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This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2014 and 2018 as the research object, and empirically tests the relationship between information technology investment and the effectiveness of internal control and the moderating effect of institutional investors’ shareholding on the two. The study finds that information technology investment can significantly improve the effectiveness of internal control, and the increase in the shareholding ratio of institutional investors will enhance the positive effect of information technology investment on the effectiveness of internal control. However, further research by industry finds that: for labor-intensive enterprises, neither the impact of information technology investment on the effectiveness of internal control nor the moderating effect of institutional investors ’shareholding on the two are significant; while information technology investment of capital-intensive enterprises and technology-intensive enterprises has positive improvement effect on the effectiveness of internal control, and institutional investors ’shareholding will enhance the improvement effect of information technology investment on the effectiveness of internal control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, we establish a panel threshold model which the threshold variable is internal control, and analyse the nonlinearity relationship between dividend and agency cost. The result shows:There exist threshold effects between dividend and agency cost based on internal control. Cash dividend can reduce agency cost when internal control quality is higher than the threshold, otherwise, cash dividend will no longer have any effect. That means, a valid internal control is the foundation of dividend governance function. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result implies that, companies with higher internal control quality than threshold are popular. This paper proofs that agency theory is effective in Chinese market, and higher internal control quality higher propensity to pay. So we disagree with the previous hypothesis of "result" and "substitution" between internal control and dividend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]