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This paper examines the role of bank capital in decision-making by bank holding companies (BHCs) in the United States. Following Chami and Cosimano's (2001) call option approach to bank capital, BHCs optimally choose the amount of capital to insure the bank against becoming capital constrained in the future. We provide empirical support for this model, and find that a higher optimal level of capital leads to higher loan rates. Furthermore, higher loan rates result in lower amounts of lending. Thus, an increase in capital requirements is likely to lead to higher loan rates and a significant reduction in lending.

A large theoretical and empirical literature has focused on the impact of financial deepening on economic growth throughout the world. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating whether this impact differs across regions, income levels, and types of economy. Using a rich dataset for 150 countries for the period 1975–2005, dynamic panel estimation results suggest that the beneficial effect of financial deepening on economic growth in fact displays measurable heterogeneity; it is generally smaller in oil exporting countries; in certain regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and in lower-income countries. Further analysis suggests that these differences might be driven by regulatory/supervisory characteristics and related to differences in the ability to provide widespread access to financial services.

This paper introduces the concept of the financial possibility frontier as a constrained optimum level of financial development to gauge the relative performance of financial systems across the globe. This frontier takes into account structural country characteristics, institutional, and macroeconomic factors that impact financial system deepening. We operationalize this framework using a benchmarking exercise, which relates the difference between the actual level of financial development and the level predicted by structural characteristics, to an array of policy variables. We also show that an overshooting of the financial system significantly beyond levels predicted by its structural fundamentals is associated with credit booms and busts.

The paper examines the slowdown of lending by large U.S. banks over the period 2007Q3 - 2009Q2, focusing on: (i) whether capital or liquidity was the binding constraint; (ii) factors influencing banks'decision to hold capital; and (iii) their pricing behavior. Using quarterly data for the largest U.S. banks, the paper finds that capital, rather than liquidity, constrained lending. Banks took actions to increase capital by slowing lending and raising profit margins, not fully passing through the Federal Reserve's interest rate cuts. Banks optimally choose capital based on the expected future demand for loans and the marginal cost of capital.