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Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons presents a philosophical conception of logic—“logical expressivism”—according to which the role of logic is to make explicit reason relations, which are often neither monotonic nor transitive. This conception of logic reveals new and enlightening perspectives on inferential roles, sequent calculi, representation, truthmakers, and many extant logical theories.The book shows how we can understand different metavocabularies as making explicit the same reason relations, namely normative-pragmatic, alethic-representational, logical, and “implication-space” metavocabularies. This includes a philosophical account of the pragmatic role of reason relations, treatments of nonmonotonic and nontransitive consequence relations in sequent calculi, a correspondence between these sequent calculi and variants of truthmaker theory, and the introduction of a novel kind of formal semantics that interprets sentences by assigning inferential roles to them. The book thus offers logical expressivists and semantic inferentialists new ways to understand logic, content, inferential roles, representation, and reason relations.This book will appeal to researchers and graduate students who are interested in the philosophy of logic, in reasons and reasoning, in theories of meaning and content, or in nonmonotonic and nontransitive logics.

This book offers a collection of papers on focal themes in truth research, including minimalism, pragmatism and pluralism, and philosophical logic. It further provides valuable hindsight with contemporary perspectives on the works of Frege, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Strawson, and Evans on truth, and it features recent discussions on the role and value of truth in politics and political discourse. The collection is based on groundbreaking presentations hosted by the Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR), including talks given at the TRUTH 20/20 conference. The volume features exclusive transcriptions of panel discussions on truth and factuality with Huw Price, Douglas Edwards, Cheryl Misak, and Amie Thomasson, and on truth and polarization with Michael Lynch, Maria Baghramian, and Cailin O'Connor. It includes the transcript of a televised 1973 conversation between Peter Strawson and Gareth Evans. And the volume features new contributions from established and early career researchers in the field. Anyone interested in the nature and value of truth will find this volume to be indispensable.

This book is about rules, and especially about human capability to create, maintain and follow rules, as a root of what makes us humans different from other animals. The leading idea is that scrutinizing this capability is able to tell us who we humans are and what kinds of lives we live. It elaborates Wilfrid Sellars'visionary observation that “to say that man is a rational animal, is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules”; and it builds on the ideas of Sellars'and Brandom's inferentialism, in a novel naturalistic way.The main tenet of inferentialism is that our language games are essentially rule-governed and that meanings are inferential roles. Jaroslav Peregrin sees the task of reconciliation of inferentialism and naturalism as centered around the problem of naturalization of rules. He argues that the most primitive form of a rule is a cluster of normative attitudes. We humans are specific by our tendency to assume peculiar attitudes to what we do, and to do so in a specific way, which turns the attitudes into “normative” ones. This self-reflective structure characterizes our ability to build systems of interconnected rules, which have come to constitute our natural niche. Furthermore, Peregrin shows how our most important system of rules – that constitutive of our language – helped to lead us to our current position of rule-following, ultra-social, rational, and discursive creatures.Normative Species will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, social ontology, cultural evolution and cognitive science.

This book provides an in-depth analysis of the nature and role of hypothetical reasoning about impossibilities. The interest in this subject stems from the simple observation that wondering is an inherent aspect of our experience. Whether one regrets choosing a taxicab over the subway or contemplates the outcome of an election turning out differently, the question'What would have happened if...?'is a familiar one. While we often focus on possible scenarios, we also ponder impossible ones: What if whales were fish? What if a man could be in two places at once? What if one could draw a round square? Puzzles concerning such questions sparked a heated discussion over the nature and role of hypothetical reasoning about impossibilities. This book goes beyond being an opinionated introduction to this debate. After comparing various approaches to this issue, it proposes a novel perspective that draws on considerations from epistemology and the philosophy of explanation and dependence. Targeting researchers and students interested in the philosophy of modalities, this book delivers an in-depth analysis of a captivating and often overlooked aspect of human reasoning.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Dieser Band versammelt Texte aus dem Nachlass Moritz Schlicks über den Begriff und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ein großer Teil davon gehört zum Spätwerk Schlicks, und er plante selbst, sie zu publizieren. Diese Edition macht darum erstmals und im Zusammenhang Texte zugänglich, die noch weitgehend unbekannt sind. Schlick zeichnete darin die Philosophiegeschichte als Geschichte eines Irrtums. Dieser Irrtum wurde von den Eleaten zuerst begangen, indem sie Schein und Sein unterschieden, und wird seither in wechselnder Terminologie wiederholt. Durch die moderne Logik kann dieser Irrtum nach Schlicks Ansicht beseitigt werden.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

Die „Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie“, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die „Enzyklopädie“ umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht.

