Search

Recent discussions of humanitarian intervention in international relations (IR) have often focused on the evolution of norms, and the development and contestation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) framework. While beneficial in tracing this process, most of these studies tend not to incorporate an analysis of colonialism, race, sexuality, or gender. While postcolonial studies of humanitarian intervention have done well to illustrate the relationship between humanitarian intervention and colonial violence, they still tend to neglect the study of sexuality and gender. Exploring how the sexualized, gendered, and racialized dimensions of colonialism can be incorporated into the study of humanitarian intervention, this paper proposes a queer approach. After exploring the valuable contributions of feminist scholarship, it suggests that the queer approaches of Nicola Pratt ("The Queen Boat Case in Egypt: Sexuality, National Security and State Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 33, no. 1 [2007]: 129–44), Cynthia Weber (Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016), and Laura Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg ("Trans- Bodies in/of War(s): Cisprivilege and Contemporary Security Strategy," Feminist Review 101, no. 1 [2012]: 5–23) offer some distinct contributions that build upon feminist insights. Applying these to the 2015 House of Commons debate on airstrikes against ISIL, the paper suggests that queer IR can invigorate the study of humanitarian intervention with a framework that unpacks the simultaneously gendered, sexual, and racial dimensions of colonial violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors' motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overlapping of a series of events in the region has brought the Sahel under the spotlight of many European countries. It has been argued that the peculiar transnational nature of many terrorist groups of the area represents a concrete threat to European security. France, specifically, has led and encouraged a series of European initiatives, which aim to stabilize the region, calling for different degrees of counterterrorism cooperation with its European allies. Many European countries, such as Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, or Italy, have indeed increased their engagement in the area. Yet, not only a variety of new actors are now involved in the response to terrorism, but European cooperation among key actors is also developing along political-strategic, organizational, and procedural dimensions largely unexplored by the existing literature. This paper specifically accounts for the different multilevel configurations of European counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel between 2012 and 2018. More specifically, the aim of this contribution is twofold. First, theoretically, through the concept of "patchwork" the paper proposes a conceptual framework able to investigate and analyze the apparently confusing multidimensional and multi-actor European cooperation in counterterrorism. Second, it empirically researches and analyzes the types of cooperation and the actors that fulfil key strategic positions in the patchwork. Overall, this paper provides a first complete account of the universe of European actors involved in the region and the types of cooperative patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes the epistemic foundations of democratic state-building, which are derived from a model of political transitions according to which liberal democratic institutions will transform a hitherto authoritarian and troubled country into a more prosperous and stable society and, therefore, foreign interventions to establish these institutions are realistic and worthy investments, provided they are properly planned based on knowledge of what has worked elsewhere. This expectation is based upon two epistemological premises. The first premise, linearity , is that social and institutional change exhibits identifiable input–output relations connecting socioeconomic conditions and outcomes. The second premise, ergodicity , is that these relations, inferred from past samples, provide reliable probabilistic projections about future outcomes, which can guide the focus of policy interventions. Drawing from the study of complex systems, the paper indicates why these two premises offer a flawed conception of political transitions and why radical and large-scale interventions, such as state-building, will tend to generate unintended consequences rather than the planned effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security scholars have traditionally viewed emergency as a state of exception that triggers a struggle for survival, justifying the breaking of rules and excesses of state power. While there have been attempts to decouple security from its survivalist logic, emergency has remained an analytical blind spot in security studies. The dominance of an elite-centric, exceptionalist paradigm in the study of emergency has foreclosed the possibility of alternative conceptions of emergency and neglected the voices of structurally disempowered agents. This paper advances a vernacular contextual research agenda that is sensitive to the empirical diversity of emergency meanings and practices while foregrounding emergency claims made by non-elite actors. Challenging the idea of emergency as a form of "anti-politics," the paper contends that emergency should be understood as an intrinsic part of politics. It then recovers an alternative, "emancipatory" conception of emergency as an extraordinary moment of spontaneous beginnings that can activate the collective agency of marginalized actors. The final section establishes conceptual foundations for actor-centered, grounded empirical research into emergency politics and suggests avenues for future research. Contextualizing emergency and attuning to the voices and experiences of everyday actors are crucial to remove the key variable that ties security to the logic of survival and exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does a state change its foreign policy objectives and who is responsible for instigating such change? According to Hermann, four primary change agents are central to this process: leaders, bureaucracies, changes in domestic constituencies, and external shocks. This paper argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a complementary policy process framework that can explain foreign policy change (FPC) and that accounts for all four of these primary change agents. Additionally, it is a broader framework of the policy process that facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing FPC than traditional FPC research. The ACF has the potential to broaden our understanding of FPC by emphasizing the intersection of the international system with domestic politics and focusing on a myriad of policy actors coordinating their advocacy efforts to influence FPC. To support this argument, the paper discusses how FPC can benefit from the ACF and reviews past applications. It proposes a research agenda using the ACF to study FPC and draws conclusions about future challenges and directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions regarding the political significance of international relations (IR) and how scholarly practice relates to/constitutes a political practice appear newly resonant, but are longstanding concerns. This article utilizes the growing literature on temporality within international politics to analyze the political potential of these intellectual interventions and generate new ways of framing scholarly practice. We observe two trends within the field. First, IR as a discipline remains