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The philosophical writings of Otto Neurath, and their central themes, have been described many times, by Carnap in his authobiographical essay, by Ayer and Morris and Kraft decades ago, by Haller and Hegselmann and Nemeth and others in recent years. How extraordinary Neurath's insights were, even when they perhaps were more to be seen as conjectures, aperfus, philosophical hypotheses, tools to be taken up and used in the practical workshop of life; and how prescient he was. A few examples may be helpful: (1) Neurath's 1912 lecture on the conceptual critique of the idea of a pleasure maximum [ON 50] substantially anticipates the development of aspects of analytical ethics in mid-century. (2) Neurath's 1915 paper on alternative hypotheses, and systems of hypotheses, within the science of physical optics [ON 81] gives a lucid account of the historically-developed clashing theories of light, their un­ realized further possibilities, and the implied contingencies of theory survival in science, all within his framework that antedates not only the quite similar work of Kuhn so many years later but also of the Vienna Circle too. (3) Neurath's subsequent paper of 1916 investigates the inadequacies of various attempts to classify systems of hypotheses [ON 82, and this volume], and sets forth a pioneering conception of the metatheoretical task of scientific philosophy.

The decision to undertake this volume was made in 1971 at Lake Como during the Varenna summer school ofthe Italian Physical Society, where Professor Leon Rosenfeld was lecturing on the history of quantum theory. We had long been struck by the unique blend of epistemological, histori­ cal and social concerns in his work on the foundations and development of physics, and decided to approach him there with the idea of publishing a collection of his papers. He responded enthusiastically, and agreed to help us select the papers; furthermore, he also agreed to write a lengthy introduction and to comment separately on those papers that he felt needed critical re-evaluation in the light of his current views. For he was still vigorously engaged in both theoretical investigations of, and critical not reflections on the foundations of theoretical physics. We certainly did conceive of the volume as a memorial to a'living saint', but rather more practically, as a useful tool to place in the hands of fellow workers and students engaged in wrestling with these difficult problems. All too sadly, fate has added a memorial aspect to our labors. We agreed that in order to make this book most useful for the con­ temporary community of physicists and philosophers, we should trans­ late all non-English items into English.

The essays in this volume (except for the contribution of Dr. Le Grand) are extremely revised versions of papers originally delivered at a workshop on Galileo held in Blacksburg, Virginia in October, 1975. The meeting was organized by Professor Joseph Pitt and sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion, The College of Arts and Sciences, and the Division of Research of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The papers that follow deal with problems OIf Galileo's philosophy of science, specific and general problems connected with his methodology, and with historical and conceptual questions concerning the relationship of his work to that of contemporaries and both earlier and later scientists. New perspectives take many forms. In this book the'newness'has, for the most part, two forms. First, in the papers by Wisan, Shea, Le Grand and Wallace (the concerns will also appear in some of the other contributions), greatly enriched historical discoveries of how Galileo's science and its method­ ology developed are provided. It should be stressed that these papers are attempts to recapture a deep sense of the kind of science Galileo was creating. Other papers in the volume, for example, those by McMullin, Machamer, Butts and Pitt, underscore the importance of this historical venture by discussing various aspects of the philosophical background of Galileo's thought. The historical and philosophical evaluations and analyses compliment one another.

'Tile; D'apC:Tile; l. DpWTa ()coi 7rpo7rapod)w £ D'T}K,mi'.'between us and Goodness the gods have placed the sweat of our brows'. This quote from Isiodos, the first lyrical poet, is jotted on a sheet of paper found among the papers of Heike Kamerlingh Onnes at the Boerhaave Museum, Leiden. On this same sheet, one can also read quotes from Schiller, Goethe, Shakespeare, Homer, Pindar and Dante. Each quote is for somebody or something. It appears to have been a game played at least by Ehrenfest and Crommelin -an unmistakable sign of these two physicists's deep culture. This particular quote was for the'Werkplaats', the Physical Laboratory of the University of Leiden. Our purpose in putting together the Selected Papers of its first Director, Kamerlingh Onnes (1853-1926), is to try and articulate the dominant trends of a different type of culture at Leiden: its physics culture during the years that established low temperature physics as a distinct branch of physics. Our aims in choosing the particular papers are threefold. First, we wish to present the interconnectedness among the different research programs of Kamerlingh Onnes and to bring out the decisive role of the work initiated by van der Waals in determining the direction of nearly all of these research programs.

The role Hans Hahn played in the Vienna Circle has not always been sufficiently appreciated. It was important in several ways. In the ftrst place, Hahn belonged to the trio of the original planners of the Circle. As students at the University of Vienna and throughout the fIrst decade of this century, he and his friends, Philipp Frank and Otto Neurath, met more or less regularly to discuss philosophical questions. When Hahn accepted his fIrSt professorial position, at the University of Czernowitz in the north­ east of the Austrian empire, and the paths of the three friends parted, they decided to continue such informal discussions at some future time - perhaps in a somewhat larger group and with the cooperation of a philosopher from the university. Various events delayed the execution of the project. Drafted into the Austrian army during the first world war'Hahn was wounded on the Italian front. Toward the end of the war he accepted an offer from the University of Bonn extended in recognition of his remarkable 1 mathematical achievements. He remained in Bonn until the spring of 1921 when he returm:d to Vienna and a chair of mathe­ matics at his alma mater. There, in 1922, the Mach-Boltzmann professorship for the philosophy of the inductive sciences became vacant by the death of Adolf Stohr; and Hahn saw a chance to realize his and his friends'old plan.