This volume develops a theory of meaning and a semantics for both mathematical and empirical sentences inspired to Chomsky's internalism, namely to a view of semantics as the study of the relations of language not with external reality but with internal, or mental, reality. In the first part a theoretical notion of justification for a sentence A is defined, by induction on the complexity of A; intuitively, justifications are conceived as cognitive states of a particular kind. The main source of inspiration for this part is Heyting's explanation of the intuitionistic meaning of logical constants.In the second part the theory is applied to the solution of several foundational problems in the theory of meaning and epistemology, such as Frege's puzzle, Mates'puzzle about synonymy, the paradox of analysis, Kripke's puzzle about belief, the de re/de dicto distinction, the specific/non-specific distinction, Gettier's problems, the paradox of knowability, and the characterization oftruth. On a more general philosophical level, throughout the book the author develops a tight critique of the neo-verificationism of Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf, and defends a mentalist interpretation of intuitionism.

This book explores some of Kit Fine's outstanding contributions to logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics, among others.Contributing authors address in-depth issues about truthmaker semantics, counterfactual conditionals, grounding, vagueness, non-classical consequence relations, and arbitrary objects, offering critical reflections and novel research contributions.Each chapter is accompanied by an extensive commentary, in which Kit Fine offers detailed responses to the ideas and themes raised by the contributors. The book includes a brief autobiography and exhaustive list of his publications to this date. This book is of interest to logicians of all stripes and to analytic philosophers more generally.

This book covers the topic of discourse and argumentation in archaeology with an aim to serve the archaeology community. The book presents discourse and argument analysis approaches and techniques in an affordable manner and applied to archaeological situations. It focuses on techniques and approaches that can be applicable to multiple situations, periods and cultures. The book begins with an introduction to discourse and argumentation analysis as a general field and also as an auxiliary technique to archaeology. The work includes conceptual applications, ranging from causality, ontological connections, vagueness, social production of discourse and public debates. The work also devotes a section to computational approaches and describes the specifics of some well-known families of algorithms such as lexical processing, information extraction or sentiment analysis. The conclusion comments on the future and which reflects on the previous chapters and discusses how the presented techniques and approaches should be adapted or improved for easier and more powerful application to archaeology. Contributing authors bring perspectives from archaeology, linguistics, and computer science.

Logical monism is the claim that there is a single correct logic, the'one true logic'of our title. The view has evident appeal, as it reflects assumptions made in ordinary reasoning as well as in mathematics, the sciences, and the law. In all these spheres, we tend to believe that there are determinate facts about the validity of arguments. Despite its evident appeal, however, logical monism must meet two challenges. The first is the challenge from logical pluralism, according to which there is more than one correct logic. The second challenge is to determine which form of logical monism is the correct one. One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particular monism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. In particular, it generalises the Tarski-Sher criterion of logicality, provides a novel defence of this generalisation, offers a clear new argument for the logicality of infinitary logic and replies to recent pluralist arguments.

Julia Tanney's Meaning, Mind, and Action mounts an overarching challenge to widely held presuppositions within the practice of philosophy in its classical ‘analytic'forms as well as in its ‘naturalist'and ‘cognitivist'turns, expanding upon those introduced in Rules, Reason and Self-Knowledge (2013). Influenced by arguments of Wittgenstein, Ryle, and others, Tanney confronts the ‘platitudes'or unalterable starting points that implicitly or explicitly ground mainstream, philosophical theorising, beginning with the ideas first, that the meaning of a complex, natural language expression such as a sentence is determined by its structure and second, that the meaning of its constituents and that such content—which must remain stable across contexts—is needed to accommodate logical transformations (embeddings in, say, negational, conditional, or propositional attitude contexts) and inferential reasoning. Opposing the ideas that this semantic or propositional content is the bearer of truth or falsehood and that to grasp a concept is to be equipped with rules which fix the relation between an expression and its reference or extension, Tanney argues, by contrast, that our practices are logically prior to their codifications. Explanations, justifications, or the appeal to principles, rules, norms are not on the same logical footing as the moves they endorse; in particular, our successful linguistic practices are not causally explained by a prior grasp of ‘meanings'. Further, to appreciate the indefinite elasticity of most, if not all, natural language expressions is to accept that there may be nothing in common by which we call a thing by the same name. Not only does this subvert the idea that the essence of our concepts can be revealed by contextually transcendent application conditions; it undermines the idea that they function to signify facts, properties, events, or relations whose nature is to be revealed by metaphysical or philosophical-scientific speculation. Construing them so would destroy the saying and explanatory power of the expressions subsumed by these concept-nouns in natural language discourses.