largely—although not exclusively—imagined as an English-language discipline generated by scholars in the Global North. Each area's political discourse is currently dominated by fears surrounding foundational political and institutional change due to the rise of racialized authoritarianism within these self-imagined democratic societies. Despite these purportedly dramatic developments, there has not been a similarly dramatic shift in the scholarly relationship with politics. Scholars continue to successfully intervene in their collective presents, but scholarship itself remains oriented toward enduring claims that accumulate knowledge and resist the possibility of "failure." This paper theorizes the temporality of critical intervention to better relate positively to the bodies that co-constitute our political present. Ultimately, this paper concludes by arguing for a reconsideration of contradiction and failure as frames for thinking scholarly practice in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consistently low credit-taking rates, 16 percent in 2016 (Global Terrorism Database), continue to challenge the understanding of terrorism as "propaganda of the deed" twenty years after researchers initially pointed out the conundrum. While providing an overview and evaluation of the limited existing literature on credit-taking, this paper draws attention to three core problems in the current literature on terrorist credit-taking, which may have led the low credit-taking rates to appear more puzzling than is due. First, the available explanations struggle to find corroboration when empirically tested and many also show theoretical shortcomings with strong unspoken assumptions and unclear predictions of credit-taking behavior. Second, data structure and data availability unnecessarily narrow our academic understanding of credit-taking. Finally, theories focused on group characteristics such as religious motivation or state sponsorship suffer from severe issues of sample bias due to unintended selection on the dependent variable. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research less prone to the problematic issues identified in the article. A re-orientation toward a less restrictive and more fine-grained understanding of credit-taking is advised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, climate security has become an increasingly salient policy agenda in international fora. Yet, despite a large body of research, the empirical links between climate-change and conflict remain highly uncertain. This paper contends that uncertainty around climate–conflict links should be understood as characteristic of complex social–ecological systems rather than a problem that can be fully resolved. Rather than striving to eliminate uncertainty, we suggest that researchers need to learn to cope with it. To this end, this article advances a set of principles for guiding scholarly practice when investigating a complex phenomenon: recognizing epistemological uncertainty, embracing epistemological diversity, and practicing humility and dialogue across difference. Taken together we call this ethos epistemological pluralism, whereby scholars self-consciously recognize the limits of their chosen epistemology for understanding the climate–conflict nexus and engage with other approaches without attempting to usurp them. Reviewing the last decade of climate–conflict scholarship, we show that climate–conflict research already manifests many of these ideals; however, we also identify problematic patterns of engagement across epistemological divides and thus plenty of scope for improvement. To illustrate why a diversity of methods (e.g. qualitative and quantitative) will not suffice, the article critically discusses prior research to illustrate why at least two epistemological approaches—constructivism and positivism—cannot be synthesized or integrated without significant analytical cost, and elaborates why excluding insights from any one would lead to an impoverished understanding of the climate–conflict nexus. We conclude with five practical recommendations of how scholars can help realize the ideal of epistemological pluralism in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do leaders create legitimacy in international organizations (IOs)? It is widely acknowledged that legitimacy matters to IOs, but little research examines internal self-legitimation—the creation of legitimacy for staff, rather than for external audiences—and who specifically undertakes these self-legitimation activities in IOs. This paper fills these gaps by examining the particular role of leaders in self-legitimation and I develop a theoretical framework that shows (1) how leaders have a unique role to play as legitimators due to their high social status within the IO and their access to discursive resources for legitimation, (2) how leaders create internal legitimacy through the introduction or reintroduction of narratives and the creation of self-referential language, and (3) how leader-led self-legitimation entails three potential risks. I illustrate these points with three case studies, one from the World Bank and two from the United Nations. I conclude by proposing a new research agenda for this underexplored area of IO and legitimacy scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some near crises tip over into full-blown crisis and others do not? This paper considers existing scholarship and identifies four key barriers to using quantitative analysis for tipping-point analyses: strategic indeterminacy; the incentives for conflict parties to avoid inefficiencies; the paucity of cases; and the availability of quality data. Due to these challenges, many do not perform well as immediate causes for crisis escalation. We also argue and demonstrate through two quantitative models of crisis escalation that some variables, particularly related to domestic politics, can do well in explaining why some disputes tip into crisis and others do not. As we illustrate with reference to the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, qualitative approaches that analyze the processes by which leaders and foreign policy institutions make decisions add needed explanatory power to purely quantitative models of the potential for near crises to tip into crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of nationalist and populist movements throughout the world has led to concerns about the future of the liberal international economic order. Central to these worries is the belief that nationalist and populist publics and their leaders will reject open trade, which has been a cornerstone of the global order. Yet despite these fears, very little empirical research has been conducted on the links between either nationalism or populism and trade policy. In this paper, we argue that nationalism and populism are likely to discourage trade liberalization in democratic states, but that these forces will have little influence on trade policy in non-democracies. To test this argument, we focus on state involvement in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Based on a variety of tests, we find considerable support for our argument. Democracies with nationalist or populist governments are especially reluctant to join PTAs, but neither nationalism nor populism systematically influences whether non-democracies enter PTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholarship has posited multiple pathways through which democracies accrue advantages in world politics. These range from enhanced warfighting capabilities to sovereign borrowing capacity to more constructive cooperation with like-minded regimes. A series of crises over the past generation, however, have called these