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What factors explain the unilateral and multilateral uses of force by the United States? That is the research question this paper addresses. In order to answer the question, the paper uses the dual concepts of opportunity to use force and conditions for the use of force (Meernick 1994, Ostrom and Job 1986) to identify a set of factors that lead either to a unilateral uses of force or to multilateral uses of force by the United States. Among those factors are NATO memberhip, which pushes the use of force in Europe towards multilateral options, and direct threats to the homeland, which pushes the United States towards unilateral uses of force. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the developed world uses some form of majority rule voting to assign users rights over natural resource appropriation. For example, in the United States eight Regional Fishery Management Councils recommend to the Secretary of Commerce catch limits of various fish species in coastal waters. Similarly, in European fisheries catch limits have been traditionally set by the Council of Ministers. In both cases, the policymaking councils utilize majority rule voting to assign different users specific quantities of catch rights. How efficient is voting in allocating sustainable harvest rights? Given the trade-offs between short-term gains and long-term investments, we might suspect that voting fails to adequately address long-run resource health. On the other hand, the use of voting as compared to top-down bureaucratic imposition of allocation rights may allow stakeholders, who have long-run incentives to maintain healthy resource stocks, a greater say in the policy process. In this paper, we present initial results of experimental investigations into majority rule voting by modeling a renewable, dynamic resource stock in which participants are asked to vote over per-time allocations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the semantic and conceptual ambiguity in the literature on "bureaucratic autonomy," we create a nomological map and a new measurement tool for the concept. In doing so, we draw on the diverse definitions, conceptualizations, and measurement strategies found in the scholarship on state autonomy (eg.., Evans et al 1985), the formal literature on bureaucratic discretion and regulatory independence (e.g., Hammond/Knott 1996; Levy/Spiller 1996), and historical case studies from American and European politics (e.g., Carpenter 2001; Verhoest et al 2004). We elucidate the origins of the idea of bureaucratic autonomy in the notion of "state autonomy versus society," and trace its use and meaning as the concept has evolved over time. We analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each literature's approach to the issues of preference formation and enactment of desired policies, and draw upon common strands to synthesize a unified definition and measurement strategy. The paper also situates bureaucratic autonomy in relation to related concepts like bureaucratic discretion, policy insulation, and political control. The end result is a cumulative measurement index useful for scholars conducting both theoretical and empirical work. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous observers have noted the recent trends of increased voter abstention, reduced confidence in politicians and political parties in decline. Such complaints are levied against the advanced democracies of Europe, their post-communist neighbors, the United States, and Latin America. Some use the term “anti-politics” to capture these apparently global phenomena that affect new and old democracies alike. This usage includes everything from relatively benign conditions of voter apathy to the more consequential loss of regime legitimacy. Whatever the specific symptom, they reflect varying degrees of negative public attitudes toward politics. Along with the rise of anti-politics, particularly in the 1990s, came a resurgence of populism. Several right-wing populists emerged in Europe, at times capturing surprisingly large shares of the popular vote. In Latin America, so-called neopopulists generated discussions of delegative democracy, hyperpresidentialism, illiberal democracy and so forth. Populist leaders of all stripes tend to exploit domestic problems to their own advantage. They play on the complaints of common citizens and blame the nation’s rulers from causing the hardships. As such, their efforts and rhetoric could be described as “anti-political.” Yet this raises an interesting question: what, exactly, is the relationship of anti-politics to populism? Are these merely two terms that describe the same phenomena, or are they analytically distinct? This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between populism and anti-politics. It enters into the conceptual discussion of populism—offering a new definition of populism as a political movement, rather than a style or strategy and so forth—and argues that anti-politics is best considered as a means of securing support. That is, if populism is not in itself a political strategy, then anti-politics must be the strategy populist leaders use. Although one can conceive of non-populists using anti-political strategies, it is difficult to conceive of populists not relying on anti-politics. Populists of all stripes rely on it. The classic populists in Latin America rose in reaction to the oligarchical parties that dominated politics at the time, and infused their messages with nationalist rhetoric. Neopopulists of the 1990s similarly reacted to the so-called political class that seemed aloof and removed from the problems of ordinary citizens. In these, as well as with the agrarian populism in the United States and the right wing populism in Europe, the effort to mobilize support includes the claim that the political system is not working properly, that the interests of ordinary citizens are ignored, and without some big changes the status quo will remain. In all of these cases the predominant argument in favor of the change is that the system needs fixing. Populists claim to offer an appropriate solution. This paper will present the logic behind this conceptualization and explore their relationships in the cases of Peru and Venezuela, with an eye toward providing an inter-regional comparative framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The latest financial crisis in the United States and Europe has been followed by calls for tighter regulation of financial intermediaries. We contribute to the literature on financial regulation and banking crises by analyzing an original database of financial regulation and supervision across 60+ countries from 1920 to 2007. This data set includes information on bank supervisory and regulatory agencies--including year of creation, levels of autonomy, institutional characteristics, and relation to central banks and other financial regulatory authorities (insurance and securities)--that allows us to consider a variety of institutional configurations that go further than the more limited dummy indicators available in the literature.  