Lange Zeit haben die apodiktischen Sätze als das goldene Eingangstor zum Kantianismus gegolten. So fand eine spürbare und fragliche Reduktion der Kantschen Gesamtlehre statt und entstand die philosophiegeschichtliche (unkritische) Illusion, daß man Descartes, Hume, Locke und Leibniz unwiderruflich widerlegen könnte. Diese Abhandlung entfaltet sich in einer reflektierenden und übergreifenderen Perspektive und vergegenwärtigt die Kantsche Methode (skeptischer Herkunft) der Suspendierung der Urteile. Die Verflechtungen des induktiven und deduktiven Verfahrens und Kants Grundunterscheidung zwischen Satz und Urteil ermöglichen - unter Berücksichtigung der zuletzt veröffentlichten Texte aus dem Nachlaß - die Vermittlung eines lebendigen, differenzierten und genaueren Bildes des Kritizismus. Die Rekonstruktion der Kantschen »Logik der vorläufigen Urteile« eröffnet den Zugang zu der tieferen Ebene des Werkes, bringt eine Mehrzahl »unbekannter« logischer und philosophischer Projekte zutage und läßt die komplexe Einstellung Kants zum Rätsel des Existenzbegriffes erst entdecken. Überraschende Entwicklungen der kritischen Formenlehre und phänomenologische Betrachtungen offenbaren die vielfältigen Funktionen der Urteilskraft und tragen zur Profilierung einer Originaldiagnostik des Urteilens bei. Der Kritizismus wird mit der Aristotelischen Tradition und mit den gegenwärtigen Strömungen in der Logik (Strawson, Dummett, Quine, Kripke, Putnam) konfrontiert. Richard Regvald beleuchtet neue Zusammenhänge der Entstehung der transzendentalen Logik und flicht die innerhalb des Kantschen Werkes zerstreuten Elemente einer universellen Logik zusammen. Virtueller Panlogismus und philosophische Reflexion ergänzen sich gegenseitig. Die Letztbegründung der Logik ist bei Kant die Endlichkeit des Menschen. Die Abhandlung verteidigt den Geist über die Buchstaben des Kritizismus.

Wittgensteins Denken belebt nach wie vor die zeitgenössischen Debatten in der Sprachphilosophie ebenso wie in der Sprachwissenschaft, der Philosophie der Logik und Mathematik oder der Philosophie des Geistes. Das Handbuch informiert über Wittgensteins Leben und seine Persönlichkeit, bietet einen umfassenden Überblick über die Editions- und Werkgeschichte und stellt zentrale Begriffe aus allen Phasen von Wittgensteins Philosophieren in alphabetischer Ordnung von ‚Absicht‘ über ‚Logik‘ bis zu ‚Zweifel‘ vor. In den Beiträgen aus der Feder international renommierter Wittgenstein-Forscherinnen und -Forscher wird der gegenwärtige Forschungsstand in seiner Breite dargelegt. Dabei werden Kontinuitäten wie auch Brüche in der Entwicklung seines Denkens besonders berücksichtigt. Abschließend wird auf Wittgensteins Wirkung eingegangen, dessen Werk nicht nur mehrere philosophische Strömungen beeinflusst, sondern auch in verschiedenen Bereichen der Kunst, wie z.B. Literatur, Musik und Film Spurenhinterlassen hat.

Argumentatie verschaft een systematische inleiding in de belangrijkste begrippen uit de argumentatieleer. Het maakt duidelijk hoe deze begrippen gebruikt kunnen worden om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de manier waarop er in betogen en discussies wordt geargumenteerd en daar vervolgens ook een beter gefundeerd oordeel over te kunnen geven. Daartoe zijn er na de uitleg van de theorie in het eerste gedeelte van het boek in het tweede gedeelte een groot aantal oefeningen opgenomen die de lezer van het boek in staat stellen de verworven inzichten te verdiepen en toe te passen. Argumentatie is de oorspronkelijke versie van deze inleiding in de argumentatieleer. Behalve in het Engels, Spaans, Chinees en Japans, is deze Nederlandstalige publicatie in tal van andere talen vertaald. Het boek is al een hele tijd een toonaangevende inleiding in het analyseren, beoordelen en houden van betogen. Bij elke nieuwe druk is het grondig gereviseerd op grond van de ervaringen die docenten, studenten en andere gebruikers ermee hebben opgedaan. Daarbij is ook steeds recht gedaan aan nieuwe ontwikkelingen in het vakgebied. In deze nieuwe druk zijn er tevens twee nieuwe hoofdstukken over het houden van schriftelijke en mondelinge betogen toegevoegd. Frans van Eemeren en Francisca Snoeck Henkemans zijn internationaal gerenommeerde deskundigen op het gebied van de argumentatietheorie. Ze zijn de auteurs van een groot aantal (vooral Engelstalige) boeken en artikelen, waarin allerlei facetten van argumentatie aan de orde komen. Frans van Eemeren is emeritus hoogleraar Taalbeheersing, Argumentatietheorie en Retorica aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans was tot haar pensioen in 2019 universitair hoofddocent aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam.

