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During the last half of the twentieth century, legal philosophy (or legal theory or jurisprudence) has grown significantly. It is no longer the do­ main of a few isolated scholars in law and philosophy. Hundreds of scho­ lars from diverse fields attend international meetings on the subject. In some universities, large lecture courses of five hundred students or more study it. The primary aim of the Law and Philosophy Library is to present some of the best original work on legal philosophy from both the Anglo­ American and European traditions. Not only does it help make some of the best work available to an international audience, but it also en­ courages increased awareness of, and interaction between, the two major traditions. The primary focus is on full-length scholarly monographs, aIthouogh some eidted volumes of original papers are also included. The Library editors are assisted by an Editorial Advisory Board of inter­ nationally renowned scholars.

3 of law as an object that has always already been there, systematic and com­ plete. Quite the contrary. Some, indeed practically all of us, reject this sort of epistemology of law, and where the hypothesis of the coherence of the legal universe is put forward, this is in order to define it in very noticeably different terms from those traditionally used in legal scholarly accounts. If this referent, the law presented as a full discourses, runs through all of the contributions, this is because reasoning by analogy has to be found its specific place within this legal culture. It is the place to locate the problem of'lacunae'in law, which at bottom allows our various contributions to be classified. With Zaccaria and Maris, the question of lacunae is accepted as such (this is, we might say, the'traditionalist'aspect of these two articles, which is counterbalanced by - keeping to the same terminology -'modernist'emphases, sometimes Dworkinian in nature), and becomes the backdrop for considerations of purely hermeneutic type, in Zaccaria, ex­ tended in Maris to the field of ethics. The papers from Lenoble and Jackson, the former philosophical and the latter semiological, take as their main tar­ get this legal knowledge where the theory of lacunae finds its place.

Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts offers an original introduction to, and critical analysis of, the central themes studied in jurisprudence courses. The book is organised in three parts: Part I sets out the key elements of modern law and their relation to political, economic, and social conditions. Part II presents competing accounts of the nature of legal validity, legality, legal reasoning, and justice. Both parts feature corresponding tutorial questions. Part III contains advanced topics including chapters on legal pluralism, law and disciplinary power, and law and the Anthropocene. Every chapter gives guidance on further reading. This fourth edition has been fully revised and updated to take into account the latest developments in jurisprudential scholarship. Additional material is included in the coverage of social law, colonialism, critical race theory, the challenges of digital technology, and the emergence of new legal subjects. Accessible, interdisciplinary and socially informed, Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts is essential reading for all students of jurisprudence and legal philosophy.

This volume explores the concepts of legal power and legal competence in fourteen original, cutting-edge chapters by leading legal theorists. Legal power and legal competence are major topics in jurisprudence, as they concern a range of practices, common to all modern legal systems, that empower individuals to bring about changes in the respective system by changing their own legal position or the legal positions of others. This compilation covers five broad themes. The chapters in the first section address open questions on the meaning of legal power and legal competence, while those in the second tackle problems regarding their normativity. The third section is devoted to specifically exploring the relationship between legal power and constitutive norms. The fourth focuses on the analysis of legal officials and legal offices, while the fifth and final section assesses various theories of legal power and legal competence.

The Global Community Yearbook on International Law and Jurisprudence is a one-stop resource for all researchers studying international law generally or international tribunals specifically. The Yearbook has established itself as an authoritative source of reference on global legal issues and international jurisprudence. It includes analysis of the most significant global trends in a way that allows readers to monitor the development of the global legal order from several perspectives. The Global Community Yearbook publishes annually in a volume of carefully chosen primary source material and corresponding expert commentary. The general editor, Professor Emeritus Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo, employs her vast expertise in international law to select excerpts from important court opinions and to choose experts from around the world to contribute essay-guides, which illuminate those cases. Although the main focus is recent case law from the major international tribunals and regional courts, the first four parts of each year's edition features expert articles by renowned scholars who address broader themes in current and future developments in international law and global policy, themes that appear throughout the case law of the many courts covered by the series as a whole. The Global Community Yearbook has thus become not just an indispensable window to recent jurisprudence: the series now also serves to prepare researchers for the issues facing emerging global law. The 2021 edition updates readers on the important work of long-standing international tribunals and introduces readers to more novel topics in international law. The Yearbook continues to provide expert coverage of the Court of Justice of the European Union and diverse tribunals from the International Court of Justice, human rights courts (ECtHR, IACtHR, ACtHPR), criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, to economically based tribunals such as ICSID and the WTO dispute settlement system. In addition to an in memoriam to Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, this edition contains original research articles on the development and analysis of the concept of global law and the views of the leading global law theorists on the subject of globalization, as well as a special section which provides a study of migratory flows between Colombia and Venezuela and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact the COVID-19 has had on China's Belt and Road Initiative. The Yearbook provides students, scholars, and practitioners alike a valuable combination of expert discussion and direct quotes from the court opinions to which that discussion relates, as well as an annual overview of the process of cross-fertilization between international courts and tribunals. This publication can also be purchased on a standing order basis.

