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The aim of the paper is twofold: to examine the argument in response to Socrates' question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial; and by doing so, to examine the method of Plato's argument. What is distinctive of the method of argument, I want to show, is that Socrates argues on both sides of these questions (the question of possibility and the question of benefit). This, I argue, is why he describes these questions as a source of aporia. Socrates can argue, without contradiction, on both sides of these questions because the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are premised on the supposition, defended by Critias, that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, whereas the arguments for its possibility and benefit are not committed to this supposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origin of matter is one of the last and greatest unsolved mysteries bedevilling modern attempts at understanding the philosophy of the Enneads. There are two stages in the production of Intellect and of soul. The One or Intellect produces an undifferentiated other, which becomes Intellect or soul by itself turning towards and looking towards the prior principle, with no possibility of the One's "turning towards" or "seeing" itself. But where does matter come from? To arrive at his conception of matter, Plotinus has radically altered the definitions of non-being given by Plato and Aristotle in their refutation of Parmenides. Matter, for Plotinus, is a non-being opposed, not to "the being of each thing", as in Plato's Sophist, but to all "the beings properly so-called", i.e. to all the forms. It is then further identified with Aristotle's definition of non-being as privation, with the crucial difference that privation, for Plotinus, is made a permanent substratum of change. This re-formulation of ideas from the Sophist and the Physics proves unmistakably that it is matter which is generated when soul produces a "non-being" which is also a "total lack of definition". The production of matter by soul does not, however, follow the model of the production of Intellect from the One or of soul from Intellect. Since matter is lifeless, it cannot turn towards its source. Soul therefore has to be herself directly responsible both for the production of matter and for the covering of matter with form. Matter is therefore included among the products which stem ultimately from the One. But the origin and the nature of matter have to be understood as very different from the double process of emanation which lies at the origin of Intellect and of soul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents comments on the essay "Plotinus," by L.P. Gerson regarding the philosophy of Plotinus. Overview of the intellectual milieu of the late Roman Empire; Discussion of imputation of scholastic anachronism; Recognition of multiplicity in either the physical world of the Nous.

Analyzes the relationship between moral virtue and wisdom, the good state of practical intelligence under Aristotle's ethical theory. Features of moral virtue; Information on how intellectualists view moral virtue; Interpretation of the relationship by William Fortenbaugh.

Examines the importance of the phantasia or imagination concept to the psychology of Aristotle. Problem of explaining how the content of mental states could ever diverge from what is actually in the world in Aristotle's "De Anima"; Theory of sensation and conception by Aristotle; Role of the phantasia in Aristotle's account of intentionality.

Describes the knowledge and powers of control of the mind included in the assertions concerning the attributes of mind. Notion that the mind control all things that possess soul; Intellectual act of distinguishing or separating one thing from another; Capacity of the mind to separate things by putting the cosmos into motion.

Examines the roles of reason and sense-experience in epistemology and methodology in the "Phaedo," by the philosopher Plato. Argument for recollection in the "Phaedo"; Description of the philosopher's practice of death; Theory of the gradual development of the human mind.