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This book develops a novel interpretation of the late-nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as holding a distinct and original metaethical position (a theory about our practice of ethics). David Emannuel Rowe characterizes it as a human-centered metaethics. A central achievement of A Nietzschean Metaethics is to bring Nietzsche into a conversation with the analytic metaethical tradition. To do so, Rowe interprets Nietzsche's use of such concepts as the notorious “will to power”; his ideal agent, the superman or Übermensch; nihilism; the eternal recurrence; Perspectivism; and Being and Becoming. The result is a view of Nietzsche as a radical moral error theorist, which is to say he defends the view that all statements that appeal to some value for their truth are false. This theory is radical because Nietzsche argues that insofar as language requires certain concepts for its truth it is in error, in virtue of an appeal to some value. Rowe also offers a view where the increase in one's power is a standard by which one can make sense of Nietzsche's so-called re-evaluation of all values. By means of this resolution, Nietzsche criticizes some contemporary themes in metaethics, such as particular views about moral motivation, reasons, moral error theory, and agency.

The past few decades have witnessed an intense focus on the notion of normativity. We orientate ourselves to think about normativity by asking a range of questions. There are ways we act and think, and ways in which the world is. But as well as what there is and what we do, what should or ought we to do? What reasons are there for acting and thinking? What values do certain ways of being have? What authority is had by the norms and standards that govern our behaviour and thought? At the heart of these debates are other questions. How should we characterize normative notions such as reason and value? What are the relations between them? Are they all properly normative? The Future of Normativity brings together work by a set of leading philosophers to consider what normative thought could and should be. These questions gain additional colour and point by being considered within different areas of our lives, such as the areas concerned with ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology. Further issues then come to the fore. Reasons and obligations in some areas seem to have more authority than in others, but why and how? Is there a'unity of normativity'across different areas? This volume therefore considers familiar questions afresh while also introducing new questions and topics, all of which bear on the future of normativity.

We often invoke broad ideas of reason, rationality, reasonableness, reasons, reasoning, and related concepts in commonsense and express their apparent authority through ordinary language and social practices. Despite what many philosophers, economists, psychologists, novelists, and others claim, the reason of everyday life is far more substantive than cold logic or calculating self-interest. Sovereign Reason: Autonomy and our Interests of Reason explores the idea that our power of reason includes an expansive set of governing abilities, substantive motives, and substantive principles. The volume develops this novel but partial theory of reason by drawing on a wide variety of Kant's texts and highlighting themes in our ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. The unifying idea of the Sovereignty Conception of Reason is that of an autonomous person who governs herself by reason in all respects. The Sovereignty Conception of Reason dramatically extends traditional Kantian conceptions of rational self-governance. We are able to govern our many mental powers by reason, not just our ability to make choices, and we can legislate, execute, and adjudicate in ourselves all kinds of principles of reason, not just moral ones. The Sovereignty Conception of Reason holds that our reason includes substantive final interests in various things. Part of having a rational nature is to care about knowledge, enlightenment, explanation, happiness, the lives of persons, and solidarity for their own sake. These interests of reason do not depend on our natural desires but are instead constitutive of our power of reason itself. The Sovereignty Conception of Reason also holds that our reason includes a principle of justifiability according to which mental acts of all kinds, including choices, beliefs, desires, and even feelings, are required by reason if and because they are justifiable to rational people on the basis of their substantive interests of reason. Many specific requirements that we affirm in commonsense can be derived from this abstract principle. The book contrasts the Sovereignty Conception of Reason with other prominent theories and explores specific rational principles it grounds concerning beneficence, coercion, deception, friendship, expressing respect, education, envy, self-development, and others.

The book highlights a neglected aspect of our moral practices: we can morally protest objectionable conduct without blaming agents for it. In this way, moral responses to wrongful conduct are possible without assessing the blameworthiness of agents. The book offers an account of moral protest as a type of stance-taking: in protest, the protester commits themselves to treating what they protest as morally objectionable, which is related to a specific class of moral emotions. The aptness conditions of moral protest and the concept of objectionability are discussed and this perspective is applied to a critical discussion of the attributionist view of blameworthiness and corresponding views of blame. It concludes that our moral practices allow for more variation than is often acknowledged, some of which unrelated to moral responsibility, and that this gives us reason not to insist on a broad view of blameworthiness. Specifically, it is argued that the significance of morally objectionable conduct and the needs of victims of wrongdoing can be done justice to without blame. The book thus suggests that moral protest without blame may be called for more often than we think, including for many types of wrongdoers whose culpability is disputed.

This volume not only explores Ross's moral philosophy and ethical theories, but also his aesthetics, intuitionist epistemology, metaphysics, and applied ethics. W. D. Ross is a major figure in the history of moral philosophy and his work has been increasingly discussed since the 1990s. He provided the first sustained articulation and defence of a new moral theory: a moderate deontology embodying a pluralistic theory of the right built around his most famous innovation, the concept of prima facie duty. His theory of the good is also pluralistic and, particularly in incorporating moral goodness, can be fruitfully contrasted both with Sidgwick's hedonism and Moore's value pluralism. Ross is an exemplar of clear moral reflection, a defender of the irreducible plurality of common-sense moral standards, a powerful opponent of absolute certainty in moral matters, and an insightful critic of utilitarianism. As a great Aristotelian scholar with a mastery of Aristotle's virtue ethics, he is able to clarify how practical wisdom informs moral deliberation and to portray, in illuminating detail, both virtue and virtuous action as paradigms of intrinsic value.