As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance and Robert Brandom's logical expressivism. Arazim then draws on proof-theoretical approaches to present a convincing argument for a dynamic version of logical inferentialism, which opens space for a new freedom to modify our own logic. He explores the scope, possibilities and limits of this freedom in order to highlight the future paths logic could take, as a motivation for further research.Marking a departure from logical monism and also from the recent doctrine of logical pluralism in its various forms, this book addresses current debates concerning the expressive role of logic and contributes to a lively area of discussion in analytic philosophy.

“A remarkable book capable of reshaping what one takes philosophy to be.”—Cora Diamond, Kenan Professor of Philosophy Emerita, University of VirginiaCould there be a logical alien—a being whose ways of talking, inferring, and contradicting exhibit an entirely different logical shape than ours, yet who nonetheless is thinking? Could someone, contrary to the most basic rules of logic, think that two contradictory statements are both true at the same time? Such questions may seem outlandish, but they serve to highlight a fundamental philosophical question: is our logical form of thought merely one among many, or must it be the form of thought as such?From Descartes and Kant to Frege and Wittgenstein, philosophers have wrestled with variants of this question, and with a range of competing answers. A seminal 1991 paper, James Conant's “The Search for Logically Alien Thought,” placed that question at the forefront of contemporary philosophical inquiry. The Logical Alien, edited by Sofia Miguens, gathers Conant's original article with reflections on it by eight distinguished philosophers—Jocelyn Benoist, Matthew Boyle, Martin Gustafsson, Arata Hamawaki, Adrian Moore, Barry Stroud, Peter Sullivan, and Charles Travis. Conant follows with a wide-ranging response that places the philosophical discussion in historical context, critiques his original paper, addresses the exegetical and systematic issues raised by others, and presents an alternative account.The Logical Alien challenges contemporary conceptions of how logical and philosophical form must each relate to their content. This monumental volume offers the possibility of a new direction in philosophy.

This volume clusters together issues centered upon the variety of types of intensional semantics. Consisting of 10 contributions, the volume is based on papers presented at the Trends in Logic 2019 conference. The various chapters introduce readers to the topic, or apply new types of logical semantics to elucidate subtleties of logical systems and natural language semantics.The book introduces hyperintentional systems that aim at solving some open philosophical problems. Specifically, the first three studies focus on relating semantics, while the following ones discuss fundamental issues related to hyper-intensional semantics or develop hyper-intensional frameworks to address issues in modal, epistemic, deontic and action logic. Authors in this volume present original results on logical systems but also extend beyond this by offering philosophical considerations on the topic as well. This volume will appeal to students and researchers in the field of logic.

A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction is a textbook on the mathematics of the probability calculus and its applications in philosophy. On the mathematical side, the textbook introduces these parts of logic and set theory that are needed for a precise formulation of the probability calculus. On the philosophical side, the main focus is on the problem of induction and its reception in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Particular emphasis is placed on the means-end approach to the justification of inductive inference rules. In addition, the book discusses the major interpretations of probability. These are philosophical accounts of the nature of probability that interpret the mathematical structure of the probability calculus. Besides the classical and logical interpretation, they include the interpretation of probability as chance, degree of belief, and relative frequency. The Bayesian interpretation of probability as degree of belief locates probability in a subject's mind. It raises the question why her degrees of belief ought to obey the probability calculus. In contrast to this, chance and relative frequency belong to the external world. While chance is postulated by theory, relative frequencies can be observed empirically. A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction aims to equip students with the ability to successfully carry out arguments. It begins with elementary deductive logic and uses it as basis for the material on probability and induction. Throughout the textbook results are carefully proved using the inference rules introduced at the beginning, and students are asked to solve problems in the form of 50 exercises. An instructor's manual contains the solutions to these exercises as well as suggested exam questions. The book does not presuppose any background in mathematics, although sections 10.3-10.9 on statistics are technically sophisticated and optional. The textbook is suitable for lower level undergraduate courses in philosophy and logic.

