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In various conflict contexts where the state is unable to maintain security and public order, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and the United Nations (UN) conduct their activities alongside one another. While previous research has focused on hostile relations between the UN and NSAGs, less attention has been given to collaborative interactions. This paper aims to address this research gap by formulating a novel conceptual typology of NSAG–UN interactions in the context of a peace operation. The typological framework comprises two-dimensions: firstly, the thematic field of interaction including human rights, humanitarian needs and governance, security, and political processes and, secondly, the nature of interaction ranging from confrontation to cooperation. Based on the typology, interaction activities between the UN and NSAGs in two peacekeeping operations—the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—are systematically documented and described. While both cases show confrontation in the security field, UNOCI also commonly cooperated with NSAGs on security-related issues; MINUSMA instead cooperated with NSAGs primarily regarding the political process. The analysis further proposes factors that may explain such variation, including institutional arrangements and NSAG characteristics. The conceptual framework presented in this paper is crucial in advancing knowledge about an empirical phenomenon that we know little about and that has important implications for different forms of "local" engagement in peace operations and the effectiveness of UN policies and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of refugee humanitarianism is commonly studied in terms of critical junctures. One such historical moment is the creation of a 'safe zone' for Iraqi Kurdish refugees above the 36th parallel of Northern Iraq through the 1991 United Nations (UN) mission known as 'Operation Provide Comfort.' The UN intervention is widely accepted as a critical juncture because it marked the beginning of international humanitarianism's extra-territorial phase. 'Operation Provide Comfort' brought a paradigm shift in the management of displaced populations by means of introducing "preventive protection" as a novel approach combining protection with control as the idea is to keep refugees in their own countries and offer them help without the need to cross an international border. The standard narrative underlines Western historical priority by attributing the preventive protection to a single source of ideas and processes stemming from the West. Drawing on postcolonial research, this paper argues for recognizing the agency of the non-West in the formulation and execution of the safe haven concept as a historical milestone. More specifically, it demonstrates the pioneering role that Turkey played through international debates and diplomatic action, which culminated into the new episode of refugee humanitarianism. The findings also invite us to revisit current explanations of the evolution of international humanitarian norms by showing the entanglement of refugee protection on the one hand, and domestic and regional questions of ethnicity and counter-insurgency on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations (IR) scholars are increasingly interested in the role of memory in world politics. In this paper, we examine a key tension in the uptake of memory in IR between its status as a topic studied within IR and its use as an optic through which the basic categories of IR might be rethought. Focusing on the problem of scales of analysis, central within memory studies more broadly, we suggest that while memory poses a challenge to typical scalar arrangements in IR, such as "levels" of analysis, memory is often studied within these very arrangements. We argue that this is significant because questions of scale are at times the central political problem at stake in international memory. We track this tension between topic and optic in studies of memory, national identity, and foreign policy; studies of collective trauma and sovereignty; and studies of conflict and cooperation over memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the pedagogical implications of the "Global International Relations (GIR)" and "Worlding Beyond the West" agendas. These two programs have criticized IR's Western-centrism and offered systematic ways to expand beyond IR's Euro-Atlantic roots. Their development coincides with other high-profile theoretical and historiographic developments, not to mention societal imperatives, to expand the substantive remit of the discipline. However, the diversification agenda has been mostly concerned with the research output of IR and has treated the pedagogical side of IR's intellectual life as a secondary consideration. Proponents of the GIR and Worlding agendas have yet to convert these programs into a classroom pedagogy. This paper fills that gap. It critiques the practical and intellectual limits of GIR and Worlding pedagogies. More importantly, it provides theoretically informed ways to transpose their diversification projects into the undergraduate classroom. In doing so, this paper bridges disciplinary analysis, IR theory, and IR pedagogy in an integrated analysis of IR's much-needed attempts at diversification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper features the process whereby an experimental Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) program fostered a critical learning community around peace and security across 13 countries and with 40 women. It addresses the epistemological questions of doing research in collective ways (with and among activists/scholars), the axiological challenge of recognizing and embracing counter-expertise, and the possibilities for incorporating values and practices of care as well as non-extractivism in producing and disseminating knowledge. By articulating the core ethical principles that emerged from this experience, the paper suggests a critical feminist epistemological commitment in taking seriously grassroots women's knowledge in peace and security processes, rather than what is often done in both policy and academy: prescribing their needs from above, interpreting their knowledge from the outside, and advising what problems to tackle and how to live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligence services are important sites of contestation, often the foci of reform and calls for greater transparency. Yet, while growing attention has been paid to intersectionality, gender equality reform, and progress in other areas of international affairs, little of this same transparency and attention has been paid to diversity in the intelligence sector. This paper seeks to bridge the gap, comprising a systematic review of the literature on diversity in the intelligence sector to improve our understanding of what is known and what can be known about the history and current make-up of the intelligence sector—and those who "do intelligence work". By identifying strengths and gaps in the literature and setting an agenda for future research within these "secret institutions", this paper argues that the lack of transparency, data, and knowledge on the interplay of gender, race, and sexuality, among other aspects of diversity in intelligence, is deeply troubling. It hampers our knowledge of how the sector may be "gendered" or otherwise experienced, as well as how this particular area of the security sector may or may not be integrating gender and other perspectives into their work. This paper finds that diversity in the intelligence and national security sectors is both an asset and a liability to be managed. Diversity is seen as a source of intelligence gathering and analysis strength, as well as a potential threat to hegemonic masculinity in intelligence practice. Further, language and processes for promoting diversity in intelligence can reinforce stereotyped knowledge of marginalized groups that ultimately hamper calls for greater representation, diversity, inclusion, access, and opportunities in the intelligence sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defense ministries regularly frame climate security in their national security strategies. Recently, "civil" ministries also begun mentioning climate security. However, they do not mean the same thing. This article develops four indicators to assess the commitment of climate security framings to an understanding of climate security as either human/environmental or national security issue. It applies the indicators to fifty submissions of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) by civil ministries and seventy defense publications. The paper finds that