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Standard productivity measures indicate large fluctuations in technology during the Great Depression. This article's historical technology series (1892–1966), controlled for aggregation effects, varying input utilization, non-constant returns, and imperfect competition, does not indicate technology regress such that could trigger the downturn. In contrast, technology improvements in the recovery were so rapid that, over the whole Great Depression period, technology growth was highest among pre-WWII decades. This article also finds that output changed little and inputs fell when technology improved in the pre-WWII period. Real-business-cycle models have difficulty in explaining pre-WWII business cycles characterized by such responses. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I use unique city-month level disaggregated data, from public employment offices, to estimate the matching functions for the 1920s and the early 1930s. The results show that the public labor exchange was slack, a relative deficiency of job vacancies, in the 1920s and it became slacker during the Great Depression. However, the findings show that there was no deterioration of the matching efficiency in the early 1930s. The outcome of a deficiency of labor demand during the 1930s implies that there was a need for effective government policies to implement the new job-creation programs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reassesses the causes of Chicago state bank failures during the Great Depression by tracking the evolution of their balance sheets in the 1920s. I find that all banks suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals; however banks that failed earlier in the 1930s had invested more in mortgages in the 1920s. The main problem with mortgages was their lack of liquidity, not their quality. Banks heavily engaged in mortgages did not have enough liquid assets to face the withdrawals, and failed. This article thus reasserts the importance of pre-crisis liquidity risk management in preventing bank failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of protection on economic growth has enjoyed a revival in recent times, with the publication of a number of comparative quantitative papers. They all share a common weakness: they measure protection as the ratio of custom revenues to import value, which biases results if demand for imports is not perfectly inelastic. In this article, we show that the measure of protection matters. We estimate the James Anderson and Peter Neary (2005) Trade Restrictiveness Index for Italy from unification to the Great Depression. We suggest a different interpretation of some key moments of Italian trade policy and we show that the aggregate welfare losses were small in the long run and mostly related to protection on sugar in the 1880s and 1890s. We document that using different measures of protection affects results of the causal relation between trade policy on economic growth in Italy and in the United States. Accordingly, we argue that a systematic re-estimating of protection in the economic history of trade policy is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the impact of the Great Depression on marriage outcomes and find that marriage rates and local economic conditions are positively correlated. Specifically, poor labor market opportunities for men negatively impact marriage. Conversely, there is some evidence that poor female labor markets actually increase marriage in the period. While the Great Depression did lower marriage rates, the effect was not long lasting: marriages were delayed, not denied. The primary long-run effect of the downturn on marriage was stability: Marriages formed in tough economic times were more likely to survive compared to matches made in more prosperous time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To estimate the impact of federal spending on state incomes, we develop an annual panel data set between 1930 and 1940. Using panel methods we estimate that an added dollar of federal spending in the state increased state per capita income by between 40 and 96 cents. The point estimates for nonfarm grants are higher and for AAA farm grants are much smaller and negative in some cases. The spending led to increase in durable good spending on automobiles but had no positive effects on private employment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The role of technology shocks as a driver of the Great Depression is the topic of our own earlier work and the paper by Watanabe in this issue. While the two studies differ in their data and assumptions, they complement each other and strengthen the conclusion of both papers: technology shocks were not the driving force of the Great Depression. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We examine the impact of the Great Depression on the share of votes for right-wing extremists in elections in the 1920s and 1930s. We confirm the existence of a link between political extremism and economic hard times as captured by growth or contraction of the economy. What mattered was not simply growth at the time of the election, but cumulative growth performance. The impact was greatest in countries with relatively short histories of democracy, with electoral systems that created low hurdles to parliamentary representation, and which had been on the losing side in World War I. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Argues that the banking crises and collapse of the international gold standard in the early 1930s contributed to the severity of the Great Depression by increasing interest-rate uncertainty. Risk premium; Financial crises, policy changes and the risk premium; Crash of 1929; Banking crises of 1930 and 1931; Britain and United States's departure from the gold standard; Investment models.

Argues for a distinction between offset by declining cost and induced by declining profits of price deflation. Proximate cause of deflation in France; Keyne's theoretical contribution of the depression experience into the heart of economic theory.