This book presents an integrated jurisprudential critique of neoclassical microeconomic theory. It explains what is ‘really wrong'with the theory both descriptively, as well as normatively. The criticism presented is based on questions of jurisprudence, and on neoclassical theory's sins of omission and commission concerning the underlying system of property and contract. On the positive side - while the presentation is almost entirely non-mathematical - the book contains the first mathematical treatment of the fundamental theorem about property and contract in jurisprudence that underlies a market economy.The book follows the tradition of John Stuart Mill as the last major political economist who considered the study of property rights as an integral part of economic theory. The conceptual criticisms presented in this book focus on the descriptive and normative misconceptions about property and contracts that are deeply embedded ideology in neoclassical economics, not to mention in the broader society. The book recognizes that the idealized microeconomic theory is not descriptive of reality and focuses its criticism on conceptual mistakes in the theory, which are even clearer due to the idealized nature of the theory. Therefore, the book is a must-read for scholars, researchers, and students interested in a better understanding of jurisprudence in economics, neoclassical microeconomic theory, and political economy in general.

This book analyses the features and functionality of the relationship between the law, individual or collective values and medical-scientific evidence when they have to be interpreted by judges, courts and para-jurisdictional bodies. The various degrees to which scientific data and moral values have been integrated into the legal discourse reveal the need for a systematic review of the options and solutions that judges have elaborated on. In turn, the book presents a systematic approach, based on a proposed pattern for classifying these various degrees, together with an in-depth analysis of the multi-layered role of jurisdictions and the means available to them for properly handling new legal demands arising in plural societies.The book outlines a model that makes it possible to focus on and address these issues in a sustainable manner, that is, to respond to individual requests and technological advances in the field of biolaw by consistently and effectively applying suitable legal instruments and jurisdictional interpretation.

This book brings together leading legal theorists to present original philosophical work on the concept of law - the central question of jurisprudence. It covers five broad topics: firstly it addresses debates concerning the methodology of jurisprudence. In Part II it focuses on the notion of a legal system and its coercive nature, while Part III explores the relationships between law and morality, the traditional point of contention between positivist and non-positivist theories of law. Part IV then examines questions regarding law's normative character and relationships with practical reason. Lastly, the final part introduces two novel theoretical approaches to conceptual jurisprudence.

Academic legal production, when it focuses on the study of law, generally grasps this concept on the basis of a reference to positive law and its practice. This book differs clearly from these analyses and integrates the legal approach into the philosophy of normative language, philosophical realism and pragmatism. The aim is not only to place the examination of law in the immanence of its practice, but also to take note of the fact that legal enunciation must be taken seriously. In order to arrive at this analysis, it is necessary to go beyond traditional perspectives and to base reflection on an investigation of the conditions for enunciating law in our democracies. This analysis thus offers a renewal of the ethics inherent in the action of jurists and an original reflection on the role of certain legal tools such as concepts, categories, or'provisions'. In this sense, the work nourishes its originality not only by the transversality of its approach, but also by the will to situate legal thought in concrete forms of its implementation. The book will be essential reading for academics working in the areas of legal theory, legal philosophy and constitutional theory.

This book addresses the legal-geographical implications of the fact that landscapes are not static, but dynamic. Within the field of legal geography, the spatial relationship of law to landscape is usually considered to be static. Environments are often considered fixed, and consequently inert, as places that literally don't go anywhere. Typically, then, it is what happens in these places, rather than the place itself, that commands academic attention. In contrast to this static viewpoint, Law and the Kinetic Environment considers how many landscapes are in flux and, as a result, may be seen as dynamic. Natural phenomena, such as oozing lava, moving glaciers, or bubbling geothermal pools, challenge and test the normative conceptualizations of stability of place, property ownership, and legal regulation. Consequently, such dynamic landscapes enliven and transform law, offering new jurisprudential insights into what law is and how it operates in response to the kineticism that, this book argues is, to some degree, inherent in all landscapes. This original engagement with legal geography will appeal to those with general interests in this area, as well as specific concerns with questions of law and place, property and the environment.

Understanding legal rules not as determinants of behavior but as points of reference for conduct, this volume considers the ways in which rules are invoked, referred to, interpreted, put forward or blurred. It also asks how both legal practitioners and lay participants conceive of and participate in the construction of facts and rules, and thus, through decisions, defenses, pleas, files, evidence, interviews and documents, actively participate in law's life. With attention to the formulation of notions such as person, evidence, intention, cause and responsibility in the course of legal practices, Legal Rules in Practice provides the outlines of a praxiological anthropology of law – an anthropology that focuses on words, concepts and reasoning as actively used to solve conflicts with the help of legal rules. As such, it will appeal to sociologists, anthropologists and scholars of law with interests in ethnomethodology, rule-based conduct and practical reasoning.

