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Action, Embodied Mind, and Life World combines embodied consciousness research, existential phenomenology, Gendlin's'focusing'concept, and recent self-organizational work on basic emotions (e.g., Panksepp, Frijda), to explore the way patterns of motivated action shape our interpretations of reality—personally, biologically, and within a sociopolitical community. Like a bat projecting sonar, we understand our world by sensing patterns of resistance against our own self-initiated actions. If hammering is the action, we find'nails'and'non-nails.'Actions in turn express a self-organizing process rooted in motivational structures that presuppose values. These patterns of motivation therefore prefigure the shape of what we think or perceive. But the emotions, feelings,'sensings'through which we discern motivation are never just about what they seem, especially given ample incentives to distortion and self-deception. The'trigger'is the tip of an iceberg. This book works toward a coherent method for getting at the basement level of the action trajectories that motivate exploration, selective attention, and thus interpretations of reality—a crucial question in an age of motivated disinformation.

In Recentering the Self, Michael Washburn presents a new account of the ego, ego development, and the role of the ego in spiritual life. He starts by tracing the premodern antecedents of the notion of the ego in Greek philosophy and Christian theology and then explains the seventeenth-century emergence of the notion in Descartes's radically new account of the soul's relation to the body. Reviewing subsequent criticisms of the notion, the author formulates a revised conception of the ego that highlights the ego's inherently two-sided nature, as a subject and agency that, although rooted within interior consciousness, lives originally and primarily in the material, social world. Washburn uses this revised conception of the ego to explain how the two sides of the ego develop in concert over major stages of the human lifespan and why the ego, despite widespread belief to the contrary, plays primarily a positive role in spiritual life. Recentering the Self makes important contributions to the history of philosophy, consciousness studies, phenomenology, developmental psychology, and spiritual or transpersonal psychology.

This staging of an elongated dialectical parallelism between Hegel's classic text and major 19th-20th-century Black thinkers explodes the western canon of philosophy. Johnson and Mandela Gray show that Hegel's abstract dialectic is transformed and critiqued when put into conversation with the lived dialectics of Black Thought: from Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs through to Malcolm X and Angela Davis.While Hegel articulates the dynamic logics that we see in these Black thinkers, when they are placed in parallel and considered together, the whiteness, both explicit and implicit, of Hegelianism itself is revealed. Forcing Hegelianism into the embodied history of Black Thought reveals a phenomenology of America whose spirit is Black.

This book is about all things consciousness, great and small. It starts by pointing to the key characteristic of consciousness, without realizing which it cannot be understood: like everything else about the mind, it is fundamentally a kind of computation. Among many other matters, this explains: how it is that we share some aspects of consciousness with bacteria; how it can arise in artificial machines and not just living ones; how the empty cocoon of the self that it spins ends up pretending to be the butterfly; and how consciousness dooms this virtual butterfly to the splendor and the suffering of being awake and aware. Unlike most other books on consciousness, this one includes a discussion of some possible ways whereby we, pinned like butterflies by our species'history and socioeconomic circumstances, can awake to our collective predicament and join forces to do something about it. It should be of interest to all readers who care about the nature of our lived experience — andabout our survival, which depends on developing critical consciousness of our dire situation and the social dynamics that shape it.

The book is addressed to scholars and students in sociology and in phenomenological philosophy. It presents the work of Durkheim in a new light and discusses the prevailing interpretations in the collective intentionality approach. It also provides a fresh conception of collective consciousness which illuminates features unattended by the traditions initiated by John Searle, Dan Zahavi and the Center for Subjectivity Research, and the Nordic Society of Phenomenology. This lucidly written book is of interest to students and scholars researching Durkheim's, Husserl's and Schutz's works.

This book argues that conscious experience is sometimes extended outside the brain and body into certain kinds of environmental interaction and tool use. It shows that if one accepts that cognitive states can extend, one must also accept that consciousness can extend. The proponents of Extended Mind defend the former claim, but usually oppose the latter claim. The most important undertaking of this book is to show that this partition is not possible on pain of inconsistency. Pii Telakivi presents three arguments for the hypothesis of Extended Conscious Mind, examines and answers the most common counterarguments, and introduces a novel means to interpret and apply the concept of constitution. She also addresses the tensions between analytic philosophy of mind and enactivism, and builds a bridge between two different traditions: on the one hand, extended mind, and on the other, enactivism and embodied mind—and maintains that a unifying approach is necessary for atheory about extended consciousness.

This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect—all varieties of pleasure and pain—and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an “enrichment approach” that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This “enrichment approach” draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.