NDC commonly refer to climate changes' anthropogenic origins and biophysical impacts but rarely to indirect consequences such as migration or conflict. In contrast, military administrations rarely mention anthropogenic origins but warn more often than NDC of indirect consequences. This shows that a civil domestic discourse on climate security has emerged, more attuned to human security and environmental security and more conducive to climate change mitigation and adaptation. The paper argues that organizational theory can explain these differences in securitization: defense and civil ministries frame climate security differently so that it falls in line with their respective mandates and established organizational features. The article concludes with a checklist for assessing framings of climate security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discourses and practices reproducing a world where a plurality of distinct civilizations clash or dialogue, rise or fall, color multiple facets of global politics today. How should we interpret this unexpected surge in civilizational politics, especially notable in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, China, and Russia? This paper argues that the growing turn to civilizations or, better, civilizationism should be understood as a counter-hegemonic ideological reaction to the globalization of the liberal international order. It theorizes the deepening and widening of the liberal international order in the aftermath of the Cold War as enabled by powerful constitutive ideological forces, which congeal into a distinctively modern, informal, universal standard of civilization. This liberal civilizational standard can be experienced by a particular category of non (fully) liberal actors within and beyond the West as ideologically entrapping them—through processes of socialization or stigmatization—in a state of symbolic disempowerment. The paper shows how civilizationism provides an ideological path for resisting and contesting the liberal standard of civilization by articulating a distinct and valued (essentialized) sense of collective belonging, and an alternative (generally illiberal) normative system and (broadly multipolar) vision of international order. Along with theorizing and exploring in original ways the drivers of civilizational politics in the current historical juncture, the paper makes two further contributions. It highlights and unpacks the key role of ideological dynamics in the making and contestation of international orders in general and the liberal one in particular. It suggests and shows why civilizations are best approached as ideological constructs rather than cultures, identities, or discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is Christendom in international relations? We argue that Christendom does not equate to a long-lost historical empire but an enduring imaginary of a political order where government secures the church and the church ministers to government. Such imaginaries have taken a diverse range of historical and geographical forms, which have barely been explored in International Relations (IR). They may be state-centric or decentered. As intellectual historians of the discipline have demonstrated, international relations was founded on a Christendom ontology and theology, and then rapidly forgot that fact. One major feature of this forgetting is a narrow historical conception of Christendom—its equation with Latin Christendom—in contrast with the wealth of scholarship in the humanities, which has revealed various conceptual forms and discursive practices of Christendom from at least the fourth century CE to the present. The effect of this narrowness has been to confirm IR's historical Eurocentrism and prevent it from exploring the international politics of Eurasian, Eastern Orthodox forms of Christendom, and signs of new imaginaries of Christendom emerging in the Global South. But such neo-Christendoms—which imagine government as re-centered on the church—raise the possibility of the emergence of modern variations of the legitimized violence associated with Latin Christendom. Alternative theologies of post-Christendom—imagining the church as politically active but decentered from government—indicate that such an imaginary is contested not just beyond but within Christian theology. The paper provides a new definition of Christendom and re-evaluation of its afterlives for the study of religion and theology in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticizes the epistemic foundations of democratic state-building, which are derived from a model of political transitions according to which liberal democratic institutions will transform a hitherto authoritarian and troubled country into a more prosperous and stable society and, therefore, foreign interventions to establish these institutions are realistic and worthy investments, provided they are properly planned based on knowledge of what has worked elsewhere. This expectation is based upon two epistemological premises. The first premise, linearity , is that social and institutional change exhibits identifiable input–output relations connecting socioeconomic conditions and outcomes. The second premise, ergodicity , is that these relations, inferred from past samples, provide reliable probabilistic projections about future outcomes, which can guide the focus of policy interventions. Drawing from the study of complex systems, the paper indicates why these two premises offer a flawed conception of political transitions and why radical and large-scale interventions, such as state-building, will tend to generate unintended consequences rather than the planned effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent discussions of humanitarian intervention in international relations (IR) have often focused on the evolution of norms, and the development and contestation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) framework. While beneficial in tracing this process, most of these studies tend not to incorporate an analysis of colonialism, race, sexuality, or gender. While postcolonial studies of humanitarian intervention have done well to illustrate the relationship between humanitarian intervention and colonial violence, they still tend to neglect the study of sexuality and gender. Exploring how the sexualized, gendered, and racialized dimensions of colonialism can be incorporated into the study of humanitarian intervention, this paper proposes a queer approach. After exploring the valuable contributions of feminist scholarship, it suggests that the queer approaches of Nicola Pratt ("The Queen Boat Case in Egypt: Sexuality, National Security and State Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 33, no. 1 [2007]: 129–44), Cynthia Weber (Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge. New York, Oxford University Press, 2016), and Laura Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg ("Trans- Bodies in/of War(s): Cisprivilege and Contemporary Security Strategy," Feminist Review 101, no. 1 [2012]: 5–23) offer some distinct contributions that build upon feminist insights. Applying these to the 2015 House of Commons debate on airstrikes against ISIL, the paper suggests that queer IR can invigorate the study of humanitarian intervention with a framework that unpacks the simultaneously gendered, sexual, and racial dimensions of colonial violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security scholars have traditionally viewed emergency as a state of exception that triggers a struggle for survival, justifying the breaking of rules and excesses of state power. While there have been attempts to decouple security from its survivalist logic, emergency has remained an analytical blind spot in security studies. The dominance of an elite-centric, exceptionalist paradigm in the study of emergency has foreclosed the possibility of alternative conceptions of emergency and neglected the voices of structurally disempowered agents. This paper advances a vernacular contextual research agenda that is sensitive to the empirical diversity of emergency meanings and practices while foregrounding emergency claims made by non-elite actors. Challenging the idea of emergency as a form of "anti-politics," the paper contends that emergency should be understood as an intrinsic part of politics. It then recovers an alternative, "emancipatory" conception of emergency as an extraordinary moment of spontaneous beginnings that can activate the collective agency of marginalized actors. The final section establishes conceptual foundations for actor-centered, grounded empirical research into emergency politics and suggests avenues for future research. Contextualizing emergency and attuning to the voices and