We use this original dataset (1) to understand mechanisms of cross-national diffusion in the adoption of different frameworks of bank regulation and (2) to document changes in bank performance--as measured by banking crises propensities, aggregate net worth of banking systems, and profitability of the banking industry--following periods of tightened financial regulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies of interethnic trust in Europe and the United States suggest ethnic diversity frequently produces interethnic distrust. This research does not bode well for the new democracies since most are ethnic diverse or divided states. Do these results hold for diverse, new democracies? The special case of highly diverse, divided states where the potential for conflict is high provides unique insight into the effects of ethnic diversity on interethnic trust. This study uses four such cases from the Afrobarometer: Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, and Ghana. The results indicate the relationship is not as simple as lower diversity leading to higher trust. For these four states, diversity and interethnic trust display two distinct relationships, one for highly divided states and one for less divided states. In either case, rising ethnic diversity increases interethnic trust at least initially even in divided states. Even for some disadvantaged groups, increased ethnic diversity increases interethnic trust. Increases in trust match association membership trends. More importantly, interethnic and intra-ethnic trust rise and fall together in all four casesâ??"High ingroup trust is no barrier to faith in others." (Bahry et al. p. 529). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contrast to conventional wisdom that political confidence and social trust are rather unrelated concepts on the individual level, recent European empirical studies support one of social capital theory's strongest claims, namely that socially trusting people are also more trustful in political institutions. Analyses reveal a powerful effect of social trust on political confidence. Moreover, this interrelationship is strong and consistent throughout Western and Eastern Europe and the U.S.. This sudden revival of the latter concept in empirical analyses can be explained by improved measurement instruments in current population surveys such as the 'Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy' survey or the European Social Survey. Consequently, the relevance of social trust for the stability of political systems is back on the research agenda which simultaneously prompts a refined search for the sources of social trust. According to social capital theory, involvement in voluntary associations should be one of its origins. For the creation of social trust, however, it fundamentally matters whether one belongs to associations of a bonding or a bridging kind, as recent studies suggest. Social engagement in bridging associations where members of different social backgrounds get together should enhance social trust whereas involvement in bonding associations where members coming from the same social background mingle should foster personalized trust which does not translate into a more embracing form of trust. Although the concept of bridging and bonding social capital has rapidly influenced scientific debates, it still lacks empirical confirmation. Instead of referring to the heterogeneity or homogeneity of social backgrounds of social activists, an alternative way of differentiation focuses on the impact of associational constitutive goods. Based on Mark Warren's goods categories, I have developed an instrument which permits to reveal relationships between social trust and specific types of voluntary associations. In essence, striving for public material, interpersonal or inclusive social goods enhances social trust and results in the creation of inclusive social capital. Following the arguments outlined above, a direct theoretical and empirical relationship between political confidence and social involvement in inclusive associations can be established. I will demonstrate this by means of linear regression analyses on the basis of the German 'Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy' population survey. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does people's willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater security correlate with concern about future terrorist attacks and the level of political trust? Why do these relationships differ between the USA and most European countries? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do attitudes towards public servants by Americans compare to similar attitudes in other nations? 