This book examines the best available empirical evidence regarding one of the most challenging and pervasive questions throughout ages, cultures, and religions: the survival of human consciousness after death. It begins with a contextual overview of belief in personal survival and refutes misguided historical and epistemological arguments against the notion of survival after death (e.g., irrational, purely religious, impossible to be addressed by science, that has been proved false by neuroscience). The book provides an overview of the scientific evidence regarding the survival of human consciousness after death, focusing on studies on mediumship, near-death and out-of-body experiences, and reincarnation.Featured topics of coverage include:The belief in life after death in the contemporary world as well as in the history of religions and philosophy.The key misguided arguments and prejudices against the academic study of afterlife survival.What constitutes empirical evidence for survival after death?The main explanatory hypotheses alternative to survival after death.The chief cultural barriers to a fair examination of the available evidence for survival of consciousness after death. Science of Life After Death is an essential resource for researchers, professors, and graduate students as well as clinicians, therapists, and other professionals in developmental and clinical psychology; spirituality, religious. and consciousness studies; psychiatry; neuroscience / neurology; phenomenology / philosophy; complementary and alternative medicine; and all interrelated disciplines.

This unique text develops an original theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between trauma and time by combining phenomenological and psychoanalytical traditions. Moving beyond Western psychoanalytical and phenomenological traditions, this volume presents new perspectives on the assessment and treatment of trauma patients. Powerfully illustrating how the temporal dimension of a patient's symptoms has until now been overlooked, the text presents a wealth of research literature to deepen our understanding of how trauma disrupts individual temporal experience. Ultimately, the resulting phenomena that occur (including dissociation and cognitive distortions) position time as a transdiagnostic psychological dimension, closely connected to the subject's sense of self.This text will benefit researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and trauma and dissociation studies more broadly. Those specifically interested in the philosophy of the mind, Freud, and psychotherapy will also benefit from this book.

This book strives to deal with Hegel's thought by means of a thorough, unitarian and logical approach and to enforce the idea that philosophy is rigorous as far as it is able to consistently tackle the question of self-consciousness. It results that the logic underlying every philosophical interest traces back to the self-referring investigation about life in the mode of self-consciousness, by which social practices and their history can be grasped. Once we assess that self-consciousness is life through the concept, we would be able to realize the logical structure underlying its historical outcomes.

The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative research, and there are new sections discussing important, recent research on topics such as critical phenomenology, imagination, social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality, and selfhood.Also included are helpful features, such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and boxed explanations of specialized topics, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

Every attempt to examine our consciousness's passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl's theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for.The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl's view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present.What this study purports to show is that Husserl's phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life.

Die Frage nach dem Menschen ist heute – im Zeitalter der zunehmenden Verschmelzung von Mensch und Technik (Cyborgisierung), der Genom-Editierung und der fortgeschrittenen Naturalisierung des Menschenbildes – aktueller denn je. Der Autor präsentiert hier erstmals eine systematische und prägnante Darstellung der Idee einer neuen Anthropologie, welche die mundanen, transzendentalen und transphänomenalen Aspekte des Menschseins gleichermaßen berücksichtigt und die Reduktion des Menschen auf seinen biologischen Körper zurückweist. Diese ‚Fundamentalanthropologie‘ genannte Disziplin versteht sich als philosophische Grundlagendisziplin und als Herzstück der Philosophie als allgemeiner Anthropologie. Außerdem werden in diesem Band zentrale und aktuelle philosophische Themen wie Selbstbewusstsein, Identität des Ich, das Wesen des menschlichen Geistes sowie die Zukunft des Menschen erstmals zum Gegenstand fundamentalanthropologischer Analysen gemacht.

Die ersten drei Bände der vorliegenden,vier Teilbände umfassenden Edition bieten eine umfangreiche Präsentation von Husserls deskriptiver Erforschung der intentionalen Strukturen des Bewusstseins in den drei Hauptklassen von intentionalen Akten, den Verstandes-, Gemüts- und Willensakten. Der größte Teil der wiedergegebenen Manuskripte entstand in den Jahren zwischen 1908 und 1915. Im Jahr 1925 hat Husserls Assistent Ludwig Landgrebe auf der Grundlage vieler der hier edierten Texte ein umfangreiches Typoskript mit dem Titel „Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins“ angefertigt. Husserls fragmentarischer Entwurf einer Einleitung zu diesem Typoskript wird im ersten Band der Edition wiedergegeben.Der erste Teilband enthält Manuskripte, die der deskriptiven Analyse verschiedener Weisen der Objektivation in unterschiedlichen Aktformen und Aktvollzügen des Vorstellens und Denkens wie dem thematischen Meinen, dem Aufmerken und Zuwenden, dem Explizieren und Urteilen sowie dem Stellungnehmen gewidmet sind. Husserls besonderes Interesse gilt dabei der Beziehung zwischen Rezeptivität und Spontaneität.Dieser Band ist der erste Teilband des vier Teilbände umfassenden Sets Husserliana 43. Er enthält keinen Index (erhältlich als Teilband 4). This volume is the first part of the four-part set Husserliana 43. It does not contain the Index (available as the fourth volume of the set).