advantages into question. This paper re-examines the key conceptual pillars underlying the democratic advantage in world politics. Scholars have posited that democracies possess inherent advantages in credible commitment mechanisms and public goods provision. The rise of populism has eroded these underlying advantages. Furthermore, the rise of China threatens to hamper the network effects that enhance democratic flourishing at the global level. Whether the democratic advantage is real and sustainable should be one of the defining political science research programs of this century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How and with what effects do institutions diffuse between international organizations (IOs)? An emerging literature extends a key insight of the study of diffusion processes among states to the international level, establishing that the adoption of institutions in IOs is regularly conditioned by the choices of other IOs. Yet, this literature neglects a key contextual difference between the two settings: unlike in the hierarchically structured organizations that have dominated the literature on diffusion, institutional creation, and change in IOs are the result of decentralized bargaining among sovereign governments. This paper develops a heuristic model that shows how diffusion between IOs shapes decision-making within them through its impact on the institutional preferences of individual governments. The model establishes that, unlike in diffusion processes among states, convergence is an unlikely outcome of diffusion between IOs. By implication, studies that take institutional convergence as their starting point are likely to underestimate the pervasiveness of diffusion effects. I demonstrate these arguments with a case study of the establishment of a regional dispute settlement system in Mercosur, a regional organization in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can there be a "radical IR?" Scholars have given little attention to the question of the following: where is radicalism in the discipline? I argue that not only is it possible to think about radical international theory, but that it is necessary in the contemporary world. International theorists have to grapple with developments of fundamental change, including the so-described decline of the (neo)liberal international order, transformations in global capital, and an upsurge in populist political movements that advocate for fundamental political change. In approaching the question of radicalism in IR, the article develops a working definition of radicalism as an approach to politics that focuses on the International as a whole, uses theoretical tools from the humanistic sciences to engage in an active politics of fundamental transformation, and deploys methods that are historicist, genealogical, and oriented toward "getting to the root of things." Additionally, the paper illustrates the virtues and promises of a radical IR by using the case of (neo)liberal world order arguments to show how a radical IR could change the trajectory of these engagements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is field research? Is it just for qualitative scholars? Must it be done in a foreign country? How much time in the field is "enough"? A lack of disciplinary consensus on what constitutes "field research" or "fieldwork" has left graduate students in political science underinformed and thus underequipped to leverage site-intensive research to address issues of interest and urgency across the subfields. Uneven training in Ph.D. programs has also left early-career researchers underprepared for the logistics of fieldwork, from developing networks and effective sampling strategies to building respondents' trust, and related issues of funding, physical safety, mental health, research ethics, and crisis response. Based on the experience of five junior scholars, this paper offers answers to questions that graduate students puzzle over, often without the benefit of others' "lessons learned." This practical guide engages theory and praxis, in support of an epistemologically and methodologically pluralistic discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting in the 1990s, international organizations (IOs) have created various opportunities of access for civil society to voice criticism. While international relations (IR) scholarship has increasingly addressed the resulting interaction between IOs and civil society with a focus on NGOs, we know little about the particular reactions to IOs' opening up by social movements. This paper analyzes reactions to opening up by a transnational social movement centrally addressing IOs: the Global Justice Movement (GJM). Examining reactions by different groups of the GJM in Europe and Southeast Asia to IOs' opening up, we demonstrate that reactions differ considerably depending on activists' assessments of the nature of opening up. In particular, we identify four pathways of reactions on a continuum from (1) strong cooperation with IOs as a reaction to opening up, (2) temporally limited cooperation with different IOs, (3) a hybrid reaction that combines cooperation with specific IOs with a strong opposition to other IOs in reaction to their opening up, to (4) a continuous rejection of all cooperation with IOs. We show how these different reactions are shaped by activists' perceptions of the quality of the international opening up in conjunction with national and local context factors. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that such perceptions can significantly change over time depending on experiences of interactions. Reactions to opening up are therefore not predictable on the basis of a movement's shape and resources only, but rather depend on a variety of factors such as the movement's perception of the IO's sincerity in a strategic and consequential interaction, as well as the movement's ideological framework and its history of interaction with institutions at other levels, especially in the domestic realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability or end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post–Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary "order versus disorder" or "US versus Chinese hegemony" scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—"coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy"—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will not only form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The received view in international relations (IR) is that the European multistate system was created when the medieval religious order broke down in the centuries following the Reformation. This view, which sees the medieval Catholic Church as a factor that hindered the advent of the multistate system, ignores a key insight of medieval historians, namely that the deeper historical precondition for the European multistate system was that the Church challenged the notions of empire and hegemony after the eleventh-century conflict of church and state. By mining this body of historiography, this paper shows how the end of the fusion of lay and religious authority in general and the Church's persistent interest in avoiding that one secular polity outmatched the others in particular contributed to the development of the European multistate system. These insights not only question dominant historiographic assumptions of IR, but may also be said to challenge the epistemological approaches of much of this scholarship. Resumen El criterio aceptado en Relaciones Internacionales (RI) es que el sistema multiestatal europeo se creó tras el colapso del orden religioso medieval en los siglos posteriores a la Reforma. Este criterio, que considera a la