2004 ISSP data are used to examine attitudes held by citizens in the U.S., Canada, and several European nations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study cross-nationally combines the public policy mood and issue emphasis concepts to empirically test the responsiveness of both American and European political parties to public opinion in terms of changing party manifesto content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the US and Europe alike, science and technology policy initiatives in the early 1980s have focused much on improving the capacity to apply their good science base in practice, expecting a resulting increase in technological advancement and implicitly improved market presence and enhanced economic growth. Yet, results vary in the US and Europe. Some advanced industrial economies do not conform to the expected relationship between science and technology, whereby strong performance in science shall lead to strong technological performance. The relationship between science and technology is very much interdependent or symbiotic. The strength and primary direction of the relationship at a given moment in time varies largely by field of science or technological innovation, as well as across long periods of time. In this exploratory study, I identify plausible explanations for the puzzling relationship between science and technology in certain economically advanced countries. I find that the science-technology link in a country may depend on the overall scientific and technological level of development in that country. The strength and interdependent nature of this link has a historical evolution that varies across fields of science and technology. The strength of the link between science and technology in a country is affected by scientific and technological specialization. Different technological fields have different scientific intensities, or degrees of building upon the science base Specialization of countries across scientific and technological fields varies, making it natural for the strength of the science-technology link to differ from one country to another. The high technological specialization of a country may impact its technological performance more than its immediately current scientific performance does. History, tradition and knowledge trasnfers may affect more returns on R&D expenditures than the actual value of R&D funds spent in either science or technology in a country. As there are plausible explanations for the puzzling behavior of the science-technology link in developed countries, I convert these explanations into a few suggested policy recommendations, with applicability to developed countries and to developing countries alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The welfare state literature has an increasing focus on the gender-neutrality of family policies that relieve dependence on the market. Yet as Orloff (1993) argues, if wives face hurdles to the market that their husbands do not, a gender neutrality focus is premature, because policies that seem to help women actually hinder full market access. For example, Morgan and Zippel (2003) argue that increasingly generous leave policies in Europe mask a desire to keep women out of the workforce. Bambra (2004) creates a gender-neutral de-familiasation index, but this and other analyses of family policy focus on parental leave and childcare. These help mothers and fathers, but none relieves women of the dependence on marriage. A complete analysis of family policy requires a focus on policies outside the traditional welfare state sphere. The paper incorporates dependence on marriage into the analysis of family policies in Canada and the United States through an examination of abortion and domestic violence. These policies either remove or create dependence on marriage and thus allow for a complete picture of equality in modern welfare states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and Europe have a common stake in stabilizing the global economy in the wake of the financial crisis. Indeed, the strength of the transatlantic partnership will be critical in managing this and related challenges, preventing future ones, and retrofitting the Western global order. But as Barack Obama underscores the imperative of reinvigorate US-European relations and McCain calls for the creation of a “League of Democracies,” little has been said about how such a steadier, more cooperative relationship will be achieved and sustained. In this paper, we draw lessons from recent experiments in governance in the United States and the European Union in issue areas ranging from environmental regulation to social inclusion in order to advance a new framework for transatlantic cooperation. We contend that the governance arrangements that underpin the partnership need to be rethought in order to promote better the normative consensus building, opportunities for mutual learning, and adaptability necessary to thrive in an increasingly fluid environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to examine the causes and outcomes of the influx of immigrants in the European Union and the United States from 1995 to 2005. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As preparation for field research in three mid-size cities in Europe and the United States, this paper presents theory and analysis supporting the advantages of local level responses to climate change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits the discussion about the interplay of trade and conflict and provides a detailed examination of trade patterns from 1931 to the end of World War II. Based upon a novel data set, I am able to establish that trade volumes rose before and during the war for all major European powers and the U.S., casting serious doubt both on the view that increased trade has pacifying effects and the widespread---yet still unproven---notion that trade levels fall during large-scale wars. In addition, I argue that an aggressor state's trade follows a unique pattern and test this view with monthly data on Nazi Germany's imports and exports. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on two recent and largely untapped sources of data to test empirically the Tocquevillian argument about the impact of involvement in civic organizations on individual attitudes and behaviors. We seek to fill-at least partially-the gap between theories of civil society and demonstrable results. Our analysis is based on two related studies-the European Social Survey (ESS) and the U.S. "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" (CID) survey-that incorporate innovative and detailed measures about respondents' involvement in voluntary associations in 19 European countries and in the United States. These surveys provide us not only with rich individual-level data, but they also allow us to develop and test a new measure of civic involvement that distinguishes between different levels of participation. After employing our new measure of civic involvement in pooled and individual country analyses, we find strong support for the Tocquevillian argument. On average, those persons with greater levels of involvement in voluntary organizations also engage in more political acts, have higher life satisfaction, and are generally more trusting of others than those who do not, even when controlling for a host of important demographic factors. Although these findings provide only an initial examination of the internal effects of participation, they highlight the general importance of actual involvement as opposed to nominal membership. