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“More than any other living scholar of medieval philosophy, Gyula Klima has influenced the way we read and understand philosophical texts by showing how the questions they ask can be placed in a modern context without loss or distortion. The key to his approach is a respect for medieval authors coupled with a commitment to regarding their texts as a genuine source of insight on questions in metaphysics, theology, psychology, logic, and the philosophy of language—as opposed to assimilating what they say to modern doctrines, or using medieval discussions as a foil for ‘new and improved'conceptual schemes.” Jack Zupko, University of Alberta“Gyula Klima is widely recognized as one of the world's leading experts on thirteenth and fourteenth-century Latin philosophy, with his own, distinctive analytic approach, which brings out both the similarities and differences between medieval and contemporary logic and semantics.” John Marenbon, Trinity College, University of Cambridge “Gyula Klima has been a towering figure in the field of medieval philosophy for decades. His influence comprises not only the scholarly results of his work, but also intense and generous mentorship of students and junior colleagues. This volume is a perfect reflection of the esteem that he enjoys around the world, collecting excellent pieces by established as well as up-and-coming scholars of medieval philosophy.” Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam“For four decades now, Gyula Klima has been setting the standard among medievalists for philosophical sophistication and historical rigor. This collection of wide-ranging studies from leading scholars in the field offers a worthy tribute to that legacy.” Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado BoulderGyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, and Senior Research Fellow, Consultant, and the Director of Institute for the History of Ideas of the Hungarian Research Institute in Budapest. In 2022, the President of Hungary awarded him the Knight's Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit, “in recognition of his outstanding academic career, significant research work and exemplary leadership.” In this volume, colleagues, collaborators, and students celebrate Klima's project with new essays on Plotinus, Anselm, Aquinas, Buridan, Ockham and others, exploring specific questions in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and logic.No contemporary surpasses Kripke and Klima in semantics and metaphysics, but only Gyula Klima's thought ranges flawlessly over classical philosophy as well. The volume is a fitting tribute to the master. David Twetten, Marquette University

The book provides a historical (with an outline of the history of the concept of truth from antiquity to our time) and systematic exposition of the semantic theory of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1930s. This theory became famous very soon and inspired logicians and philosophers. It has two different, but interconnected aspects: formal-logical and philosophical. The book deals with both, but it is intended mostly as a philosophical monograph. It explains Tarski's motivation and presents discussions about his ideas (pro and contra) as well as points out various applications of the semantic theory of truth to philosophical problems (truth-criteria, realism and anti-realism, future contingents or the concept of correspondence between language and reality).

Ultralogic as Universal? is a seminal text in non-classcial logic. Richard Routley (Sylvan) presents a hugely ambitious program: to use an'ultramodal'logic as a universal key, which opens, if rightly operated, all locks. It provides a canon for reasoning in every situation, including illogical, inconsistent and paradoxical ones, realized or not, possible or not. A universal logic, Routley argues, enables us to go where no other logic—especially not classical logic—can.Routley provides an expansive and singular vision of how a universal logic might one day solve major problems in set theory, arithmetic, linguistics, physics, and more. It circulated in typescript in the late 1970s before appearing as the Appendix to Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. With engaging, forceful prose, unsparing criticism of entrenched institutions, and many tantalizing proof sketches (is the Axiom of Choice a theorem of naive set theory?), Ultralogic? has had a major influence on the development of paraconsistent and relevant logic.This new edition makes this work available for a modern audience, newly typeset and corrected, along with extensive notes, and new commentary essays.

This edited book brings together research work in the field of constructive semantics with scholarship on the phenomenological foundations of logic and mathematics. It addresses one of the central issues in the epistemology and philosophy of mathematics, namely the relationship between phenomenological meaning constitution and constructive semantics. Contributing authors explore deep structural connections and fundamental differences between phenomenology and constructivism. Papers are drawn from contributions to a prestigious workshop held at the University of Friedrichshafen. Readers will discover insight into structural connections between the phenomenological concept of meaning constitution and constructivist concepts of meaning. Discussion ranges from more specific conceptualizations in the philosophy of logic and mathematics to more general considerations in epistemology, inferential semantics and phenomenology. Questions such as a possible phenomenological understandingof the relationship between structural rules and particle rules in dialogical logic are explored. Significant aspects of both phenomenology and dialectics, and dialectics and constructivism emerge. Graduates and researchers of philosophy, especially logic, as well as scholars of mathematics will all find something of interest in the expert insights presented in this volume.