experiences of everyday actors are crucial to remove the key variable that ties security to the logic of survival and exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The religion–politics nexus has become a thriving field within the study of global politics. However, the fast development has translated only into a moderate diversification of the research. Building on Bourdieu's analysis of the social field, this paper argues that this limited pluralization is related to the strong heteronomy of the field. This heteronomy has three "concentric" sources—the dependence on the field of politics, the continued influence of the secularist bias of Western social science, and the dependence on the theoretical developments in the broader discipline of international relations. Methodologically, the article builds on a detailed analysis of eighteen top academic journals and their scholarly output related to religion in global politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to contribute to the English School's (ES) understanding of the European Regional International Society (ERIS) through the work of Karl Polanyi. While ES theory has long been interested in regional international societies, its general approach remains limited to a methodologically internationalist frame that fails to capture the dynamism and historical change of regional formations. We therefore aim to better ground the ES account of the ERIS within a more robust political economy framework that incorporates domestic dynamics with international processes. The article first examines the making of the nineteenth-century liberal order and its eventual breakdown during the turn of the century—the "great transformation", which ultimately informed the rationale for the European Community (EC). We then focus our analysis on the EC's Common Agricultural Policy. With specific examination of sugar production, we explore the tensions and contradictions bound up with the formation of a protected domestic and regional sugar market, the pressures it exerted on the wider international society, and the ways in which European officials skillfully exploited the post-Cold War liberalization of international society as a means of (partially) "disembedding" European sugar. Lastly, we hope that this article begins a new conversation on how the tenets of political economy (Polanyian or otherwise) might, at long last, make an impact on ES theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper integrates the scholarship on compliance with international human rights courts to reflect upon how the literature approaches delays and compliance cycles. Building on this review, we propose a new analytical approach that helps distinguish between reparations prone to immediate or protracted implementation. We introduce two metrics to facilitate the interpretation of delays: the yearly probability of compliance and the expected time to compliance. We also show, using machine-learning tools, how scholars can reconstruct life cycles of compliance. The article illustrates the utility of this approach with an analysis of all cases decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) between 1989 and 2019. This analytical framework provides critical insights for courts and activists seeking to promote interventions at key moments when compliance is most likely. Moreover, the study underscores important lessons for the Inter-American Human Rights System. Current concerns about a compliance "crisis" at the IACtHR partly reflect a failure to distinguish between reparation types and the Court's preference for reparations requiring protracted implementation. By modeling compliance life cycles, our study opens a promising research avenue that can facilitate effectual and timely policy intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through its potential to contribute to mass suffering, economic disruption, and social unrest, climate change poses a security threat to the constitutional identities of states (as democratic, autocratic, or hybrid regimes). This paper proposes a conceptual framework of mediated causality for climatic impacts on constitutional identity and engages in novel theory-building for one mediating vector of change: the post-fossil energy transition. Theories of the "oil curse" and of "carbon democracy" are compared and critiqued for their contributions to understanding the potential impacts of decarbonized energy systems on democracy. Two counterintuitive conclusions emerge. First, transitioning away from petroleum may not result in increased democratization, as the oil curse implies. Second, post-fossil energy systems are unlikely to become structurally decentralized, as advocates of "energy democracy" suppose, and may even need to remain centralized in order for popular mobilization around energy to help maintain or reinvigorate democratic rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors' motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does a state change its foreign policy objectives and who is responsible for instigating such change? According to Hermann, four primary change agents are central to this process: leaders, bureaucracies, changes in domestic constituencies, and external shocks. This paper argues that the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a complementary policy process framework that can explain foreign policy change (FPC) and that accounts for all four of these primary change agents. Additionally, it is a broader framework of the policy process that facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing FPC than traditional FPC research. The ACF has the potential to broaden our understanding of FPC by emphasizing the intersection of the international system with domestic politics and focusing on a myriad of policy actors coordinating their advocacy efforts to influence FPC. To support this argument, the paper discusses how FPC can benefit from the ACF and reviews past applications. It proposes a research agenda using the ACF to study FPC and draws conclusions about future challenges and directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Questions regarding the political significance of international relations (IR) and how scholarly practice relates to/constitutes a political practice appear newly resonant, but are longstanding concerns. This article utilizes the growing literature on temporality within international politics to analyze the political potential of these intellectual interventions and generate new ways of framing scholarly practice. We observe two trends within the field. First, IR as a discipline remains largely—although not exclusively—imagined as an English-language discipline generated by scholars in the Global North. Each area's political discourse is currently dominated by fears surrounding foundational political and institutional change due to the rise of racialized authoritarianism within these self-imagined democratic societies. Despite these purportedly dramatic developments, there has not been a similarly dramatic shift in the scholarly relationship with politics. Scholars continue to successfully intervene in their collective presents, but scholarship itself remains oriented toward enduring claims that accumulate knowledge and resist the possibility of "failure." This paper theorizes the temporality of critical intervention to better relate positively to the bodies that co-constitute our political present. Ultimately, this paper concludes by arguing for a reconsideration of contradiction and failure as frames for thinking scholarly practice in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The overlapping of a series of events in the region has brought the Sahel under the spotlight of many European countries. It has been argued that the peculiar transnational nature of many terrorist groups of the area represents a concrete threat to European security. France, specifically, has led and encouraged a series of European initiatives, which aim to stabilize the region, calling for different degrees of counterterrorism cooperation with its European allies. Many European countries, such as Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, or Italy, have indeed increased their engagement in the area. Yet, not only a variety of new actors are now involved in the response to terrorism, but European cooperation among key actors is also developing along political-strategic, organizational, and procedural dimensions largely unexplored by the existing literature. This paper specifically accounts for the different multilevel configurations of European counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel between 2012 and 2018. More specifically, the aim of this contribution is twofold. First, theoretically, through the concept