The various efforts to develop a Marxist philosophy of science in the one­ time'socialist'countries were casualties of the Cold War. Even those who were in no way Marxists, and those who were undogmatic in their Marxisms, now confront a new world. All the more harsh is it for those who worked within the framework imposed upon professional philosophy by the official ideology. Here in this book, we are concerned with some 31 colleagues from the late German Democratic Republic, representative in their scholarship of the achievements of a curiously creative while dismayingly repressive period. The literature published in the GDR was blossoming, certainly in the final decade, but it developed within a totalitarian regime where personal careers either advanced or faltered through the private protection or denunciation of mentors. We will never know how many good minds did not enter the field of philosophy in the first place due to their prudent judgments that there was a virtual requirement that the candidate join the Socialist Unity (i.e. Communist) Party. Among those who started careers and were sidetracked, the record is now beginning to be revealed; and for the rest, the price of'doing philosophy'was mostly silence in the face of harassments the likes of which make academic politics in the West seem child's play.

These remarks preface two volumes consisting of the proceedings of the Third International Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. The conference was held under the auspices of the Union, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science. The meetings took place in Montreal, Canada, 25-29 August 1980, with Concordia University as host institution. The program of the conference was arranged by a Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science consisting of Robert E. Butts (Canada), John Murdoch (U. S. A.), Vladimir Kirsanov (U. S. S. R.), and Paul Weingartner (Austria). The Local Arrangements Committee consisted of Stanley G. French, Chair (Concordia), Michel Paradis, treasurer (McGill), Fran~ois Duchesneau (Universite de Montreal), Robert Nadeau (Universite du Quebec it Montreal), and William Shea (McGill University). Both committees are indebted to Dr. G. R. Paterson, then President of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, who shared his expertise in many ways. Dr. French and his staff worked diligently and efficiently on behalf of all participants. The city of Montreal was, as always, the subtle mixture of extravagance, charm, warmth and excitement that retains her status as the jewel of Canadian cities. The funding of major international conferences is always a problem.

The unusual ambition of this volume is to engage scientists, historians, and philosophers in a common quest to delineate the structure of the creative thinking responsible for major advances in physical theory. The topic does not fit anyone discipline's proprietary interests, and can only be pursued cooperatively. This volume was conceived in the hope that the importance of learning something general about how theories are developed and what makes the difference between productive and abortive directions of theo­ retical inquiry could overcome well-known barriers to such cooperation. The volume originated in a conference held at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro in 1988, as an installment of the annual Greensboro Symposium in Philosophy. Most of the papers descend from papers pre­ sented on that occasion. The authors are well known in their own disciplines, but should be identified to the wider audience for interdisciplinary work in science studies. Rafael Sorkin, of Syracuse University, and Don Page, of the University of Alberta, are theoretical physicists who have done research in quantum gravity and cosmology. John Stachel, a physicist at Boston University, is widely known as the Director of the Einstein Project and editor of Einstein's papers. William Harper, a historian of science and philosopher at the University of Western Ontario, is a Newton scholar and specialist in decision theory.

In this book I have tried to develop further the ideas expressed in my previous work, Between Experience and Metaphysics, which was published in the same series in 1975. Several years have passed since the original Polish edition (and then 1 the Italian translation) of this book appeared. The fact that the principal ideas expressed in it have withstood, as I see it, the brunt of criticism, has led me to remain basically with the original text. Two main changes have, however, been introduced. First, I have added an Appendix containing the original version of a paper I presented at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in June 1988 and a short postscript to that paper referring to comments made during two dis­ cussions at the Kolleg. Let me briefly explain the reason for this addition. In recent years the landscape for historical and philosophical in­ terpretation of the evolution of scientific knowledge has altered. The strongest of the new contenders for epistemological recognition are social constructivists, who analyze in detail how knowledge is produced within specific social settings, including the instruments and procedures of par­ ticular laboratories and the economic and political realities of particular scientific communities. The local character of these studies raises the question of whether they can ever provide generalizable epistemological claims.

The International Congresses of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, which are held every fourth year, give a cross-section of ongoing research in logic and philosophy of science. Both the invited lectures and the many contributed papers are conductive to this end. At the 9th Congress held in Uppsala in 1991 there were 54 invited lectures and around 650 contributed papers divided into 15 different sections. Some of the speakers who presented contributed papers that attracted special interest were invited to submit their papers for publication, and the result is the present volume. A few papers appear here more or less as they were presented at the Congress whereas others are expansions or elaborations of the talks given at the Congress. A selection of this kind, containing 38 papers drawn from the 650 contributed papers presented at the Uppsala Congress, cannot do justice to all facets of the field as it appeared at the Congress. But it should allow the reader to get a representative survey of contemporary research in large areas of philosophical logic and philosophy of science. About half of the papers of the volume appear in sections listed at the Congress under the heading Philosophical and Foundational Problems about the Sciences. The section Foundations of Logic, Mathematics and Computer Science is represented by three papers, Foundations of Physical Sciences by six papers, Foundations of Biological Sciences by three papers, Foundations of Cognitive Science and AI by one paper, and Foundations of Linguistics by three papers.