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, empirical work (Dogan 1994) suggested that "nationalism" was in decline in the West. However, the 9/11 attack in the U.S. and subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere may have increased nationalism, patriotism, and national pride as well as an antipathy to outsiders. While pride may not always imply prejudice, this paper investigates the claim that often it does. It identifies the types of patriotism found within Europe and the United States, and the consequences of each type of pride for salient minority populations. Evaluating data from 21 countries from the 1995 and 2003 ISSP National Identity Survey, it finds that pride in country is a multidimensional phenomenon and only certain types of it are associated with antipathy towards ethnic minorities or distinctive outgroups, including immigrants. Chauvinists and those most proud of their country's cultural heritage are more likely to define membership in the political community in an ethnically exclusive manner and to express prejudicial views of immigrants to the country. Those, however, who express strong pride in the state, its institutions, and its social policies, are more open to immigrants and are less likely to endorse ethnically exclusive criteria for membership in the political community. Thus, pride in the state, as opposed to pride in the ethno-cultural nation, especially among titular groups, can ameliorate prejudicial attitudes about non-titular groups and immigrants. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion studies in the US show an alignment of evangelical Protestantism with many of the goals of current US foreign policy (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt, 2005). Evangelical Protestantism is also growing at a rapid pace in the Global South generally, and in Latin America specifically. Yet there is no scholarly consensus concerning Latin American evangelicals' attitudes about American foreign policy and America's international influence. On the one hand, given the historical and contemporary influence of the US government and of US evangelical Protestants (via missionary efforts, denominational ties, and evangelistic religious media) in Latin America, some scholars have seen Latin American evangelical churches as mere outposts in a U.S. evangelical empire, ones with close affinities with the politics of the U.S. religious right. On the other hand, some scholars of global evangelicalism see increasing indigenization of churches and concomitant increases in political/ideological independence. In a recent interview, for instance, Joel Carpenter, director of the Nagel Institute for the Study of World Christianity at Calvin College, remarked that "I have not met one foreign evangelical leader that approves of American foreign policy" (Philadelphia Inquirer, 2/20/06). What's missing in this debate is broad-based analysis of survey data collected in Latin America. What are Latin American evangelicals' attitudes about America's role in the world and how might they differ from non-evangelicals in the region? Are evangelicals in Latin America more supportive than their fellow citizens of US foreign policies, its war on terror, its influence on economic globalization, and its ideas about global democracy? In this paper we will investigate these questions using the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey data, which contains multiple measures of religious affiliation and beliefs as well as attitudes toward the US role in the world. The Latin American countries surveyed on these measures include Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we report on the extent to which the U.S. and Europe have converged and diverged over the past 35 years in their regulation of 100 risks randomly selected from a universe of nearly 3000 risks. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a strong empirical link between imperial linkages and their re-organization, the Post-WW2 process of restructuring the American and European states, and the emergence of the EEC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom holds that, in the months prior to the war in Iraq, the NATO alliance was shaken in unprecedented fashion by disagreements between the US and some of its European allies regarding the proper course of action to take in Iraq. The argument of this paper, however, is that far from demonstrating either NATO’s irrelevance or weakness, trans-Atlantic relations in this period demonstrated exactly why the NATO-based security arrangement continues to be relevant, and furthermore, that it is functioning precisely as it was intended. What, exactly, did transpire between the allies during these months? Germany, along with France, attempted to dictate to the rest of Europe what European foreign and security policy should be. And what did the rest of Europe – barring the Benelux countries – do in response? They effectively balanced against the German-French initiative by rallying around the US position. That is to say, what occurred in Europe in late 2002 and early 2003 was a version of what has always occurred throughout European history whenever one or more powers have attempted to dominate the security arrangement of the region, namely, the rest of Europe grouped together to balance against the potential hegemon. Prior to the 20th Century, the key to maintaining the balance of power in Europe lay with Britain, which acted as Europe’s offshore balancer, ready to throw its support to those states fighting