This book brings the insights of theatre theory to law, legal interpretation and the jurisprudential to reshape law as a practice of response and responsibility.Confronting a Baconian antitheatrical legality embedded in its jurisprudences and interpretative practices, Marett Leiboff turns to theatre theory and practice to ground a theatrical jurisprudence, taking its cues from Han-Thies Lehmann's conception of the post-dramatic theatre and the early work of theatre visionary Jerzy Grotowski. She asks law to move beyond an imagined ideal grounded in Aristotelian drama and tragedy, and turns to the formation of the legal interpreter ・ lawyer, judge, jurisprudent ・ as fundamental to understanding what's “noticed” or not noticed in law. We “notice” most easily through that which is written into the body of the legal interpreter, in a way that can't be replicated through law's standard practices of thinking and reasoning. Without more, thinking and reasoning are the epitome of antitheatricality legality; a set of theatrical antonyms, including transgression and instinct, offer instead a set of possibilities through which to reconceive assumptions and foundational concepts etched into the legal imaginary. And by turning to critical dramaturgy, the book reveals that the liveliness that sits behind theatrical jurisprudence isn't a new concept in law at all, but has a long pedigree and lineage that had been lost and hidden. Theatrical jurisprudence, which demands an awareness of self and beyond self, grounds a responsiveness that can't be found within doctrine, principle, or the technocratic, but also challenges us to notice what it is we think we know as well as what we know of lives in law that aren't our own. The book will be of interest to scholars and students in the field of jurisprudence, legal theory, theatre and performance studies, cultural studies and philosophy.

Legal doctrine—the creation of doctrinal concepts, arguments, and legal regimes built on the foundation of written law—is the currency of contemporary law. Yet law students, lawyers, and judges often take doctrine for granted, without asking even the most basic questions. How to Do Things with Legal Doctrine is a sweeping and original study that focuses on how to understand legal doctrine via a hands-on approach. Taking up the provocative invitations from the “New Doctrinalists,” Pierre Schlag and Amy J. Griffin refine the conceptual and rhetorical operations legal professionals perform with doctrine—focusing especially on those difficult moments where law seems to run out, but legal argument must go on. The authors make the crucial operations of doctrine explicit, revealing how they work, and how they shape the law that emerges. How to Do Things with Legal Doctrine will help all those studying or working with law to gain a more systematic understanding of the doctrinal moves many of our best lawyers make intuitively.

This edited collection considers the work of one of the most important legal philosophers of our time, Professor Gerald J Postema. It includes contributions from expert philosophers of law. The chapters dig deep into important camps of Postema's rich theoretical project including:- the value of the rule of law;- the ideal of integrity in adjudication; - his works on analogical reasoning;- the methodology of jurisprudence; - dialogues with Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, Frederick Schauer and HLA Hart.The collection includes an original article by Professor Postema, in which he develops his conception of the rule of law and replies to some objections to previous works, and an interview in which he provides a fascinating and unique insight into his philosophy of law.

This title was first published in 2000: The author is a legal and moral philosopher who has applied the insight and methods of Wittgenstein to a range of topics in constitutional law, criminal law and theories of justice. This collection offers his most important and influential essays, together with an introductory essay which reviews and develops his contribution to legal and moral philosophy.

Any contemporary state presents itself as committed to the “rule of law”, and this notion is perhaps the most powerful political ideal within the current global discourse on legal and political institutions. Despite being a contested concept, the rule of law is generally recognised as meaning that government is bound in all its actions by fixed and public rules, and that these rules respect certain formal requirements and are enforced by an independent judiciary. This book focuses on formal legality and the question of how to achieve good laws—a topic that was famously addressed by the 18th century enlightened thinkers, but also by prominent legal scholars of our time. Historically, the canon of “good legislation” demanded generality, publicity and accessibility, and comprehensibility of laws; non-retroactivity; consistency; the possibility of complying with legal obligations and prohibitions; stability; and congruency between enacted laws and their application. All these are valuable ideals that should not be abandoned in today's legal systems, particularly in view of the silent revolution that is transforming our legality-based “states of law” into jurisdictional states. Such ideals are still worth pursuing for those who believe in representative democracy, in the rule of law and in the dignity of legislation. The idea for the book stemmed from the author's parliamentary and governmental experience; he was responsible for the Government of Spain's legislative co-ordination from 1982 to 1993, which were years of intensive legislative production. The more than five hundred laws (and thousands of decrees) elaborated in this period profoundly changed all sectors of the legal order inherited from Franco's dictatorship, and laid the foundations of a new social and democratic system. For an academic, this was an exciting experience, which offered a unique opportunity to put the theory of legislation to the test. Reflecting and elaborating on this experience, the book not only increases scholarly awareness of how laws are made, but above all, improves the quality of legislation and as a result the rule of law.

A New Introduction to Jurisprudence takes one of the central problems of law and jurisprudence as its point of departure: what is the law? Adopting an intermediate position between legal positivism and natural law, this book reflects on the concept of ‘liberal democracy'or ‘constitutional democracy'.In five chapters the book analyses: (i) the idea of higher law, (ii) liberal democracy as a legitimate model for the state, (iii) the separation of church and state or secularism as essential for the democratic state, (iv) the universality of higher law principles, (v) the history of modern political thought.This interdisciplinary approach to jurisprudence is relevant for legal scholars, philosophers, political theorists, public intellectuals, historians, and politicians.