This volume explores the importance of constitutivism for legal studies. Constitutivism is the view that the normative force, or authority, of practical reasons is grounded in principles, capacities, aims, or functions that are essential to, and thus constitutive of, agency. While the implications that the constitutivist approach has on the fundamental metaethical disputes and central ethical debates have been extensively explored, the literature on the relations between constitutivism and law remains scarce, unsystematic, and sporadic. This collection brings together world-renowned practical philosophers and legal theorists to fill a noticeable gap in the literature. The authors systematically and innovatively address key dimensions of the relationships between constitutivism and the theoretical study of law, as well as programmatically offering novel insights into the conceptual connections between constitutivist claims, fundamental legal concepts and practices, legal issues, and, ultimately, the law as a distinctive concept. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Legal Philosophy, Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, Moral Philosophy and Metaethics.

Good as Usual argues that contemporary discussion on the nature of norms and values goes wrong by treating them as exceptional and mysterious, since they do not fit popular philosophical assumptions about metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. Timothy Williamson shows that, once we throw out those preconceived and outdated ideas, we can understand moral and evaluative features of reality as similar to its other features, and capable of being known and described in similar ways. The result is a new and anti-reductionist form of moral and evaluative realism and cognitivism. Williamson applies the same approach to practical reasoning about what to do, criticizing the subjectivist assumptions of standard decision theory, showing how the desires as well as the beliefs on which we act can amount to knowledge, and how connections between the justification of belief and the justification of action can benefit epistemology. Light is cast on the nature of rationality by a sharp distinction between rational beliefs and rational believers. Subtle logical fallacies about permissibility, obligation, and reasons are shown to have confused our normative thinking. This volume brings together and expands all of the author's work on normativity and value; it can be understood as the application to practical philosophy of the approach to theoretical philosophy developed in earlier work.

This book delves into a broad range of hitherto unresolved issues related to Zhuangzi's ethics, which include, but are not limited to, the fundamental question of whether Zhuangzi should be regarded as a moralist in the ordinary sense and what Zhuangzi's views on topics such as equality, moral relativism, good life, intersubjective relations, and social harmony really are. The twelve contributors to this book deliberate on these issues in six debates centering on recent influential publications in the field. In each debate, the relevant publications will be first challenged by their critic and then defended by their author, through which different and competing interpretations of Zhuangzi's ethical themes will directly confront each other. These author-meets-critic debates will not only reflect what is currently at stake in discussing Zhuangzi's ethics but also engage and enrich the state of the field today. This volume serves as a good companion to scholars, as well as graduate-level students, who are interested in gaining philosophical and ethical insights from Zhuangzi and Chinese philosophy in general.

We all have ethical beliefs. We may believe, for example, that torture is wrong, that compassion is a virtue, and that it is rational to promote what one values. These beliefs are normative; they concern what we ought or ought not to do, or what is valuable or worthy of our choosing, or what a society must try to guarantee. The problem of normativity is to explain what the normativity of these beliefs comes to. What is it for an ethical claim, an ethical judgment, or an ethical fact to be normative? All of the main problems in metaethics can be traced back to the problem of normativity. They arise in the form they do because ethics is normative. Ethical realists hold that there are ethical facts that are the truth-makers of ethical beliefs -- facts such as the fact that torture is wrong -- facts that are similar in all metaphysically and epistemologically important respects to biological, psychological, and physical ones. Ethical realism faces a variety of objections, but the most important is its purported inability to account for the normativity of the ethical facts that it postulates. Some philosophers think that the normativity objection poses an especially acute challenge to ethical naturalism because of its view that the ethical properties and facts are natural ones. David Copp aims to explain the naturalist's position, why it is important, and why we might find it plausible despite the objections it faces. He argues that, in fact, ethical naturalism is better positioned to answer the normativity objection, and to explain the nature of normativity, than its alternatives.

Henrique Schneider argues that understanding the three Early Confucian thinkers—Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi—as virtue-ethicists, political philosophers, or social conservatives proves too narrow. Championing a broader and more philosophical reading, The Early Confucian Philosophy of Agency: Virtuous Conduct sheds new light on a well-established topic. Virtuous conduct—aligning actions and motivations with virtues, social roles, and rituals—is the philosophy of agency of Early Confucianism. Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi share a common philosophy of agency, which does more than describe agents and acts: it also represents a progressive social and political program. Schneider characterizes Early Confucianism as a progressive philosophy due to its human-centered program for social reform, its process view of self-cultivation, and its development. Agents who cultivate themselves can produce virtuous conduct, flourish, and become Junzi. This lets them lead each other in self-cultivation, social environment, and polity. As such, virtuous conduct integrates ethics, social and political philosophy in a theory of action.