of "patchwork" the paper proposes a conceptual framework able to investigate and analyze the apparently confusing multidimensional and multi-actor European cooperation in counterterrorism. Second, it empirically researches and analyzes the types of cooperation and the actors that fulfil key strategic positions in the patchwork. Overall, this paper provides a first complete account of the universe of European actors involved in the region and the types of cooperative patterns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The consistently low credit-taking rates, 16 percent in 2016 (Global Terrorism Database), continue to challenge the understanding of terrorism as "propaganda of the deed" twenty years after researchers initially pointed out the conundrum. While providing an overview and evaluation of the limited existing literature on credit-taking, this paper draws attention to three core problems in the current literature on terrorist credit-taking, which may have led the low credit-taking rates to appear more puzzling than is due. First, the available explanations struggle to find corroboration when empirically tested and many also show theoretical shortcomings with strong unspoken assumptions and unclear predictions of credit-taking behavior. Second, data structure and data availability unnecessarily narrow our academic understanding of credit-taking. Finally, theories focused on group characteristics such as religious motivation or state sponsorship suffer from severe issues of sample bias due to unintended selection on the dependent variable. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research less prone to the problematic issues identified in the article. A re-orientation toward a less restrictive and more fine-grained understanding of credit-taking is advised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, climate security has become an increasingly salient policy agenda in international fora. Yet, despite a large body of research, the empirical links between climate-change and conflict remain highly uncertain. This paper contends that uncertainty around climate–conflict links should be understood as characteristic of complex social–ecological systems rather than a problem that can be fully resolved. Rather than striving to eliminate uncertainty, we suggest that researchers need to learn to cope with it. To this end, this article advances a set of principles for guiding scholarly practice when investigating a complex phenomenon: recognizing epistemological uncertainty, embracing epistemological diversity, and practicing humility and dialogue across difference. Taken together we call this ethos epistemological pluralism, whereby scholars self-consciously recognize the limits of their chosen epistemology for understanding the climate–conflict nexus and engage with other approaches without attempting to usurp them. Reviewing the last decade of climate–conflict scholarship, we show that climate–conflict research already manifests many of these ideals; however, we also identify problematic patterns of engagement across epistemological divides and thus plenty of scope for improvement. To illustrate why a diversity of methods (e.g. qualitative and quantitative) will not suffice, the article critically discusses prior research to illustrate why at least two epistemological approaches—constructivism and positivism—cannot be synthesized or integrated without significant analytical cost, and elaborates why excluding insights from any one would lead to an impoverished understanding of the climate–conflict nexus. We conclude with five practical recommendations of how scholars can help realize the ideal of epistemological pluralism in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some near crises tip over into full-blown crisis and others do not? This paper considers existing scholarship and identifies four key barriers to using quantitative analysis for tipping-point analyses: strategic indeterminacy; the incentives for conflict parties to avoid inefficiencies; the paucity of cases; and the availability of quality data. Due to these challenges, many do not perform well as immediate causes for crisis escalation. We also argue and demonstrate through two quantitative models of crisis escalation that some variables, particularly related to domestic politics, can do well in explaining why some disputes tip into crisis and others do not. As we illustrate with reference to the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Straits Crisis, qualitative approaches that analyze the processes by which leaders and foreign policy institutions make decisions add needed explanatory power to purely quantitative models of the potential for near crises to tip into crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do leaders create legitimacy in international organizations (IOs)? It is widely acknowledged that legitimacy matters to IOs, but little research examines internal self-legitimation—the creation of legitimacy for staff, rather than for external audiences—and who specifically undertakes these self-legitimation activities in IOs. This paper fills these gaps by examining the particular role of leaders in self-legitimation and I develop a theoretical framework that shows (1) how leaders have a unique role to play as legitimators due to their high social status within the IO and their access to discursive resources for legitimation, (2) how leaders create internal legitimacy through the introduction or reintroduction of narratives and the creation of self-referential language, and (3) how leader-led self-legitimation entails three potential risks. I illustrate these points with three case studies, one from the World Bank and two from the United Nations. I conclude by proposing a new research agenda for this underexplored area of IO and legitimacy scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the prospects and likely future direction of European integration? Will it be marked by resilience and perhaps even deepening integration among European Union (EU) member states, or will it encounter further instability that could lead to fragmentation and disintegration? The answers to these questions are currently unknown but are important not just for the citizens and countries of the EU but for world politics more broadly. Scholars and other observers have advanced a range of arguments to answer these questions, many of which are derived from the three mainstream theoretical paradigms of contemporary International Relations (IR): realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These arguments reveal disagreement both within and across paradigms over the question of the EU's future. While it is commonly thought that realists are generally pessimistic and liberals and constructivists broadly optimistic regarding the EU's future prospects, it is possible to identify arguments derived from liberal IR theory that the EU faces possibly fatal challenges and realists who see powerful reasons for the EU to stick together, while there are constructivists who think it can go either way. There are thus six basic positions on the future of the EU derived from IR theory. This paper identifies and evaluates a broad range of causal forces that will affect the future of European integration. The paper concludes by discussing the enduring role and value of theory in the study of international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholarship has posited multiple pathways through which democracies accrue advantages in world politics. These range from enhanced warfighting capabilities to sovereign borrowing capacity to more constructive cooperation with like-minded regimes. A series of crises over the past generation, however, have called these advantages into question. This paper re-examines the key conceptual pillars underlying the democratic advantage in world politics. Scholars have posited that democracies possess inherent advantages in credible commitment mechanisms and public goods provision. The rise of populism has eroded these underlying advantages. Furthermore, the rise of China threatens to hamper the network effects that enhance democratic flourishing at the global level. Whether the democratic advantage is real and sustainable should be one of the defining political science research programs of this century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of nationalist and populist movements throughout the world has led to concerns about the future of the liberal international economic order. Central to these worries is the belief that nationalist and populist publics and their leaders will reject open trade, which has been a cornerstone of the global order. Yet despite these fears, very little empirical research has been conducted on the