First published in 1998, this volume examines the work of Ronald Dworkin, the leading legal philosopher of our time, ten years after his seminal work, Law's Empire. Its impact and influence was so extensive that the authors felt compelled to undertake both an in-depth analysis of both the book itself and its critical reaction, including a survey of the literature on Law's Empire.

First published in 1998, this text is the prefatory first part of Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Laws and first appeared separately from the Lectures in 1832. This volume reproduces the standard text of The Province from Robert Campbell's fifth edition, published in 1885, and clarifies the structure and readability of the text, retaining Austin's ‘Analysis'as a whole at the start of the book. John Austin (1790-1859) was the first professor of jurisprudence at the University of London, which is now University College. His classic, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, was derived from his course lectures. Austin took great pride in his ability to clearly delineate the study of law. Austin took a surgical approach and created a stripped down view of material central to the study of law. While this approach overlooks the ambiguity inherent in interpretations of law, it nevertheless stands as a landmark work and provides an excellent starting point for any deeper inquiry into the subject of jurisprudence.

Jurisprudence: Themes and Concepts offers an original introduction to, and critical analysis of, the central themes studied in jurisprudence courses. The book is presented in three parts: the first two contain general themes with corresponding tutorial questions, and the third contains advanced topics. Every chapter in the book gives guidance on further reading. Accessible, interdisciplinary and socially informed, this book has been revised to take into account the latest developments in jurisprudential scholarship.

This book seeks to re-appreciate the concept of customary international law as a form of spontaneous societal self-organisation, and to develop the methodological consequences that ensue from this conception for the practice of its application. In pursuing this aim, the author draws from three different strands of scholarship that have not yet been considered in connection with one another: First, general jurisprudential theories of customary law; second, theories of customary international law, especially as they relate to international relations scholarship; and third, methodological approaches to the interpretation of international law. This expansive, philosophical layout of the book enables the author to put the conceptual enigmas of customary international law into a broader perspective.Among the issues discussed in the book are the dichotomy of its traditional and modern forms and the respective benefits and disadvantages of inductive and deductive approaches to its ascertainment. In the course of this analysis, the author draws insights from Friedrich August Hayek's theory of law as a ‘spontaneous order', an information-processing device which enables the participants of a legal system to make use of decentralised knowledge. The book argues that the major advantage of custom as a source of international law lies in the fact that it is the result of a gradual process of trial and error, rather than the product of deliberate planning. This makes it a particularly apposite source of law in a time of seismic shifts in the distribution of power within a vastly diverse community of States, when a new global order is expected to emerge, the contours of which are not yet clearly discernible.This book applies general concepts of legal philosophy to explain the continuing relevance of custom as a source of international law while at the same time inferring from this theoretical framework concrete practical and methodological consequences, the most important of which is the special role that purposive interpretation plays with respect to rules of international custom. Given this broad approach, the book will be of interest to several groups of potential readers including academics interested in the philosophy of customary law in general, academic international lawyers and legal practitioners, especially judges, scholars of international relations and all those interested in how the international community of States organises itself.

Jurisprudence is a classic work by James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill. A table of contents is included. Das E-Book Jurisprudence wird angeboten von Charles River Editors und wurde mit folgenden Begriffen kategorisiert: john stuart mill; political; free

In Right, Power, and Faquanism, Tong Zhiwei proposes that right and power are ultimately a unified entity which can be named “faquan,” and that the purpose of law should be to establish a balanced faquan structure and to promote its preservation and proliferation. “Faquan” is thus a jurisprudential category reflecting the understanding of the unity of right and power. It has interest protected by the law and property with defined ownership as its content, and manifests itself as the external forms of jural right, freedom, liberty, jural power, public function, authority, competence, privilege, and immunity, etc. Faquanism relies mainly on six basic concepts (faquan, right, power, quan, residual quan and duty) to analyze the content of interests and property in all legal phenomena.

This title was first published in 2003.This book explores the interaction of globalization and the development of law. The framework of the book is established by William Twining, who asks how legal concepts can be generalised within a variety of legal orders. This theme is taken up by a group of leading Australian scholars, who produce essays on international economic law, including financial regulation and human rights, and citizenship, migration and crime, under the headings Globalization and the Laws of Money, Globalization and the Laws of People, Globalization, Cultures and Comparisons. This collection marks an important step towards the construction of a jurisprudence for a connected, but still culturally diverse, globe.

Judging and Emotion investigates how judicial officers understand, experience, display, manage and deploy emotions in their everyday work, in light of their fundamental commitment to impartiality.Judging and Emotion challenges the conventional assumption that emotion is inherently unpredictable, stressful or a personal quality inconsistent with impartiality. Extensive empirical research with Australian judicial officers demonstrates the ways emotion, emotional capacities and emotion work are integral to judicial practice. Judging and Emotion articulates a broader conception of emotion, as a social practice emerging from interaction, and demonstrates how judicial officers undertake emotion work and use emotion as a resource to achieve impartiality. A key insight is that institutional requirements, including conceptions of impartiality as dispassion, do not completely determine the emotion dimensions of judicial work. Through their everyday work, judicial officers construct and maintain the boundaries of an impartial judicial role which necessarily incorporates emotion and emotion work.Building on a growing interest in emotion in law and social sciences, this book will be of considerable importance to socio-legal scholars, sociologists, the judiciary, legal practitioners and all users of the courts.

