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This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.

Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories of legal obligation. The notion of legal obligation is widely regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials make reference to obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges, powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation championed in legal philosophy today. With contributions from renowned theorists, this book will be invaluable for scholars and students of legal theory, legal philosophy, and jurisprudence.

What role does empirical data play in law? How can we draw normative conclusions from empirical legal research? New insights in philosophy, the social sciences and the humanities have forced the relationship between facts and norms on to the agenda. This book presents an innovative set of perspectives on the relationship between descriptive and normative elements in legal inquiry and practice. The contributors provide critical insights from a range of different disciplinary traditions and theoretical positions. They discuss topics such as the epistemic dependence of judicial decision-makers, legal doctrine as a non-normative discipline, systems-theory critique and law, and exploring the boundaries of law. This book will benefit legal academics and graduate students looking to explore issues of methodology. It will also be of great interest to researchers in law and related topics interested in discussions of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research.Contributors include: R. Cotterrell, P. Cserne, W. de Been, M. Del Mar, L. Francot, J. Hage, R. Herdy, O.W. Lembcke, A.R. Mackor, A.M. Pacces, G. Samuel, S. Taekema, B. van Klin, W. van der Burg

Desde que en 1969 David Lewis publicara su influyente obra On Convention, el problema que conlleva el concepto de convención y sus múltiples aplicaciones a los estudios sociales queda planteado en su forma canónica. En Teoría del derecho, el análisis actual de la relación entre convención y derecho parte en buena medida de la caracterización que Hart hizo de la regla de reconocimiento como convención. En este libro, algunos de los más destacados especialistas actuales en la materia realizan una serie de aportaciones significativas sobre esta cuestión, agrupadas en tres partes. En la primera, se aborda críticamente la noción de convención (Celano, Rodríguez-Blanco); en la segunda, se analiza la posibilidad de entender la regla de reconocimiento como una convención constitutiva (Marmor, Rodríguez, Vilajosana) y la dificultad que una visión convencional de dicha regla tiene para dar cuenta del carácter institucional o de la normatividad del derecho (Sánchez-Brígido, Stravropoulos); en la tercera, se examina críticamente el convencionalismo dentro del ámbito de la interpretación jurídica (Arena, Ramírez Ludeña, Shapiro). En este sentido, este texto será de interés para quienes deseen conocer el estado de la cuestión acerca del convencionalismo jurídico, pero también para quienes pretendan profundizar en los desarrollos presentados por los autores.

La pregunta más básica de la filosofía de la responsabilidad extracontractual es qué explica el deber de compensar los daños que causamos a otros. Esta cuestión ha sido abordada desde dos perspectivas bien diferentes. Por un lado, los partidarios del análisis económico del derecho adoptan una visión instrumentalista de las prácticas jurídicas, y adscriben a la responsabilidad civil el objetivo de reducir hasta un nivel razonable el coste de los accidentes. Los teóricos de la justicia correctiva, en cambio, sostienen que la práctica cobra su mayor sentido cuando se la interpreta a la luz de la rectificación de las interacciones injustas. La moral interna de la práctica está asociada a la justicia entre particulares y no al logro de objetivos sociales. Después de realizar una evaluación crítica de ambas teorías, este libro defiende un enfoque plural, de acuerdo con el cual el derecho de daños implementa un conjunto de consideraciones distributivas y correctivas que solo puede comprenderse totalmente cuando se advierte la importancia conceptual de lo

Este libro reúne una serie de ensayos que tienen como objetivo, por una parte, comprender algunas posturas de autores relevantes en la filosofía del derecho contemporánea, y por la otra, explicar algunos temas concretos desde una perspectiva analítica de la filosofía jurídica, temas como la retroactividad, la autoridad, las relaciones entre derecho y moral y los límites del derecho. En relación a la discusión de posturas relevantes en la filosofía del derecho, se expone de una manera novedosa el debate Hart-Fuller para poder evaluarlo de manera certera, además, se discute la tesis de la autoridad de Raz y también un capítulo se dedica a presentar un análisis crítico de la postura metodológica de Dworkin, entre otros autores que se analizan. Juan Vega Gómez es Investigador del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Profesor de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Miembro del Sistema Nacional de Investigadores y Director de la Revista “Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho”. Regularmente imparte la clase de Teoría Jurídica Contemporánea en el Posgrado en Derecho de la UNAM y en diversas universidades de México. Ha realizado estancias de investigación en la Universidad de Oxford; Universidad de California, Los Ángeles (UCLA), y Universidad de Jaén en España.

This book provides a concise and accessible guide to modern jurisprudence, offering an examination of the major theories and systematic discussion of themes such as legality and justice. It gives readers a better understanding of the rival viewpoints by exploring the historical developments which give modern thinking its distinctive shape, and placing law in its political context. A key feature of the book is that readers are not simply presented with opposing theories, but are guided through the rival standpoints on the basis of a coherent line of reflection from which an overall sense of the subject can be gained. Chapters on Hart, Fuller, Rawls, Dworkin and Finnis take the reader systematically through the terrain of modern legal philosophy, tracing the issues back to fundamental questions of philosophy, and indicating lines of criticism that build to a fresh and original perspective on the subject.

The second Yearbook of the Central East European Forum of Young Legal, Political and Social Theorists aims at reassessing some major legacies of jurisprudence and political philosophy, thereby celebrating one hundred years from the publication of the first important theoretical account of Hans Kelsen – Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre; the fifty-years anniversary of one of the most important contemporary books in legal theory – Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law; as well as the forty-years heritage of the most influential 20th century account of justice – John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. On this occasion fourteen scholars from Eastern and Central Europe gave their accounts and interpretations of jurisprudential and political philosophical problems that persist or emerge anew in contemporary debates.

In a departure from the mainstream methodology of a positivist-oriented jurisprudence, Collective Rights provides the first legal-theoretical treatment of this area. It advances a normative-moral standpoint of'value collectivism'which goes against the traditional political philosophy of liberalism and the dominant ideas of liberal multiculturalism. Moreover, it places a theoretical account of collective rights within the larger debate between proponents of different rights theories. By exploring why'collective rights'should be differentiated from similar legal concepts, the relationship between collective and individual rights and why groups should be recognised as the third distinctive type of right-holders, it presents the topic as connected to the larger philosophical debate about international law of human rights, most notably to the problem of universality of rights.

Includes index.