links between either nationalism or populism and trade policy. In this paper, we argue that nationalism and populism are likely to discourage trade liberalization in democratic states, but that these forces will have little influence on trade policy in non-democracies. To test this argument, we focus on state involvement in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Based on a variety of tests, we find considerable support for our argument. Democracies with nationalist or populist governments are especially reluctant to join PTAs, but neither nationalism nor populism systematically influences whether non-democracies enter PTAs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In discussing the historical origins of sovereignty, Jens Bartelson (2018, 510) wrote, "Making sense of sovereignty. . . entails making sense of its component terms—supreme authority and territory—and how these terms were forged together into a concept." The question of sovereignty in cyberspace, however, inverts this historical "forging together," as territoriality and authority are sundered in cyberspace. This paper argues that attempts to apply sovereignty to cyberspace governance are inappropriate to the domain. It develops a technically grounded definition of "cyberspace" and examines its characteristics as a distinct domain for action, conflict, and governance, while clarifying its relationship to territoriality. It reviews the literature on cyberspace and sovereignty since the early 1990s, showing the emergence of explicitly pro-sovereigntist ideas and practices in the last ten years. The cyber-sovereignty debate is linked to IR research on the historical emergence of sovereignty, demonstrating how technologies routinely change the basis of international order and challenging the presumption that territorial sovereignty is a stable and uniform principle of international organization that can be presumptively applied to the internet. The paper also links the conceptual debate over cyber-sovereignty to the real-world geopolitical struggle over the governance of the internet, showing how different conceptions of sovereignty serve the interests of different powers, notably the United States, Russia, and China. The paper explores the relevance of an alternative governance model for cyberspace based on the global commons concept. It refutes the arguments made against that model and then explains what difference it might make to governance if we conceive of cyberspace in that way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral conferences are the bread-and-butter of international politics. In such settings, countries may pursue their interests individually, but most of the time they prefer to act through coalitions. Such coalitions are overlapping, creating a network structure. States build and utilize networks to get agenda items pushed through or to block unfavorable ones. While sometimes they are formed on the basis of formal institutions (such as the NAM or the EU), frequently their membership is based on either ad hoc cooperation or existing informal bodies (such as the NSG, New Agenda Coalition, or Zangger Committee). The attention to such networks is, however, still in its infancy. This paper looks at how state networks within one of the most important recurring diplomatic conferences—the quinquennial NPT Review Conference—develop and transform over time. By doing so, the paper maps the existing networks and explains their transformation as an instrument of global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are widespread worries about the impending fragmentation of the internet. Reviewing the IR literature on cyberspace and internet governance, this paper demonstrates that these debates rest on very traditional understandings of territory and the state, focusing on ways that hard-shelled "power containers" are recreated in cyberspace. Using a practice-oriented conceptual framework drawing on insights from critical geography, the paper highlights how state, corporate, and private actors deterritorialize and reterritorialize cyberspace. Results indicate that there are multiple ways to territorialize cyberspace beyond the reconstruction of the "national territory" and that a multitude of actors engage in territorializing practices. This allows for a more nuanced reevaluation of the "internet fragmentation" discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In civil war, rebel groups play a central role as a regulator in the management of civilian economic activities in their territory of control. While previous studies have intensively researched the impact of economic conditions on the war process and dynamics, little attention has been paid to the variation in economic policies adopted by the rebels. This paper conceptualizes the types of regulation policies imposed by the rebels against civilian economic activities and theorizes patterns and particular measures of (non)regulation taken by the rebel groups: formal regulation, deliberate connivance, and laissez-faire. The degree of economic intervention by the rebels is contingent on the extent of economic informalization within the territory and the relative capability of the economic sector. When the sector involves a large portion of the population and is densely networked, its economic potential comes to be perceived by the rebels as a threat to their incumbency. Such a threat compels them to undertake measures of regulation. In contrast, if the level of informalization is low or civilian activities are poorly backed by their network, the threat perceived by the rebels is less, in addition to which, formal regulation against such a loosely organized sector to effectively control civilian activities would be too costly. This paper proposes a number of research agendas on wartime rebel economies and their broader relevance to international relations and political science: mechanisms of rebel economies, rent and the resource curse, the process of civil-rebel relations, and rebel governance. It concludes by advancing implications for policy development; policymakers need to be scrupulous about the effectiveness of (neo)liberal economic policies in conflict-affected societies and to design postwar reconstruction by taking into consideration the legacy of rebel economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is safe to say that much of international law—the bedrock of the international order—has been shaped by the Western legal doctrine. How does the Islamic legal tradition relate to international law? What are Islamic law states' (ILS) stance toward the global order and international relations? This article offers a fresh perspective of similarities and differences between international law and Islamic law. ILS' patterns of commitments to a number of international treaties and institutions reveal a nuanced picture of these states' position in the contemporary global order. I bring together the English-language-dominated field of international relations and the Arabic-language literature on global order and Islamic law. I trace Islam's contributions to international law and argue that international law and Islamic law share more similarities than they are given credit for. However, the inherent diversity of Islamic law and the lack of an authoritative body of Islamic international law muddle effects of historical cross-fertilization between Islamic law and international law. In reality, ILS' position in the global order is not about a fundamental clash of values. A much more intricate picture emerges. In an important way, this paper sketches an emerging research agenda for understanding ILS' position in the modern global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and with what effects do institutions diffuse between international organizations (IOs)? An emerging literature extends a key insight of the study of diffusion processes among states to the international level, establishing that the adoption of institutions in IOs is regularly conditioned by the choices of other IOs. Yet, this literature neglects a key contextual difference between the two settings: unlike in the hierarchically structured organizations that have dominated the literature on diffusion, institutional creation, and change in IOs are the result of decentralized bargaining among sovereign governments. This paper develops a heuristic model that shows how diffusion between IOs shapes decision-making within them through its impact on the institutional preferences of individual governments. The model establishes that, unlike in diffusion processes among states, convergence is an unlikely outcome of diffusion between IOs. By implication, studies that take institutional convergence as their starting point are likely to underestimate the