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The paper explores recent U.S. initiatives to conclude arms control agreements as well as confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan and assesses the prospects for progress in these areas. After U.S.-led negotiations in the wake of the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests, India and Pakistan expressed renewed interest in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). In contrast, U.S. efforts to convince India and Pakistan to adopt the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and to disarm have failed. Since January 2001, the Bush administration has continued to promote CBMs and Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures (NRRMs) between the two countries. Since 2002, the administration considered offering missile-defenses to Pakistan and India, which might improve conditions for arms control and reduction. Indian officials have expressed interest in missile defense and noted the links with arms reduction. However, Pakistan and its ally, China, suspect that U.S. and Indian missile defenses are intended to neutralize their deterrents, which could open the door to an accelerated arms race and even preemptive action. A contradiction explored in the paper is that, while the United States tries to negotiate arms control agreements in South Asia, it has moved away from the ABM treaty, the CTBT, and other arms control measures. Another issue is what the United States can achieve as a mediator through arms control and CBMs, such as cooperative aerial monitoring, a more rigorous ‘hot line,’ and a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) program. A related issue that is explored is the connection between arms control and missile defenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We often imagine that countries with nuclear energy programs are nuclear weapons states waiting to happen. Yet there are multiple ways that states can enhance their nuclear security, even when they possess the requisite technology for a weapons program. They may undertake diplomatic efforts to reduce the level of threat, they may seek shelter under an ally's nuclear umbrella, and they may adopt unilateral military measures, up to and including the development of a nuclear arsenal. Over the past five decades, India has engaged in all three of these approaches. Since India's pursuit of nuclear weapons is already well-documented, this article focuses on its efforts to elicit nuclear restraint from other states through diplomacy and to seek the protection of nuclear-armed allies. Drawing on archival documents and interviews in New Delhi and Mumbai, it documents how Indian leaders eventually became disillusioned with these two alternatives to nuclear armament. In doing so, it depicts India's emergence as a nuclear power not simply as a response to regional threats, but also as the result of dissatisfaction with alternative paths to nuclear security. The paper concludes by exploring the implications of this finding for possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in nuclear energy in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how domestic politics influenced the July 2005 agreement between India and the United States for civilian nuclear technology transfers to India. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Indian-American citizens' groups in the United States, and the efforts of an increasingly professionalized and well-funded "India lobby" on Capitol Hill, were critical in rallying congressional support around a significant and controversial bilateral nuclear trade and cooperation agreement between India and the United States in 2006. This episode may represent the consolidation of the "India lobby" and portend its emergence as of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over US foreign policy in the 21st Century. Existing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American foreign policy typically focuses on communities such as Jewish and Cuban Americans (the "Israel lobby," in particular has been the subject of recent contentious academic and policy debates ), and argues that wealth, geographic concentration, and group cohesion are important factors explaining ethnic lobby influence in the US foreign policy process. Indian-Americans as a community broadly fit the first two criteria, but until very recently were highly segmented into particular professional and Indian language/regional associations, and received scant attention in the ethnic lobby literature. Recently, though, the community has become more unified and politically mobilized, with potentially important implications for US policy in South Asia, the broader Asian region, and the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]