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Known as the founder of the phenomenological movement, this book examines Husserl's various phases of phenomenology during his realist, transcendental, static, genetic, and post-Crisis (of European Sciences) periods. Consisting of ten carefully researched and thoroughly examined essays, this book describes Husserl's concepts and ideas through numerous examples and diagrammatic representations, in a bid to elucidate the nuances of phenomenology for its readers. Valuable insights into Husserl's realist phase are made in the chapter on Meaning, and the chapters on Natural Attitude, Epoché and Phenomenological Reduction, while the chapter on Noesis & Noema symbolizes the transcendental phase. Thomas points out Husserl's transition from static to genetic phenomenology in the chapter on Lived Body, with the chapters on Lifeworld, and the Notion of the Other, later focusing on this perspective. Husserl's entire phenomenological space, including his pre-phenomenological period, are covered in the chapter on Lived Time. However, the chapters on Phenomenology: The Study of Self and Beyond, and Consciousness and Intentionality are the fulcrums upon which the edifice of phenomenology turns. The final chapter on Presuppositionlessness in phenomenology expresses Thomas'personal enquiries into Husserl's contention that phenomenology is a presuppositionless science. This book will be of particular interest to research scholars and post-graduate students in the areas of Philosophy and Social Sciences, as well as those interested in contemporary Western Philosophy, and the history and development of Ideas.

Der vorliegende Ergänzungsband zu Husserliana Band XI Analysen zur passiven Synthesis enthält den letzten Teil der ursprünglichen Fassung der Vorlesung über `Transzendentale Logik'vom Wintersemester 1920/21, deren Hauptteil in Band XI veröffentlicht wurde. Diese Vorlesung spielt eine wichtige Rolle in der Entwicklung von Husserls Philosophie. Sie markiert den Übergang zur genetischen Phänomenologie, und sie ist Husserls erster durchgeführter Entwurf einer transzendentalen Logik. Der hier veröffentlichte Teil der Vorlesung diente Ludwig Landgrebe als Grundlage für die Ausarbeitung von Erfahrung und Urteil. Durch den vorliegenden Ergänzungsband wird die ursprüngliche Fassung dieser Vorlesung in ihrer Gesamtheit zugänglich gemacht. Dadurch werden die Analysen zur passiven Synthesis in ihren ursprünglichen transzendental-logischen Zusammenhang gestellt.

For some twenty years now, I have been working on a philosophical programme which falls into two parts, a systematic metaphysics, to be entitled Being and Becoming, conceived in the general framework of ontological phenomenology, but employing what I call a'genetic'methodol­ ogy, and an historical interpretation, designed to support and confirm the ontological philosophy in question. The historical part of the overall programme was originally conceived in the form of an Epochal Interpretation of the history of modern philosophy from Descartes on. Part of the material accumulated towards such an Epochal Interpretation has however been deployed rather differently. First, the Kant material has already been turned into an interpretive transforma­ tion of Kant's Critical Philosophy. Second, the material on Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy now forms the basis of the present study. The interpretive transformation of Kant's Critical philosophy was published by Winter Verlag in the context of a Humboldt fellowship. In that work, I took Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics as my model. Like Heidegger, I subjected the Critical Philosophy to an interpre­ tive procedure as a result of which I finished up with structures matching and reflecting the basic structures of my own (genetic) ontology. But I sought to overcome certain limitations inherent in the Heideggerian project.

2 called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modern sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modern times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a naivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate apriori possibilities and necessities.