a potential hegemon. Two world wars and the commencement of the Cold War, however, convinced western leaders that Britain was no longer capable of effectively playing the balancing role. As such, NATO was established as a means by which Europeans could effectively maintain Europe’s power balance, tying as it did the US into the European security architecture and thereby turning the US into Europe’s offshore balancer. As NATO’s first secretary general, Lord Ismay, once noted, “NATO is there to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” Put another way, the US was turned into Europe’s offshore balancer to prevent Europe’s two most likely hegemons from making a run at conquering the continent. In the wake of the Cold War, however, the Russian threat has receded into the background while simultaneously Germany has moved into its proper leadership role as Europe’s most powerful state. While the US’s balancing role in Europe has therefore become less relevant vis-à-vis Russia, its balancing role vis-à-vis Germany remains very relevant indeed. Why the relevance of this role remains so widely misunderstood is two-fold: 1) A lack of appreciation of the fact that NATO was created not simply as an anti-Soviet institution, but as an anti-European-hegemon institution; as such, people under appreciate the relevance of NATO with regard to Germany. 2) A lack of understanding of the nature and purpose of power dynamics in the EU, leading to a failure to understand how a militarily weak Germany can nonetheless be a ominous threat to its neighbors. It is precisely these two key points, therefore, that this article addresses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analysis of pharmaceutical regulation in advanced industrialized countries through the lens of organizational reputation. Differences between American and European arrangements are analyzed, as are dependencies between among these arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture consisted of an operational and an ideational level. It is analyzed why the European Community successfully influenced the former level and why US interests prevailed at the latter. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious intensity as social insurance explains why fiscal and social conservatives and liberals come together. We explain the changing nature of religious movements and why church-state separation arose in the US but not in many European countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The future of the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia Introduction During the Cold War, the United States deployed a large amount of armed forces in Europe and Asia. In the past, the United States military involvement and intervention were important dynamics for security movement in Asia. These policies and actions also played indispensable roles in the U.S diplomatic and defense policies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States decreased the size of its troops deployed in Europe, but there was no change in Asia. Obviously, the United States is convinced that it is suitable political choice to keep current military presence for guaranteeing the American national interest in Asia and dealing with the happening and future political and security development of this region. The question is: What is the future of the U.S. military presence? (e.g. military strategy, units, structure, personal, bases, cooperation with local countries) in Northeast Asia? Is it likely to remain the same, increase or decrease? Theoretical Construction The U.S military presence is depended on its grand strategy. What is the suitable theory to explain U.S. grand strategy toward this region? In 2002, President George W. Bush said America’s international strategies, and we can find the “Bush Doctrine” in this report; the United States will use a variety of measures, including forces, to actively, preemptively deal with the international affairs. The U.S. seeks not just to deter traditional great powers, but to eliminate the threats of “rogue states” and non-state actors capable of exercising disproportionate influence terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Scholars have attempted to define the U.S grand strategy, for example, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross said that the United States had to reconsider its national security policy after the Cold War. There are four possible grand strategies; they may be termed neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy. According to Robert J. Art, The United States should maintain military presence abroad to prevent five adverse situations, three ones of those situations relate to Northeast Asia; an acceleration of nuclear weapons spread, great power war, and the conquest or destruction of U.S allies, such as South Korea. John Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” is a structural theory of international politics. He defines that U.S is an offshore balancer; he means that U.S tried to “pass the buck” to other great powers to balance against the potential hegemony. If the approach failed, the United States will use its own military forces to eliminate the threat and ensure that it remains a sole regional hegemony. By historical experience, I think this theory that is helpful to describe the main reason for U.S to maintain its military presence in this region is past, now and future. The important factors (independent variables) By offensive realism, it is not strange for U.S to keep military presence in Northeast Asia. Now, the question is: What are the variables which increase or decrease the U.S. military presence? l The threat environment in Northeast Asia: present and future In the past five decades, the United States grand strategy was devoted to prevent Communist expansion. The well-known strategy was containment. Containment policy dictated U.S military presence in Asia. The U.S deployed-forward armed forces play two profound roles; formed an effective deterrence to Communism and supported the confidence of allies to defend themselves. As we have seen, there is a new world order in the sense that bipolar system established after World War II broken down. As China and Asia’s economic power rising, the