pervasiveness of diffusion effects. I demonstrate these arguments with a case study of the establishment of a regional dispute settlement system in Mercosur, a regional organization in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can there be a "radical IR?" Scholars have given little attention to the question of the following: where is radicalism in the discipline? I argue that not only is it possible to think about radical international theory, but that it is necessary in the contemporary world. International theorists have to grapple with developments of fundamental change, including the so-described decline of the (neo)liberal international order, transformations in global capital, and an upsurge in populist political movements that advocate for fundamental political change. In approaching the question of radicalism in IR, the article develops a working definition of radicalism as an approach to politics that focuses on the International as a whole, uses theoretical tools from the humanistic sciences to engage in an active politics of fundamental transformation, and deploys methods that are historicist, genealogical, and oriented toward "getting to the root of things." Additionally, the paper illustrates the virtues and promises of a radical IR by using the case of (neo)liberal world order arguments to show how a radical IR could change the trajectory of these engagements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting in the 1990s, international organizations (IOs) have created various opportunities of access for civil society to voice criticism. While international relations (IR) scholarship has increasingly addressed the resulting interaction between IOs and civil society with a focus on NGOs, we know little about the particular reactions to IOs' opening up by social movements. This paper analyzes reactions to opening up by a transnational social movement centrally addressing IOs: the Global Justice Movement (GJM). Examining reactions by different groups of the GJM in Europe and Southeast Asia to IOs' opening up, we demonstrate that reactions differ considerably depending on activists' assessments of the nature of opening up. In particular, we identify four pathways of reactions on a continuum from (1) strong cooperation with IOs as a reaction to opening up, (2) temporally limited cooperation with different IOs, (3) a hybrid reaction that combines cooperation with specific IOs with a strong opposition to other IOs in reaction to their opening up, to (4) a continuous rejection of all cooperation with IOs. We show how these different reactions are shaped by activists' perceptions of the quality of the international opening up in conjunction with national and local context factors. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that such perceptions can significantly change over time depending on experiences of interactions. Reactions to opening up are therefore not predictable on the basis of a movement's shape and resources only, but rather depend on a variety of factors such as the movement's perception of the IO's sincerity in a strategic and consequential interaction, as well as the movement's ideological framework and its history of interaction with institutions at other levels, especially in the domestic realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is field research? Is it just for qualitative scholars? Must it be done in a foreign country? How much time in the field is "enough"? A lack of disciplinary consensus on what constitutes "field research" or "fieldwork" has left graduate students in political science underinformed and thus underequipped to leverage site-intensive research to address issues of interest and urgency across the subfields. Uneven training in Ph.D. programs has also left early-career researchers underprepared for the logistics of fieldwork, from developing networks and effective sampling strategies to building respondents' trust, and related issues of funding, physical safety, mental health, research ethics, and crisis response. Based on the experience of five junior scholars, this paper offers answers to questions that graduate students puzzle over, often without the benefit of others' "lessons learned." This practical guide engages theory and praxis, in support of an epistemologically and methodologically pluralistic discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise has raised important questions about the durability of US hegemony in East Asia. Much of the debate, however, has generally been cast in fairly simplistic terms, suggesting the durability or end of US regional hegemony. Such framings nevertheless fail to fully capture regional dynamics and complexity. Advancing an English School conception of hegemony, this paper examines the politics, contestation, and renegotiation of the post–Cold War US hegemonic order in East Asia. It maps out four logics of hegemonic ordering in the existing literature, outlines their shortfalls and advances a twofold argument. First, although regional order will not disintegrate into binary "order versus disorder" or "US versus Chinese hegemony" scenarios, the politics of hegemonic ordering—the interactive discourses, processes, relations, and practices that underpin hegemony—will intensify as the United States and China continue to both cooperate and compete for power, position, and influence in East Asia. Second, I argue that the East Asian regional order will evolve in ways that resemble hybrid forms of hegemony in a complex hierarchy. Specifically, I develop a new logic—"coalitional and collaborative hegemonies in a complex hierarchy"—that is anchored in assertiveness, fluidity, and compartmentalization. It demonstrates that Washington and Beijing will not only form coalitional hegemonies, seeking legitimation from multiple and often overlapping constituencies, but also engage in a collaborative hegemony on shared interests. This better reflects evolving regional dynamics and yields theoretical insights into examining hegemonic transitions less as clearly delineated transitions from one distinct hegemonic order to the next, and more as partial and hybrid ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The received view in international relations (IR) is that the European multistate system was created when the medieval religious order broke down in the centuries following the Reformation. This view, which sees the medieval Catholic Church as a factor that hindered the advent of the multistate system, ignores a key insight of medieval historians, namely that the deeper historical precondition for the European multistate system was that the Church challenged the notions of empire and hegemony after the eleventh-century conflict of church and state. By mining this body of historiography, this paper shows how the end of the fusion of lay and religious authority in general and the Church's persistent interest in avoiding that one secular polity outmatched the others in particular contributed to the development of the European multistate system. These insights not only question dominant historiographic assumptions of IR, but may also be said to challenge the epistemological approaches of much of this scholarship. Resumen El criterio aceptado en Relaciones Internacionales (RI) es que el sistema multiestatal europeo se creó tras el colapso del orden religioso medieval en los siglos posteriores a la Reforma. Este criterio, que considera a la Iglesia católica como un factor que dificultó el advenimiento del sistema multiestatal, ignora un conocimiento clave de los historiadores medievales, específicamente, que la condición previa histórica más profunda del sistema multiestatal europeo fue que la Iglesia desafió las nociones de imperio y hegemonía después del conflicto entre la iglesia y el estado en el siglos XI. Al indagar exhaustivamente este cuerpo de historiografía, este informe demuestra cómo el fin de la fusión entre autoridad laica y religiosa en general y el interés persistente de la Iglesia por evitar que una forma de gobierno secular supere a las otras en particular contribuyeron al desarrollo del sistema multiestatal europeo. Estas conclusiones no solo cuestionan las conjeturas historiográficas dominantes de RI, sino que puede decirse que también desafían los abordajes epistemiológicos de gran parte de esta erudición. Extrait Le point de vue généralement accepté dans les relations internationales est que le système multiétatique européen s'est constitué lorsque l'ordre religieux médiéval s'est effondré dans les siècles qui ont suivi la Réforme. Ce point de vue, qui voit l'Église catholique médiévale comme un facteur ayant empêché l'avènement du système multiétatique, omet une perspective clé des historiens médiévaux, c'est-à-dire que l'une des conditions