Sortal concepts are at the center of certain logical discussions and have played a significant role in solutions to particular problems in philosophy. Apart from logic and philosophy, the study of sortal concepts has found its place in specific fields of psychology, such as the theory of infant cognitive development and the theory of human perception. In this monograph, different formal logics for sortal concepts and sortal-related logical notions (such as sortal identity and first-order sortal quantification) are characterized. Most of these logics are intensional in nature and possess, in addition, a bidimensional character. That is, they simultaneously represent two different logical dimensions. In most cases, the dimensions are those of time and natural necessity, and, in other cases, those of time and epistemic necessity. Another feature of the logics in question concerns second-order quantification over sortal concepts, a logical notion that is also represented in thelogics. Some of the logics adopt a constant domain interpretation, others a varying domain interpretation of such quantification. Two of the above bidimensional logics are philosophically grounded on predication sortalism, that is, on the philosophical view that predication necessarily requires sortal concepts. Another bidimensional logic constitutes a logic for complex sortal predicates. These three sorts of logics are among the important novelties of this work since logics with similar features have not been developed up to now, and they might be instrumental for the solution of philosophically significant problems regarding sortal predicates. The book assumes a modern variant of conceptualism as a philosophical background. For this reason, the approach to sortal predicates is in terms of sortal concepts. Concepts, in general, are here understood as intersubjective realizable cognitive capacities. The proper features of sortal concepts are determined by an analysisof the main features of sortal predicates. Posterior to this analysis, the sortal-related logical notions represented in the above logics are discussed. There is also a discussion on the extent to which the set-theoretic formal semantic systems of the book capture different aspects of the conceptualist approach to sortals. These different semantic frameworks are also related to realist and nominalist approaches to sortal predicates, and possible modifications to them are considered that might represent those alternative approaches.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), American Scientist, Mathematician, and Logician, developed much of the logic widely used today. Using copies of his unpublished manuscripts, this book provides a comprehensive collection of Peirce's writings on Phaneroscopy and the outlines of his project to develop a Science of Reasoning. The collection is focused on three main fields: Phaneroscopy, the science of observation, Semeiotic, the science of sign relations, and Logic, the science of inferences. Peirce understands all thought to be mediated in and through signs and its essence to be diagrammatic. The book serves as a timely contribution for the introduction of Peirce's Phaneroscopy to the emerging research field of Image Sciences.

This collection originated at a conference organized by the Institute Vienna Circle and the University of Vienna on the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism and was held in Vienna in July 2001. (cf. The Vienna Orcle and Logical Empiricism. Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives. Edited by Frie­ drich Stadler. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer, 2003, Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10). All the essays in this volume with one exception are based on talks presented on that occasion and appear here for the first time. The contributions address a broad range of issues in the philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, but two themes stand out. Many authors respond directly or indirectly to objections against various aspects of Carnap's work: the pro gram of Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, his views on ontology and realism, and his explication of disposition predicates. w. v. Quine's shadow looms large. Rising to the challenge, these authors constructively modify Carnapian ideas or explore alternatives withoutabandoning key tenets of his empiri­ cism. As our understanding of Carnap's work in its historical context has become more nuanced and detailed over the past decade, the room for dis agreement over its interpretation has grown. Several of the papers aim to put the record straight with respect to such works as Logische Syntax der Sprache, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, and Der Raum. This collection then attests to the continuing and growing attraction of Carnap's philosophy.

Preface This book is about semantics and logic. More specifically, it is about the semantics and logic of natural language; and, even more specifically than that, it is about a particular way of dealing with those subjects, known as Discourse Representation Theory, or DRT. DRT is an approach towards natural language semantics which, some thirteen years ago, arose out of attempts to deal with two distinct problems. The first of those was the semantic puzzle that had been brought to contempo­ rary attention by Geach's notorious'donkey sentences'- sentences like If Pedro owns some donkey, he beats it, in which the anaphoric connection we perceive between the indefinite noun phrase some donkey and the pronoun it may seem to conflict with the existential meaning of the word some. The second problem had to do with tense and aspect. Some languages, for instance French and the other Romance languages, have two morphologically distinct past tenses, a simple past (the French Passe Simple) and a continuous past (the French Imparfait). To articulate precisely what the difference between these tenses is has turned out to be surprisingly difficult.