On 5-6 April 1991, there was a conference on Kant at Florida State University; this volume collects the (revised versions ofthe) papers presented on that occasion. The occasion was, give or take a few months, the 90th birthday of Professor (Emeritus) William H. Werkmeister. Werkie (as all his friends call hirn) hirnself gave the final paper at this conference. Hence the inclusion of a paper by Werkie in a volume honoring hirn. Although he is primarily known for his expertise in the field of Kantian philosophy, Werkie's published scholarship has spanned a wide range of subjects for more than fifty years: his first book, A Philosophy of Science, appeared in 1940; today, among other endeavors, he is at work on a book on Heidegger, and there have been other books and more than a hundred papers in between. Readers interested in fuller biographical information about Werkie should consult the first three papers in the 1 Festschrift celebrating his eightieth hirthday in 1981. Since then, Werkie's activities have continued without much letup. He no longer teaches regularly, hut he gives frequent colloquia in the Philosophy Department here, participates in conferences on Kant around the world, and continues to puhlish, particularly on Kant and Nicolai Hartmann. Wayne McEvilly,'The Teacher Remembered'; Charles H.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. Contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out, however, and are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History And Philosophy of Science viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The majority of the papers in this collection had their origin in the 2001 Australasian Association for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science annual conference, held at the University of Melbourne, where streams of papers on the themes of scientific realism and commonsense were organised.

The articles in this collection were all selected from the first five volumes of the Journal of Dialectics of Nature published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1979 and 1985. The Journal was established in 1979 as a comprehensive theoretical publication concerning the history, philosophy and sociology of the natural sciences. It began publication as a response to China's reform, particularly the policy of opening to the outside world. Chinese scholars began to undertake distinctive, original research in these fields. This collection provides a cross-section of their efforts during the initial phase. To enable western scholars to understand the historical process of this change in Chinese academics, Yu Guangyuan's `On the Emancipation of the Mind'and Xu Liangying's `Essay on the Role of Science and Democracy in Society'have been included in this collection. Three of the papers included on the philosophy of science are discussions of philosophical issues in cosmology and biology by scientists themselves. The remaining four are written by philosophers of science and discuss information and cognition, homeostasis and Chinese traditional medicine, the I Ching (Yi Jing) and mathematics, etc. Papers have been selected on the history of both classical and modern science and technology, the most distinctive of which are macro-comparisons of the development of science in China and the west. Some papers discuss the issue of the demarcation of periods in the history of science, the history of ancient Chinese mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, machinery, medicine, etc. Others discuss the history of modern physics and biology, the history of historiography of science in China and the history of regional development of Chinese science and technology. Also included are biographies of three post-eighteenth-century Chinese scholars, Li Shanlan (1811-1882), Hua Hengfang (1833&endash;1902), and Cai Yuanpei (1868&endash;1940), who contributed greatly to the introduction of western science and scholarship to China. In addition, three short papers have been included introducing the interactions between Chinese scholars and three great western scientists, Niels Bohr, Norbert Wiener, and Robert A. Millikan.

This volume is presented in honour of Heinz Post, who founded a distinc­ tive and distinguished school of philosophy of science at Chelsea College, University of London. The'Chelsea tradition'in philosophy of science takes the content of science seriously, as exemplified by the papers presented here. The unifying theme of this work is that of'Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics', after the title of a classic and seminal paper by Heinz Post, published in 1971, which is reproduced in this volume with the kind permission of the editors and publishers of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Described by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method as'brilliant'and'... a partial antidote against the view which I try to defend'(1975, p. 61, fn. 17), this paper, peppered with illustrative examples from the history of science, brings to the fore some of Heinz Post's central concerns: the heuristic criteria used by scientists in constructing their theories, the intertheoretic relationships which these criteria reflect and, in particular, the nature of the correspondence that holds between a theory and its predecessors (and its suc­ cessors). The appearance of this volume more than twenty years later is an indica­ tion of the fruitfulness of Post's contribution: philosophers of science continue to explore the issues raised in his 1971 paper.

This book, a tribute to historian of mathematics Jeremy Gray, offers an overview of the history of mathematics and its inseparable connection to philosophy and other disciplines. Many different approaches to the study of the history of mathematics have been developed. Understanding this diversity is central to learning about these fields, but very few books deal with their richness and concrete suggestions for the “what, why and how” of these domains of inquiry. The editors and authors approach the basic question of what the history of mathematics is by means of concrete examples. For the “how” question, basic methodological issues are addressed, from the different perspectives of mathematicians and historians. Containing essays by leading scholars, this book provides a multitude of perspectives on mathematics, its role in culture and development, and connections with other sciences, making it an important resource for students and academics in the history and philosophy of mathematics.

Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The book will be of interest to philosophers and scientists alike in the reassessment it provides of earlier debates about method and current directions of research.