“Experience” is a thoroughly political category, a social and historical product not authored by any individual. At the same time, “the personal is political,” and one's own lived experience is an important epistemic resource. In Anaesthetics of Existence Cressida J. Heyes reconciles these two positions, drawing on examples of things that happen to us but are nonetheless excluded from experience. If for Foucault an “aesthetics of existence” was a project of making one's life a work of art, Heyes's “anaesthetics of existence” describes antiprojects that are tacitly excluded from life—but should be brought back in. Drawing on critical phenomenology, genealogy, and feminist theory, Heyes shows how and why experience has edges, and she analyzes phenomena that press against those edges. Essays on sexual violence against unconscious victims, the temporality of drug use, and childbirth as a limit-experience build a politics of experience while showcasing Heyes's much-needed new philosophical method.

Robert Brandom's rationalist philosophy of language, expounded in his highly influential Making It Explicit, has been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate, establishing him as one of the leading philosophers of his generation. In A Spirit of Trust, Brandom presents the fruits of his thirty-year engagement with Hegel. He submits that the Phenomenology of Spirit holds not only many lessons for today's philosophy of language, but also a moral lesson much needed in today's increasingly polarized societies, in the form of a postmodern ethics of trust.In this outstanding collection, leading philosophers examine and assess A Spirit of Trust. The twelve specially commissioned chapters explore topics including: negation and truth empirical and speculative concepts experience conflict and recognition varieties of idealism premodern ethical life and modern alienation a postmodern ethics of trust. Reading Brandom: On A Spirit of Trust is essential reading for all students and scholars of Brandom's work and those in philosophy of language. It will also be important reading for those studying nineteenth-century philosophy, particularly Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit.

The Phenomenology of Spirit, first published in 1807, is G. W. F. Hegel's remarkable philosophical text that examines the dynamics of human experience from its simplest beginnings in consciousness through its development into ever more complex and self-conscious forms. The work explores the inner discovery of reason and its progressive expansion into spirit, a world of intercommunicating and interacting minds reconceiving and re-creating themselves and their reality. The Phenomenology of Spirit is a notoriously challenging and arduous text that students and scholars have been studying ever since its publication.In this long-awaited translation, Peter Fuss and John Dobbins provide a succinct, highly informative, and readily comprehensible introduction to several key concepts in Hegel's thinking. This edition includes an extensive conceptual index, which offers easy reference to specific discussions in the text and elucidates the more subtle nuances of Hegel's concepts and word usage. This modern American English translation employs natural idioms that accurately convey what Hegel means. Throughout the book, the translators adhered to the maxim: if you want to understand Hegel, read him in the English. This book is intended for intellectuals with a vested interest in modern philosophy and history, as well as students of all levels, seeking to access or further engage with this seminal text.

Dílo, koncipované Hegelem jako úvod do systému a současně jako filosofické ospravedlnění systému, přerostlo v neopakovatelný výklad systému samého. Ovlivnilo evropské duchovní dějiny a filosofické poznání v řadě jeho oblastí. Překlad, mající počáteční východisko v překladu Jana Patočky, se opírá o akademické vydání a přejímá z něho rozsáhlé poznámky, které odkazují na filosofický, vědecký a literární kontext Hegelových myšlenek a přinášejí také odkazy na věcně související místa v textu. Vznikl ve snaze dostát současným nárokům na vydávání klasických děl a pokročilejšímu stavu bádání.

