Search

This book investigates the relationship between our present and future selves. It focuses specifically on diachronic self-regarding decisions: choices involving our earlier and later selves, in which the earlier self makes a decision for the later self.The author connects the scientific understanding of the neurobehavioral processes at the core of individuals'perceptions of their future selves with the philosophical reflection on individuals'moral relationship with their future selves. She delineates a descriptive theory of the perception of the future self that is based on empirical evidence and that systematizes and integrates the current theoretical literature. She then argues for the morality of prudence and interprets diachronic self-regarding decisions as decisions between two agents— the earlier and later selves—that belong to the realm of intergenerational ethics, which regulates the relationship between contemporary people and future generations. Finally, the author provides a moral theory of prudence based on respect for one's agency. This theory identifies what the present and the future selves owe to one another in diachronic self-regarding decisions.Moral Choices for Our Future Selves will be of interest to scholars and students working in ethics, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

Much of knowing what to do is knowing what to do for ourselves, but knowing how to act in our best interest is complex---we must know what benefits us, what burdens us, and how these facts present and constitute considerations in favor of action. Additionally, we must know how we should weigh our interests at different times---past, present, and future. Dale Dorsey argues that a theory of prudence is needed: a theory of how we ought to act when we are acting for ourselves. A Theory of Prudence provides a comprehensive account of prudence, including the metaethics of prudential value, the nature of the personal good, the reasons of prudence, and the structure of prudential normativity over time.

Philosophers have long theorized about what makes people's lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. However, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse--thought and talk about what is good and bad for us; what contributes to well-being; and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do. This situation is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and cries out for further investigation of what it is like and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, about which there has been extensive theorizing, in meta-ethics. Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse has three broad aims. Firstly, Guy Fletcher explores the nature of prudential discourse. Secondly, he argues that prudential discourse is normative and authoritative, like moral discourse. Thirdly, Fletcher aims to show that prudential discourse is worthy of further, explicit, attention both due to its intrinsic interest but also for the light it sheds on the meta-normative more broadly.

Las virtudes pueden ser una ayuda, pero también un obstáculo, un límite, un estorbo. En ese caso, no pocos optan por considerarlas algo ornamental. El juicio de prudencia se reduce entonces a la simple toma de decisiones, sin mapas ni códigos. Frente a esa opinión, el autor defiende la primacía de la persona y el respeto de su dignidad e integridad, como límite infranqueable de cualquier actividad biotecnocientífica. La bioética que propone no suprime las normas y llega aún más lejos, al no perder de vista el elemento esencial de la ética: la felicidad, el bien.

La virtù del voler guardare lontano Saggezza, capacità di governare le passioni e di orientare l'azione al perseguimento di un bene comune di tipo universale: è l'idea di prudenza che ci hanno trasmesso i classici e di cui oggi abbiamo più che mai bisogno. Il pensiero economico dominante concepisce erroneamente la prudenza solo come avversione al rischio; mentre in realtà il problema è vedere al di là dei vantaggi a breve termine e agire secondo una visione di lungo periodo. Ecco allora che la vera sfida è trasferire il principio di prudenza alla sfera collettiva e farlo vivere all'interno del disegno delle istituzioni e dei sistemi di governance delle imprese.

Einer oft geteilten Einschätzung zufolge reduziert Kant mit seiner auf reine Vernunft ausgerichteten praktischen Philosophie Klugheit auf eine Form der Geschicklichkeit. Zwischen technisch-praktischer Rationalität und reiner praktischer Vernunft scheint es unmöglich, ihr einen systematischen Ort innerhalb seiner Philosophie zuzuweisen. Kommt jedoch reiner Vernunft allein die Fähigkeit zu, Zwecke zu bestimmen und nicht nur, sie zu verfolgen, so bleibt kein Platz für empirische Zweckbestimmung durch eine empirisch bedingte Vernunft – und damit auch nicht für Klugheit. Dem entgegen wird hier Klugheit bei Kant rekonstruiert als ein sowohl auf die eigene Glückseligkeit als auch auf die möglichen Zwecke anderer reflektierendes Vermögen, das sich im Rückgriff u.a. auf die Kategorien der Freiheit als empirische Form der praktischen Vernunft erweist. Es werden alle wesentlichen Aspekte und Funktionen der Klugheit im Rahmen von Kants praktischer Philosophie, der Anthropologie sowie der Rechtslehre behandelt. Mit der Untersuchung der Klugheit als ausübende Tugendlehre schließt sich der Kreis.

Klugheit ist die Kompetenz, sich selbst im Handeln und Leben zu orientieren. Einstmals als Kardinaltugend hoch angesehen, geriet die Klugheit in der neuzeitlichen Ethik in eine merkwürdige Opposition zu moralischem Denken und Handeln. Luckner analysiert die Klugheitskonzepte unter anderem von Kant, Aristoteles, Machiavelli und Montaigne mit dem Ziel, das Thema'Klugheit als Tugend'für die Ethik wieder zu gewinnen. Interessanterweise erweist sich die Klugheit dabei als relevant auch und gerade für moralphilosophische Überlegungen: Mag Klugheit ohne Moral zwar blind sein, so bleibt umgekehrt Moral ohne Klugheit leer. Luckner zeigt, wie Klugheit als Tugend des sinn- und glücksbezogenen Umgangs mit Ansprüchen normativer Art gedacht werden kann, eine Kompetenz, wie sie gerade in Situationen der Unübersichtlichkeit hochnotwendig ist.

Realizing that a world remade by techno-science and global capital stands in great need of practical wisdom as an antidote to various forms of modern hubris, scholars across the human sciences have taken a renewed interest in exploring how the classical virtue of prudence can be reformulated as a guide for postmodern practice.This volume brings together scholars in classics, political philosophy, and rhetoric to analyze prudence as a distinctive and vital form of political intelligence. Through case studies from each of the major periods in the history of prudence, the authors identify neglected resources for political judgment in today's conditions of pluralism and interdependency.Three assumptions inform these essays: the many dimensions of prudence cannot be adequately represented in the lexicon of any single discipline; the Aristotelian focus on prudence as rational calculation needs to be balanced by the Ciceronian emphasis on prudence as discursive performance embedded in familiar social practices; and understanding prudence requires attention to how it operates through the communicative media and public discourses that constitute the political community. Contributors, besides the editor, are Stephen H. Browne, Robert W. Cape Jr., Maurice Charland, Peter J. Diamond, Eugene Garver, James Jasinski, John S. Nelson, and Christine L. Oravec.

Günther's book demonstrates that most objections to moral and legal principles are directed not against the validity of principles but against the manner of their application. If one distinguishes between the justification of a principle and its appropriate application, then the claim that the application of the principle in each individual case follows automatically from its universal justification proves to be a misunderstanding. Günther develops this distinction with the help of Habermas's discourse theory of morality. He then employs it to extend Kohlberg's theory of moral development and to defend this against Gilligan's critique. In the third and fourth parts of the book, Günther shows—in debate with Hare, Dworkin, and others—how argumentation on the appropriate application of norms and principles in morality and law is possible.Klaus Günther is Professor of Law at the University of Frankfurt.