First published in 1917 (Part 1) and 1918 (Part 2), with a second edition in 1946, this is the first English translation of Santi Romano's classic work, L'ordinamento giuridico (The Legal Order). The main focus of The Legal Order is the notion of institution, which Romano considers to be both the core and distinguishing feature of law. After criticising accounts of the nature of law centred on notions of rule, coercion or authority, he offers a compelling conception, not merely of law as an institution, but of the institution as ‘the first, original and essential manifestation of law'. Romano advances a definition of a legal institution as any group who share rules within a bounded context: for example, a family, a firm, a factory, a prison, an association, a church, an illegal organisation, a state, the community of states, and so on. Therefore, this understanding of legal institutionalism at the same time provides a ground-breaking theory of legal pluralism whereby ‘there are as many legal orders as institutions'. The acme of a jurisprudential current long overlooked in the Anglophone environment (Romano's work is highly regarded in France, Germany, Spain and South America, as well as in Italy), The Legal Order not only proposes what Carl Schmitt described as a ‘very significant theory'. More importantly, it offers precious insights for a thorough rethinking of the relationship between law and society in today's world.

​In diesem Sammelband diskutieren die beitragenden Autoren, inwieweit andere Disziplinen von den Erkenntnissen der Rechtswissenschaft profitieren können. Bisher wird diese Frage nur umgekehrt, nämlich mit Blick auf den Erkenntniswert anderer Disziplinen für die Rechtswissenschaft, erörtert. Die Beiträge waren Teil einer an der Universität Rostock im Sommer 2016 durchgeführten Vortragsreihe.

La jurisprudence est l'un des phénomènes juridiques les plus problématiques, comme source du droit réel mais non officielle. Ce livre retrace son parcours dans l'histoire de la pensée juridique, longtemps dominée par le légicentrisme. Il s'intéresse également à la difficile identification doctrinale des jugements, arrêts et décisions à portée jurisprudentielle. Il s'attache enfin à la jurisprudentialisation du droit, qui constitue l'une des données les plus remarquables du droit contemporain, ainsi qu'aux critiques que la doctrine adresse à un droit trop abandonné au'gouvernement des juges'.

This book defines the characteristics of a new discipline that is both legal and scientific: user-friendly legal science.Focusing on how legal tools and practices can be used to achieve objectives in different contexts, it offers an alternative to doctrinal research, law-and-something disciplines, and the traditional interdisciplinary approach.The book not only defines the new discipline's research approach, point of view, theory-building, and research methods, it also shows how it relates to other scientific disciplines and how existing doctrinal legal disciplines can be upgraded into scientific disciplines.

Routledge Q&As give you the tools to practice and refine your exam technique, showing you how to apply your knowledge to maximum effect in assessment. Each book contains essay and problem-based questions on the most commonly examined topics, complete with expert guidance and model answers that help you to:Plan your revision and know what examiners are looking for: Introducing how best to approach revision in each subject Identifying and explaining the main elements of each question, and providing marker annotation to show how examiners will read your answer Understand and remember the law: Using memorable diagram overviews for each answer to demonstrate how the law fits together and how best to structure your answer Gain marks and understand areas of debate: Providing revision tips and advice to help you aim higher in essays and exams Highlighting areas that are contentious and on which you will need to form an opinion Avoid common errors: Identifying common pitfalls students encounter in class and in assessment The series is supported by an online resource that allows you to test your progress during the run-up to exams. Features include: multiple choice questions, bonus Q&As and podcasts.

Volume 8, the third of the historical volumes of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, offers a history of legal philosophy in common-law countries from the 17th to the 19th century. Its main focus (like that of Volume 9) is on the ways in which jurists and legal philosophers thought about law and legal reasoning. The volume begins with a discussion of the ‘common law mind'as it evolved in late medieval and early modern England. It goes on to examine the different jurisprudential traditions which developed in England and the United States, showing that while Coke's vision of the common law continued to exert a strong influence on American jurists, in England a more positivist approach took root, which found its fullest articulation in the work of Bentham and Austin.

According to many Islamic jurists, the world is divided between dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the abode of war). This dual division of the world has led to a great amount of juridical discussion concerning what makes a territory part of dar al-Islam, what the status of Muslims living outside of this is, and whether they are obliged to obey Islamic jurisprudence. Susanne Olsson examines the differing understandings of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, as well as related concepts, such as jihad and takfir. She thereby is able to explore how these concepts have been utilised, transformed and negotiated throughout history. As the subject of Muslims living in Europe is such a topical and sometimes controversial one, this book will appeal to researchers of modern Islam as integral to the Western experience.