This book proposes a novel and rigorous explanation of consciousness. It argues that the study of an aspect of our self-consciousness known as the ‘feeling of embodiment'teaches us that there are two distinct phenomena to be targeted by an explanation of consciousness. First is an explanation of the phenomenal qualities –'what it is like'– of the experience; and second is the subject's awareness of those qualities. Glenn Carruthers explores the phenomenal qualities of the feeling of embodiment using the tools of quality spaces, as well as the subject's awareness of those qualities as a functionally emergent property of various kinds of processing of these spaces. Where much recent work on consciousness focuses on visual experience, this book rather draws evidence from the study of self-consciousness. Carruthers argues that in light of recent methodological discoveries, awareness must be explained in terms of the organization of multiple cognitive processes. The book offers an explanation of anomalous body representations and, from that, poses a more general theory of consciousness. Ultimately this book creates a hybrid account of consciousness that explains phenomenology and awareness using different tools. It will be of great interest to all scholars of psychology and philosophy as well as anyone interested in exploring the intricacies of how we experience our bodies, what we are and how we fit into the world.

From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience identifies the strong philosophical tradition that runs from Aristotle, through phenomenology, to the current analytical philosophy of mind and consciousness. In a fascinating account, the author integrates the history of philosophy of mind and phenomenology with recent discoveries on the neuroscience of conscious states. The reader can trace the development of a neuro-philosophical synthesis through the work of Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Brentano and Hughlings-Jackson, among others, and so explore contemporary philosophical puzzles surrounding consciousness and its relation to cerebral synchrony and connectedness. Of interest to students and scholars of neuroethics, neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind, as well as philosophy of psychiatry, From Aristotle to Neuroscience demonstrates the real essence of consciousness as it increasingly connects with philosophy, law, morality, aesthetics, and spirituality.

Nancy J. Holland turns to the thought of Martin Heidegger to help understand an age-old philosophical question: Is there a split between the body and the mind? Arguing against philosophical positions that define human consciousness as an overarching phenomenon or reduce it to the brain or physicality, Holland contends that consciousness is relational and it is this relationship that allows us to inhabit and negotiate in the world. Holland forwards a complex and nuanced reading of Heidegger as she focuses on consciousness, being, and what might constitute the animal or, more broadly, other-than-human world. Holland engages with the depth and breadth of Heidegger's work as she opens space for a discussion about the uniqueness of human consciousness.

Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind delves into the relationship between the current analytical debates on consciousness and the debates that took place within continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular around the time of Sartre and within his seminal works. Examining the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to functional or cognitive properties, this volume includes twenty-two unique contributions from leading scholars in the field. Asking questions such as: Why we should think that self-consciousness is non-reflective? Is subjectivity first-personal? Does consciousness necessitate self-awareness? Do we need pre-reflective self-consciousness? Are ego-disorders in psychosis a dysfunction of pre-reflective self-awareness? How does the Cartesian duality between body and mind fit into Sartre's conceptions of consciousness?

Written in 1938/9, Mindfulness (translated from the German Besinnung) is Martin Heidegger's second major being-historical treatise. Here, Heidegger develops some of his key concepts and themes including truth, nothingness, enownment, art and Be-ing and discusses the Greeks, Nietzsche and Hegel at length. In addition to the main text, the text also includes two further important essays,'A Retrospective Look at the Pathway'(1937/8) and'The Wish and the Will (On Preserving What is Attempted)'(1937/8), in which Heidegger surveys his unpublished works and discusses his relationship to Catholic and Protestant Christianity and reflects on his life's path. This is a major translation of a key text from one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, now available in the Bloomsbury Revelations Series.

Essays on Aesthetic Genesis is a collection of essays written on Jeff Mitscherling's work in realist phenomenology, Aesthetic Genesis: The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature. The authors explicate, expand, contextualize and apply the concepts of intentional being, the “New Copernican Hypothesis” (a reversal of the fundamental tenet of phenomenology that all consciousness is intentional—intentionality, rather, gives rise to consciousness), the idea of intentional structures in nature, and the foundational concepts of Aesthetic Genesis as they appear in the work of Aristotle, Ingarden and Gadamer amongst others. This book takes as its focus Mitscherling's comprehensive phenomenological analysis of embodiment, aesthetic experience, the interpretation of texts, moral behavior, and cognition, and exemplifies subsequent work in the field of realist phenomenology being conducted by an international collection of active scholars influenced by Aesthetic Genesis.

This book presents an interpretation of pharmaceutical, surgical and psychotherapeutic interventions based on a univalent metalanguage: biosemiotics. It proposes that a metalanguage for the physical, mental, social, and cultural aspects of health and medicine could bring all parts and aspects of human life together and thus shape a picture of the human being as a whole, made up from the heterogeneous images of the vast variety of sciences and technologies in medicine discourse. The book adopts a biosemiotics clinical model of thinking because, similar to the ancient principle of alchemy, tam ethice quam physice, everything in this model is physical as much as it is mental. Signs in the forms of vibrations, molecules, cells, words, images, reflections and rites conform cultural, mental, physical, and social phenomena. The book decodes healing, dealing with health, illness and therapy by emphasizing the first-person experience as well as objective events. It allows readers to follow the energy-information flows through and between embodied minds and to see how they form physiological functions such as our emotions and narratives.