In The End of Epistemology As We Know It Brian Talbot explores various ways in which epistemic norms could matter, and shows how epistemic norms as standardly understood fall short on each. He argues that we can and should replace existing norms with norms that matter more. These replacement norms will be quite different from the norms standardly accepted by philosophers. In whichever way we try to explain the importance of the epistemic, it does not matter at all what we believe about most topics or why we believe it. When what we believe does matter, it is often not particularly important that our beliefs are true, but rather just that they are good enough for our purposes. When the truth is not what really matters, then no truth-connected epistemic notions, such as reliability, evidence, coherence, accuracy, or knowledge, are really normatively significant. Even when truth is genuinely important, Talbot argues, the standard epistemic norms do not properly aim at truth, because they do not allow us to sacrifice one true belief for the sake of others. In light of all of this, epistemic norms as standardly conceived are not really concerned with what matters. Talbot explains how epistemic norms that genuinely matter should replace truth-based epistemic notions with conceptions of success, reasons, and justification aimed at the'good enough.'These new norms will require us to form some seemingly bad beliefs--beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false--in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever. These arguments open the door for new projects in epistemology. They reveal the need for new accounts of epistemic goodness and rationality, and illuminate how to rigorously pursue these in ways that are genuinely attuned to what is worthwhile.

Why do people persist in commitments that threaten their happiness, security, and comfort? Why do some of our most central, identity-defining commitments seem to resist the effects of reasoning and critical reflection? Drawing on real-life examples, empirical psychology, and philosophical reflection, Paul Katsafanas argues that these commitments involve an ethical stance called devotion, which plays a pervasive--but often hidden--role in human life. Devotion typically involves sacralizing certain values, goals, or relationships. To sacralize a value is to treat it as inviolable (trade-offs with ordinary values are forbidden), incontestable (even contemplating such trade-offs is prohibited), and dialectically invulnerable (no rational considerations can disrupt the agent's commitment to the value). Philosophy of Devotion offers a detailed philosophical account and defense of these features. Devotion and the sacralization of values can be reasonable; indeed, a life involving meaningful, sustained commitment depends on these stances. Without devotion, we risk an existential condition that Katsafanas describes as normative dissipation, in which all of our commitments become etiolated. Yet devotion can easily go wrong, deforming into the individual and group fanaticism that have become pervasive features of modern social life. Katsafanas provides an alternative to fanaticism, investigating the way in which we can express non-pathological forms of devotion. We can be devoted through affirmation and through what Katsafanas calls the deepening move, which treats the agent's central commitments as systematically inchoate. Each of these stances enables a wholehearted form of devotion that nevertheless preserves flexibility and openness, avoiding the dangers of fanaticism on the one hand and normative dissipation on the other. But this is inevitably a fragile and precarious achievement: affirmation can slide into a focus on rejecting what isn't affirmed, and the deepening move can ossify into rigidity. Only the perpetual quest to maintain a form of existential flexibility, which may require oscillation between affirmation and deepening, can stave off these dangers

Belief in moral responsibility enjoys widespread support, both among philosophers and in popular culture. Moral responsibility for our characters and our acts is often regarded as beyond doubt or question, and, although the belief seems to be a cultural universal, it is particularly powerful in the USA and the UK. This book explores the deep psychological factors at the source of the profound commitment to belief in moral responsibility. Philosophers have developed legions of arguments in support of moral responsibility, but even philosophical champions of those arguments acknowledge that they are not conclusive and certainly not strong enough to account for the powerful belief in moral responsibility; and because those philosophical arguments are not widely known, they cannot be the source of the popular belief in moral responsibility. Belief in moral responsibility is rooted in forces that run much deeper than justifications favored by both philosophers and the layperson. This book is a quest to uncover those deeper sources, showing that the roots of the common belief in moral responsibility run deep, and they include powerful factors that rarely rise to consciousness.

In the first scholarly exposition of Maria Montessori's moral philosophy, Patrick R. Frierson presents an empirically-grounded ethics that takes its start from our tendency to strive for excellence and emphasizes mutual respect, social solidarity, and love. Laying out a compelling, Montessorian approach to ethical life, Frierson constructs an account of human agency based on children, who when attentively at work on self-chosen tasks, have agency worthy of respect. Through this interpretation of children's agency, he introduces the core concept of Montessorian “character”: in Montessori's ethics, character provides the ultimate value worthy of direct respect, and those with character have a natural tendency to respect others. Character is enhanced through corporate forms of agency that Montessori calls “social solidarity.” Weaving this educationalist's ethics with theory from Nietzsche, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, Frierson places Montessori in the context of the history of philosophy. His study effectively unites philosophy and education, showing how human ethical life can be enhanced through a moral theory based on the respectful attention to the lived agency of young children.

Updated and expanded to represent the fundamental questions at the heart of philosophical ethics today, the second edition of The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics covers the key topics in metaethics and normative ethical theory. This edition includes 12 fully revised chapters, and 3 newly commissioned contributions from a range of esteemed academics who provide accessible introductions to their own areas of expertise. The first part of the book covers the field of metaethics, including subjects such as moral realism, expressivism, constructivism, practical reason, moral psychology, experimental ethics, and evolutionary ethics, as well as two new chapters that respond to ethical debates concerning moral relativism and moral responsibility that enable students and scholars to better navigate this complicated ethical terrain. Moving onto normative ethical theory, the second part of the book ranges across morality and religion, consequentialism, and particularism, as well as Kantian, virtue, feminist, and Confucian ethics. This comprehensive edition provides a one-stop resource for students of ethics, which includes updated detailed overviews of the field and methodological issues, as well as an appendix of additional resources, including technical terms in ethics.