Iglesia católica como un factor que dificultó el advenimiento del sistema multiestatal, ignora un conocimiento clave de los historiadores medievales, específicamente, que la condición previa histórica más profunda del sistema multiestatal europeo fue que la Iglesia desafió las nociones de imperio y hegemonía después del conflicto entre la iglesia y el estado en el siglos XI. Al indagar exhaustivamente este cuerpo de historiografía, este informe demuestra cómo el fin de la fusión entre autoridad laica y religiosa en general y el interés persistente de la Iglesia por evitar que una forma de gobierno secular supere a las otras en particular contribuyeron al desarrollo del sistema multiestatal europeo. Estas conclusiones no solo cuestionan las conjeturas historiográficas dominantes de RI, sino que puede decirse que también desafían los abordajes epistemiológicos de gran parte de esta erudición. Extrait Le point de vue généralement accepté dans les relations internationales est que le système multiétatique européen s'est constitué lorsque l'ordre religieux médiéval s'est effondré dans les siècles qui ont suivi la Réforme. Ce point de vue, qui voit l'Église catholique médiévale comme un facteur ayant empêché l'avènement du système multiétatique, omet une perspective clé des historiens médiévaux, c'est-à-dire que l'une des conditions historiques préalables plus profondes à l'établissement du système multiétatique européen a été le fait que l'Église avait remis en question les notions d'empire et d'hégémonie après le conflit entre Église et État du 11e siècle. En exploitant ce corpus historiographique, cet article montre comment la fin de la fusion des autorités laïques et religieuses en général, et l'intérêt persistant de l'Église à éviter qu'un régime laïque ne dépasse les autres en particulier, ont contribué au développement du système multiétatique européen. Ces perspectives remettent non seulement en question les hypothèses historiographiques dominantes, mais nous pouvons considérer qu'elles remettent également en question les approches épistémologiques d'une grande partie des recherches dans ce domaine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to two debates about international relations (IR) as a discipline: first, how global is IR, and how is it structured? Second, what is the state of theory in IR? We conducted (co-) citation analyses of both Web of Science (WoS) and—for the first time— non-WoS publications from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. With regard to the first question, we find that global IR resembles a core–periphery structure as a "hub and spoke" system whereby transatlantic core nodes are interconnected to each other and to some periphery nodes, while the periphery nodes are connected to the core but not to each other. IR scholarship in the periphery quotes the transatlantic theory cluster but is not linked to each other, not even in the same region. Knowledge produced in the periphery has to go through the transatlantic core in order to be recognized globally. As to the transatlantic core, we identify two major (co-) citation clusters: one committed to IR theory-building across issue areas from a variety of perspectives and the other focused on security studies with a strong emphasis on quantitative methods. With regard to the second question, global IR hangs together through references to the IR theory cluster consisting of North American and European authors who appear to define what IR theory is. Scholars in the periphery refer to this transatlantic IR theory cluster when engaging in theory-building. IR theories have become rather diverse and pluralistic, even in the core. While scholars still refer to the big "isms," they use them around the globe in a synthesizing manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws a comprehensive map of conflict climate change scholarship. It uses visualizations and descriptive statistics to trace the temporal, spatial, and topical evolution of the field of study via a bibliometric analysis of more than six hundred publications. It then proceeds to summarize findings, theoretical explanations, and methodological approaches. Overall, this systematic review shows a remarkable inconsistency of evidence among publications. As a way forward, this article recommends future research to use computational models, informed by a social-ecological perspective, to better explore the link between climate change and conflict. Resumen En este artículo se traza un mapa integral de la erudición conflictiva del cambio climático. Se utilizan visualizaciones y estadísticas descriptivas para rastrear la evolución temporal, espacial y temática del campo de estudio mediante un análisis bibliométrico de más de seiscientas publicaciones. Luego, continúa con un resumen de los hallazgos, las explicaciones teóricas y los enfoques metodológicos. En términos generales, esta revisión sistemática muestra una notable incoherencia de evidencias entre las publicaciones. En este artículo se recomiendan investigaciones a futuro para utilizar los modelos computacionales, informados con una perspectiva socioecológica, a fin de explorar mejor la conexión entre el cambio climático y los conflictos. Extrait Cet article offre une représentation complète des recherches portant sur les conflits liés au changement climatique. Il utilise des visualisations et des statistiques descriptives pour retracer l'évolution temporelle, spatiale et thématique de ce domaine d'étude via une analyse bibliométrique de plus de six cents publications. Il résume ensuite les constatations, explications théoriques et approches méthodologiques. Globalement, cette synthèse systématique montre une incohérence remarquable des preuves entre les publications. Pour aller de l'avant, cet article recommande que les recherches futures passent par des modèles informatiques éclairés par une perspective socio-écologique pour mieux explorer le lien entre le changement climatique et les conflits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has passed over eighteen thousand resolutions since its foundation. It is a very heterogeneous collection, containing at once landmark documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and scores of less important and even controversial pieces. Hence, scholarship for the past 75 years has been divided on the actual relevance of UNGA resolutions and on member states' motivations in engaging with their drafting. We propose a novel theoretical typology to organize prevailing views on the role of UNGA resolutions. Relying on the dimensions of effect and consensus, that is, whether or not resolutions are deemed to have a real-world impact and to what extent they represent world opinion, we sort the literature into four ideal types: resolutions can be regarded as the fruit of deliberation, dispute, diversion, or drama. We discuss the rationale of each view and indicate proposals within the UNGA that exemplify these perspectives. Our typology contributes to scholarship by both tidying previous debates and highlighting unnoticed commonalities between the UNGA and topics from the political representation literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of world politics can readily list the global governors of our time, but why and how did these particular actors gain agency in the first place? While there is impressive scholarship on single global governors and their respective impact, there is little comparative work and systematic theorization on what agency in world politics is and how actors gain it. This forum brings together contributions that apply relational frameworks to the question, focusing on the dynamics of self-agentification, delegation, and recognition. Individual contributions