The title is his own. Herbert Feigl, the provocateur and the soul (if we may put it so) of modesty, wrote to me some years ago,'I'm more of a catalyst than producer of new and original ideas all my life...', but then he com­ pleted the self-appraisal:'... with just a few exceptions perhaps'. We need not argue for the creative nature of catalysis, but will simply remark that there are'new and original ideas'in the twenty-four papers selected for this volume, in the extraordinary aperrus of the 25-year-old Feigl in his Vienna dissertation of 1927 on Zufall und Gesetz, in the creative critique and articulation in his classical monograph of 1958 on The'Mental'and the'Physical'; and the reader will want to turn to some of the seventy other titles in our Feigl bibliography appended. Professor Feigl has been a model philosophical worker: above all else, honest, self-aware, open-minded and open-hearted; keenly, devotedly, and even arduously the student of the sciences, he has been a logician and an empiricist. Early on, he brought the Vienna Circle to America, and much later he helped to bring it back to Central Europe. The story of the logical empiricist movement, and of Herbert Feigl's part in it, has often been told, importantly by Feigl himself in four papers we have included here.

The Law of Causality and its Limits was the principal philosophical work of the physicist turned philosopher, Philipp Frank. Born in Vienna on March 20, 1884, Frank died in Cambridge, Massachusetts on July 21, 1966. He received his doctorate in 1907 at the University of Vienna in theoretical physics, having studied under Ludwig Boltzmann; his sub­ sequent research in physics and mathematics was represented by more than 60 scientific papers. Moreover his great success as teacher and expositor was recognized throughout the scientific world with publication of his collaborative Die Differentialgleichungen der Mechanik und Physik, with Richard von Mises, in 1925-27. Frank was responsible for the second volume, on physics, and especially noted for his authoritative article on classical Hamiltonian mechanics and optics. Among his earliest papers were those, beginning in 1908, devoted to special relativity, which together with general relativity and physical cosmology occupied him throughout his life. Already in 1907, Frank published his seminal paper'Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung'('Experience and the Law of Causality'), much later collected with a splendid selection of his essays on philosophy of science, in English (1941c and 1949g, in our Bibliography). Joining the first'Vienna Circle'in the first decade of the 20th century, with Hans Hahn, mathematician, and Otto Neurath, sociologist and economist, and deeply influenced by studies of Ernst Mach's critical conceptual histories of science and by the striking challenge of Poincare and Duhem, Frank continued his epistemological investigations.

The papers in this volume are offered in celebration of the 200th anni versary of the pub 1 i cat i on of Inmanue 1 Kant's The MetaphysicaL Foundations of NatupaL Science. All of the es­ says (including the Introduction) save two were written espe­ ci ally for thi s volume. Gernot Bohme's paper is an amended and enlarged version of one originally read in the series of lectures and colloquia in philosophy of science offered by Boston University. My own paper is a revised and enlarged version (with an appendix containing completely new material) of one read at the biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Sci­ ence Association held in Chicago in 1984. Why is it important to devote this attention to Kant's last published work in the philosophy of physics? The excellent essays in the volume will answer the question. I will provide some schematic com­ ments designed to provide an image leading from the general question to its very specific answers. Kant is best known for hi s monumental Croitique of Pure Reason and for his writings in ethical theory. His'critical'philosophy requires an initial sharp division of knowledge into its theoretical and practical parts. Moral perfection of attempts to act out of duty is the aim of practical reason. The aim of theoretical reason is to know the truth about ma­ terial and spiritual nature.

On the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Boston Studies series in 1985, Cohen, Elkana, and Wartofsky wrote in another preface such as this that the time had come for establishing institutions supporting a vision to which the series had been devoted since its inception, namely that of a more broadly conceived, interdisciplinary study of the history and philosophy of science: In recent years it has become evident that, in addition to serious and competent disciplinary work on the specifics of the History of Science, the Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Science, there is now a growing need to develop a problem­ oriented approach which no longer distinguishes between these three specialties in a cut and dried way. Since the time has come for such an approach, the institutional tools should be provided. A way to do so would be... to organize colloquia and to publish good papers stemming from these, without attempting to organize the papers under the separate rubrics of History of Philosophy or Sociology of Science; and moreover to consider it natural that any fundamental issue of the foundations of the sciences, or their place in a culture and the way they are institutionalized in the societal web, is still our concern, no matter whether we are a professional scientist, historian or philosopher who deals with the problem (p. vii).

Marx Wartofsky has been working for many years within an unusual confluence of philosophical problems. He brings to these intersecting problems his comprehensive intelligence, at once imaginative and rigorous, analytic and historical. He is a philosopher's philosopher, but also Everyman's. Wartofsky is philosopher of the natural and the social sciences, of perception, esthetics and the creative arts, of the 18th century French and the 19th century Germans, of politics and morality, ofthe methods and morals of medicine, and it is plain, of all human existence. To a colleague, he seems Jack-of-all-philosophical-trades, and master of them too. The reader soon will learn that Wartofsky is a genial, lucid and relaxed philosophical companion, deeply serious but without noticeable anxiety. I need not highlight these selected epistemological papers gathered as, and about, Models, since Wartofsky's own introductory remarks are helpful and stimulating in that respect. I need only, after 21 years of friendship and collaboration with him, warn the reader to beware of how profound and provocative these papers will show themselves to be beneath their good-humored and swiftly-flowing surface. And I must publicly note the pleasure with which I welcome Marx Wartofsky's volume to our Boston Studies. Boston University R.S.C. Center for the Philosophy and History of Science September 1979 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE VII xi AC K NOWLEDGEMENTS xiii INTRODUCTION The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism 1.