Victims of wrongdoing are often advised not to harbour resentment or seek revenge. Instead, they are encouraged to forgive and move on. Forgiveness is described as a generous gift that heals the rifts created by wrongdoing. It is the path to happiness, the way to escape bitter cycles of revenge and retribution. Yet in some situations it seems that it would be unwise, even dangerous, to forgive. We might worry that victims who forgive unrepentant perpetrators are letting them off the hook and facilitating further wrongdoing. These moral disputes about when we ought to forgive are complicated by the fact that it is unclear exactly what we are talking about when we use the word'forgiveness'. The supposed experts make wildly divergent claims about what forgiveness is supposed to be. Some say that forgiveness is purely an emotional change in which the victim's anger and resentment are replaced with goodwill. Others say that forgiveness is primarily a behavioural change in which the victim withholds any further blame and punishment. Still others think that forgiving is actually a mental commitment, or even that it is a performative speech act similar to making a promise or cancelling a debt. In Real Forgiveness, Luke Russell identifies the underlying tensions in our thinking about forgiveness, and shows how these tensions have led to mass confusion. Many of us assume that forgiveness is permissible whenever it is possible, and that forgiveness is available to every victim, and that forgiveness results in peace. But forgiveness cannot be all of these things simultaneously, so we must decide which one of these assumptions we will reject. Russell argues that real forgiveness is powerful and appealing precisely because it removes conflict between victims and wrongdoers. Yet sometimes victims ought to remain in conflict with wrongdoers in order to protect themselves and other vulnerable members of the community, so sometimes is it morally wrong to forgive.

This book is about the philosophical, historical, and interpretative aspects of Mencius. It explores his influence, reception, and relevance in China from the third century BCE to the present, as well as offers comparative studies of Mencius and major figures in the history of Chinese and Western philosophy. With 34 accessible articles written by leading philosophers and scholars, the Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius provides both broad pictures and in-depth discussions regarding the work of one of the most important and influential Chinese philosophers. It covers his normative ethics, meta-ethics, political philosophy, epistemology and moral psychology. The last section of the volume, “Mencius and Western Philosophers: Comparative Perspectives,” explicitly puts him in dialogue with major Western philosophers. The Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius serves as an essential volume for college students, graduate students, and scholars who study and teach Mencius as well as Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy in general.​

Stephen Ingram defends a robustly realistic metaethical theory, based on the concept of normative arbitrariness, of which he provides the first in-depth analysis. He argues that, in order to capture the normative non-arbitrariness of moral choice, we must commit to the existence of robustly stance-independent, categorical, irreducibly normative, non-natural moral facts. Specifically, he identifies five ways in which a metaethical theory might fail to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. The first involves claims about the bruteness of moral attitudes or facts. The second involves claims about the privileging of some attitudes over others. The third involves the claim that some metaethical theories leave a normative deficit. The fourth involves a claim about our ownership over moral reality. And the fifth involves the claim that certain metaethical theories introduce a destabilising contingency into the moral domain. Ingram argues that robust realism is the theory that is best placed to avoid all five of these arbitrariness charges. He then goes on to show that, by exploring the nature of interpersonal moral dialogue, robust realists can defend epistemological and meta-semantic theories that are friendly to their view. Specifically, he defends a dualistic form of moral intuitionism on which some moral beliefs are justified on the basis of a priori intuitions, whilst others are justified on the basis of a posteriori moral experiences, and provides a theory of'moral mental files'to explain how moral terms and concepts are able to refer to robust moral facts.

This book develops a grammatical method for our underlying presuppositions which can help us unravel the problem of evil. The problem essentially rests on a dualism between fact and meaning. Evil and Intelligibility provides an examination of the grammar of being and of the intelligibility of the world, culminating in a philosophical grammar in which God, meaning, and evil can coexist.

The Human A Priori is a collection of essays by A.W. Moore, one of them previously unpublished and the rest all revised. These essays are all concerned, more or less directly, with something ineliminably anthropocentric in our systematic pursuit of a priori sense-making. Part I deals with the nature, scope, and limits of a priori sense-making in general. Parts II, III, and IV deal with what are often thought to be the three great exemplars of the systematic pursuit of such sense-making: philosophy in the case of Part II, ethics in the case of Part III, and mathematics in the case of Part IV. Much of the attention throughout is devoted to the work of other philosophers: Kant and Wittgenstein feature prominently, and five of the essays take the form of reviews or critical notices of recent work in philosophy. But the interest in never purely exegetical. One of the lessons that emerges from the essays, either in opposition to the views of these other philosophers or by invocation of their views, is that we humans achieve nothing of real significance in philosophy, ethics, or mathematics except from a human point of view, and hence that all three of these pursuits can be said to betoken what may reasonably be called'the human a priori'.

Contemporary philosophy is interested in questions of luck and moral responsibility. Christian theology is largely unconcerned with luck because of its understanding of the creatureliness of the will. This understanding is rooted in story of the primal sin the narrative about how the first good creature chose wrongly. When considered philosophically, this story produces a problem for describing how a good creature can sin in ideal circumstances. The tradition has appealed to a voluntarist account of the devil's sin as a satisfying response to this problem. But some have worried that this kind of free choice succumbs to a responsibility denying kind of luck. This volume describes how this underlying story undermines worries about luck for Christian moral reasoning by reflecting on how any luck the devil has is his own. John R. Gilhooly argues that even if one regards the Devil as fictional, the primal sin remains an interesting philosophical test case, particularly for questions of moral luck. The reason that this is so is because it seems that moral luck is either irrelevant to moral judgment of the Devil, or an illegitimate moral concern at least as regards the primal sin.

