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In 2014, FERC adopted a new theory of capital markets for the purpose of setting authorized returns-on-equity: that all observed dividends and interest rates were anomalous and therefore unreliable indicators of the returns necessary for investors to hold the stocks and bonds of transmission owners. The new theory, used to justify higher authorized ROEs, rejected evidence of fundamental conditions in capital markets and explicitly adopted arguments by investor-owned utilities regarding unreliable markets. After a judicial remand, FERC abandoned the new theory, but consumers in New England and the Midwest were arbitrarily charged hundreds of millions of dollars over several years due to unjust and unreasonable rates for transmission service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Litigating return on equity disputes exposes public utilities to substantial uncertainty in today’s market and regulatory environment. Anomalous capital market conditions have led some regulators to modify their approaches to assessing ROE and to consider alternative metrics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]