historiques préalables plus profondes à l'établissement du système multiétatique européen a été le fait que l'Église avait remis en question les notions d'empire et d'hégémonie après le conflit entre Église et État du 11e siècle. En exploitant ce corpus historiographique, cet article montre comment la fin de la fusion des autorités laïques et religieuses en général, et l'intérêt persistant de l'Église à éviter qu'un régime laïque ne dépasse les autres en particulier, ont contribué au développement du système multiétatique européen. Ces perspectives remettent non seulement en question les hypothèses historiographiques dominantes, mais nous pouvons considérer qu'elles remettent également en question les approches épistémologiques d'une grande partie des recherches dans ce domaine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an original theoretical framework for the study of insults in international relations (IR). Bringing into IR the two main theoretical approaches to aggravating language, slurs and dysphemisms, we conceptualize insults' disruptive impact on international interactions in a way that explains their logic, consequences, and risks. Specifically, we argue that insults constitute both at once tactical tools used by international actors to achieve their interests by disrupting an interaction and modifying the payoffs associated with it and linguistic artifacts constructing and sharpening self- and other identities. The components of our theoretical framework are illustrated with a wide range of empirical cases of international insults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses interpretive epistemology in international relations (IR) and its advantages to address the field's sociological composition, its scholars' identity, and knowledge structuration. The research proposes to engage in sociological reflexivity on IR methods and the way in which knowledge accumulation and structuration are driven by canonical assumptions of what are considered "normal"/"good" scientific procedures. The central argument focuses on interpretive epistemological approaches as possible venues for research to participate in the collective effort to address, and redress, the imbalance between the sociology of the field and its knowledge production and structuration processes. By allowing dialogue around meanings and interpretation among increasingly diverse members, an interpretive stance on IR opens the floor to criticism and rival interpretations. More specifically, the paper presents the methodology of interpretive phenomenological analysis as a method which both emphasizes context and actor specificity with regard to the subject of study and fully acknowledges the researcher's identity and voice in scientific inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By championing certain actors over others, International Relations (IR) theory conventionally avoids questions of agency and does not, at least in theoretical terms, discuss which entities can develop capacities needed to act in world politics. Whether it is states, institutions, or individuals, we simply "locate" agency in particular entities, which then exist and act as global governors qua definition. In other words, agency is determined by a priori claims and we rarely reflect the dispositions needed to be(come) an actor in the first place. Even global governance, despite its impetus to consider agency beyond the state, has not engaged in such a discussion, at least not in theoretical terms. In order to initiate such a discussion, the paper draws on the distinction between substantialism and relationalism. After reviewing how agency has been framed in IR, the paper outlines three general dispositions of agency and relates those to the two ontological perspectives. Based on this theorization, the paper contents that IR's lack of reflection and its substantialized notions of agency, whether in rationalist or constructivist appearance, remain problematic. As such, there is potential to conceptualize agency in world politics not as an inherent disposition of entities but rather as emerging from social relations between them. Such a framework compels researchers to not just assume discrete actors but to focus on relational processes through which their agency emerges in the first place and sustains over time. Reconstructing these processes reveals their political nature and allows us to consider who should govern the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The strategies of subordinate states in hegemonic or asymmetrical relations have been widely studied by international relations scholars. Such works generally focus on how a subordinate state can influence the hegemon's behavior so as to address and further the interests of the subordinate state. The relation between subordinate-state agency and the hegemonic system, the makeup of the hegemonic order, itself receives less attention. Through analysis of two cases of US hegemony in Latin America, this article examines how subordinate-state agency may strengthen or weaken the hegemonic system and, as such, makes a case for subordinate-state agency as an underpinning element of hegemony. It explores Colombian agency in the design phase of Plan Colombia as contributing to US hegemony, while Bolivian agency under the presidency of Evo Morales is examined as a challenge. In both instances, it was the United States, rather than the Latin American states, that took on a passive role, leaving the initiative with Colombia and Bolivia. Therefore, instead of reaffirmations of active one-way US hegemony versus passive subordinate states, the paper proposes to understand both cases as demonstrating the importance of subordinate-state agency in the configuration of the hegemonic system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introductory paper of the presidential issue examines IR theory's problems and prospects in understanding when and how change happens, especially peaceful transformations in world politics. The ISA 2017 Baltimore conference was aimed at taking an assessment of our understanding of change, its different manifestations as well as implications. The papers in this special issue deal with important questions on different markers and manifestations of change in world politics. The implications might range from epochal transformations to limited changes in the international system, especially within and between regions to incremental changes in how international treaties and global governance initiatives are promulgated, which in turn produce long-term and/or short-term changes in the architecture of world politics. It also addresses the following questions: How do different IR paradigms address change? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Can we understand change sequentially or cumulatively or combining their insights? How do material and ideational factors link together in generating change? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global economy is experiencing the digitalization of production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services. The internet and cross-border data flows are becoming important channels of trade as more products are traded through the web or integrate features that rely on digital connectivity. Reflecting the autonomy states have to enact such policies, national variations in internet governance have expanded over the previous decade, with states increasingly looking to use internet and data policies for economic and trade objectives. These dynamics are having important implications on the international trade regime through challenging existing trade rules and creating demands for new rules. This has resulted in growing debates in the trade arena around "digital trade," as a number of states, led by the United States, push for rules as a way to discipline national internet policies and support trade in digital goods and services. This paper examines the political economy of this campaign. We argue that the objectives of this campaign go beyond updating rules to better fit the "Internet age" into achieving further liberalization of trade in goods and services. We highlight the technological contingency of existing international rules and show how technological shifts have been a driver of competitive regime creation and forum shifting contributing to processes of fragmentation of the international trade regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the scholarly study of "transfer" from track-two workshops to track-one negotiations is highly applicable to the study of transfer from other modalities of participation to track-one in inclusive peace negotiations. During the last decade, other approaches to make negotiations more inclusive have also been increasingly