This book draws connections between recent advances in analytic philosophy of mind and insights from the rich phenomenological tradition concerning the nature of thinking. By combining both analytic and continental approaches, the volume arrives at a more comprehensive understanding of the mental process of'thinking'and the experience and manipulation of objects of thought. Contributors scrutinize aspects of thinking that have a common grounding in both the phenomenological and analytic tradition: perception, language, logic, embodiment and situatedness due to individual history or current experience. This collection serves to broaden and enrich the current debate over'cognitive phenomenology,'and lays the foundations for further dialogue between analytic and continental approaches to the phenomenal character of thinking.

​This book investigates the nature of aesthetic experience and aesthetic objects. Written by leading philosophers, psychologists, literary scholars and semioticians, the book addresses two intertwined issues. The first is related to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience: The understanding of how human beings respond to artworks, how we process linguistic or visual information, and what properties in artworks trigger aesthetic experiences. The examination of the properties of aesthetic experience reveals essential aspects of our perceptual, cognitive, and semiotic capacities. The second issue studied in this volume is related to the ontology of the work of art: Written or visual artworks are a specific type of objects, containing particular kinds of representation which elicit a particular kind of experience. The research question explored is: What properties in artful objects trigger this type of experience, and what characterizes representation in written and visual artworks? Thevolume sets the scene for state-of-the-art inquiries in the intersection between the psychology and ontology of art. The investigations of the relation between the properties of artworks and the characteristics of aesthetic experience increase our insight into what art is. In addition, they shed light on essential properties of human meaning-making in general.

This book discusses consciousness from the perspectives of neuroscience, neuropsychiatry and philosophy. It develops a novel approach in consciousness studies by charting the pathways in which the brain challenges the self and the self challenges the brain. The author argues that the central issue in brain studies is to explain the unity, continuity, and adherence of experience, whether it is sensory or mental awareness, phenomenal- or self-consciousness. To address such a unity is to understand mutual challenges that the brain and the self pose for each other. The fascinating discussions that this book presents are: How do the brain and self create the conspiracy of experience where the physicality of the brain is lost in the subjectivity of the self?

This series includes monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope spans the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental powers of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis is placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. This multi-authored volume provides investigations that fall into three broad areas of inquiry. In Part I, Antti Revonsuo reviews and evaluates contem­ porary discussions of the nature of consciousness. In Part II, Matti Kamppinen explores methodological issues, distinguishing between'intentional'and'structural'explanations. In Part III, Seppo Sajama and Simo Vihjanen consider whether humans ever have direct access to reality (in Section A), while Matti Kamppinen and Antti Revonsuo explore the conse­ quences of the claim that our knowledge of reality is conceptually mediated (in Section B). These studies combine to provide a stimulating exploration of cognitive science that should appeal to students and to scholars alike. J.H.F. vii PREFACE BY THE EDITOR The purpose of the book is to illustrate how empirical and conceptual problems interact in modem cognitive science. We argue that several topics discussed in contemporary research have long historical roots in philosophy.

conditions of the possibility of Experience... must mean nothing else than all that which lies immanently in the essence of Experience... and therefore belongs to it indispensably. The essence of Experience that phenomenological analysis of Experience elucidates is the same as the possibility of Experience, and all that which is determined in the essence, in the possibility of Experience, is eo ipso 1 condition of the possibility of Experience. Through acquaintance with Husserl's work, then, I developed my way of understand­ ing what, according to their very possibility, lies in conscious activities of mentally representing something, for example, by imagining or remembering it, or by viewing it in a picture, all these understood as forms of modified perception. As Husserl himself made clear, such reflective and descriptive analyses of the mental activities according to their very possibility are carried out regardless of the way they have actually come to be. However, I was also interested in developmen­ tal questions, especially with regard to the activity of imagining. Hence I turned to cognitive developmental psychology in order to get acquainted with the neces­ sary empirical material. Moreover, I conducted a pilot-study with young children that I had conceived according to phenomenologically relevant aspects concerning the difference and yet inner connection of the activities of imagining and viewing 2 pictures.

