1. Contracts for health care and asymmetric information.
- Author
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de Fraja, Gianni and De Fraja, G
- Subjects
- *
MEDICAL care , *HEALTH planning , *PATIENTS , *INSURANCE companies , *HOSPITALS , *COST , *THERAPEUTICS - Abstract
The paper presents a stylised model of contracting for a specific health service. The benefit of this service differs across patients. A purchaser, National Health Service (NHS, insurer) offers a contract to providers (hospitals, GP's), under the constraint of limited information about the provider's costs and the contract specifies the payment as a function of the number of cases treated. A number of features of the optimal contract are derived. Some of these are surprising: for example, the price per case generally increases with the efficiency of the provider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2000
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