This book is the final outcome of two projects. My first project was to publish a set of texts written by Schrodinger at the beginning of the 1950's for his seminars and lectures at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies. These almost completely forgotten texts contained important insights into the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and they provided several ideas which were missing or elusively expressed in SchrOdinger's published papers and books of the same period. However, they were likely to be misinterpreted out of their context. The problem was that current scholarship could not help very much the reader of these writings to figure out their significance. The few available studies about SchrOdinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics are generally excellent, but almost entirely restricted to the initial period 1925-1927. Very little work has been done on Schrodinger's late views on the theory he contributed to create and develop. The generally accepted view is that he never really recovered from his interpretative failure of 1926-1927, and that his late reflections (during the 1950's) are little more than an expression of his rising nostalgia for the lost ideal of picturing the world, not to say for some favourite traditional picture. But the content and style of Schrodinger's texts of the 1950's do not agree at all with this melancholic appraisal; they rather set the stage for a thorough renewal of accepted representations. In order to elucidate this paradox, I adopted several strategies.

Prefatory Explanation It must be remarked at once that I am'editor'of this volume only in that I had the honor of presiding at the symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences at which a number of these papers were presented (exceptions are those by Hans Jonas, Richard Popkin, Joe VanZandt and our four European contributors), in that I have given some editorial advice on details of some of the papers, including translations, and finally, in that my name appears on the cover. The choice of speakers, and of addi­ tional contributors, is entirely due to Robert Cohen and Debra Nails; and nearly all the burden of readying the manuscript for the press has been borne by the latter. In the introduction to another anthology on Spinoza I opened my remarks by quoting a statement of Sir Stuart Hampshire about inter­ pretations of Spinoza's chief work: All these masks have been fitted on him and each of them does to some extent fit. But they remain masks, not the living face. They do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts in Spinoza's Ethics. (Hampshire, 1973, p. 297) The double theme of'moving tensions'and'unresolved conflicts'seems even more appropriate to the present volume. What is Spinoza's rela­ tion to the sciences? The answers are many, and they criss-cross one another in a number of complicated ways.

The present volume grew out of a double session of the Boston Collo­ quium for the Philosophy of Science held in Boston on March 25, 1983. The papers presented there (by Biezunski, Glick, Goldberg, and Judith Goodstein!) offered both sufficient comparability to establish regulari­ ties in the reception of relativity and Einstein's impact in France, Spain, the United States and Italy, and sufficient contrast to suggest the salience of national inflections in the process. The interaction among the participants and the added perspectives offered by members of the audience suggested the interest of commissioning articles for a more inclusive volume which would cover as many national cases as we could muster. Only general guidelines were given to the authors: to treat the special or general theories, or both, hopefully in a multidisciplinary setting, to examine the popular reception of relativity, or Einstein's personal impact, or to survey all these topics. In a previous volume, on the 2 comparative reception of Darwinism, one of us devised a detailed set of guidelines which in general were not followed. In our opinion, the studies in this collection offer greater comparability, no doubt because relativity by its nature and its complexity offers a sharper, more easily bounded target. As in the Darwinism volume, this book concludes with an essay intended to draw together in comparative perspective some of many themes addressed by the participants.

This anthology contains selected papers from the'Science as Culture'conference held at Lake Como, and Pavia University Italy, 15-19 September 1999. The conference, attended by about 220 individuals from thirty countries, was a joint venture of the International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group (its fifth conference) and the History of Physics and Physics Teaching Division of the European Physical Society (its eighth conference). The magnificient Villa Olmo, on the lakeshore, provided a memorable location for the presentors of the 160 papers and the audience that discussed them. The conference was part of local celebrations of the bicentenary of Alessandro Volta's creation of the battery in 1799. Volta was born in Como in 1745, and for forty years from 1778 he was professor of experimental physics at Pavia University. The conference was fortunate to have had the generous financial support of the Italian government's Volta Bicentenary Fund, Lombardy region, Pavia University, Italian Research Council, and Kluwer Academic Publishers. The papers included here, have or will be, published in the journal Science & Education, the inaugural volume (1992) of which was a landmark in the history of science education publication, because it was the first journal in the field devoted to contributions from historical, philosophical and sociological scholarship. Clearly these'foundational'disciplines inform numerous theoretical, curricular and pedagogical debates in science education. Contemporary Concerns The reseach promoted by the International and European Groups, and by the journal, is central to science education programmes in most areas of the world.

Most of the papers appearing in volume 87 numbers, 1-2 are based on papers presented at the Colloquium on the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein held at the Department of Philosophy at Florida State University on 7-8 April 1989. We owe warm thanks to Florida State University for generously supporting this colloquium. The English translation of the chapter entitled'Philosophie', from Wittgenstein's typescript number 213 (von Wright), appears here with permission of Wittgenstein's literary heirs, without affecting existing copyrights. The original German version of this chapter was edited by Heikki Nyman and appeared in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43 (1989), pp. 175-203. Jaakko Hintikka's article (87, No.2) first appeared in a shorter form in The Times Literary Supplement No. 4565 (28 September to 4 October 1990, p. 1030). The present version appears with the permis­ sion of The Times Literary Supplement, which is gratefully acknowl­ edged. Our thanks are due to all the participants of the colloquium and the contributors to these special numbers.

