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This paper examines the role of European economic integration and European norms on the rights of minority groups in Estonian and Latvian ethnic politics in the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, Estonia and Latvia amended the citizenship and language policies of the early 1990s, while maintaining the principle of the ethnically based state. The main incentive for policy reform came from the prospect of European Union (EU) membership. The international norms on minority rights, developed mostly after the end of the Cold War, have complemented the incentive of EU membership. Estonia was quicker to respond to the incentive of European Union (EU) membership than Latvia. The domestic consensus on market reforms and membership in the West have enabled the Estonian elites to form coalitions necessary to adopt the minority policy changes required for EU membership. In Latvia, a consensus on EU membership is also present. Nevertheless, the prominent role of extremist nationalist in Latvian politics has often weakened government coalitions and slowed down the process of both economic and minority policy reform. The European norms on minority rights have played a greater role in Latvian deliberations on policy reform. Latvian centrists have referred to European norms to justify their compliance with EU membership criteria. In Estonia, the strong domestic consensus on EU membership and lack of debate on the citizenship and language policies has meant that European norms have not played a significant role. Estonian elites complied with EU recommendations when it was clear that compliance was required for membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two newly democratized post-Soviet giants, Russia and Ukraine, share a host of post-communist parallels. The long dominance of the CPSU in both countries denied them a legacy of open, democratic politics. Based on these parallels, one would expect their patterns of legislative behavior to mirror each other. Commonalities exist in the legislative behavior of both chambers; however, in at least one area, they are not analogous: the level of parliamentary party discipline among SMD deputies.the Ukrainian SMD deputies of the first mixed-member Rada (1998-2002) voted with the majority position of their parliamentary party at higher rates than their Russian brethren did in the first mixed-member Duma (1994-1995). In this paper, I attempt to find an answer for this conundrum by analyzing the roll-call voting behavior of SMD deputies in both legislatures. I argue that the higher level of discipline among SMD deputies in the Rada is a function of a more pronounced social cleavage found in the Ukrainian electorate. While both Russia and Ukraine feature a pro-reform/anti-reform cleavage, only Ukraine features a reinforcing regional cleavage built on ethnic and linguistic differences between eastern and western Ukraine. The presence of this reinforcing cleavage helps solidify behavior in the Rada, while Russia, lacking such cleavages, features a more fluid legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]