Social Phenomenology brings together insights from the tradition of phenomenology and recent discussions of collective intentionality. In doing so, it offers a unique account of how consciousness is formative of the social world. That is, how our thinking things to be so can, in some cases, actually make them so. For instance, that the money one uses day in and day out is worth something is not because of its physical characteristics, but because we accept that those physical traits, printed by the right institutions make it so. The book argues for a position between atomism and collectivism. That is, the book denies there is any such thing as collective consciousness, while also denying the atomic conception of subjects which views subjects as islands unto themselves, free of relation to others.

The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: • what is phenomenology? • naturalizing phenomenology and the cognitive sciences • phenomenology and consciousness • consciousness and self-consciousness • time and consciousness • intentionality • the embodied mind • action • knowledge of other minds • situated and extended minds • phenomenology and personal identity. This second edition includes a new preface, and revised and improved chapters. Also included are helpful features such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and a glossary, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.

John Locke's foundational place in the history of British empiricism and liberal political thought is well established. So, in what sense can Locke be considered a modern European philosopher? Identity and Difference argues for reassessing this canonical figure. Closely examining the'treatise on identity'added to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Etienne Balibar demonstrates Locke's role in the formation of two concepts central to the metaphysics of the subject-consciousness and the self-and the complex philosophical, legal, moral and political nature of his terms. With an accompanying essay by Stella Sandford, situating Balibar's reading of Locke in the history of the reception of the Essay and within Balibar's other writings on'the subject,'Identity and Difference rethinks a crucial moment in the history of Western philosophy.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is probably his most famous work. First published in 1807, it has exercised considerable influence on subsequent thinkers from Feuerbach and Marx to Heidegger, Kojève, Adorno and Derrida. The book contains many memorable analyses of, for example, the master / slave dialectic, the unhappy consciousness, Sophocles'Antigone and the French Revolution and is one of the most important works in the Western philosophical tradition. It is, however, a difficult and challenging book and needs to be studied together with a clear and accessible secondary text. Stephen Houlgate's Reader's Guide offers guidance on: Philosophical and historical contextKey themesReading the textReception and influenceFurther reading

A proposal for merging a science of human consciousness with neuroscience and psychology.The study of consciousness has advanced rapidly over the last two decades. And yet there is no clear path to creating models for a direct science of human experience or for integrating its insights with those of neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. In Inner Experience and Neuroscience, Donald Price and James Barrell show how a science of human experience can be developed through a strategy that integrates experiential paradigms with methods from the natural sciences. They argue that the accuracy and results of both psychology and neuroscience would benefit from an experiential perspective and methods.Price and Barrell describe phenomenologically based methods for scientific research on human experience, as well as their philosophical underpinnings, and relate these to empirical results associated with such phenomena as pain and suffering, emotions, and volition. They argue that the methods of psychophysics are critical for integrating experiential and natural sciences, describe how qualitative and quantitative methods can be merged, and then apply this approach to the phenomena of pain, placebo responses, and background states of consciousness. In the course of their argument, they draw on empirical results that include qualitative studies, quantitative studies, and neuroimaging studies. Finally, they propose that the integration of experiential and natural science can extend efforts to understand such difficult issues as free will and complex negative emotions including jealousy and greed.

The question of what characterizes feelings of being alive is a puzzling and controversial one. Are we dealing with a unique affective phenomenon or can it be integrated into existing classifications of emotions and moods? What might be the natural basis for such feelings? What could be considered their specifically human dimension? These issues are addressed by researchers from various disciplines, including philosophy of mind and emotions, psychology, and history of art.This volume contains original papers on the topic of feelings of being alive by Fiorella Battaglia, Eva-Maria Engelen, Joerg Fingerhut, Thomas Fuchs, Alice Holzhey-Kunz, Matthias Jung, Tanja Klemm, Riccardo Manzotti, Sabine Marienberg, Matthew Ratcliffe, Arbogast Schmitt, Jan Slaby, and Achim Stephan.

Die Phänomenologie ist kein historisches Thema. Genauso wenig eine bloße Angelegenheit für eine akademische Philosophie. Ein Blick auf Psychotherapie, Psychiatrie, auf Soziologie und Literaturwissenschaften belegt das zur Genüge. Die Phänomenologie ist eine systematische Grundlagenforschung der Existenz. Eine Grundlagenforschung – gerichtet auf letztmögliche Hinterdenklichkeit – im Blick auf das Dasein und seine ihm notwendig zugehörige Lebenswelt. Die Phänomenologie ist eine Arbeitsphilosophie. Ihre Grundlage ist die selbsteigene Anschauung und Erfahrung und die Reflexion dieser Anschauung und Erfahrung. Das bestimmt den Phänomenologie-Begriff der vorliegenden Publikation, in deren Mittelpunkt Edmund Husserl steht. Der Autor schafft hier eine erste phänomenologische Vor-Lage für ein mehrjähriges Forschungsprojekt am »Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie Hannover« (»Die Philosophie der Großstadt«).