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint­ ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of W ollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand.'Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science'aims to provide a distinctive pUblication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further­ more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question.

Modern mathematical logic would not exist without the analytical tools first developed by George Boole in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic and The Laws of Thought. The influence of the Boolean school on the development of logic, always recognised but long underestimated, has recently become a major research topic. This collection is the first anthology of works on Boole. It contains two works published in 1865, the year of Boole's death, but never reprinted, as well as several classic studies of recent decades and ten original contributions appearing here for the first time. From the programme of the English Algebraic School to Boole's use of operator methods, from the problem of interpretability to that of psychologism, a full range of issues is covered. The Boole Anthology is indispensable to Boole studies and will remain so for years to come.

John von Neumann (1903-1957) was undoubtedly one of the scientific geniuses of the 20th century. The main fields to which he contributed include various disciplines of pure and applied mathematics, mathematical and theoretical physics, logic, theoretical computer science, and computer architecture. Von Neumann was also actively involved in politics and science management and he had a major impact on US government decisions during, and especially after, the Second World War. There exist several popular books on his personality and various collections focusing on his achievements in mathematics, computer science, and economy. Strangely enough, to date no detailed appraisal of his seminal contributions to the mathematical foundations of quantum physics has appeared. Von Neumann's theory of measurement and his critique of hidden variables became the touchstone of most debates in the foundations of quantum mechanics. Today, his name also figures most prominently in the mathematically rigorous branches of contemporary quantum mechanics of large systems and quantum field theory. And finally - as one of his last lectures, published in this volume for the first time, shows - he considered the relation of quantum logic and quantum mechanical probability as his most important problem for the second half of the twentieth century. The present volume embraces both historical and systematic analyses of his methodology of mathematical physics, and of the various aspects of his work in the foundations of quantum physics, such as theory of measurement, quantum logic, and quantum mechanical entropy. The volume is rounded off by previously unpublished letters and lectures documenting von Neumann's thinking about quantum theory after his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. The general part of the Yearbook contains papers emerging from the Institute's annual lecture series and reviews of important publications of philosophy of science and its history.

For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is `logical anarchy'avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true? The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain.

Much of Duhem's work as a professional scientist was closely related to the newly emerging discipline of physical chemistry. The book and associated papers translated here revolve around his concomitant philosophical and historical interests in chemistry-topics largely uncovered by Duhem's writings hitherto available in English. He understood contemporary concerns of chemists to be a development of the ancient dispute over the nature of mixture. Having developed his historical account from distinctions drawn from the atomists and Aristotelians of antiquity, he places his own views of chemical combination squarely within the Aristotelian tradition. Apart from illuminating Duhem's own work, it is of interest to see how the ancient dispute can be related to modern science by someone competent to make such comparisons. The book is lucid and logically stringent without assuming any particular mathematical prerequisites, and provides a masterly statement of an important line of nineteenth century thought which is of interest in its own right as well as providing insight into Duhem's broader philosophical views.

We are often told that quantum phenomena demand radical revisions of our scientific world view and that no physical theory describing well defined objects, such as particles described by their positions, evolving in a well defined way, let alone deterministically, can account for such phenomena. The great majority of physicists continue to subscribe to this view, despite the fact that just such a deterministic theory, accounting for all of the phe­ nomena of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, was proposed by David Bohm more than four decades ago and has arguably been around almost since the inception of quantum mechanics itself. Our purpose in asking colleagues to write the essays for this volume has not been to produce a Festschrift in honor of David Bohm (worthy an undertaking as that would have been) or to gather together a collection of papers simply stating uncritically Bohm's views on quantum mechanics. The central theme around which the essays in this volume are arranged is David Bohm's version of quantum mechanics. It has by now become fairly standard practice to refer to his theory as Bohmian mechanics and to the larger conceptual framework within which this is located as the causal quantum theory program. While it is true that one can have reservations about the appropriateness of these specific labels, both do elicit distinc­ tive images characteristic of the key concepts of these approaches and such terminology does serve effectively to contrast this class of theories with more standard formulations of quantum theory.

The sub-title of this symposium is accurate and, in a curious way, promises more than it states: Classical Physicist, Modem Philosopher. Heinrich Hertz, as the con­ summate experimentalist of 19th century technique and as brilliant clarifying critic of physical theory of his time, achieved one of the fulfilments but at the same time opened one of the transition points of classical physics. Thus, in his'popular'lecture'On the Relations Between Light and Electricity'at Heidelberg in the Fall of 1889, Hertz identified the ether as henceforth the most fundamental problem of physics, as the conceptual mystery but also the key to understanding mass, electric­ ity, and gravity. Of Hertz's demonstration of electric waves, Helmholtz told the Physical Society of Berlin:'Gentlemen! I have to communicate to you today the most important physical discovery of the century.'Hertz, philosophizing in his direct, lucid, pithy style, once wrote'We have to imagine'. Perhaps this is metaphysics on the horizon? In the early pages of his Principles of Mechanics, we read A doubt which makes an impression on our mind cannot be removed by calling it metaphysical: every thoughtful mind as such has needs which scientific men are accustomed to denote as metaphysical. (PM23) And at another place, concerning the terms'force'and'electricity'and the alleged mystery of their natures, Hertz wrote: We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared up.