employed, such as national dialogue conferences, variety of consultation mechanisms, or a diverse set of peace commissions. In this paper, we aim to expand the conceptualization of transfer beyond ICR workshops and discuss how the knowledge accumulated concerning transfer in the ICR literature during the last decades can be applied to understand and evaluate transfer from other inclusion modalities used in peace negotiations today. We therefore make a distinction between the first generation of transfer (1.0) developed by the ICR workshops scholars and practitioners and the transfer process from other modalities used in inclusive negotiations (2.0). To apply the lessons learned from transfer 1.0 to 2.0, we start with an overview of the concept as developed in track-two literature. We then suggest a conceptualization of transfer 2.0, based on insights from how it has unfolded in five of the seven inclusion modalities examined in our comparative case study. We discuss the similarities and differences between transfer 1.0 and 2.0 and how transfer 2.0 can be studied, including and beyond track-two initiatives. We conclude by suggesting a number of directions for future research on transfer 2.0 that are relevant to several inclusion modalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the inception of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) in 2000, feminist academia has been closely interested in the developing women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda in international affairs. The majority of this work has emerged from within feminist international relations (Mcleod 2015 ; Shepherd 2008) and feminist legal studies. Less attention has been paid to the WPS agenda by feminist political science. As a result, less consideration has been given to political institutions within the WPS framework. This paper argues that the design and implementation of postconflict political institutions is an important component of the WPS agenda and one which deserves greater attention. It demonstrates that using certain tenets of feminist political science, and feminist institutionalism in particular, can offer key insights into greater understanding of the importance of political institutions within postconflict societies. The article illustrates how political institutions have been underconsidered within academic work on the WPS agenda. It then argues that political institutions are an important part of the puzzle when it comes to implementing the WPS agenda. It shows how feminist institutional theory can help to provide key insights into the nature of postconflict institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to present a broad yet systematic framework for thinking about the role of popular culture (PC) in international conflict management and resolution, from an International Relations perspective. Protracted conflicts often involve a non-material dimension, as they become central elements in the rival states' sense of identity, and as societies develop over time strong beliefs about the conflict, which help sustain it over time. Popular culture can play an important role in shaping and changing this non-material dimension of international conflicts. This is largely due to the unique characteristics of PC products that can reach a large number of people, and can convey both information and emotions. Despite this potential, the role of PC in international conflicts has not been systematically analyzed, due to internal divides within the field of IR between positivist and critical understandings of what PC is and how it should be studied, and due to the very interdisciplinary nature of PC and its operation, which leads to many discussions of PC within different disciplines that do not engage each other. The paper examines the multiple roles that PC can play in the context of protracted conflicts. It examines its role domestically within states-societies that live under conflict; the role of PC as a foreign policy tool used by governments vis-à-vis the publics of their rival; the role and limits of PC in challenging conflicts and facilitating transitions to peace; and finally the impact of the joint consumption of global PC by citizens of states in conflict. These different roles of PC are illustrated throughout with examples from different protracted conflict around the world. The goal of this framework is to serve as a focal point for research that transcends the disciplinary divides and allows for fruitful engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between the everyday and the international has received increasing attention in critical IR in recent years. As many contributions aim to rethink the international in terms of the everyday, the mundane and the ordinary become a site of geopolitical analysis. The paper's central idea is that we, as academics and human beings, constantly face what can be called an international political sociology of the everyday in world politics: How is life in "distant" places? Who lives in these places? And, what are the people doing "over there"? By reflecting on how we obtain an idea of the everyday of certain places, this paper shifts its focus on representations or, more precisely, imaginations of home and the everyday for particular audiences. Precisely because the mundane can simultaneously be anything, everything, and nothing, it is important to turn to the practices and, in this vein, to the (geo)politics of mediating the everyday to us. In this regard, the paper provides an interpretive reading of two aesthetic texts--a film and a photographic essay--with the purpose of addressing imaginaries of home, the special senses, and venues of belonging wherein the everyday takes place, as particular sites of the international. In this way, the paper contributes to current efforts to decentralize current conceptions of the international. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discourse analysis offers an extremely diversified landscape, spanning time and disciplines far beyond the field of international relations (IR). With a rich lineage, it comes as no surprise that under the label "Discourse Analysis" (DA) one cannot find a unified theoretical family within IR but rather a plurality of heterogeneous ways of approaching discourse analysis. By leveraging the wealth of discourse analytical works accumulated over more than three decades, this article intends to discuss some of the main theoretical tenets of three competing perspectives on discourse analysis (PDAs): constructivism, critical realism and poststructuralism. It does so by tracing their links to their respective putative philosophical referents. Distinct from Milliken (1999), who consciously stresses the commonalities between various PDAs, this contribution identifies the differences between them. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it locates IR PDAs in the framework of debates over the core branches of the philosophy of social science. Constructivist, poststructuralist and critical realist PDAs will be located along both a foundational/nonfoundational ontological continuum and a positivist/post-positivist epistemological continuum. Secondly, it retraces the main tenets of post-structuralist, constructivist, and critical realist PDAs to discourse by identifying the relevant debates that have characterized the approach to discourse analysis in IR. Finally, it presents some methodological guidelines and provides examples on how DA endeavors have been practiced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extending cue theory and arguments about heuristics, in this article we argue that in the European Union (EU) member states, trust in the EU acts as a proxy for trust in the United Nations. While existing studies have shown that citizens take cues from national political institutions in order to form an opinion about institutions at the transnational and international level, this study illuminates why and shows how the same is done from the EU to the international level. It further shows that the less politically aware citizens are, the more likely they are to use the EU as a proxy for assessing institutional structures at the international level. The findings suggest that the sociological legitimacy of international organizations should be assessed in a more nuanced manner that takes into consideration regional institutions. This is a methodologically instructive paper, drawing on several waves of the European Social Survey and additionally employing an elaborate replication design, confirming our main findings using empirical data from four international studies, with alternative question wordings, different question order, and different response formats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]