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Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can the trade relationship between Japan and China be measured? What are the strengths/weakness of existing models? Is there a more accurate model that can describe trade relations between nations? If so, what is it? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years, trade diplomacy in East Asia has undergone tremendous change. Not only did China finally gained membership into the WTO, but very soon afterwards opened talks about further regional integration with ASEAN nations. Indeed, one of the most remarkable trends in East Asian trade diplomacy is the unprecedented move by some of the largest regional powers ?most notably Japan and China- to experiment with minilateral or bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). This paper seeks to explain the birth of a Japanese FTA strategy by addressing three important questions. First, why is East Asia now willing to experiment with economic bilateralism given that in the past, most Asian countries rejected formal integration schemes? Second, what are the causes (domestic and international) behind Japan’s recent endorsement of preferential trading? And third, based on Japanese free trade negotiations with Singapore and Mexico, what kind of regional integration is Japan seeking with its new trade diplomacy? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]