Sortal concepts are at the center of certain logical discussions and have played a significant role in solutions to particular problems in philosophy. Apart from logic and philosophy, the study of sortal concepts has found its place in specific fields of psychology, such as the theory of infant cognitive development and the theory of human perception. In this monograph, different formal logics for sortal concepts and sortal-related logical notions (such as sortal identity and first-order sortal quantification) are characterized. Most of these logics are intensional in nature and possess, in addition, a bidimensional character. That is, they simultaneously represent two different logical dimensions. In most cases, the dimensions are those of time and natural necessity, and, in other cases, those of time and epistemic necessity. Another feature of the logics in question concerns second-order quantification over sortal concepts, a logical notion that is also represented in thelogics. Some of the logics adopt a constant domain interpretation, others a varying domain interpretation of such quantification. Two of the above bidimensional logics are philosophically grounded on predication sortalism, that is, on the philosophical view that predication necessarily requires sortal concepts. Another bidimensional logic constitutes a logic for complex sortal predicates. These three sorts of logics are among the important novelties of this work since logics with similar features have not been developed up to now, and they might be instrumental for the solution of philosophically significant problems regarding sortal predicates. The book assumes a modern variant of conceptualism as a philosophical background. For this reason, the approach to sortal predicates is in terms of sortal concepts. Concepts, in general, are here understood as intersubjective realizable cognitive capacities. The proper features of sortal concepts are determined by an analysisof the main features of sortal predicates. Posterior to this analysis, the sortal-related logical notions represented in the above logics are discussed. There is also a discussion on the extent to which the set-theoretic formal semantic systems of the book capture different aspects of the conceptualist approach to sortals. These different semantic frameworks are also related to realist and nominalist approaches to sortal predicates, and possible modifications to them are considered that might represent those alternative approaches.

Ludwig Wittgenstein ist zweifellos einer der bedeutendsten und einflussreichsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts – und das, obwohl er zu Lebzeiten kaum etwas veröffentlicht hat. Bis heute wirken der Stil seines Philosophierens und seine Radikalität auf viele philosophisch außerordentlich inspirierend. Hinzu kommt das Schillernde seiner von Anekdoten umrankten Persönlichkeit, die in etlichen biographischen Werken aufgearbeitet wurde. Stefan Majetschak gibt einen konzisen Überblick über Leben und Gesamtwerk dieser Jahrhundertfigur und spürt ihren Wirkungen nach.

Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.

This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows?It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they areunambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn't in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it?Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction.The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.

This book addresses two related questions that have first arisen in Toulmin's seminal book on the uses of argument. The first question is the one of the relationship between the semantic analysis of modality and the structure of arguments. The second question is the one of the distinctive place, or role, of modality in the fundamental structure of arguments. These two questions concern how modality, as a semantic category, relates to the fundamental structure of arguments. The book addresses modality and argumentation also according to another perspective by looking at how different linguistic modal expressions may be taken as argumentative indicators. It explores the role of modal expressions as argumentative indicators by using the Italian modal system as a case study. At the same time, it uses predictions/forecasts in the business-financial daily press to investigate the relation between modality and the context of argumentation.

In recent years there have been a number of books-both anthologies and monographs-that have focused on the Liar Paradox and, more generally, on the semantic paradoxes, either offering proposed treatments to those paradoxes or critically evaluating ones that occupy logical space. At the same time, there are a number of people who do great work in philosophy, who have various semantic, logical, metaphysical and/or epistemological commitments that suggest that they should say something about the Liar Paradox, yet who have said very little, if anything, about that paradox or about the extant projects involving it. The purpose of this volume is to afford those philosophers the opportunity to address what might be described as reflections on the Liar.

This book brings together in one place David Hitchcock's most significant published articles on reasoning and argument. In seven new chapters he updates his thinking in the light of subsequent scholarship. Collectively, the papers articulate a distinctive position in the philosophy of argumentation.Among other things, the author:•develops an account of “material consequence” that permits evaluation of inferences without problematic postulation of unstated premises.•updates his recursive definition of argument that accommodates chaining and embedding of arguments and allows any type of illocutionary act to be a conclusion. •advances a general theory of relevance.•provides comprehensive frameworks for evaluating inferences in reasoning by analogy, means-end reasoning, and appeals to considerations or criteria.•argues that none of the forms of arguing ad hominem is a fallacy.•describes proven methods of teaching critical thinking effectively.