Given the current climate of political division and global conflict it is not surprising that there has been an increasing interest in how we ought to respond to perceived wrongdoing, both personal and political. In this volume, top scholars from around the world contribute all new original essays on the ethics of forgiveness, revenge, and punishment. This book draws on both historical and contemporary debates in order to answer important questions about the nature of forgiveness, the power of apology, the relationship between punishment and revenge, the path to reconciliation, the morality of blame, and the role of forgiveness in political conflict.Chapter 16 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

Moral psychology is the study of how human minds make and are made by human morality. This state-of-the-art volume covers contemporary philosophical and psychological work on moral psychology, as well as notable historical theories and figures in the field of moral psychology, such as Aristotle, Kant, Nietzsche, and the Buddha. The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology's fifty chapters, authored by leading figures in the field, cover foundational topics, such as character, virtue, emotion, moral responsibility, the neuroscience of morality, weakness of will, and the nature of moral judgments and reasons. The volume also canvases emerging work in applied moral psychology, including adaptive preferences, animals, mental illness, poverty, marriage, race, bias, and victim blaming. Collectively, the essays form the definitive survey of contemporary moral psychology.

Nihilism seems to be per definition linked to violence. Indeed, if the nihilist is a person who acknowledges no moral or religious authority, then what does stop him from committing any kind of crime? Dostoevsky precisely called attention to this danger: if there is no God and no immortality of the soul, then everything is permitted, even anthropophagy. Nietzsche, too, emphasised, although in different terms, the consequences deriving from the death of God and the collapse of Judeo-Christian morality. This context shaped the way in which philosophers, writers and artists thought about violence, in its different manifestations, during the 20th century. The goal of this interdisciplinary volume is to explore the various modern and contemporary configurations of the link between violence and nihilism as understood by philosophers and artists (in both literature and film).

Kaum ein Begriff hat so viele Erweiterungen und Umdeutungen erfahren wie der Begriff der Natur. Seit seiner Einführung in der ionischen Naturphilosophie befindet er sich in einem Prozess stetiger Revision und inhaltlicher Ausdifferenzierungen. Die damit einhergehende Inkohärenz und Unübersichtlichkeit ist aber kein semantisches Unglück. In den verschiedenen begrifflichen Konstellationen zeichnen sich vielmehr der Ort der humanen Lebensform in der Natur und die epistemischen, ethischen und ästhetischen Einstellungen zur Natur ab. Die Beiträge thematisieren arbeitsteilig semantische, systematische und normative Aspekte menschlicher Naturverhältnisse wie Ursprung und Veränderung, die menschliche Natur, Verbindungen von Naturwissenschaft, Ethik, Technik und Ästhetik sowie bioethische, tierethische, umweltethische und klimaethische Herausforderungen.

For those captive to the broken world of late modernity, wherein ageing and dying persons become vulnerable to despair, this book offers a diagnostic of such despair. It also resources the practices of a realistic, humanising hope that might enable a strength for person to journey with and for others, together, through such despair. Thus, by addressing the aetiology of despair experienced by people confronting ageing, frailty and dying, and drawing upon the writings of Gabriel Marcel, among others, Ashley Moyse reveals the problematic life of a broken world with its functionalising metaphors, instrumentalising reasoning and objectifying desires that offer no hope at all. It is a broken world where despair generates behaviours that anticipate suicide or other, often tragic, outcomes that impede or greatly curtail or even completely inhibit human flourishing. Resisting despair, but living through it, Moyse presents the activity of the moral life, demonstrating a way persons might be resourced through an intersubjective and reflective pedagogy, with its habits or practices that enable a humanising hope, liberating human beings to become those readied to confront the actualities of human living and dying, and encouraged to grow and develop as ‘wayfarers', hopefully.

Climate change poses questions of intergenerational justice, but some of its features make it difficult to determine whether we have obligations of climate justice to future generations. This book offers a novel argument, justifying the present generation's obligations to future people.Livia Ester Luzzatto shows that we have intergenerational obligations because many of our actions are based on presuppositions about future people. When agents engage in such intergenerational actions, they also acquire an obligation to recognise those future people as agents within their principles of justice and with that a duty to respect their agency and autonomy. Intergenerational Challenges and Climate Justice also offers a way to circumvent the problems of non-identity and non-existence. Its approach overcomes the intergenerational challenges of climate change by meeting three necessary criteria: providing ways to cope with uncertainty, dealing with the complexity of climate change, and including future people for their own sake. The author meets these criteria by adopting an action-centred methodology that grounds our obligations of justice on the presuppositions of activity. This robust framework can be used to justify increased climate action and the greater inclusion of future-oriented policies in current decision-making.This book will be of great interest to academics and students concerned with the issues of climate and intergenerational justice.

