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The political economy of agricultural policies - why certain interventions may be preferred by political leaders rather than others - is well recognized. This paper explores a perspective that has previously been neglected: the political economy of the agricultural statistics. In developing economies, the data on agricultural production are weak. Because these data are assembled using competing methods and assumptions, the final series are subject to political pressure, particularly when the government is subsidizing agricultural inputs. This paper draws on debates on the evidence of a Green Revolution in India and the arguments on the effect of withdrawing fertilizer subsidies during structural adjustment in Nigeria, and finally the paper presents new data on the effect of crop data subsidies in Malawi. The recent agricultural census (2006/7) indicates a maize output of 2.1 million metric tonnes, compared to the previously widely circulated figures of 3.4 million metric tonnes. The paper suggests that 'data' are themselves a product of agricultural policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a case study of the 2001/02 famine in Malawi from a village in the Southern Region of the country. Based on in-depth micro-level field research, it challenges some commonly accepted views about this crisis. The paper provides evidence that: (1) there was a serious 'famine' in the community; (2) the decline in food availability was not the major causal factor of the famine; (3) the early warning system in the rural areas was functioning appropriately and the famine did not happen in 'silence', unnoticed; (4) the food preferences of Malawians are not 'inflexible'; and (5) the famine, contrary to the claims of some of the 'new famine hypotheses', was less the consequence of underlying vulnerability and long-term social or economic trends but, rather, the result of an unexpected and sudden shock, which was generated by the exponential increase in the price of all food crops. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smallholders grow the majority of Malawi's main export crop - burley tobacco. We analyse this value chain segment for the 2003/4 and 2009/10 seasons. The comparison shows smallholder profits in 2003/4 were limited by two main factors: a cartel of leaf merchants at auction and inefficient marketing arrangements. In 2009/10, there was greater competition at auction, improvements in marketing, tighter state regulation (including minimum prices) and much more contract farming. The paper concludes by reflecting on aspects of the political economy of the tobacco industry at national and global levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]