With this volume of the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science edited by S. Rahman et al. a challenging dialogue is being continued. The series'first volume argued that one way to recover the connections between logic, philosophy of sciences, and sciences is to acknowledge the host of alternative logics which are currently being developed. The present volume focuses on four key themes. First of all, several chapters unpack the connection between knowledge and epistemology with particular focus on the notion of knowledge as resulting from interaction. Secondly, new epistemological perspectives on linguistics, the foundations of mathematics and logic, physics, biology and law are a subject of analysis. Thirdly, several chapters are dedicated to a discussion of Constructive Type Theory and more generally of the proof-theoretical notion of meaning.Finally, the book brings together studies on the epistemic role of abduction and argumentation theory, both linked to non-monotonic approaches to the dynamics of knowledge.

This volume presents 50 contributions on the themes of reasonableness and effectiveness and their connections, which are central issues in argumentation theory. It discusses van Eemeren's views on the study of argumentation; the approach to argumentation adopted in pragma-dialectics; pragma-dialectical perspectives on the dialectical and pragmatic dimensions of argumentative discourse; the notion of strategic maneuvering; the pragma-dialectical method of analyzing argumentative discourse; the treatment of fallacies as violations of rules for critical discussion; pragma-dialectical views on context, the role of logic, verbal indicators of argumentative moves and argument schemes; and the process of writing and rewriting argumentative texts. The pragma-dialectical quantitative approach to empirical research on argumentative discourse is illustrated by reporting on selected, illustrative experimental studies, as well as qualitative studies of historical cases.

This book attempts to explicate and expand upon Frank Ramsey's notion of the realistic spirit. In so doing, it provides a systematic reading of his work, and demonstrates the extent of Ramsey's genius as evinced by both his responses to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the impact he had on Wittgenstein's later philosophical insights.

Für Martin Heidegger besteht ein enger innerer Zusammenhang zwischen der abendländischen Metaphysik und ihrer Logik. Er selbst hingegen hat sein ganzes Denken darauf ausgerichtet, die ›Wahrheit des Seins‹ vom Schicksal einer auf der Grundlage der Logik konstruierten Metaphysik zu trennen. Der erste Teil des vorliegenden Buches nimmt einige besonders signifikante Texte in den Blick und bietet eine Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers Denken über die Logik und ihre enge Beziehung zur Grundgestalt der Metaphysik. Der zweite Teil schließt hier an, indem er die wichtigsten der von Heidegger vorgebrachten Gründe dafür diskutiert, warum die abendländische Metaphysik die Wahrheit des Seins nicht habe aufzeigen können und warum sie die Gottesfrage falsch gestellt – und somit schon gar nicht gelöst – habe. Generell fokussiert die Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger auf die immer wieder betonte Identifikation von Philosophie und Phänomenologie sowie auf das Verbergende der Logik.

Logical pluralism is the view that different logics are equally appropriate, or equally correct. Logical relativism is a pluralism according to which validity and logical consequence are relative to something. In Varieties of Logic, Stewart Shapiro develops several ways in which one can be a pluralist or relativist about logic. One of these is an extended argument that words and phrases like'valid'and'logical consequence'are polysemous or, perhaps better, are cluster concepts. The notions can be sharpened in various ways. This explains away the'debates'in the literature between inferentialists and advocates of a truth-conditional, model-theoretic approach, and between those who advocate higher-order logic and those who insist that logic is first-order. A significant kind of pluralism flows from an orientation toward mathematics that emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century, and continues to dominate the field today. The theme is that consistency is the only legitimate criterion for a theory. Logical pluralism arises when one considers a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that invoke a non-classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent, and trivial, if classical logic is imposed. So validity is relative to a theory or structure. The perspective raises a host of important questions about meaning. The most significant of these concern the semantic content of logical terminology, words like'or','not', and'for all', as they occur in rigorous mathematical deduction. Does the intuitionistic'not', for example, have the same meaning as its classical counterpart? Shapiro examines the major arguments on the issue, on both sides, and finds them all wanting. He then articulates and defends a thesis that the question of meaning-shift is itself context-sensitive and, indeed, interest-relative. He relates the issue to some prominent considerations concerning open texture, vagueness, and verbal disputes. Logic is ubiquitous. Whenever there is deductive reasoning, there is logic. So there are questions about logical pluralism that are analogous to standard questions about global relativism. The most pressing of these concerns foundational studies, wherein one compares theories, sometimes with different logics, and where one figures out what follows from what in a given logic. Shapiro shows that the issues are not problematic, and that is usually easy to keep track of the logic being used and the one mentioned.