The first-ever multivolume treatment of the issues in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence, from both a theoretical and a historical perspective. The work is aimed at jurists as well as legal and practical philosophers. Edited by the renowned theorist Enrico Pattaro and his team, this book is a classical reference work that would be of great interest to legal and practical philosophers as well as to jurists and legal scholar at all levels. The work is divided in two parts. The theoretical part (published in 2005), consisting of five volumes, covers the main topics of the contemporary debate; the historical part, consisting of six volumes (Volumes 6-8 published in 2007; Volumes 9 and 10, published in 2009; Volume 11 published in 2011 and Volume 12 forthcoming in 2015), accounts for the development of legal thought from ancient Greek times through the twentieth century. The entire set will be completed with an index.Volume 6: A History of the Philosophy of Law from theAncient Greeks to the Scholastics 2nd revised edition, edited by Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi Volume 6 is the first of the Treatise's historical volumes (following the five theoretical ones) and is dedicated to the philosophers'philosophy of law from ancient Greece to the 16th century. The volume thus begins with the dawning of legal philosophy in Greek and Roman philosophical thought and then covers the birth and development of European medieval legal philosophy, the influence of Judaism and the Islamic philosophers, the revival of Roman and Christian canon law, and the rise of scholastic philosophy in the late Middle Ages, which paved the way for early-modern Western legal philosophy. This second, revised edition comes with an entirely new chapter devoted to the later Scholastics (Chapter 14, by Annabel Brett) and an epilogue (by Carrie-Ann Biondi) on the legacy of ancient and medieval thought for modern legal philosophy, as well as with updated references and indexes.

In this book the author investigates what is common to the German idea of the Rechtsstaat and the Anglo-American idea of the Rule of Law. He argues that, although dressed up in rather different garb, these two concepts are in fact based on the same fundamental idea and stand for the same values (“the law-state values”) – all ideas that are in the European tradition older than their British and German variants. The fundamental idea is that the individual shall enjoy legal protection against infringements brought about by the exercise of power on the part of the state. In the book basic concepts such as legality, legal equality, legal certainty, legal accessibility and legal security are investigated. Also explored are their mutual relations, in particular, conflicts between them. Furthermore, the book offers practical advice on realising and sustaining these values in practice. Finally, it is argued that the characteristic law-state values can only be justified by reference to an even more fundamental humanistic idea, namely, what the author calls “a life of human dignity”.

In Knowing the Suffering of Others, legal scholar Austin Sarat brings together essays that address suffering as it relates to the law, highlighting the ways law imagines suffering and how pain and suffering become jurisprudential facts. From fetal imaging to end-of-life decisions, torts to international human rights, domestic violence to torture, and the law of war to victim impact statements, the law is awash in epistemological and ethical problems associated with knowing and imagining suffering. In each of these domains we might ask: How well do legal actors perceive and understand suffering in such varied domains of legal life? What problems of representation and interpretation bedevil efforts to grasp the suffering of others? What historical, political, literary, cultural, and/or theological resources can legal actors and citizens draw on to understand the suffering of others? In Knowing the Suffering of Others, Austin Sarat presents legal scholarship that explores these questions and puts the problem of suffering at the center of thinking about law. The contributors to this volume do not regard pain and suffering as objective facts of a universe remote from law; rather they examine how both are discursively constructed in and by law. They examine how pain and suffering help construct and give meaning to the law as we know it. The authors attend to the various ways suffering appears in law as well as the different forms of suffering that require the law's attention. Throughout this book law is regarded as a domain in which the meanings of pain and suffering are contested, and constituted, as well as an instrument for inflicting suffering or for providing or refusing its relief. It challenges scholars, lawyers, students, and policymakers to ask how various legal actors and audiences understand the suffering of others. Contributors Montré D. Carodine / Cathy Caruth / Alan L. Durham / Bryan K.Fair / Steven H. Hobbs / Gregory C. Keating / Linda Ross Meyer / Meredith M. Render / Jeannie Suk / John Fabian Witt

Professor Jenkins develops a systematic theory of the origins, the ends, and the functions of law. He then applies this theory to the problems that law encounters and the conditions that it must satisfy if it is to be an effective force in society.Originally published in 1980.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Lord Rodger of Earlsferry was a distinguished judge and scholar. He was a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the author of many high quality law journal articles and two books. Written in memory of Lord Rodger, this collection contains 47 essays by Lord Rodger's friends and colleagues from the UK and Europe. The essays reflect Lord Rodger's role as a leading judge and also his wide-ranging academic interests including Roman law, Scots law and legal history, and a miscellany of other topics. The authors in this volume are leading academics or judges, and a particularly notable feature is the nine essays written by Supreme Court justices. As the highest judges in the UK they provide a unique insight into the work of the Supreme Court, as well as Lord Rodger's work in the Court. The book also includes the memorial tributes to Lord Rodger which explain his remarkable legal career, including his roles as Lord Advocate (Senior Law Officer of Scotland) Lord President of the Court of Session, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and, finally, Justice of the UK Supreme Court. The essays include personal reminiscences of Lord Rodger, helping the reader to understand why he was so highly regarded and why his untimely death has dealt such a devastating blow to law in the UK.

This unique volume develops a new philosophy of law and a new theory of law enforcement. The concepts developed provide the basis for a general unified theory of law that reconciles what legislators and judges do, with what police do to resolve important questions in the field and make public policy recommendations.