detail different empirical cases, from individuals to the G20, and introduce concepts for meso-level theorizing. Taken together, the contributions call for a more dynamic research agenda that not only allows scholars to reconstruct how agency emerges but also pushes us toward an agency-focused reframing of global governance, which is needed to ensure the continued relevance of the paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has returned attention to the links between power transitions and war. In this literature, three different causal mechanisms can be confused. This essay disentangles them. Power transitions can lead to three kinds of war: preventive, accidental, and revisionist. Formal models tend to study the first, in which a declining state tries to delay or prevent a rival's ascent. However, major wars during great power transitions are usually initiated by the rising state, not the declining one. To describe these historical cases, less formal theories, especially neorealism and neoclassical realism, focus on accidental and revisionist wars, but these theories tend to fall back on nonrational mechanisms to connect changing power to the risk of conflict. This leaves a theoretical gap: Why would a rising, rational actor deliberately choose conflict, i.e. start a revisionist war? To suggest an answer, this essay demonstrates how a simple change in standard bargaining models—incorporating a nonzero probability of indecisive war—can ground realist intuitions on rationalist foundations. It further shows how this change leads immediately to an intuitive, formal definition of stability that aligns naturally with existing informal work. Then, contrary to existing realist theory, it shows why the rigorous analysis of realist assumptions leads to a nonmonotonic relationship between the offense/defense balance and war. It thus uses realism to inform and potentially redirect formal scholarship; it also uses formal scholarship to sharpen the logical foundations of realism and, in so doing, derive novel empirical predictions. The essay concludes by applying this synthesis to the rise of China today and indicating directions for deepening the formal/realist synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power-sharing provisions have been included in many peace agreements intended to end intra-state violent conflict, including, for example, in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Sudan, and Lebanon. Power-sharing has been subject to extensive scholarly examination. Many of these examinations focus on the impact of power-sharing on peace, often defined as the non-recurrence of violent conflict. However, the results of these examinations have not generated a consensus as to the value of power-sharing as a conflict management tool. This lack of consensus highlights a need to more clearly understand the effects of power-sharing. To fully comprehend the role of power-sharing, we must move away from simply asking if it is associated with the reoccurrence of violence and explore the paths through which it can contribute to different outcomes of interest, for example, group relations or stable government. Both Hartzell and Mehler (2019) and Keil and McCulloch (2021) seek to address this current weakness in our understanding of power-sharing, albeit in quite different ways. These books show that by paying closer attention to the impact of power-sharing on different outcomes, including a focus on the mechanisms that link its different power-sharing provisions to specific outcomes, we can develop a fundamentally deeper understanding of power-sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some norms go through long contested periods, resulting in norm change, rejection, or persisting conflict. Others are adopted quite quickly, with little resistance across diverse societies. An underlying and unanswered theoretical question is why? A foundational characteristic of a norm as a concept, and a key aspect of constructivist scholarship on norms, is the role of values and moral principles in giving norms meaning and in motivating global policy change. For a field placing significant emphasis on the importance of ideas, the limited theorizing around the value-based content of these ideas is a notable shortcoming. Emphasizing the importance of moral values as among the most deeply held beliefs, I outline a theory of how moral values and moral distance can help explain why certain normative processes and outcomes occur. Building from constructivist work on norms and social psychology scholarship on morality, I propose that moral distance, the degree of alignment, overlap, or separation in moral values between actors can help to explain the type of contestation, the intensity and duration of contestation, and what processes or outcomes are more likely to transpire. The shorter the moral distance, the more likely persuasion or adaptations will occur, leading to the eventual adoption of a norm. The greater the moral distance, the more likely prolonged and heated contestation will occur, leading to rejection or enduring contestation. I argue that centering the analysis of moral values and moral distance in research on normative agreement and disagreement can therefore contribute to understanding why or under what circumstances conflict is more or less likely to happen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship drawing from a wide array of perspectives including field theoretical and functional differentiation approaches has shed increasing light on the sectoral dimensions of world politics. In contrast to dominant approaches emphasizing hierarchy and power in relations between global fields, this article offers a novel interpretive framework for understanding how diverse fields, systems, or sectors may interact and facilitate change in world politics beyond the operation of established hierarchies and power dynamics. Taking forward the previously underutilized concept of symbolically generalized media of communication, this article elucidates two processes of international political change by which different fields, systems, or sectors may transform world politics. The first process, lateral retreat, is illustrated with reference to the case study of the Protestant Reformation, in which internal changes in the religious field facilitated the development of an increasingly autonomous political domain. The second process, lateral penetration, is illustrated with reference to the international political response to the climate change and Covid-19 crises, in which the scientific sector contributed toward transformed political priorities and associated hierarchies, at least in the short term. These diverse cases are used to indicate the broad potential scope of application of the concept of symbolically generalized media of communication to enrich relational theorizing in the study of international relations, and to improve understanding of diverse dynamics of international political change missed in traditional power- (and anarchy-) centric accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diplomats in embassies and permanent representations are increasingly using the messaging application WhatsApp to communicate with their peers. They use WhatsApp groups to coordinate initiatives at multilateral forums, communicate more rapidly with headquarters and stay in touch with organizational developments at home, as well as form more personal working relations among their peers. To make sense of this phenomenon, our analysis looks at adaptation in practice. Instead of separating digital practices from offline/traditional ways of doing things, we build on the practice turn in International Relations and develop a nuanced framework in which