Moral Theory: An Introduction explores some of the historically most important and currently debated moral theories about the nature of the right and the good, including divine command theory, relativism, natural law theory, consequentialism, egoism, Kant's ethics, ethics of prima facie duties, contractualism, virtue ethics and care ethics. Providing an introduction to moral theory that explains and critically examines the theories of such classical philosophers as Aristotle, Aquinas, Bentham, Kant, Mill, and Ross, this book acquaints students with the work of contemporary moral philosophers. Each chapter has been revised and updated. The third edition includes a new chapter on moral contractualism and an extensively revised chapter on virtue ethics and care ethics. Additionally, the book discusses recent work by moral psychologists making an impact on moral theory.

“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory. The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.

'A runaway trolley is speeding down a track'So begins what is perhaps the most fecund thought experiment of the past several decades since its invention by Philippa Foot. Since then, moral philosophers have applied the'trolley problem'as a thought experiment to study many different ethical conflicts - and chief among them is the programming of autonomous vehicles. Nowadays, however, very few philosophers accept that the trolley problem is a perfect analogy for driverless cars or that the situations autonomous vehicles face will resemble the forced choice of the unlucky bystander in the original thought experiment. This book represents a substantial and purposeful effort to move the academic discussion beyond the trolley problem to the broader ethical, legal, and social implications that autonomous vehicles present. There are still urgent questions waiting to be addressed, for example: how AVs might interact with human drivers in mixed or'hybrid'traffic environments; how AVs might reshape our urban landscapes; what unique security or privacy concerns are raised by AVs as connected devices in the'Internet of Things'; how the benefits and burdens of this new technology, including mobility, traffic congestion, and pollution, will be distributed throughout society; and more. An attempt to map the landscape of these next-generation questions and to suggest preliminary answers, this volume draws on the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, economics, urban planning and transportation engineering, business ethics and more, and represents a global range of perspectives.

The claim that there are objective ethical truths has attracted its share of doubters. Many have thought that such truths would require an extra-ethical foundation or vindication--in metaphysics, or the philosophy of language, or epistemology--and have worried that no such thing is available. Pragmatist Quietism argues that, on the contrary, there are objective ethical truths, and that these neither require nor admit of a foundation or vindication from outside of ethics. Recognizing that the idea of an ethical realm untethered from inquiry into reality, meaning, and knowledge may strike us as mysterious, this book offers a comprehensive meta-ethical worldview within which this jarring proposal may be ensconced. The key moves are, first, the assimilation of normative-ethical inquiry to the sorts of debates that many have labelled'merely verbal'or'non-substantive', and second, the adoption of pragmatism--the approach to inquiry and explanation on which we endeavour to guide our thinking by considerations of value, rather than aiming to correctly represent the world.

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible.

John M. Doris has been a leading proponent of interdisciplinary approaches to moral psychology since their rise to prominence in the 1990's. His work has helped foster a methodological reorientation in the field, and has had a transformative effect on the way philosophers approach questions of character, virtue, and agency. This volume collects a selection of Doris'work spanning 20 years, focusing on the ways in which human personality orders (and fails to order) moral cognition and behaviour. It also presents two new chapters, which together form an in-depth assessment of recent developments in the moral psychology of character, as well as a closing commentary outlining methodological recommendations for those aspiring to do empirically responsible moral psychology. Together, these works present a distinctive vision of moral psychology which will engage both philosophers and psychologists.

Much of knowing what to do is knowing what to do for ourselves, but knowing how to act in our best interest is complex---we must know what benefits us, what burdens us, and how these facts present and constitute considerations in favor of action. Additionally, we must know how we should weigh our interests at different times---past, present, and future. Dale Dorsey argues that a theory of prudence is needed: a theory of how we ought to act when we are acting for ourselves. A Theory of Prudence provides a comprehensive account of prudence, including the metaethics of prudential value, the nature of the personal good, the reasons of prudence, and the structure of prudential normativity over time.

This collection showcases the most influential published essays by philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. One of the most distinguished thinkers working in epistemology today, particularly where the theory of knowledge meets ethics and the philosophy of religion, Zagzebski is well-known for broadening epistemology and refocusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. Her work has greatly influenced the trajectory of contemporary epistemology, opening up new fields in analytic epistemology. The papers collected here are organized into six sections to underline the scope of her impact on six key subject areas of epistemology: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.

Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information.The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or use knowledge (or information) deliberate ignorance. When is this a virtue, when is it a vice, and what can be learned from formally modeling the underlying motives? On which normative grounds can it be judged? Which institutional interventions can promote or prevent it? In this book, psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the scope of deliberate ignorance.Drawing from multiple examples, including the right not to know in genetic testing, collective amnesia in transformational societies, blind orchestral auditions, and “don't ask don't tell” policies), the contributors offer novel insights and outline avenues for future research into this elusive yet fascinating aspect of human nature.ContributorsSarah Auster, Benjamin E. Berkman, Felix Bierbrauer, Gordon D. A. Brown, Jason Dana, Stefanie Egidy, Dagmar Ellerbrock, Christoph Engel, Jens Frankenreiter, Simon Gächter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Russell Golman, Krishna P. Gummadi, Kristin Hagel, David Hagmann, Ulrike Hahn, Ralph Hertwig, Christian Hilbe, Derek M. Isaacowitz, Anne Kandler, Yaakov Kareev, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Joachim I. Krueger, Christina Leuker, Stephan Lewandowsky, Robert J. MacCoun, Richard McElreath, Thorsten Pachur, Peter J. Richerson, Lael J. Schooler, Laura Schmid, Barry Schwartz, Nora Szech, Eric Talley, Doron Teichman, Pete C. Trimmer, Sonja Utz, Lukasz Walasek, Michael R. Waldmann, Peter Wehling, Roi Yair, Eyal Zamir

This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness.The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of'ought'implies'can'leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle,'ought'implies'evidence', which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.).From Value to Rightness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics.

