1. THE INCENTIVE GAP: REASSESSING U.S. POLICIES TO SECURE NUCLEAR ARSENALS WORLDWIDE.
- Subjects
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LAW , *NUCLEAR weapons (International law) , *NUCLEAR warfare , *GOVERNMENT policy , *NUCLEAR weapons testing laws , *LEGISLATION , *POLICY sciences , *INTERNATIONAL relations - Abstract
The article focuses on reassessing the U.S. policies to secure nuclear arsenals worldwide. Accordingly, the paper considers the questions facing policymakers charged with designing a strategy to secure nuclear weapons and material worldwide from theft and use by terrorists. In tackling these questions, the paper proceeds in five parts such as the outlining of U.S. policy for preventing state behaviors that could facilitate nuclear terrorism, assessing the results of this policy, concluding that it has failed to produce adequate levels of fissile material security, exploring the reasons for this lack of progress, and the consideration of a range of potential options for creating stronger incentives for states to secure their nuclear stockpiles.
- Published
- 2008