This book is about the use of legal scholarship by judges. It discusses the possibility that legal scholarship may function as a genuine source of law in modern municipal legal systems. The book advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The major conceptual claims are found in Chapters 2 and 3, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The relevant notion of content-independence is derived (with qualifications) from H.L.A. Hart's jurisprudence. Indeed, the book's analysis of the concept of a source of law relies at various points on Hartian insights about law and legal reasoning. Chapter 4 argues that legal scholarship – or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that might be described as standard or doctrinal – can be, and indeed is, used as a source of law in modern legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate judicial recourse to legal scholarship with judicial activism. This association is discussed and criticized in Chapters 5 and 6. It is argued that, in spite of a relatively common opinion to the contrary, legal scholarship can be used to mitigate discretion. In fact, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it really does not. The concluding chapter addresses potential objections not explicitly discussed in earlier chapters.​

This is the first ever collected volume on John Austin, whose role in the founding of analytical jurisprudence is unquestionable. After 150 years, time has come to assess his legacy. The book fills a void in existing literature, by letting top scholars with diverse outlooks flesh out and discuss Austin's legacy today. A nuanced, vibrant, and richly diverse picture of both his legal and ethical theories emerges, making a case for a renewal of interest in his work. The book applies multiple perspectives, reflecting Austin's various interests – stretching from moral theory to theory of law and state, from Roman Law to Constitutional Law – and it offers a comparative outlook on Austin and his legacy in the light of the contemporary debate and major movements within legal theory. It sheds new light on some central issues of practical reasoning: the relation between law and morals, the nature of legal systems, the function of effectiveness, the value-free character of legal theory, the connection between normative and factual inquiries in the law, the role of power, the character of obedience and the notion of duty.​

PATRICKNERHOT Since the two operations overlap each other so much, speaking about fact and interpretation in legal science separately would undoubtedly be highly artificial. To speak about fact in law already brings in the operation we call interpretation. EquaHy, to speak about interpretation is to deal with the method of identifying reality and therefore, in large part, to enter the area of the question of fact. By way of example, Bemard Jackson's text, which we have placed in section 11 of the first part of this volume, could no doubt just as weH have found a horne in section I. This work is aimed at analyzing this interpretation of the operation of identifying fact on the one hand and identifying the meaning of a text on the other. All philosophies of law recognize themselves in the analysis they propose for this interpretation, and we too shall seek in this volume to fumish a few elements of use for this analysis. We wish however to make it clear that our endeavour is addressed not only to legal philosophers: the nature of the interpretive act in legal science is a matter of interest to the legal practitioner too. He will find in these pages, we believe, elements that will serve hirn in rcflcction on his daily work.

How do laws resemble rules of games, moral rules, personal rules, rules found in religious teachings, school rules, and so on? Are laws rules at all? Are they all made by human beings? And if so how should we go about interpreting them? How are they organized into systems, and what does it mean for these systems to have'constitutions'? Should everyone want to live under a system of law? Is there a special kind of'legal justice'? Does it consist simply in applying the law of the system? And how does it relate to the ideal of'the rule of law'? These and other classic questions in the philosophy of law form the subject-matter of Law as a Leap of Faith. In this book John Gardner collects, revisits, and supplements fifteen years of celebrated writings on general questions about law and legal systems - writings in which he attempts, without loss of philosophical finesse or insight, to cut through some of the technicalities with which the subject has become encrusted in the late twentieth century. Taking his agenda broadly from H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law (1961), Gardner shows how the key ideas in that work live on, and how they have been and can still be improved in modest ways to meet important criticisms - in some cases by concession, in some cases by circumvention, and in some cases by restatement. In the process Gardner engages with key ideas of other modern giants of the subject including Kelsen, Holmes, Raz, and Dworkin. Most importantly he presents the main elements of his own unique and refreshingly direct way of thinking about law, brought together in one place for the first time.

It gives me great pleasure to offer this foreword to the present work of my admired friend and respected colleague Ota Weinberger. Apart from the essays of his which were published in our joint work An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism in 1986, relatively little of Wein­ berger's work is available in English. This is the more to be regretted, since his is work of particular interest to jurists of the English-speaking world both in view of its origins and in respect of its content As to its origins, Weinberger war reared as a student of the Pure Theory of Law, a theory which in its Kelsenian form has aroused very great interest and has had considerable influence among anglophoone scholars -perhaps even more than in the Germanic countries. Less well known is the fact that the Pure Theory itself divided into two schools, that of Vienna and that of Brno. It was in the Brno school of Frantisek Weyr that Weinberger's legal theory found its early formation, and perhaps from that early influence one can trace his continuing insistence on the dual character of legal norms -both as genuinely normative and yet at the same time having real social existence.