In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, William J. Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses it to propose a new way of understanding rational belief that can be applied to pressing social and political issues. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics – It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the imaginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. From this model, Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn, as well as with a range of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. On the basis of his model of rational belief, Talbott articulates a new theory of prejudice, which he uses to help diagnose the sources of inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, as well as to provide insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. Learning from Our Mistakes offers a new lens through which to interpret the history of Western epistemology and analyze the complicated social and political phenomena facing us today.

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers present original contributions to our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing approaches to normative ethics (including moral realism, constructivism, and expressivism) to questions of how we should act and live well. OSNE is an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

If we are kind people, we care about others, including others who tend to hurt themselves. We all have friends or family members who have potential but squander or even ruin their lives from things like drug abuse, unwise spending decisions, or poor dietary habits. Concern for others often motivates us to endorse laws or private interventions meant to keep people from harming themselves even if that's what they want to do in the moment. However, it is far from clear that such paternalistic measures are, on net, benign, and they tend to violate an understanding that we should let adults make their own decisions. In this little book, William Glod argues that it's OK to allow people to make bad choices. It's OK even if those choices risk causing a lot of harm. Most defenders of paternalism agree that some bad choices are not harmful enough to require laws to stop them. However, Glod goes further. He argues that some people might want – and deserve – the freedom to make truly bad choices because such freedom is the only way they can act responsibly. He also argues that some'bad'choices may not even be bad, even if we can't know with confidence a person's true desires. In addition, the book explores choices that are bad because they might impose high monetary costs on others, arguing that mandatory insurance may be a better solution than eliminating the choice. Finally, it explores the potential pitfalls of paternalistic laws and policies – and how unintended, costly consequences can sabotage the most well-intended plans.Key Features Introduces key concepts for understanding paternalism and freedom of choice for undergraduates and general readers Discusses how many of our preferences are not easily understood by others, and shows how assumptions of what our true preferences can often backfire Explores ways in which people may want the freedom to make mistakes Examines the unintended consequences and associated problems of many paternalistic laws and regulations

Assessing his continuing importance and introducing him to a new generation of readers, Austin Farrer for Today brings together a stellar collection of writers to reflect on Farrer's contribution to biblical theology, philosophy, language, doctrine, prayer and preaching.

Utilitarianism began as a movement for social reform that changed the world, based on the ideal of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. There is a tendency to enter into debates for and against the ethical doctrine of Utilitarianism without a clear understanding of its basic concepts. The Pursuit of Happiness now offers a rigorous account of the foundations of Utilitarianism, and vividly sets out possible ways forward for its future development. To understand Utilitarianism, we must understand utility: how is it to be measured, and how the aggregate utility of a group can be understood. Louis Narens and Brian Skyrms, respectively a cognitive scientist and a philosopher, pursue these questions by adopting both formal and historical methods, examining theories of measuring utility from Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the Utilitarian movement, to the present day, taking in psychophysics, positivism, measurement theory, meaningfulness, neuropsychology, representation theorems, and the dynamics of formation of conventions. On this basis, Narens and Skyrms argue that a meaningful form of Utilitarianism that can coordinate action in social groups is possible through interpersonal comparison and the formation of conventions.

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies rapidly progress, questions about the ethics of AI, in both the near-future and the long-term, become more pressing than ever. This volume features seventeen original essays by prominent AI scientists and philosophers and represents the state-of-the-art thinking in this fast-growing field. Organized into four sections, this volume explores the issues surrounding how to build ethics into machines; ethical issues in specific technologies, including self-driving cars, autonomous weapon systems, surveillance algorithms, and sex robots; the long term risks of superintelligence; and whether AI systems can be conscious or have rights. Though the use and practical applications of AI are growing exponentially, discussion of its ethical implications is still in its infancy. This volume provides an invaluable resource for thinking through the ethical issues surrounding AI today and for shaping the study and development of AI in the coming years.

Explorations in Ethics is a collection of essays with a speculative bent. Its twelve contributors attempt to take ethics thinking in new directions. Ethics is fundamentally a speculative discipline. We sometimes lose sight of that because of our current scholarly practices, which include reliance on a set of traditional works in ethics, deferring to the scholarly literature, drawing from the evidential sources afforded us. This volume breaks the mold. It is committed, first and foremost, to exploring new ground in a methodologically sound way whilst respecting and building on the literature where needed. The contributors range from world renowned ethicists to early-career scholars. The ethical standpoints represented are various and the overall aim of this collection is to stimulate fresh thinking.

This collection offers an in-depth look at Cora Diamond's distinctive approach to ethics and its philosophical significance. It comprises a new essay by Cora Diamond on the policing of concepts, followed by ten original chapters by world-class scholars covering conceptual loss, moral theory, the category of the human, the moral consideration of animals, and the meaning of narcissism. Including comparisons to the work of other contemporary moral philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum, Jeff McMahan, Rai Gaita, Eva Kittay, Christine Korsgaard, and Edward Harcourt, the volume also creates interdisciplinary links between Diamond's work and other fields of study, including psychoanalysis and contemporary ethology. Showcasing the vital importance of Diamond's contribution to philosophy, this volume is essential reading for scholars working in ethics, philosophy of language and literature.

Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and the Desire to be a God explores the hidden corridors of the moral responsibility system to discover why that system is so widely accepted and passionately defended. The moral responsibility system has obvious charms: it provides justification for our powerful strike-back motives, transforms selfishness into the virtuous defense of our justly deserved special benefits, draws a radical distinction between humans and the other species we exploit, and protects our nonconscious belief in a just world. Those charms notwithstanding, the resilience and endurance of the moral responsibility system indicates a hidden force that not only binds together the pieces of the system but also motivates our stubborn devotion to that system. That hidden force is a nonconscious desire to be a god: a desire that afflicts both believers and atheists, and that is almost universally denied (Nietzsche being a special exception). That desire can be found throughout the history of philosophy, from Aristotle to the present. It is also manifested in myths and a variety of religious practices and teachings. The breadth, power and harm of nonconscious “apotheosis aspiration” is the focus of this study.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. Very often we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don't know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the lives of distant strangers, or how to think about the ethics of bringing new people into existence. But we still need to act. So how should we make decisions in the face of such uncertainty? Though economists and philosophers have extensively studied the issue of decision-making in the face of uncertainty about matters of fact, the question of decision-making given fundamental moral uncertainty has been neglected. Philosophers William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord try to fill this gap. Moral Uncertainty argues that there are distinctive norms that govern how one ought to make decisions. It defends an information-sensitive account of how to make such decisions by developing an analogy between moral uncertainty and social choice, arguing that the correct way to act in the face of moral uncertainty depends on whether the moral theories in which one has credence are merely ordinal, cardinal, or both cardinal and intertheoretically comparable. It tackles the problem of how to make intertheoretical comparisons, discussing potential solutions and the implications of their view for metaethics and practical ethics.

Thirty-five years ago Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue established virtue ethics as a major challenger to competing visions of morality, but there is still considerable disagreement concerning which version of virtue ethics provides the best approach. The Supremacy of Love describes and advocates an agape-centered vision of Aristotelian virtue ethics that portrays love as the most important moral virtue, and the goals of love as a partial constituent of every genuine virtue. This structural improvement to Aristotelian virtue ethics—found originally in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas—enables this account to address several controversial topics in contemporary virtue ethics, including why the virtues cannot be used badly, in what sense is there a unity between the virtues, how the virtues benefit the virtuous person, and how virtues provide action guidance. Eric J. Silverman demonstrates how and why a distinctly love-centered approach to virtue ethics should make the view widely attractive in comparison to alternative accounts of virtue ethics, duty based deontological theories, as well as results-based consequentialist views.

Many subscribe to an Ethic of Life, an ethical perspective on which all living things deserve some level of moral concern. Within philosophy, the Ethic of Life has been clarified, developed, and rigorously defended; yet it has also found its harshest critics. Between biocentrists, those that endorse the Ethic of Life, and those that accept a more restricted view of moral status, the debate has reached a standstill, with few new resources for shifting or complicating it. In The Death of the Ethic of Life, John Basl seeks to end this comfortable stalemate by emphasizing a simple truth: the well-being of non-sentient beings, such as plants, species, and ecosystems, is morally significant only to the extent that it matters to sentient beings. Basl first develops a version of The Ethic of Life that best meets traditional challenges: the Ethic, if it is to survive criticism, must be able to explain how it is that all living things have a welfare or a good of their own. The best hope of offering such an explanation is to ground that welfare in teleology or goal-directedness, and then to ground that goal-directedness in the workings of natural selection. While a naturalistic account of teleology is crucial to defending an Ethic of Life, it is also its downfall. This Ethic ultimately entails that not only are ecosystems and collectives morally considerable, but so, too, are artifacts: everything from can openers to computers. Basl shows that evaluation of the resources for distinguishing artifacts from organisms forces us to abandon, for good, the Ethic of Life. The Death of the Ethic of Life provides not only a new answer to a fundamental question in environmental ethics, but a new way to conceive of fundamental concepts and issues in debates over who or what matters from the moral point of view, with wide-ranging implications in the philosophy of technology and bioethics.

Prejudice influences people's thoughts and behaviors in many ways; it can lead people to underestimate others'credibility, to read anger or hysteria into their words, or to expect knowledge and truth to ‘sound'a certain way—or to come from a certain type of person. These biases and mistakes can have a big effect on everything from an institutional culture to an individual's self-understanding. These kinds of intellectual harms are known as epistemic injustice.Most people are opposed to unfair prejudices (at least in principle), and no one wants to make avoidable mistakes. But research in the social sciences reveals a disturbing truth: Even people who intend to be fair-minded and unprejudiced are influenced by unconscious biases and stereotypes. We may sincerely want to be epistemically just, but we frequently fail, and simply thinking harder about it will not fix the problem.The essays collected in this volume draw from cutting-edge social science research and detailed case studies, to suggest how we can better tackle our unconscious reactions and institutional biases, to help ameliorate epistemic injustice. The volume concludes with an afterward by Miranda Fricker, who catalyzed recent scholarship on epistemic injustice, reflecting on these new lines of research and potential future directions to explore.