genetics.'It is simply the appropriation of that term, very likely with insufficient knowledge and respect for its past usage. For that, the Editor alone is responsible and requests tolerance. He has, as far as he can tell, no intention or desire to use it for any historiographical purposes other than that just mentioned. Even more important, the decision to consider Muller together with Fisher, Haldane and Wright is also not original. Crow (1984) has already done so, arguing persua­ sively that Muller was'keenly interested in evolution and made sub­ stantial contributions to the development of the neo-Darwinian view.'Crow's reasons for considering these four figures together and the reasons discussed above are complementary. This book continues a historiographical choice he initiated; others will have to judge whether it is appropriate. The foregoing considerations were intended to show why Fisher, Haldane, Muller and Wright should be considered together in the history of theoretical evolutionary genetics. I By a welcome stroke of luck, from the point of view of the Editor, all four of these figures were born almost together, between 1889 and 1892, and almost exactly a century ago. It therefore seemed appropriate to use their birth cente­ naries to consider their work together. A conference was held at Boston University, on March 6, 1990, under the auspices of the Boston Center for the Philosophy and History of Science, to discuss their work. This book has emerged mainly from that conference.

Among the extraordinary Polish philosophers of the past one hundred years, Zygmunt Zawirski deserves to be given particular attention for his fusion of analytic and historical scholarship. Strikingly versatile, and con­ tributing original work in all his fields of competence, Zawirski thought through issues in the philosophical aspects of relativity theory, on the claims of intuitionalistic foundations of mathematics, on the nature and usefulness of many-value Logics, and on the calculus of probability, on the axiomatic method in science and in the philosophy of science, on the genesis and development of scientific and philosophical concepts, and in his crowning achievement, the conceptual history of notions of time. His work has been too little known in English despite the respect which has been so clearly shown by his Polish COlleagues and students. In this generous selection from his papers and from his great critical study L'Evolution de la Notion du Temps, Dr. Irena Szumilewicz-Lachman has provided a clear account of Zawirski's achievement; and she has written a fine comprehensive introductory essay which provides both the personal and historical context of his work and a systematic survey of his principal publications.

This book presents a perspective on the history of theoretical physics over the past two hundreds years. It comprises essays on the history of pre-Maxwellian electrodynamics, of Maxwell's and Hertz's field theories, and of the present century's relativity and quantum physics. A common thread across the essays is the search for and the exploration of themes that influenced significant con­ ceptual changes in the great movement of ideas and experiments which heralded the emergence of theoretical physics (hereafter: TP). The fun. damental change involved the recognition of the scien­ tific validity of theoretical physics. In the second half of the nine­ teenth century, it was not easy for many physicists to understand the nature and scope of theoretical physics and of its adept, the theoreti­ cal physicist. A physicist like Ludwig Boltzmann, one of the eminent contributors to the new discipline, confessed in 1895 that,'even the formulation of this concept [of a theoretical physicist] is not entirely without difficulty'. 1 Although science had always been divided into theory and experiment, it was only in physics that theoretical work developed into a major research and teaching specialty in its own right. 2 It is true that theoretical physics was mainly a creation of tum­ of-the century German physics, where it received full institutional recognition, but it is also undeniable that outstanding physicists in other European countries, namely, Ampere, Fourier, and Maxwell, also had an important part in its creation.

It is fast becoming a cliche that scientific discovery is being rediscovered. For two philosophical generations (that of the Founders and that of the Followers of the logical positivist and logical empiricist movements), discovery had been consigned to the domain of the intractable, the ineffable, the inscrutable. The philosophy of science was focused on the so-called context of justification as its proper domain. More recently, as the exclusivity of the logical reconstruc­ tion program in philosophy of science came under question, and as the critique of justification developed within the framework of logical and epistemological analysis, the old question of scientific discovery, which had been put on the back burner, began to emerge once again. Emphasis on the relation of the history of science to the philosophy of science, and attention to the question of theory change and theory replacement, also served to legitimate a new concern with the origins of scientific change to be found within discovery and invention. How welcome then to see what a wide range of issues and what a broad representation of philosophers and historians of science have been brought together in the present two volumes of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science! For what these volumes achieve, in effect, is the continuation of a tradition which had once been strong in the philosophy of science - namely, that tradition which addressed the question of scientific discovery as a central question in the understanding of science.

