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Despite seven decades of development of the European Union project, on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom, Europe and the rest of the world were surprised when the Leave campaign won the Brexit referendum, offering an extraordinary case study for researchers. We spatially disaggregate the vote share data, which allows us to explore where anti‐European sentiment took root in the UK and why. In this paper, a spatial dependence model is applied to clarify and quantify the relevance of the different dimensions—demographic, cultural/educational and economic—that play a role in explaining the rise of support for the Leave campaign. The analysis is conducted at the local level, using local authorities (LAs) as the spatial unit of analysis due to the combination of official datasets with newly generated data in the context of an EU H2020 project. A new indicator capturing the affluence of each local area relative to its close neighbours is proposed and included in the model. In general, we observe that most of the main conclusions obtained by large regions or at the national level also hold at the local scale. However, it is particularly interesting that inequalities by LAs are clearly significant, indicating a marked influence on voters' decisions that have thus far been unaccounted for. This result provides further support for the existence of, to use Andrés Rodriguez‐Pose's terminology, an even more intense "revenge of the places that do not matter" at the local scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper looks at the results of the referendum on the United Kingdom membership to the European Union in order to test the link between the internationalization of the local economy and the openness of the local society as factors associated with the Leave vote (Brexit). The paper compares a number of alternative explanations put forward in the public debate after the referendum. The empirical analysis suggests that the outcome of the referendum can be linked to an increasing tension between the ever increasing internationalization of local firms and the ‘localistic’ attitude of their employees. Brexit can be seen as the result of a process of ‘split Europeanization’ whereby Euroscepticism is triggered by the increasing mismatch between internationalized economies (and corporate economic interests) and localistic societies (and workers’ attitudes and cultural preferences). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The United Kingdom has opted to leave the European Union. The consequences of Brexit on international trade are large and negative. While the UK aims for new, ambitious trade agreements after Brexit, it is not explicit about the type of agreements it envisions or with whom specifically. This paper considers the UK's options. We confirm Brexit's substantial, negative trade effects for the UK, EU, and major countries around the world. After reviewing all potential options, our answer to the question whether the UK has an alternative for the existing agreement with the EU is: No. Paradoxically, only a trade agreement with the EU can compensate for Brexit's trade losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper offers a cautionary tale about the economic cost of European disintegration. Scotland provides an interesting twist on that story as somewhere that voted to remain part of the EU, but is now likely to be negatively affected, even though it is less directly exposed to EU trade than the UK. This occurs even if it were to achieve the softer Brexit with continued single market membership to which it aspires. The analysis includes potentially important lessons for the many nations and regions in which there exists pressures to move away from trade liberalization and towards protectionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The paper measures regional GDP growth losses that a smaller market size caused by the reintroduction of legal and administrative barriers would cause. We model augmented barriers in a Keynesian framework, pointing at four effects: a border effect, stronger for regions close to borders; an exposure effect, stronger for regions open to trade; a centrality effect, affecting areas close to the economic core; a demand concentration effect, stronger for regions close to large trading partners. By estimating border effects with data on EU NUTS 3 regions and simulating a general increase in barriers among EU countries, the four regional effects clearly emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Leaving the EU will reshape the UK's economic relations with the rest of the world. This paper summarizes the findings of recent research studying the UK's role in the global economy, and the consequences of Brexit for UK trade, investment, and living standards. We emphasize that international integration affects investment and labour flows as well as trade in goods and services. There are important interdependencies between different forms of integration that should be accounted for when evaluating policy changes. Brexit is likely to make the UK poorer by reducing trade and investment flows, but the magnitude of the economic decline will depend upon the nature of the UK's post‐Brexit economic relations with the EU and the rest of the world. We conclude by considering options for UK‐EU relations after Brexit and how the UK should approach future trade negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper discusses the implications of Brexit for both the UK and its regions, as the latter depends on the former. We concentrate on the forecasts by Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT), the Cambridge Centre for Business Research and the Economists for Brexit. It is argued that the estimates of HMT of the loss of GDP are likely to be overstated, but, nevertheless, there will probably be a fall in output. Given this, the effect on the UK regions is analysed using the regional balance‐of‐payments constrained growth model. This suggests that Brexit will cause regional disparities to widen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In this paper we employ an extension of the World Input‐Output Database (WIOD) with regional detail for EU countries to study the degree to which EU regions and countries are exposed to negative trade‐related consequences of Brexit. We develop an index of this exposure, which incorporates all effects due to geographically fragmented production processes within the UK, the EU and beyond. Our findings demonstrate that UK regions are far more exposed than regions in other countries. Only regions in the Republic of Ireland face exposure levels similar to some UK regions, while the next most affected regions are in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This imbalance may influence the outcomes of the negotiations between the UK and the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusess topics within the issue including impact of Brexit on trade theory; risk exposure to Brexit; and impact of Brexit on Great Britain's trade policy.

Abstract: Regional development is one of the main EU spending priorities through its Cohesion Policy. Brexit is among several influences on the future of the policy, whose evolution is part of a wider reshaping of the principles and practice of regional policy in Europe. In the context of emerging policy challenges and recent contributions to the regional policy literature, the article highlights innovation, human capital and effective institutions as three crucial dimensions of future policy. It argues that a shift in regional policy priorities, governance and territorial focus is underway – partly influenced by place‐based policy thinking ‐ at EU level under Cohesion Policy as well as under national regional policies in the EU27 and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]