Search

This paper analyzes the gender wage gap for recent graduates in formal jobs in Colombia emphasizing the role that degree subject plays in explaining the gender wage gap at early stages of the labour market experience. To conduct the analysis we took advantage of a unique dataset that contains administrative records for individuals observed in formal employment one year after graduation from college and that contains detailed information for degree subjects. The results suggest that, on average the wage gap against women is about 11%, from which 40% is explained by gender diferences in the type of degree chosen. By using a distributional gender wage gap decomposition we find evidence not only of an increasing gap at diferent levels of the wage distribution but evidence that only 30% of it is explained by degree subject. This result also supports the existence of a glass ceiling phenomenon from early stages of labour market experience which is of particular interest for policy makers given that, some of the explanations given to the glass ceiling efect are related to experience and promotions, characteristics that are not significantly diferent for recent graduates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the cost effectiveness property of different control strategies for improving environmental quality. Our prospective analysis considers the application of Transferable Emissions Permit System (TEPS), Transferable Ambient Permit System (TAPS) and Standards (Std) applied on fix sources in Bogota-Colombia. A numerical simulation model allowed us to obtain costs of each regulatory system, which were compared with associated environmental quality. The results show that the most cost effective regulation for any environmental quality goal is TEPS, followed by TAPS and finally Std. In addition, the paper presents a new conceptual result on the enforcement strategies for a regulatory instrument that considers a spatially differentiated pollutant. The results suggest that for any goal of environmental improvement, a TAPS induce compliance cheaper than in any other regulatory system under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the effects that the decentralization reforms implemented in Colombia during the early nineties had on the quality of public schools. Through panel data techniques at the school level we find that, in the Colombian context, political economy trade-offs such as low ability of local governments, unfunded mandates or local capture are not important factors in the determination of decentralization results. Conversely, accounting for the changes in households' drop-out decisions can significantly alter the interpretation of such results implying the importance for future impact policy evaluation to directly take them into account. Specifically, allowing for households' schooling decisions to change, we find that the total effect of the reforms decreased the quality of public schooling. However, controlling for the significant changes in the drop-out rate of public school students that took place after the reforms were undertaken, we find that the quality of public schools actually improved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically estimates the pass-through of the value-added tax (VAT) on Colombian consumer prices. The identification strategy uses the consumer price index and takes advantage of the relatively frequent tax reforms that have taken place recently in Colombia. The results suggest that the pass-through for the consumer basket is about one at the national level. We also consider a specification where the goods are treated individually (hence not taking into account their weight in the consumer basket), and where we control for unobservable city characteristics. The results in this case show a lower average pass-through and bring to the fore the heterogeneity of the VAT incidence across markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. These insights, however, are often overlooked in empirical studies. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the pre-electoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents who run high deficits before the election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]