate policy costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing concern about climate change impacts on local government areas. In Australia, the federal carbon tax (from 1 July 2012) will also increase costs for local councils. This paper evaluates what carbon mitigation (i.e. energy, water, and waste management) actions have been implemented by metropolitan Adelaide councils (n=14) and why (or why not). A survey of environmental officers profiled carbon mitigation actions, emissions auditing, and motives for emissions reduction by Adelaide councils. The main reasons for adopting carbon actions were a climate change plan, climate leadership, and cost savings. Internal council governance of climate change actions was also evaluated. A climate governance framework based on adaptive management, communication, and reflective practice (Nursey-Bray 2010) was applied to assess climate mitigation by Adelaide councils. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we argue that the financial provisions of the Copenhagen Accord, if used primarily to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions, could compensate the lack of more energetic action on the domestic mitigation side. In order to maximize the mitigation potential, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (CGCF) should be transformed into the International Bank for Emissions Allowance Acquisition (IBEAA) envisaged by Bradford (). We estimate that 50 percent of the CGCF in 2020 (50 US billions) could finance from 2.1 to 3.3 Gt CO2-eq emission reductions, depending on the domestic mitigation effort of Annex I and Non-Annex I countries. We construct a matrix that shows the level of GHGs emissions in 2020 under all possible combinations of abatement pledges and international mitigation financing, thus highlighting a rich set of options to reach the same level of GHGs emissions in 2020. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the regulatory challenges presented by climate engineering as a potential set of response to the threat of anthropogenic climate change, with . It explores the history and proposed forms of climate engineering such as the separation of solar radiation management (SRM) climate engineering from carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and deployment from research. Furthermore, examines the potential of SRM Governance Initiative to regulate SRM research.

This article contributes to emerging research on the social construction of carbon markets by focusing on the mobilisation of desire amongst carbon market actors, and on the routinisation of financial practices within such markets. We examine specifically the markets that have emerged around the Clean Development Mechanism. First, we look at the stories market actors tell each other in advertising and at Carbon Expo. Second, we look at the routinisation of carbon finance through the borrowing of ideas and tools from traditional financial markets. We suggest that the former animates the markets while the latter enables the markets to become 'normalised' for financiers. We also suggest that the two aspects however also work in tension with each other, and that the character of this tension is one way of understanding the distinctiveness of carbon markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]