Free logic - i.e., logic free of existential presuppositions in general and with respect to singular terms in particular- began to come into its own as a field of research in the 1950s. As is the case with so many developments in Western philosophy, its roots can be traced back to ancient Greek philo­ sophy. It is only during the last fifty years, however, that it has become well established as a branch of modern logic. The name of Karel Lambert is most closely connected with this development: he gave it its name and its profile as a well defined field of research. After a development of fifty years, it is time to look back and take stock while at the same time scanning for new perspectives. This is the purpose of the papers collected in this volume. The first paper is written by Karel Lambert himself who also comments on all the papers of the other authors. In an introductory essay we give a survey of the present status of and new directions in free logic.

This volume of papers grew out of a research project on'Cross-Linguistic Quantification'originated by Emmon Bach, Angelika Kratzer and Barbara Partee in 1987 at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and supported by National Science Foundation Grant BNS 871999. The publication also reflects directly or indirectly several other related activ­ ities. Bach, Kratzer, and Partee organized a two-evening symposium on cross-linguistic quantification at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America in New Orleans (held without financial support) in order to bring the project to the attention of the linguistic community and solicit ideas and feedback from colleagues who might share our concern for developing a broader typological basis for research in semantics and a better integration of descriptive and theoretical work in the area of quantification in particular. The same trio organized a six-week workshop and open lecture series and related one-day confer­ ence on the same topic at the 1989 LSA Linguistic Institute at the University of Arizona in Tucson, supported by a supplementary grant, NSF grant BNS-8811250, and Partee offered a seminar on the same topic as part of the Institute course offerings. Eloise Jelinek, who served as a consultant on the principal grant and was a participant in the LSA symposium and the Arizona workshops, joined the group of editors for this volume in 1989.

Like the journal TOPOl, the TOPOl Library is based on the assumption that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of shooting our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a dialogue, that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one's approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one's own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every comer, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect.

The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition (or explication) of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski's famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising'by-product'of Tarski's effort to bring truth under control was the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non­ trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language. This implied that truth (and consequently semantic concepts to which truth appeared to be reducible) proved itself to be strangely'language-dependent': we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine (1969, p. 68) put it, that truth belongs to'transcendental metaphysics', and Tarski's'scientific'investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some more traditional philosophical views on truth. 3. TARSKI'S THEORY AS A PARADIGM So far Tarski himself. Subsequent philosophers then had to find out what his considerations of the concept of truth really mean and what are their consequences; and this now seems to be an almost interminable task.

The papers in this volume address central issues in the study of Plurality and Quantification from three different perspectives: • Algebraic approaches to Plurals and Quantification • Distributivity and Collectivity: Theoretical Foundations • Distributivity and Collectivity: Empirical Investigations Algebraic approaches to the semantics of natural languages were in­ dependently introduced for the study of generalized quantification, pred­ ication, intensionality, mass terms and plurality. The most prominent modern advocate for an algebraic theory of plurality (and mass terms) is certainly Godehard Link. It is indicative of the Wirkungsgeschichte of Link's work that most of the contributions in this volume take the logic of plurals proposed by Godehard Link (Link 1983, 1987) as their foundation or, at the very least, as their point of reference. Link's own paper in this volume provides a concise summary of many of the central research issues that have engaged semanticists during the last decade. Link's paper also contains an extensive bibliography that provides an excellent resource for scholars interested in the semantics of plurals. Since we can refer readers to Link's paper for an excellent survey of the subject matter of this book, we will limit our attention in this in­ troduction to summarizing the individual contributions in this volume. The book is organized into three main sections; within each section the papers are ordered alphabetically. However, as in much of linguistic the­ orizing, there is an exception: for reasons pointed out above, Godehard Link's article appears as Chapter 1.

Various students of general linguistics and semantics quote and discuss Wittgenstein, among others, OGDEN and RICHARDS (1960), ULLMANN (1951, 1962), PAGLIARO (1952, 1957), WELLS (1960), REGNELL (1960) and 1 ZIFF (1960). For the most part however they quote the Tractatus and not 2 the Philosophical Investigations ; not all of them consider the most important ideas in the Tractatus but often discuss marginal points; above all they often make the discussion of Wittgenstein's ideas secondary to the development of their own thought. It should be added, moreover, that these students are exceptions. The large majority of language theorists, especially those with a philological background, have almost no know­ ledge of Wittgenstein's ideas. One scholar thinks that Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy rests upon a grotesque misunderstanding of the workings of language (HERDAN, 1962, Chapter 24). The present book seeks to draw the attention of students of general linguistics and semantics to the thought of both the early and the later Wittgenstein: not only the Philosophical Investigations but also the Tractatus is concerned with everyday language: Wittgenstein was thinking of the propositions of everyday language, when he affirmed that the proposition is a picture of reality (Chapter 1). This conception is very old, it is in fact found in Aristotle and it dominated ancient, mediaeval and modern rationalistic thought; only Locke, Vico and Leibniz criticized it strongly (Chapter 2).