This selection of papers that were presented (or nearly so!) to the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science during the seventies fairly re­ presents some of the most disturbing issues of scientific knowledge in these years. To the distant observer, it may seem that the defense of rational standards, objective reference, methodical self-correction, even the distin­ guishing of the foolish from the sensible and the truth-seeking from the ideological, has nearly collapsed. In fact, the defense may be seen to have shifted; the knowledge business came under scrutiny decades ago and, indeed, from the time of Francis Bacon and even far earlier, the practicality of the discovery of knowledge was either hailed or lamented. So the defense may be founded on the premise that science may yet be liberating. In that case, the analysis of philosophical issues expands to embrace issues of social interest and social function, of instrumentality and arbitrary perspective, of biological constraints (upon knowledge as well as upon the species-wide behavior of human beings in other relationships too), of distortions due to explanatory metaphors and imposed categories, and of radical comparisons among the perspectives of different civilizations. Some of our contributors are frankly programmatic, showing how problems must be formulated afresh, how evasions must be identified and omissions rectified, but they do not reach their own completion.

Philosophically, there is a book which was a tremendous experience for me: Eino Kaila's hychology of the Person­ ality _ His thesis that man lives strictly according to his needs - negative and positive - was shattering to me, but terribly true. And I built on this ground. Ingmar Bergman J 1. This introductory essay is neither intended to be a full presentation nor to be a critical evaluation of the contributions to philosophy made by Eino Kaila. Kaila's work will speak to the reader through the four papers here published in English translation from the German. They belong in the tra­ dition of the Vienna Circle and of logical empiricism. They cover, however, only one period or sector of Kaila's rich and varied life-work. This is the sector best integrated into the mainstream of contemporary philosophic thinking. The primary aim of this essay is to portray an impressive intellectual personality and to make a modest contribution to Finnish and Scandinavian intellectual history. Much of its content may be thought to be of'local'relevance only. But considering the position which Kaila held in his country and considering his decisive influence on the development of philosophy in Finland, I hope that this local background will also interest an international circle of readers.

Ideas for Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Natural Sciences (published in 1993 as volume 15 of this series) comprised mainly ontological reflections on the natural sciences. That book explained why the natural sciences must be considered inherently interpretive in character, and clarified the conditions under which scientific interpretations are'legitimate'and may be called'true'. This companion volume focuses on methodological issues. Its first part elucidates the methodical hermeneutics developed in the 19th century by Boeckh, Birt, Dilthey, and others. Its second part, through the use of concrete examples drawn from modern physics as it unfolded from Copernicus to Maxwell, clarifies and'proves'the main points of the ontologico-hermeneutical conception of the sciences elaborated in the earlier volume. It thereby both illuminates the most important problems confronting an ontologico-phenomenological approach to the natural sciences and offers an alternative to Kuhn's conception of the historical development of the natural sciences.

These two volumes form a full portrait of Hans Reichenbach, from the school boy and university student to the maturing and creative scholar, who was as well an immensely devoted teacher and a gifted popular writer and speaker on science and philosophy. We selected the articles for several reasons. Many of them have not pre­ viously been available in English; many are out of print, either in English or in German; some, especially the early ones, have been little known, and deal with subject-matters other than philosophy of science. The genesis and evolu­ tion of Reichenbach's ideas appeared to be of deep interest, and so we in­ cluded papers from four decades, despite occasional redundancy. We were, for example, pleased to include his extensive review article from the encyclo­ pedic Handbuch der Physik of 1929 on'The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge', written at a time of creative collaboration between Reichenbach's Berlin group and the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap. Reichenbach was a pioneer, opening new pathways to the solution of age-old problems in many fields: space, time, causality, induction and probability - philosophical analysis and interpretation of classical physics, relativity and quantum physics - logic, language, ethics, scientific explanation and methodology, critical appreciation and reconstruction of past metaphysical thinkers and scientists from Plato to Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, his own philosophical journey was initiated by his passage from Kant to anti-Kant.

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint­ ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand.'Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science'aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further­ more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour­ aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question.

and less as the emanation unden\'ent radioactive decay, and it became motion­ less after about 30 seconds. Since this process was occurring very rapidly, Hahn and Sackur marked the position of the pointer on a scale with pencil marks. As a timing device they used a metronome that beat out intervals of approximately 1. 3 seconds. This simple method enabled them to determine that the half-life of the emanations of actinium and emanium were the same. Although Giesel's measurements had been more precise than Debierne's, the name of actinium was retained since Debierne had made the discovery first. Hahn now returned to his sample of barium chloride. He soon conjectured that the radium-enriched preparations must harbor another radioactive sub­ stance. The liquids resulting from fractional crystallization, which were sup­ posed to contain radium only, produced two kinds of emanation. One was the long-lived emanation of radium, the other had a short life similar to the emanation produced by thorium. Hahn tried to separate this substance by adding some iron to the solutions that should have been free of radium, but to no avail. Later the reason for his failure became apparent. The element that emitted the thorium emanation was constantly replenished by the ele­ ment believed to be radium. Hahn succeeded in enriching a preparation until it was more than 100,000 times as intensive in its radiation as the same quantity of thorium.

How happy it is to recall Imre Lakatos. Now, fifteen years after his death, his intelligence, wit, generosity are vivid. In the Preface to the book of Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Boston Studies, 39, 1976), the editors wrote:... Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. The book before us carries old and new friends of that Lakatosian spirit further into the issues which he wanted to investigate. That the new friends include a dozen scientific, historical and philosophical scholars from Greece would have pleased Lakatos very much, and with an essay from China, he would have smiled all the more. But the key lies in the quality of these papers, and in the imaginative organization of the conference at Thessaloniki in summer 1986 which worked so well.