The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epist~ology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston. I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of'knowledge by acquaintance,'in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study.

of A first attempt to formulate the phenomenological problem identity was originally made in my doctoral dissertation,'The Identity of the Logical Proposition,'(Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, 1969). Further development of the problem, both direct and indirect, as well as extensive revision, has found expression in'The Foundation of Predicative Experience and the Spontaneity of Consciousness'(Life-World and Consciousness. Essays for Aron Gurwitsch, 1972),'Gurwitsch's Concept of Per­ ceptual Unity as the Basic Form of Rational Consciousness,'(Social Research, April, 1975), and'The Refinement of the Concept of Constitution'(Research in Phenomenology, Vol. IV, 1974). These studies, in turn, formed the springboard for the present study of the problem of identity. No more than the other studies, this study far from claiming finality, is rather an ever-widening beginning of a phenomenological inquiry into the constitution of identity. I am enormously indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor Fred Kersten of the University of Wisconsin at Green Bay. No tribute is sufficient to acknowledge his invaluable assistance and counsel in the preparation of this work for publication. I would also like to thank Professor Werner Marx of the University of Freiburg for his sustaining encouragement in the later phase of this work. INTRODUCTION The purpose of this essay is to investigate the meaning of the concept of identity within a framework of the phenomenological theory of consciousness.

What is awareness? How is dreaming different from ordinary awareness? What does mathematics have to do with awareness? Are different kinds of awareness related? “Awareness” is commonly spoken of as “mind, soul, spirit, consciousness, the unconscious, psyche, imagination, self, and other.” The Phenomena of Awareness is a study of awareness as it is directly experienced. From the start, Cecile T. Tougas engages the reader in reflective notice of awareness as it appears from moment to moment in a variety of ways. The book draws us in and asks us to focus on the flow of phenomena in living experience, not as a theoretical construct, nor an image, nor a biochemical product, but instead as phases, moments, or parts that cannot exist without one another. Tougas shows how these parts exist in mutual dependence as a continuum of awareness, as the flow of lived time, and how noticing time deepens psychological self-understanding and understanding of another.The Phenomena of Awareness is divided into four parts: • Seeking and Noticing Awareness• Observing and Understanding the Flow of Phenomena• Distinguishing Intentional Acts• Work in ProgressDrawing on the work of E. Husserl, G. Cantor and C.G. Jung, this book is an original synthesis of phenomenology, mathematics and psychology that explores awareness and the concept of ‘transfinite number'. This book will be of interest to analytical psychologists, philosophers, mathematicians, feminist scholars, humanities teachers and students. Cecile T. Tougas teaches Latin at the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Durham. She taught philosophy at the University of Southern Maine and the University of Massachusetts Lowell.

This new work (the first in a two-volume series) by the leading Marxian philosopher of our day is a milestone in human self-understanding. It focuses on the location where action emerges from freedom and necessity, thefoundation of all social science.Today, as never before, the investigation of the close relationship between social structure—defined by Marx as'arising from the life-process of definite individuals'—and the various forms of consciousness is particularly important. We can only perceive what is possible by first identifying the historical process that constrains consciousness itself and therefore social action.The relationship between social structure and forms of consciousness discussed in this volume is multifaceted and profoundly dialectical. It requires the presentation of a great wealth of historical material and the assessment of the relevant philosophical literature, from Descartes through Hegel and the Liberal tradition to the present, together with their connections with political economy and political theory. István Mészáros moves beyond both abstract solutions to the surveyed methodological questions and one-sided structuralist evaluation of the important substantive issues, bringing the process of our understanding of social structure and consciousness to a level not previously attained.Above all, in the spirit of the Marxian approach, even the most complicated problems are always analyzed in relation to the major practical concerns of our time. The primary aim of this work is to outline the dialectical intelligibility of historical development toward a viable societal reproductive order. Social Structures and Forms of Consciousness is of the highest importance as both a political and philosophical work, illuminating the place from where we must act, today.