This volume contains a collection of research papers centered around the concept of quantifier. Recently this concept has become the central point of research in logic. It is one of the important logical concepts whose exact domain and applications have so far been insufficiently explored, especially in the area of inferential and semantic properties of languages. It should thus remain the central point of research in the future. Moreover, during the last twenty years generalized quantifiers and logical technics based on them have proved their utility in various applications. The example of natu­ rallanguage semantics has been partcularly striking. For a long time it has been belived that elementary logic also called first-order logic was an ade­ quate theory of logical forms of natural language sentences. Recently it has been accepted that semantics of many natural language constructions can­ not be properly represented in elementary logic. It has turned out, however, that they can be described by means of generalized quantifiers. As far as computational applications oflogic are concerned, particulary interesting are semantics restricted to finite models. Under this restriction elementary logic looses several of its advantages such as axiomatizability and compactness. And for various purposes we can use equally well some semantically richer languages of which generalized quantifiers offer the most universal methods of describing extensions of elementary logic. Moreover we can look at generalized quantifiers as an explication of some specific mathematical concepts, e. g.

Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Computation is the first concentrated effort to give a systematic presentation of the main research results on the subject, since the modern concept was formulated in the late'50s and early'60s. The majority of the papers are in the nature of a handbook. All of them are self-contained, at various levels of difficulty. The Introduction surveys the main ideas and problems encountered in the logical investigation of quantifiers. The Prologue, written by Per Lindström, presents the early history of the concept of generalised quantifiers. The volume then continues with a series of papers surveying various research areas, particularly those that are of current interest. Together they provide introductions to the subject from the points of view of mathematics, linguistics, and theoretical computer science. The present volume has been prepared in parallel with Quantifiers: Logics, Models and Computation, Volume Two. Contributions, which contains a collection of research papers on the subject in areas that are too fresh to be summarised. The two volumes are complementary. For logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, linguists and computer scientists. Suitable as a text for advanced undergraduate and graduate specialised courses in logic.

On the occasion of bis sixtieth birthday, we dedicate this volume to Jan Wo­ leriski-s-our teacher, our colleague, our friend. Both of us are particularly indebted to Jan not only with regards to profes­ sional matters, but some private ones as well. Hence, we hope that he forgives us an occasional lapse into fondness and affection. That said, may the list of bis personalmerits remain shrouded in mystery; rather than unveil them, we open here by appraising Jan's presence from a broader perspective. Tonote that Jan was not always a part of our lives would not evoke surprise. However, to imagine the Institute of Pbilosophy on Grodzka Street or Krakow pbilosophy without him in it would be a harder task-at least for us, Nonethe­ less, we do remember the days when he was commuting to Krakow as a guest lecturer. Is there anything about those days which particularly comes to mind? To shed light on the story which follows, one must begin by stating that the early 1980s when we were studying philosophy was not a bright period. The great masters of Krakow philosophy-Ingarden, Mehlberg, Zawirski, or Dambska-> were either dead or, for political reasons, kept silent. The years following Martial Law (1981-1983) were intellectually very blighted and barren. In the midst of all this we were attending Jan's course on general methodology.

1. Metaphors and Logic Metaphors are among the most vigorous offspring of the creative mind; but their vitality springs from the fact that they are logical organisms in the ecology of l- guage. I aim to use logical techniques to analyze the meanings of metaphors. My goal here is to show how contemporary formal semantics can be extended to handle metaphorical utterances. What distinguishes this work is that it focuses intensely on the logical aspects of metaphors. I stress the role of logic in the generation and int- pretation of metaphors. While I don't presuppose any formal training in logic, some familiarity with philosophical logic (the propositional calculus and the predicate c- culus) is helpful. Since my theory makes great use of the notion of structure, I refer to it as the structural theory of m etaphor (STM). STM is a semant ic theory of m etaphor : if STM is correct, then metaphors are cognitively meaningful and are n- trivially logically linked with truth. I aim to extend possible worlds semantics to handle metaphors. I'll argue that some sentences in natural languages like English have multiple meanings:'Juliet is the sun'has (at least) two meanings: the literal meaning'(Juliet is the sunkIT'and the metaphorical meaning'(Juliet is the sun)MET'. Each meaning is a function from (possible) worlds to truth-values. I deny that these functions are identical; I deny that the metaphorical function is necessarily false or necessarily true.