Reading Modern Law identifies and elaborates upon key critical methodologies for reading and writing about law in modernity. The force of law rests on determinate and localizable authorizations, as well as an expansive capacity to encompass what has not been pre-figured by an order of rules. The key question this dynamic of law raises is how legal forms might be deployed to confront and disrupt injustice. The urgency of this question must not eclipse the care its complexity demands. This book offers a critical methodology for addressing the many challenges thrown up by that question, whilst testifying to its complexity. The essays in this volume - engagements direct or oblique, with the work of Peter Fitzpatrick - chart a mode of resisting the proliferation of social scientific methods, as much as geo-political empire. The authors elaborate a critical and interdisciplinary treatment of law and modernity, and outline the pivotal role of sovereignty in contemporary formations of power, both national and international. From various overlapping vantage points, therefore, Reading Modern Law interrogates law's relationship to power, as well as its relationship to the critical work of reading and writing about law in modernity.

HLA Hart's The Concept of Law is one of the most influential works of philosophy of the twentieth century, redefining the field of legal philosophy and introducing generations of students to philosophical reflection on the nature of law. Since its publication in 1961 an industry of academic research and debate has grown up around the book, disputing, refining, and developing Hart's work. Under the sheer volume of competing interpretations of the book the original contexts - cultural and intellectual - that shaped Hart's project can be obscured. In this book, renowned legal historian AWB Simpson attempts to sweep aside the volumes of academic criticism and return to'Troy I', revealing the world of post-war Oxford that produced Hart and his famous book. Drawing on his personal experience of studying and teaching in Oxford at the time Hart developed The Concept of Law, Simpson recreates with characteristic wit the social and intellectual culture of Oxford philosophy and the law faculty in the 1950s. He traces Hart's early work and influences, within and outside Oxford, showing how Hart developed his picture of philosophy and its potential for enriching the understanding of law. He also lays bare the painful shortcomings of post-war Oxford academia, depicting a world of eccentric dons and intellectual Cyclopses - isolated and closed to broad, interdisciplinary exchange - arguing that Hart did not escape from the limitations of his intellectual world. Simpson's entertaining, and controversial, account of the world that produced The Concept of Law will be essential reading for all those engaged in interpreting and teaching the seminal book, and an engaging read for anyone interested in the history of Oxford philosophy and legal education.

What is law? This question has preoccupied philosophers from Plato to Thomas Hobbes to H. L. A. Hart. Yet many others find it perplexing. How could we possibly know how to answer such an abstract question? And what would be the point of doing so? In Legality, Scott Shapiro argues that the question is not only meaningful but vitally important. In fact, many of the most pressing puzzles that lawyers confront—including who has legal authority over us and how we should interpret constitutions, statutes, and cases—will remain elusive until this grand philosophical question is resolved.Shapiro draws on recent work in the philosophy of action to develop an original and compelling answer to this age-old question. Breaking with a long tradition in jurisprudence, he argues that the law cannot be understood simply in terms of rules. Legal systems are best understood as highly complex and sophisticated tools for creating and applying plans. Shifting the focus of jurisprudence in this way—from rules to plans—not only resolves many of the most vexing puzzles about the nature of law but has profound implications for legal practice as well.Written in clear, jargon-free language, and presupposing no legal or philosophical background, Legality is both a groundbreaking new theory of law and an excellent introduction to and defense of classical jurisprudence.

The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized argues that the school of analytical jurisprudence has masqueraded as a detached pursuit that can be relevant to all legal systems in all places at all times. Allan C. Hutchinson presents evidence that analytical jurisprudence has a definite history and is part of a contested political tradition that is fundamentally at odds with democracy. This book seeks to expose the failings and frailties of analytical jurisprudence, to uncover its political roots and leanings, and to suggest an alternative legal theory that highlights the practical consequences of a Dewey-inspired approach.

MacCormick's `Institutions of Law'is the culmination of a lifetime's work in legal theory by one of the world's most respected legal theorists. Featuring an impressive collection of contributions from well-known legal theorists from around the world, all of whom are familiar with MacCormick's work, this collection provides a cutting edge account of the book's significance.

Reasonableness is at the centre of legal debate, both in academic circles and in practice. This unique reference work adopts an interdisciplinary perspective, merging jurisprudence, legal theory, political philosophy and the different branches of law. All aspects relating to reasonableness and law are addressed by the most prominent scholars in the field. In the first part of the book, the focus is on jurisprudential analyses of the concept of reasonableness and on its moral, political and constitutional implications. In the second part, reasonableness is examined in the different fields of law like Public, Private and International Law. Here in more detail the practical consequences of reasonableness are worked out, making this work of interest to practitioners as well as legal theorists.

How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, politicians, and judges all have answers to that question: these range from “nothing” to “everything.”In Justice in Robes, Ronald Dworkin argues that the question is much more complex than it has often been taken to be and charts a variety of dimensions—semantic, jurisprudential, and doctrinal—in which law and morals are undoubtedly interwoven. He restates and summarizes his own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticizes the most influential rival theories to his own. He argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalism reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority. In the course of that critical study he discusses the work of many of the most influential lawyers and philosophers of the era, including Isaiah Berlin, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Antonin Scalia, and Joseph Raz.Dworkin's new collection of essays and original chapters is a model of lucid, logical, and impassioned reasoning that will advance the crucially important debate about the roles of justice in law.