improvising agents in a transformed context adapt to new realities while continuously being influenced by past ways of doing things—a phenomenon called "hysteresis" by practice turners. We analyze how traditional practices are supplemented by new technologies (complementarities) as well as how offline and online relationships are shaped by similar practical logics (similarities). We apply these micro-lenses to understand multilateral diplomacy at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. Building on twenty-three interviews with practitioners, we find that WhatsApp redefines the meaning of face-to-face interactions among ambassadors and permanent representatives and makes physical meetings between diplomats more—rather than less—important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Almost all ceasefires experience violations, yet we know little about how such violations relate to the military and political aspirations of conflict parties. This article builds on ceasefire and bargaining literature to understand why ceasefire violations occur and how they relate to strategic decision-making processes. Building on these theoretical insights, it proposes a typology of four main types of ceasefire violations: strategic violations serve to strengthen the military advantage of a conflict party, retaliatory violations seek to ensure ceasefire compliance, spoiling violations aim to undermine the efforts of leaders, and localized violations are delinked from strategic decision-making processes. A case study of a major ceasefire violation in the Bangsamoro peace process illustrates how we may use informal Bayesian reasoning to empirically distinguish between these different types of violations. Treating ceasefire violations as part of wider military and political processes enables us to better understand the causal conditions under which ceasefire violations occur and identify strategic interests of different actors to carry out these violations. This helps explain the varied responses to ceasefire violations and sharpens our understanding of how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 9/11, a number of scholars added gender as a new variable to explain how economic, political, and/or social developments in the Middle East have diverged from developments elsewhere. These studies relied almost exclusively on statistical analysis and frequently discounted much of the extant literature, especially the more feminist and historically sensitive and in-depth qualitative works on the subject matter. Almost uniformly, the point of departure for many of these works was the disempowered socioeconomic and/or political status of Arab/Muslim women. Most of the scholars of these works had no gender expertise and had never written on women previously. Regardless, these works spawned an important discussion in the field of comparative politics and their scholarly impact has been noteworthy. Such scholarship, however, is not benign. Accordingly, this article seeks to answer two critical questions: How does the work of non-gender specialists of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) come to have such a significant impact on the study of women and politics in the field of comparative politics? How can we approach these research inquiries differently so that expertise, lived realities, and history matter? The article argues that feminist international relations could serve as a critical corrective to this current trajectory of comparative politics research. This corrective also requires a commitment to feminist scholarship that begins with women's lives and seeks to eliminate gender inequality, as well as greater understanding of the composition and changing structure of our disciplinary communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work in international relations has problematized state-centric assumptions of governance to explore variations in authority by a range of nonstate actors (e.g. nongovernmental organizations, criminal syndicates, gangs). This forum centers on the phenomenon of rebel group governance during civil wars and leverages the concept to advance our understanding of current theories and conceptualizations of governance. The nature of rebel organizations provides a unique opportunity for researchers to expand the state-centric focus on governance because rebel actors differ from states in their comparative position within the global state system, the contexts in which they operate, and their lack of legitimizing principles that permit consistent membership as a class of political actors. These differences allow for meaningful extensions of how we theorize and conceptualize governance beyond the state. Furthermore, variation across these differences allows our findings in the study rebel governance to speak directly to the broader literature in international relations on governance by state actors. In our introduction to this forum, we detail the ways in which rebel groups have chosen to address the central components of governance through a variety of governance strategies. We then devote three essays in the forum to the concepts of legitimacy, capacity, and territorial control. In each of the three essays, authors discuss the ways in which rebel governance problematizes and advances these concepts for the broader study of governance. In the conclusion, this forum synthesizes extant and emerging work in the field of rebel governance in order to raise new questions of the governance and state building literatures. In this way, we show how investigating governance by rebel groups in particular advances our understanding of governance more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to help the literature on global governance and international professionalism move beyond a myopic focus on epistemic communities by unpacking the underutilized term epistemic coalition. Epistemic coalitions are an international nonstate actor that employ a broadened notion of expertise to incorporate business and political advocates alongside technical experts. I differentiate epistemic coalitions from epistemic communities by synthesizing the international relations, organizational theory, and public policy literatures. These organizations differ in the breadth of their policy agendas, dynamics of internal cohesion, and capabilities to engage in global policy transfer. However, I note that it is still unclear how epistemic coalitions coordinate member action along different professions and what are the conditions under which epistemic coalitions' membership balances will be viewed by national elites as professionally legitimate. I then examine the role of the International Olympic Committee in US steroid policy to induce two preliminary hypotheses that can potentially address these gaps. First, epistemic coalitions use a foundational narrative to coordinate action among professions. Second, perceptions of equitable membership balance stem from an ideational congruence between national and international elites. I conclude with how these hypotheses can be tested in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which countries are likely to be subjects of research in the study of armed conflict? Evidence from other fields suggests that research often focuses disproportionately on the West, but it is unclear to what extent this is true in conflict studies. We suggest that a baseline explanation of research focus is each country's conflict experience, and we present two additional hypotheses: Western bias and research feasibility. Empirically, we count countries in the abstracts of five prominent conflict or security journals, 1990–2015. We also manually count single-country case studies. Western countries, measured by U.N. voting or geographic location, appear more than non-Western countries, even after considering conflict, wealth, and other factors. There is less support for the research feasibility argument, measured by each country's official languages and democracy. We find French- and Spanish-language countries less likely to appear in the literature. We conclude with a discussion of under-studied countries and offer related suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