The main aim of this book is to present recent ideas in logic centered around the notion of a consequence operation. We wish to show these ideas in a factually and materially connected way, i.e., in the form of a consistent theory derived from several simple assumptions and definitions. These ideas have arisen in many research centers. The thorough study of their history can certainly be an exciting task for the historian of logic; in the book this aspect of the theory is being played down. The book belongs to abstract algebraic logic, the area of research that explores to a large extent interconnections between algebra and logic. The results presented here concern logics defined in zero-order languages (Le., quantifier-free sentential languages without predicate symbols). The reach of the theory expounded in the book is, in fact, much wider. The theory is also valid for logics defined in languages of higer orders. The problem of transferring the theory to the level of first-order languages has been satisfactorily solved and new ideas within this area have been put forward in the work of Blok and Pigozzi [1989].

The larger part of Yearbook 6 of the Institute Vienna Circle constitutes the proceedings of a symposium on Alfred Tarski and his influence on and interchanges with the Vienna Circle, especially those on and with Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel. It is the first time that this topic has been treated on such a scale and in such depth. Attention is mainly paid to the origins, development and subsequent role of Tarski's definition of truth. Some contributions are primarily historical, others analyze logical aspects of the concept of truth. Contributors include Anita and Saul Feferman, Jan Wolenski, Jan Tarski and Hans Sluga. Several Polish logicians contributed: Gzegorczyk, Wójcicki, Murawski and Rojszczak. The volume presents entirely new biographical material on Tarski, both from his Polish period and on his influential career in the United States: at Harvard, in Princeton, at Hunter, and at the University of California at Berkeley. The high point of the analysis involves Tarski's influence on Carnap's evolution from a narrow syntactical view of language, to the ontologically more sophisticated but more controversial semantical view. Another highlight involves the interchange between Tarski and Gödel on the connection between truth and proof and on the nature of metalanguages. The concluding part of Yearbook 6 includes documentation, book reviews and a summary of current activities of the Institute Vienna Circle. Jan Tarski introduces letters written by his father to Gödel; Paolo Parrini reports on the Vienna Circle's influence in Italy; several reviews cover recent books on logical empiricism, on Gödel, on cosmology, on holistic approaches in Germany, and on Mauthner.

Computational semantics is concerned with computing the meanings of linguistic objects such as sentences, text fragments, and dialogue contributions. As such it is the interdisciplinary child of semantics, the study of meaning and its linguistic encoding, and computational linguistics, the discipline that is concerned with computations on linguistic objects. From one parent computational semantics inherits concepts and techniques that have been developed under the banner of formal (or model-theoretic) semantics. This blend of logic and linguistics applies the methods of logic to the description of meaning. From the other parent the young discipline inherits methods and techniques for parsing sentences, for effective and efficient representation of syntactic structure and logical form, and for reasoning with semantic information. Computational semantics integrates and further develops these methods, concepts and techniques. This book is a collection of papers written by outstanding researchers in the newly emerging field of computational semantics. It is aimed at those linguists, computer scientists, and logicians who want to know more about the algorithmic realisation of meaning in natural language and about what is happening in this field of research. There is a general introduction by the editors.

This collection of papers stems originally from a conference on Property Theory, Type Theory and Semantics held in Amherst on March 13-16 1986. The conference brought together logicians, philosophers, com­ puter scientists and linguists who had been working on these issues (of ten in isolation from one another). Our intent was to boost debate and exchange of ideas on these fundamental issues at a time of rapid change in semantics and cognitive science. The papers published in this work have evolved substantially since their original presentation at the conference. Given their scope, we thought it convenient to divide the work into two volumes. The first deals primarily with logical and philosophical foundations, the second with more empirical semantic issues. While there is a common set of issues tying the two volumes together, they are both self-contained and can be read independently of one another. Two of the papers in the present collection (van Benthem in volume 1 and Chierchia in volume II) were not actually read at the conference. They are nevertheless included here for their direct relevance to the topics of the volumes. Regrettably, some of the papers that were presented (Feferman, Klein, and Plotkin) could not be included in the present work due to timing problems. We nevertheless thank the authors for their contribu­ tion in terms of ideas and participation in the debate.

