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Structural reforms have failed to bring about convergence in the Eurozone. This argument is made here by comparing two countries – Italy and Germany – assumed to embody contrasting economic models. Three main points are made in the paper. First, the generalisation of the macroeconomic strategy of the northern countries threatens to undermine political support for European integration, as the disparities it engenders drive the electoral successes of Eurosceptic parties. Second, Italian performance does not display the traits commonly associated with the southern European syndrome. Third, Italy's core economic problem – its persistently low GDP and productivity growth – is due to its prolonged efforts to reduce a public debt which originated in the 1970s and 1980s. The paper argues for the need to return to a macroeconomic analysis, as opposed to the focus on the microeconomic issue of competitiveness, and for the need to consider other policies in addition to the completion of the banking, financial and fiscal unions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the Italian election of 2018 and the first populist government of Western Europe. It mentions consequence of the 2016 constitutional referendum as the electoral laws for the two houses of the Italian Parliament lacked uniformity and mentions voters are allowed to cast their two votes on a single ballot paper. It also mentions competition between Partito Democratico (PD) and People of Freedom party and strengths of political leader Matteo Renzi in elections.

What explains regulators’ preferences concerning the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)? The paper answers this question by providing an alternative account of the creation of the SSM using an institutionalist perspective. It is argued that the creation of the SSM does not simply reflect the material interests of governments and domestic financial firms, but that regulators’ positions were also significantly affected by the institutional environment in which they operated. Two characteristics of domestic supervisory governance are identified: the institutional responsibilities of banking regulators (microprudential and/or macroprudential) and the fragmentation of supervisory and monetary policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates the relevance of these factors for shaping regulators’ preferences both within and across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The first decade of the twenty-first century may be remembered for the rebirth of consensus on labour market policy. After three decades of bitter political and ideological controversy between a neo-liberal and a traditional social democratic approach, a new model, often labelled flexicurity, has emerged. This model is promoted by numerous political organisations since it promises to put an end to the old trade-off between equality and efficiency. Several countries are embracing the flexicurity model as a blueprint for labour market reform, but others, mostly belonging to the 'Mediterranean Rim', are clearly lagging behind. Why is it so difficult for these countries to implement the flexicurity model? This paper argues that the application of a flexicurity strategy in these countries is complicated by the lack of social trust between social partners and the state as well as political economy traditions that highlight the role of labour market regulation as a source of social protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of recent welfare reforms associated with new forms of managerial and financial accountability, this paper analyses the significance for the construction of new legitimate forms of governance of the relationship between public managers of welfare provider units and local elected politicians. The shift from local government as democratic representative institutions to depoliticised efficient agent of welfare provision has created in Italy the opportunity for the emergence of a new cadre of managers, less subject to interference by the parties. The increasingly problematic relationship between managers and politicians reflects the dynamics of a shifting game, originally intended for sector-specific interests, that was later transformed into a struggle between political elites across territory and about territorial politics. Any set of alternatives juxtaposing efficient management and politics is best viewed by taking account of the significance of local welfare institutions for political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy's post-war political system has been analysed as a case of consociational democracy, albeit of a special kind. Not cultural segmentation, but ideological polarisation was the main source of division, giving rise to a distinct pattern of elite cooperation captured with such terms as ‘consociativismo’ and ‘degenerated consociationalism’. This paper examines the origins, dynamics, and outcomes of ‘consociationalism Italian style’ through a systematic comparison of consociational interpretations with the analysis of the Italian party system as a case of polarised pluralism. The aim is a better understanding of the challenges posed by segmentation and polarisation and of the reasons why they require different forms of political accommodation. The findings have relevance for the analysis of other cases of polarisation, including contemporary ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]