English School accounts of international relations always stressed some degree of interaction between political international society and ideational world society. Yet, English School research, relying on agential and structural premises, often misses how and where international society and world society interact. If intermediation between the two societies is identified, it often remains abstract. I argue that identifying agents and the standards defining their practices helps to understand intermediation between international society and world society. I suggest that likely candidates that practice intermediation are rooted in both international society and world society. This is because practices rooted in both realms are also defined by the standards of both realms. I argue that the Pope and the United Nations Secretary-General are likely intermediation instances between international society and world society. Both are equally footed in international society and world society. Given their organizational embedding in international society, both rely on practices informed by international society standards such as diplomacy. Yet, both also rely on world society standards such as their concern for humanity. Focusing on the sanctity of the individual rather than only on state-based interests and agendas of international society marks their concern and caring for refugees. I illustrate this argument with advocacy, an intermediation practice. Deprived of membership in a community, solutions for refugees in international society require political and moral theory from world society, relying on concepts such as humanity. Advocating for refugees on the grounds of world society's common humanity, the Pope and the United Nations Secretary-General are intermediation instances between world society and international society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing chorus of critics have called upon transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs) from the Global North to "decolonize" their practices, to "shift the power" to the Global South, and to put an end to "white saviorism" by initiating a variety of significant organizational changes. Despite these repeated calls, the TNGO sector still struggles to reform. Explanations for TNGOs' ongoing struggles from within the field of international relations have generally centered on TNGOs themselves and the ironies and paradoxes of organizational growth and financial success. This article introduces a different argument that TNGOs' struggles to adapt in response to their critics are the result of TNGOs' "nonprofitness." By virtue of being nonprofit, TNGOs are embedded in an architecture consisting of forms and norms that inherently limit the extent to which they are able to change. Using the construct of the architecture, this article provides a novel account for the challenges that TNGOs confront as they attempt to close the gap between the rhetoric and reality of inclusive and transformational socioeconomic, political, or environmental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unprecedented economic interdependence and the extensive legalization of international commerce have created unique opportunities for states to exercise power in world politics. Yet, while international relations (IR) scholars have revealed much about how interdependence conditions the ability of states to leverage economic relationships to influence other actors, the equivalent role of law has received less systematic attention. This article explains the logic and dynamics that inform how, why, and under what conditions states may use law as a sword or shield in the realm of international commerce. Drawing upon the IR literature on economic statecraft and the international law literature on lawfare, the article conceptualizes "economic lawfare" and uses it to elucidate how law may shape the use of economic power. It outlines a typology of pathways through which economic lawfare can be employed and their associated opportunities and constraints, before presenting a simple model of key dynamics that shape their use. That model's plausibility is probed and the pathways are empirically illustrated in two case studies of recent episodes in which the Chinese government has sought to manipulate international commerce for strategic purposes. The article clarifies the distinction between legal and nonlegal instruments of economic statecraft, offers a theoretically explicit account of key mechanisms through which law may condition the use of economic power, and provides new conceptual foundations for emerging research on how institutions shape the ability of states to intervene in markets to achieve strategic objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine publications on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in nine leading political science journals across three decades (1990–2019) to evaluate the scope of political science engagement with the region since the 1990s and analyze trends in research interests, developments in the use of empirical methods, and authorship patterns. Our data highlight significant gaps in the geographic and substantive scope of extant scholarship. Specifically, the disproportionate focus on non-Arab countries and limited engagement with certain topics, including identity, nationalism, and state formation, raise concerns about selection bias and causal misidentification. Nevertheless, we find encouraging trends with respect to methodological developments; however, the methods and data sources employed appear to be determined by case selection to some extent. We also note that few MENA-based scholars currently publish in these journals. These findings have important implications for the integration of MENA studies with and knowledge production in political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the non-straightforward role of data about attacks on health in creating policy and normative change to safeguard access to healthcare and protect healthcare providers in conflict. Acknowledging the importance of data as a key component in the quest to reduce instances of attacks, we take this one step further, asking: what is the relationship between data, action, and change processes? While scholars have examined the efficacy of transnational advocacy, rarely has the specific role of data been the focus of analysis. Here we consider two pathways for creating change: operational change designed to prevent or mitigate the impact of attacks on health at the level of those affected by attacks, and normative change that leads to a reduction in the frequency of attacks, at the level of those perpetrating attacks. Drawing on research investigating the influence of data in humanitarian decision-making and security management and research on transnational advocacy, we discuss the lessons for responding to the problem of attacks on healthcare. We end by broadening the scope of our conclusions to highlight the non-straightforward role of data in operational and normative change processes more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing literature on ontological security theory (OST) in international relations, ontological security studies (OSS), is characterized by great internal diversity. This