Philosophical aspects of law and jurisprudence are investigated from various points of view. This collection represents the analytic approach to legal philosophy. However, this approach is not extreme in the sense that it is limited exclusively to linguistic matters. The concept of norm as a directive of conduct is the central category analyzed in particular essays. The structure of directives as well as their semantic and pragmatic roles are studied. Pragmatic functions of directives are linked with their functioning as speech acts. Moreover, existence and validity of norms are analyzed. The author also touches on general methodological problems of legal theory and philosophy, particularly their relations to social sciences. The collection covers material interesting for philosophers, lawyers and social scientists.

This book is a historical investigation of the leading philosophical movement in England in the twentieth century. In seven chapters, the intellectual development of the most prominent representatives of analytic philosophy-Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein in Cambridge, and Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett in Oxford-is traced. The book does not aim, however, at delivering a story. This means, above all, that generalisations and conclusions are reduced to a minimum-an approach adopted in an endeavour to avert the danger of subjectivism that interpreting the philosophers under scrutiny would impose. My hope is that by following this aproach, my inves­ tigation will stimulate readers to make their own generalisations and conclusions on the basis of the objectively presented data. Instead, my aim is to articulate a flawless, comprehensive description of the phil­ osophical texts of the seven most significant analytic philosophers in England in the twentieth century. For this purpose, all their articles and books have been sifted through in order to pick out the most representative parts. For obvious reasons, only the chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein, and-to a lesser extent-the chapter on Moore, are more theoretical.

Andrea Bottani Massimiliano Carrara Pierdaniele Giaretta What do we do when we do metaphysics? The aim of this introduction is to give a provisional answer to this question, and then to explain the subtitle of the volume. It is easy to observe that when we do meta­ physics we engage in a linguistic activity, mainly consisting of uttering declarative sentences that are not very clear to most people. That is true, but, of course, it is not very informative. What do we speak of when we do metaphysics? A traditional answer could be: we speak of what things really are, so suggesting that things can appear in a way that is different from the way they really are. So understood, meta­ physics is about the sense, or the senses, of'real being'. A question that immediately arises is whether the sense of being is unique or is different for different types of things. Another question is whether it is possible that something could appear to be, but really not be. Modem analytic metaphysicians usually answer that the sense of being is unique, while acknowledging that there are different kinds of things, and that to say that something could appear to be but really not be is a plain contradiction, unless what is understood is that it could appear to us that there is something having such and such features, but viii Individuals, Essence, and Identity really there is no such a thing.

Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science is a collection of outstanding contributed papers presented at the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science held in Kraków in 1999. The Congress was a follow-up to the series of meetings, initiated once by Alfred Tarski, which aimed to provide an interdisciplinary forum for scientists, philosophers and logicians. The articles selected for publication in the book comply with that idea and innovatively address current issues in logic, metamathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and cognitive science, as well as philosophical problems of biology, chemistry and physics. The volume will be of interest to philosophers, logicians and scientists interested in foundational problems of their disciplines.

Like the journal TOPOl, the TOPOl Library is based on the assumption that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of shooting our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a dialogue, that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one's approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one's own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every comer, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect.

This collection of essays presents a systematic and up-to-date survey of the main aspects of Georg Henrik von Wright's philosophy, tracing the general humanistic leitmotiv to be found in his vast, varied output. The analysis covers the developments in Von Wright's thought up to the end of the 1990s. The essays are arranged thematically to focus on the chief areas of Von Wright's interests: practical rationality; human action and determinism; philosophical logic and theories of norms; research in the analytical tradition; and Wittgenstein studies. Readership: Scholars and students of moral philosophy, logic, psychology, sociology, cognitive science and the history of contemporary philosophy.

The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition (or explication) of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski's famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising'by-product'of Tarski's effort to bring truth under control was the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non­ trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language. This implied that truth (and consequently semantic concepts to which truth appeared to be reducible) proved itself to be strangely'language-dependent': we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine (1969, p. 68) put it, that truth belongs to'transcendental metaphysics', and Tarski's'scientific'investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some more traditional philosophical views on truth. 3. TARSKI'S THEORY AS A PARADIGM So far Tarski himself. Subsequent philosophers then had to find out what his considerations of the concept of truth really mean and what are their consequences; and this now seems to be an almost interminable task.

