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The article presents a brief account of notes on functional representation in the British House of Commons. The purpose of this paper is to consider two different but related hypotheses concerning functional representation in the House of Commons. Although private members usually represent party interests with considerable cohesion, a significant number also conspicuously represent various par- ticular interests; when this is true, their behavior during debate will reflect this type of representation as well as their party representation. A debate on the procedures of the House of Commons, which must of necessity consider the role of the private member, is in part a debate over theories of representation. It may be that the recent discussions of Commons procedures are, whether so intended or not, a reflection of some discontent with the present balance between collectivist views of representation and the concepts of functional representation. Certainly a consideration of the way in which institutional changes might alter the access of interest representation in Britain is necessary for a full understanding of these institutions themselves.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss certain selected topics which illustrate how the tendency to approach the study of American institutions in terms of the British system has given rise to errors in judgment, to a mistaken emphasis, and to the distortion of facts. In the U.S. the investigating committee with its extensive hearings and its sifting of evidence has done much to correct shortcomings and failures in the administrative branch and has paved the way for the adoption of reform legislation. Although select committees were the most important instrumentality used in Great Britain for inquiry purposes in the nineteenth century, they have today almost completely ceased to be of any political importance. The tendency of the British Cabinet to treat "every serious criticism of the work of the Departments as an attack upon itself, to be resisted with the whole strength of its majority," has caused parliamentary discussions to become stereo-typed debates between opposing armies under rigid party discipline rather than informative and critical analyses of present-day conditions. The advantages of the English cabinet system over the American presidential system have frequently been pointed out. However, the major problem of government today is how to maintain an effective control over the administrative machine.

The article discusses Bimetallic controversy of fifty years ago. Bimetallism thrilled people as perhaps no other controversy of the day. It was at its height in the years preceding the discovery of the Rand in 1886, a discovery which before the end of the century had robbed it of all but academic interest. In Great Britain itself it became a lively issue owing to the sharp and prolonged fall in the gold price of silver and other commodities after 1872. It gave a minister of the government Alfred Marshall the opportunity to expound before the Gold and Silver Commission of 1887-8 and the House of Commons Committee on Indian Currency (1899) not only his plan of Symmetallism, i.e., of paper based on a composite of gold and silver; but his whole theory of money and credit. In the United States, which had a great silver-producing interest, it drew from William Jennings Bryan, the democratic candidate for the American presidency in 1896, the famous challenge "Shall mankind be crucified on a cross of gold?" But all Europe was interested; and it is on the Continent that the story begins and develops.