internal pluralism is one of its greatest strengths, but it is also potentially confusing, for example, when different works using an ontological security lens arrive at contradictory conclusions without it being obvious why. In order to make sense of this diversity, this article traces two interrelated conceptual divergences related to the notion of anxiety. The first one concerns the observation that anxiety is seemingly both debilitating and an impediment to action, as well as a call to action, inspiring adaptation and change. The second divergence centers on whether ontological security is at all attainable, which is largely a matter of whether anxiety is best understood as an extraordinary and temporally limited condition or as an ever-present and normal part of life. This article argues that the divergent answers to these questions, and the problems they give rise to, are primarily the result of ambiguity with regard to the key concept of anxiety. The malleable nature of the concept of anxiety engenders deviating interpretations and applications among scholars. While awareness of these issues already goes a long way toward making sense of some of the diversity within OSS, this article further suggests ways to increase the conceptual clarity of anxiety and to address the two issues of change and attainability. Doing so increases our conceptual understanding of OST. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although less than a decade old, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been the subject of considerable attention and conjecture. After initial waves of speculation and punditry, now more rigorous work on the plans, structure, and implementation of this initiative is beginning to contribute to the debate. In this essay, we showcase how three recent monographs make sense of the BRI: One Belt One Road: Chinese Power Meets the World , by Eyck Freymann; The Belt Road and Beyond: State- M obilized Globalization in China: 1998–2018 , by Min Ye; and Orchestration: China's Economic Statecraft across Asia and Europe , by James Reilly. Surveying the arguments and findings of these works together, we seek to draw out insights and implications for how we should understand the BRI. In particular, we highlight the political significance of the BRI's close association with PRC leader Xi Jinping, the ways in which the BRI follows long-standing patterns of campaign-style mobilization within the PRC, the crucial role of local partners, and the BRI's potential consequences for the larger international system in light of the broader literature in international relations. We conclude by discussing the need to now also consider unintended outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dictators, rebel commanders, and mafia bosses frequently delegate gruesome and immoral tasks to their subordinates. However, most individuals want to avoid such work. This analytical essay proposes an institutional logic to understand how dictatorships, insurgent organizations, and criminal gangs get their evil work done nonetheless. We argue that common features of organizations produce mundane career pressures that incentivize subordinates to zealously execute reprehensible tasks. Subordinates may come under pressure for six distinct reasons: incompetence, misconduct, origin, isolation, organizational backlog, and shrinkage. Superiors, in turn, can exploit that pressured subordinates hope to improve their prospects for advancement by loyally executing the organization's evil tasks. Empirically, we illustrate how Nazi Germany utilized each of the suggested career pressures to staff the units in charge of the Holocaust. We highlight that our logic might also apply to less extreme forms of organizational evil. Together, the essay offers a novel perspective to demystify radical behavior in state and non-state organizations with important implications for our understanding of transnational terrorist violence and underworld crimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the steady increase in environmental provisions being included in trade agreements to address potential environmental risks associated with increased trade, growing public concern about environmental issues has given rise to major public protests against various trade agreements. However, facing the widespread backlash against the liberal international economic order, pro-trade leaders have yet to respond adequately to the public's concern over the potential implications of trade on the environment. A review of European Union (EU) officials' public communication on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership shows that trade advocates narrowly focus on the economic benefits of trade in their trade-related communication while paying little attention to the environmental impacts of the trade deal. This ignores an important aspect of the public discontent with economic globalization. This article argues that the pro-trade camp's failure to engage the public in an inclusive and transparent debate about the environmental effects of trade presents a missed opportunity that has triggered widespread resistance to trade liberalization. By studying the communication channel, this essay highlights the important role of information and dialogue as a potential response to the current public backlash against economic globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy has been a central forum for contesting the uneasy relationship between capitalism and democracy since the late nineteenth century. From the earliest policy debates, concerns that robust competition policies aimed at limiting economic concentration would disadvantage domestic producers featured prominently. This dynamic creates an international cooperation problem over competition policy that has intensified with the dramatic increases in globalization over the last several decades. Understanding the causes and consequences of this cooperation problem is central to understanding global governance of the world economy, including the ability of democratic states to manage global capitalism in a manner that sustains democracy. This essay frames the challenge that global competition policy has posed over the last hundred years and argues that democratic major powers have played a critical role in shaping the limited cooperation that has been achieved. A research agenda that develops integrated theories of domestic and international competition policymaking as well as a multi-method empirical agenda for describing and explaining policy outcomes and their consequences for economic inequality, growth, and democracy is an essential task for international relations scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many of the most visible examples of the backlash against multilateralism, globalization, and democracy do not target free trade, investment, or elections directly, but the judicial institutions that were created to protect the rights of traders, investors, and citizens. Is the backlash against globalization and democracy really a backlash against the growing ideological convergence on rule of law principles as appropriate standards for both international and domestic governance? This essay suggests that this might be so by highlighting that the rule of law does not just constrain the powerful, but also majoritarian politics. A new domestic ideological cleavage permeates many liberal democracies that is in part about liberal conceptions of justice. An illustrative empirical analysis shows that illiberal views about justice are negatively and significantly correlated with trust in European institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Studies Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)