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Motivation: In recent years, research has shown that informal workers and businesses in low‐income countries are increasingly taxed by the state. While rarely a significant revenue source, informal sector taxation in highly informalized economies affects a large proportion of the working population. Under such circumstances the question of whether taxing informal economic activity either improves or undermines state–society relations are still debated, particularly in the case of fragile states whose tax systems tend to be characterized by a high degree of coercion towards poor actors. Purpose: Previous research has tended to focus on tax evasion and how to increase tax compliance in the informal economy. In this article, we aim to explore how informal sector actors in Bamako, Mali, interact with local tax collectors in various ways with varying levels of agency. On this basis, we develop a broader analytical framework for understanding local government–taxpayer relations. Approach and methods: In a case study of Mali, a fragile state with violent conflict and a highly informalized economy, we made use of qualitative research methods with semi‐structured interviews and focus group discussions with different actors in the informal economy. Findings: We find four main modes of interaction: (1) "tax evasion," where individuals evade or minimize their tax obligations; (2) "tax bargaining," where groups with limited political resources negotiate with local authorities; (3) "forced taxation," where disadvantaged groups pay taxes without tangible returns or a voice in protest; and (4) "harsh sanctions" faced by those unable to pay or evade taxes. Informal sector actors show a different capacity for collective action impacting their agency vis‐à‐vis state authorities. Policy implications: The informal sector needs to be unpacked in fragile states, focusing on understanding existing fiscal pressures on different informal actors and their various strategies for navigating tax systems. Tax administrations should promote dialogue and trust‐building measures and avoid strategies that exacerbate social division and undermine state–society relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: Formal social protection systems, such as health insurance and representation, are often biased in favour of formal workers, thereby excluding most of the world's working population who make a living in the informal economy. Purpose: The article extends existing critiques of formality bias by investigating the reality of work for people in the informal economy in Kenya and Tanzania and analysing related social protection challenges. Specifically, we look at: (1) the governance of work; (2) the organization of work relations; and (3) collective agency. In terms of social protection, we focus on formal and informal forms of social insurance and representation. Methods and approach: We draw on interview and survey data from people working in micro trading, transport, and construction in Nairobi and Kisumu in Kenya, and Dar es Salaam and Dodoma in Tanzania. A total of 1,462 workers were surveyed and 24 focus group discussions were held with such workers. Interviews were conducted with 120 key informants: leaders and members of informal workers' associations in the three sectors, as well as representatives of authorities, trade unions, and business associations. Data were collected from June 2018 to December 2019. Findings: Formal social insurance and representation do not fit the real experience of most people working in the informal economy. They have been modelled on and designed to support workers in formal standard employment relations. At the same time, informal workers' associations play important roles in meeting—albeit inadequately—the social insurance and representational needs of their members. Policy implications: Meaningful engagement with the reality of work and collective agency in the informal economy is necessary to inform more appropriate policies and measures to provide informal workers with appropriate social protection measures, particularly social insurance and representation. Their reality should not have to conform to an inadequate model; rather, the model should fit their reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]