This volume contains Gurwitsch's magnum opus, which emphasizes how items in the thematic field are relevant to the theme. It is introduced by his student Richard Zaner. This volume also includes the posthumous text, Marginal Consciousness.

In Aesthetic Genesis, the author argues for a reversal of the most fundamental tenet of phenomenology-namely, that all consciousness is intentional (that is, directed toward an object). Mitscherling suggests, as a new'Copernican hypothesis,'that intentionality (i.e., directionality) gives rise to consciousness. This book describes not only the origin, or'genesis,'of human cognition in sensation, but also the genesis of sensation from intentional structures belonging to nature itself. A phenomenological examination of our experience leads to the conclusion that the two sorts of being generally recognized by contemporary science and philosophy-that is, material being and ideal being-prove ontologically inadequate to account for this experience. Mitscherling rehabilitates the pre-modern concepts of'intentional being'and'formal causality'and employs them in the construction of a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of embodiment, aesthetic experience, the interpretation of texts, moral behavior, and cognition in general.

Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy.We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called'the phenomenal-concept strategy,'which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy is mistaken.A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. Tye points to four major puzzles of consciousness that arise: How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what does the explanatory gap consist and how can it be bridged? How can the hard problem of consciousness be solved? How are zombies possible? Tye presents solutions to these puzzles—solutions that relieve the pressure on the materialist created by the failure of the phenomenal-concept strategy. In doing so, he discusses and makes new proposals on a wide range of issues, including the nature of perceptual content, the conditions necessary for consciousness of a given object, the proper understanding of change blindness, the nature of phenomenal character and our awareness of it, whether we have privileged access to our own experiences, and, if we do, in what such access consists.

SARA HEINÄMAA,VILI LÄHTEENMÄKI AND PAULIINA REMES This book is about consciousness. It illuminates the concept in its complexity and richness, capturing its theoretical and philosophical significance as well as its problematic aspects. By taking a new look into the history of concepts, the collection questions several deep-seated assumptions about consciousness – assumptions both thematic and methodological. It argues that, even though our predecessors did not formulate their philosophical queries in terms of consciousness, they have much to offer to our current disputes concerning its central features, such as reflexivity, subjectivity and aboutness, as well as related themes, from selfhood to attention and embodiment. At the same time, the collection demonstrates that consciousness is not just an issue in the p- losophy of mind, but is bound to ontology, epistemology and moral theory. We can find premodern and early modern concepts and arguments that are interesting and even crucialto our own philosophical concerns, but we should not assume that these belong or contribute to any theory of mind isolated from metaphysical and ethical discussions: an argument that for us provides insightful descriptions of perception or self-awareness might to its writer have meant not just a theoretization of the soul or the mind, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a contribution to ethics or ontology.

Reputed to be one of the most difficult yet rewarding works of philosophical literature, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit has long been in need of an introduction for English readers. Without using jargon or technical terms, Donald Phillip Verene provides that introduction, guiding the reader through Hegel's text as a whole and offering a way to grasp the major insights and sections of Hegel's text without oversimplifying its narrative. A glossary of sixty of Hegel's terms, discussed in both their original German and English equivalents, is included.

This brand new translation of Martin Heidgger's Mindfulness (Besinnung) makes available in English for the first time Heidegger's second major being-historical treatise. Here Heidegger returns to and elaborates in detail many of the individual dimensions of the historically self-showing and transforming allotments of be-ing. In addition to the main text, this volume also includes two further important texts, A Retrospective Look at the Pathway (1937/8) and'The Wish and the Will (On Preserving What is Attempted)'(1937/8), in which Heidegger surveys his unpublished works, gives instructions for their eventual publication, talks about his relationship to Catholic and Protestant Christianity, and reflects on his life's path. This is a major new translation of a key text from one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century.This volume is translated by Parvis Emad, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University, Chicago, and Thomas Kalary, Professor of Philosophy at Suvidya College, Bangalore.

'This collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism - and which are not. Hutto's paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. The inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further degree of depth and integration often lacki.

This collection explores the structure of consciousness and its place in the world, or inversely the structure of the world and the place of consciousness in it. Amongst the topics covered are: the phenomenological aspects of experience (inner awareness, self-awareness), dependencies between experience and the world (the role of the body in experience, the role of culturally formed background ideas) and the basic ontological categories found in the world at large (unity, state-of-affairs, connectedness, dependence and intentionality). Developing ideas drawn from historical figures such as Descartes, Husserl, Aristotle, and Whitehead, the essays together demonstrate the interdependence of ontology and phenomenology and its significance for the philosophy of mind.