The papers in this volume address central issues in the study of Plurality and Quantification from three different perspectives: • Algebraic approaches to Plurals and Quantification • Distributivity and Collectivity: Theoretical Foundations • Distributivity and Collectivity: Empirical Investigations Algebraic approaches to the semantics of natural languages were in­ dependently introduced for the study of generalized quantification, pred­ ication, intensionality, mass terms and plurality. The most prominent modern advocate for an algebraic theory of plurality (and mass terms) is certainly Godehard Link. It is indicative of the Wirkungsgeschichte of Link's work that most of the contributions in this volume take the logic of plurals proposed by Godehard Link (Link 1983, 1987) as their foundation or, at the very least, as their point of reference. Link's own paper in this volume provides a concise summary of many of the central research issues that have engaged semanticists during the last decade. Link's paper also contains an extensive bibliography that provides an excellent resource for scholars interested in the semantics of plurals. Since we can refer readers to Link's paper for an excellent survey of the subject matter of this book, we will limit our attention in this in­ troduction to summarizing the individual contributions in this volume. The book is organized into three main sections; within each section the papers are ordered alphabetically. However, as in much of linguistic the­ orizing, there is an exception: for reasons pointed out above, Godehard Link's article appears as Chapter 1.

Abelard is one of the foremost protagonists of the'twelfth-century Renaissance'. He'picks up the baton'from Boethius resuming the activity of commenting on Aristotle's works. The present book focuses on the logical-grammatical analysis of natural language, which for Abelard is a fragment of'scientific Latin'. Tools of modern categorial grammar are employed to clarify many of the problems raised by historiography (such as meaning, abstract entities and universals). Among the merits of the volume is the fact that it has enlightened the radical interplay between the traditions of Aristotle's and Priscian's commentators and, in this context, Abelard's peculiar role in exploring a new field of linguistic inquiry. An ample analysis of grammatical sources and critical literature allows to evaluate the progress which is at the basis of the forthcoming terministic logic. The book is aimed at scholars of medieval philosophy as well as historians of logic and linguistics.

Joseph 1. Kockelmans Pennsylvania State University In July of 1999, Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Seebohm turned 65 years old, and thus en­ tered mandatory retirement. His friends, colleagues, and former students thought that it would be fitting to celebrate the event of his retirement with a volume of essays in his honor, in order to render homage to a great human being, an outstanding and dedicated teacher, a highly regarded philosopher and scholar, but above all a dear friend and colleague. When the editors thought about a unifying theme for the anthology, they finally settled on the research interests of Professor Seebohm; in their view the vast do­ main of his competence and interests would leave all participants the freedom to select a topic of their own choice that would nonetheless lie within this large realm as well as within the area of their own research interests. Professor Seebohm's research interests encompass work in Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, German Idealism (Kant in particular), History of Philosophy, Phi­ losophy of the formal sciences (of Logic in particular), Philosophy of History, Methodology and Philosophy of the Human Sciences, (including Psychology and Sociology), History of 19th Century British Empiricism (Mill), American Pragma­ tism, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Law and Practical Philosophy, the devel­ opment of the history of philosophy in Eastern Europe, especially in the Middle Ages, but also in the nineteenth century.

Over the past decade, rational agency has come to be recognised as a central theme in artificial intelligence. Drawing upon research on rational action and agency in philosophy, logic, game theory, decision theory, and the philosophy of language, this volume represents an advanced, comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of the field of rational agency as it stands today. It covers the philosophical foundations of rational agency, logical and decision-theoretic approaches to rational agency, multi-agent aspects of rational agency (including speech acts, joint plans, and cooperation protocols), and, finally, describes a number of approaches to programming rational agents. Although written from the standpoint of artificial intelligence, this interdisciplinary text will be of interest to researchers in logic, mainstream computer science, the philosophy of rational action and agency, and economics.

Willard VanOrman Quine has probably been the most influential th American philosopher of the 20 century. His work spans over seven decades, and covers many domains in philosophy. He has made major contributions to the fields of logic and set theory, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. Quine's first work in philosophy was in the field of logic. His major contributions are the two set-theoretic systems NF (1936) and ML (1940). 1 These systems were alternatives to the type theory of Principia Mathematica or Zermelo's set theory, and are still being studied by 2 mathematicians. An indirect contribution to the field of logic is his strong resistance to moda110gic. Quine's objectIons to the notions of necessity and analyticity have influenced the development of moda110gic? Quine has had an enormous influence on philosophy of mathematics. When Quine entered philosophy there was a discussion on the foundations of mathematics between the schools of intuitionism, formalism, and conventionalism. Quine soon took issue with Carnap's conventionalism in'Truth by convention,,4 (1936). Quine has never joined one of the other schools, but has added new elements that are the basic ones of the 5 contemporary schools of nominalism, platonism, and structuralism. Quine has long been in the shadow of Benacerraf and Putnam in this field. At the moment there seems to be a renewed interest in Quine's work, and most philosophers explicitly refer to Quine's work.