This book is a collection of papers written by outstanding researchers in the newly emerging field of computational semantics. Computational semantics is concerned with the computation of the meanings of linguistic objects such as text fragments, spoken dialogue utterances, and e-mail messages. The meaning of such an object is determined partly by linguistic information and partly by information from the context in which the object occurs. The information from these sources is combined by processes that infer which interpretation of the object applies in the given context. This applies not only to notoriously difficult aspects of interpreting linguistic objects, such as indexicals, anaphora, and metonymy, but also to establishing the precise reference of common nouns and the scopes of noun phrases. The central issue in computational semantics is how processes of finding and combining the relevant linguistic and contextual information into contextually appropriate meanings can be organised. Traditional approaches of applying context information to disambiguated natural language expressions do not work well, due to the massive ambiguity in natural language. Recent work in computational semantics suggests, alternatively, to represent linguistic semantic information in formal structures with underspecification, and to apply context information in inference processes that result in further specification of these representations. Underspecified representation and inference are therefore the key topics in this book. The book is aimed at those linguists, computer scientists, and logicians who take an interest in the computation of meaning, and who want to know what is happening in this exciting field of research.

Our preferences determine how we act and think, but exactly what the mechanics are and how they work is a central cause of concern in many disciplines. This book uses techniques from modern logics of information flow and action to develop a unified new theory of what preference is and how it changes. The theory emphasizes reasons for preference, as well as its entanglement with our beliefs. Moreover, the book provides dynamic logical systems which describe the explicit triggers driving preference change, including new information, suggestions, and commands. In sum, the book creates new bridges between many fields, from philosophy and computer science to economics, linguistics, and psychology. For the experienced scholar access to a large body of recent literature is provided and the novice gets a thorough introduction to the action and techniques of dynamic logic.

This book argues that languages are composed of sets of ‘signs', rather than ‘strings'. This notion, first posited by de Saussure in the early 20th century, has for decades been neglected by linguists, particularly following Chomsky's heavy critiques of the 1950s. Yet since the emergence of formal semantics in the 1970s, the issue of compositionality has gained traction in the theoretical debate, becoming a selling point for linguistic theories.Yet the concept of ‘compositionality'itself remains ill-defined, an issue this book addresses. Positioning compositionality as a cornerstone in linguistic theory, it argues that, contrary to widely held beliefs, there exist non-compositional languages, which shows that the concept of compositionality has empirical content. The author asserts that the existence of syntactic structure can flow from the fact that a compositional grammar cannot be delivered without prior agreement on the syntactic structure of the constituents.

Abstract In the chapter some preliminary methodological issues are discussed, including the demarcation between logic and linguistics and the shortcomings of empirical base of the theory of syntax. An epistemological approach to language is sketched out and a need for the proper balance between logical aspects of natural language and vernacular usage is claimed crucial for any reliable theory of syntax and - mantics. Learnability and efficiency are presented as the most important c- straints to be imposed upon a logical analysis of language. Keywords Linguistics, Logic, Methodology, Natural Language 1. 1 Epistemological Background of the Problem of Syntax Among central questions of epistemology two are the most fundamental: how language is related to the reality that we talk about in this language, and how one can rationally learn what this reality is like. Let us label these questions resp- tively ‘the question of reference'and ‘the question of method'. Certainly these two are very closely interconnected. Perhaps some solution to the problem of r- erence would solve the problem of method: the way in which language refers to reality would tell us how to verify the sentences of this language. But in general it can be otherwise. Equally imaginable is the case that we know what (e. g. which possible states of affairs) our sentences refer to but we do not know (scil. we c- not rationally justify our belief in this respect), whether they are true (scil.

OndrejMajer,Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen,andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as pretty disparate logical ‘systems', or else merely an assortment of formal and mathematical ‘approaches'to phi- sophical inquiry. This development has largely been fueled by an increasing dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a straightforward outcome of ‘logical pluralism'or ‘methodological diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete objects of formal study.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is rapidly becoming recognized as the greatest American philosopher. At the center of his philosophy was a revolutionary model of the way human beings think. Peirce, a logician, challenged traditional models by describing thoughts not as'ideas'but as'signs,'external to the self and without meaning unless interpreted by a subsequent thought. His general theory of signs -- or semiotic -- is especially pertinent to methodologies currently being debated in many disciplines.This anthology, the first one-volume work devoted to Peirce's writings on semiotic, provides a much-needed, basic introduction to a complex aspect of his work. James Hoopes has selected the most authoritative texts and supplemented them with informative headnotes. His introduction explains the place of Peirce's semiotic in the history of philosophy and compares Peirce's theory of signs to theories developed in literature and linguistics.