military dimension becomes more important. Events such as: - The potential conflict between Republic of Korea (south) and Democratic People’s Republic Korea(north); One of the most important missions for U.S armed forces in this region to help counter a North Korea invasion. North Korea still deploys a huge amount of troops near the South Korea. The skirmishes between two Koreas are usually. Undoubtedly, the United States will involve any war that breaks out between North and South Korea. - North Korea’s nuclear weapon threat; although this country has serious economic crisis, the possibility of the deployment, production and proliferation of mass destruction weapons in this region is likely to be higher. It confronts Japan and the United States with a host of new security challenges. The United States came close to fighting a war against North Korea in June 1994 to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. In 2003, North Korea administration claimed the similar threat to the United States. - China: There are several reasons led us to believe China is the most important actor for affecting the threat environment that U.S has to face. Firstly, by offshore realism, the United States will prevent any sole hegemony to domain this region. China is a potential hegemony in Asia undoubtedly. In fact, the disappearance of Soviet Union, rising economic power, and nationalism would perhaps increase the possibility for China to become new hegemony to impact on Asian threat environment. Secondly, historically, China’s attitude, geographical situation, and its intervening in regional war, such as Korea War and Vietnam War, directly influenced American military presence in Northern Asia. Thirdly, China has intention to unify Taiwan by forces. The United States could get pulled into war with China over both Korea and Taiwan. In 1996, China’s missile exercise led President Clinton sent two aircraft-carrier battle groups into the waters around Taiwan. China is deploying large numbers of missiles in Fuijian province and its procuring more advanced weapons from Russia has posted a new threat to the U.S military troops in the region during a crisis. Fourthly, China can play relatively significant role in North Korea’s problem because Beijing is a Pyongyang’s supporter for past decades. l The attitude of the host countries: South Korea and Japan Obviously, the domestic pressure for reconsidering the current U.S military bases becomes higher today for two countries’ governments. For example, democratization in South Korea gave the Seoul administration more incentive to re-examine the status of U.S troops than past military leaders. More Japanese living in Okinawa do not favor U.S. troops stationed their island There are a lot negotiations and re-arrangements of the U.S military bases in Okinawa between American and Japanese government after the Cold War. Moreover, South Korea and Japan are stronger and able to defend themselves; therefore, the U.S security commitments to the region now are perhaps not as necessary as in the past decades. l Military technological developments The military technological development seems to change the pattern and varieties of forces deployment. For example, The U.S Air force are attempting to establish a forces of Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV), it would likely to decrease the number of U.S air bases in Asia. Because new aircrafts’ cost—such as F-22 and F-35—are higher than past fighters, the fleet of U.S Air Force is likely to decline. Due to the improvement of tactics and technology of landing battle, the role and deployment of U.S Marine Corps in Okinawa is another interesting issue for Pentagon. In the other words, the NMD (National Missile Defense) and TMD (Theater Missile Defense) have become the new American defense focus, and the North Korean and China ballistic missile threat will led the United States to build a new force based on Japan to help Tokyo administration to defend such threat. My Argument By historic experience and the U.S grand strategy, the important variable to influence the U.S military presence is threat environment. During the Cold War, containment was the core of U.S grand strategy, and the American military presence was an effective tool to contain Communists’ threat and defend the relatively weaker allies. However, the Cold War was end. The regional countries—South Korea and Japan—are also safer and stronger than before. Why do American soldiers stay here? According to offshore realism, therefore, if China does not become a potential hegemon, the United States will be likely to withdraw its troops from this region. If China becomes a potential hegemon, the U.S would keep military presence in the region to deal with China. Although the Soviet Union—the strongest military adversary America ever faced— collapsed, the future threat that U.S. will face in this region does not disappear. In current and future threat environment, China will play more important role due to its rising economy and military capability. However, the China’s problems, such as political instability, huge bad debt problem in banks, conflicts between countryside and urban areas, and serious income diversity not only decline the possibility for Beijing administration to become a regional hegemony, but also perhaps decrease its support to the North Korea. Therefore, the China’s strength or “collapse” will affect the U.S overall policies in this region, including military presence. Of course, it needs time. Moreover, the U.S. host countries (South Korea and Japan) may change the attitude and policies to U.S. military presence in the future. Besides, U.S. military technological development may change the future policies and composition of U.S. military presence. But the U.S military presence in South Korea and Japan not only defend them, but also serve for America’s strategic interest. If the United States supposes the regional threat environment that it needs military forces to deal with, it would persuade the host counties to support U.S policy regardless their possible opposition. In conclusion, the U.S military presence will remain the same in visible future after reviewing these variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]