Search

This paper assesses the impact of the European Union?s Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on Italy?s institutional capability in the employment and social inclusion policy fields. Institutional capability is defined as the extent to which a system of collective action is able ? by means of interactive dynamics ? to elaborate ?satisficing? responses to environmental challenges; transform such responses into decisions of a political nature; implement such decisions; and learn from experience. Both in employment and social inclusion, Italy has suffered from a twofold handicap: initial congruence of its policymaking process with that presupposed by the OMC was low in both fields, and there have been internal dynamics of change which have significantly interacted with the push related to the OMC. However, the evidence provided in the paper points towards a clear strengthening of institutional capability as an OMC-induced effect in the employment field, while the OMC seems to have had little ? if any ? impact on institutional capability in the social assistance field. This variance is put to work in order to identify clusters of factors that have plausibly affected the impact of the OMC on Italy?s institutional capability, and could be exploited to generate general hypotheses about the impact of the OMC on national institutional capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-examines some of the assumptions of the Europeanization literature by suggesting that it might be possible for domestic political events to have a direct influence on supranational political organizations. This possibility is addressed through an analysis of the impact that the dramatic political reform of the Italian party system in the 1990s had on the primary home of political party action in the EU, the European Parliament. The goal is to determine the extent to which the transformation of the Italian political party system impacted the party system of the EP through an analysis of EP party group voting unity and the additional impact that these events may have had on the political roles and influence of Italian MEPs within the EP through an examination of the allocation committee chairmanships and rapporteurships across time. The results are in many ways counterintuitive and suggest that the norms and rules that structure the supranational institutions may be hardier and more resistant to shock than currently assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first part of the paper is theoretical and aims at identifying two interpretations on the enlargement process of the European Union. The first one in based on a liberal attitude of the decision makers (especially the Commission), trying to apply in a neutral way the economic and political criteria of conditionality to EU enlargement. The second one is founded on a conservative orientation leading to correct those criteria; thus, European governments modify neutrality because of "realist" interests: either patron/client links with candidate states, or security reasons. For example, it seems that some consequences of Kosovo war of 1999 pushed EU to start negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria -which were quite late in economic reforms. Also the recent decision to begin negotiations with Turkey (with many problems concerning political criteria) was influenced by the support of a conservative coalition formed by the USA, the UK and Italy. The Italian governments applied the conservative orientation, based on the support of Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey, because all those candidates were perceived as compatible with firms and state interests. That position was supported by the Foreign Affairs minister of the left governments, Dini (since 1996), and by the leaders of the right coalition (since 2001): Berlusconi and Fini. A convergence materialized with the constructivist left, whose post/1989 ideology is strictly anchored to politically correctness and thus with the objective of making equal what is different, by favoring underprivileged actors. Thus enlargement was favored for both economic -redistribution channels of the EU should favor Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia- and cultural -a "plural" Europe, with Islamic Turkey, was strongly encouraged- reasons. Some shy liberal criticism -based on a fair objection to the partial compliance of Turkey to political conditionality criteria- were raised by single politicians of moderate right or left parties (Margherita, Forza Italia, UDC), but were not relevant. Cultural biases against Islamic Turkey were promoted by Bossi's Lega, while the neo-Communists and the Greens objected to Turkish candidature because of their manicheism, with a dichotomous division between the good (the Kurds) and the evil (Turkish armed forces). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europeanization has brought radical change to the governance practices of all EU member-states, which have in turn clashed with traditional ideas about democracy. These changes in practices and challenges to ideas have profoundly affected all EU member states, but some more so than others, largely as a question of ?institutional fit.? The EU, as a ?compound? supranational polity in which governing activity is highly diffused through multiple authorities, has been more disruptive to ?simple? national polities such as Britain and France, in which governing activity has traditionally been channeled through a single authority, than to ?compound? national polities such as Germany and Italy, in which it has traditionally also been diffused through multiple authorities. The main problem for EU member-states, however, is not so much that practices have changed and that ideas have been challenged than that national leaders have generally failed to come up with new ideas and discourse that reflect the new Europeanized realities. But here, too, institutional differences matter, although to differing effect. Simple polities have greater potential for speaking to changes in practices and challenges to ideas, were they to so choose, because their concentration of authority ensures them a more elaborate ?communicative? discourse to the general public, in which they are better able to speak in one voice and to convey a single message than more compound national polities, let alone the EU, given the number of potentially authoritative voices with differing messages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1990s saw an important shift from long-term reform sclerosis in the Italian industrial relations and welfare state systems to important innovations, both in the mode of policy making (concertation via social pacts) and the content of reform (decentralization in the collective bargaining system and greater flexibilization of a highly-rigid labour market). After 1998, concertation weakened considerably once macro-economic convergence for EMU membership had been achieved, and contestation of the collective bargaining system and labour market regulation reappeared. This article seeks to explain the rise and demise of concertation over the past decade or so, and to assess the consequences of reform for wage bargaining and employment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we first trace the Europeanization of social policy at the EU level in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the subsequent issuance of anti-discrimination directives. The advent of these institutional changes at the EU level and the inclusion of sexual orientation in the anti-discrimination directives, have provided new opportunities for gay and lesbian civil society organizations across Europe to work together transnationally. This Europeanization of anti-discrimination has laid a minimum ground floor, in which further extension of rights beyond the area of employment, to include equality in housing, the provision of services, and other areas have become possible. In addition, while some countries have extended rights of marriage to same-sex couples or offer other forms of state recognized partnerships, this has emerged as a new goal for gay and lesbian groups in other countries. The Europeanization of the policy area has led to a growing transnationalization of the movement, in which groups learn and are assisted by groups in other countries. This article presented an empirical investigation of the goals and strategies pursued by two national groups, Arcigay in Italy and the COC in the Netherlands. From the two empirical cases presented here, it is apparent that the two possible modes of interaction faced by gay and lesbian groups offered in the literature, either highly divisive 'morality politics' or an incremental 'interest group' mode of interaction, must be joined by a third which we call 'high profile' politics - one marked by coalition seeking, highly visible public events, government support, and transnational activity at the EU level and in countries abroad. This is a strategy possible where this is a high degree of public support for equality and minimal partisan or religious opposition to the movement. The modern gay and lesbian rights movement has moved well beyond the identity politics of Stonewall to demand equal rights, including anti-discrimination measures and the right to marriage. While some gay and lesbian civil rights groups remain trapped in a 'morality politics' mode of interaction because of strong opposition to their demand for equal rights, which makes success difficult, other groups may be able to achieve results through an incremental 'interest group' mode of political interaction. But we have seen, others civil society organizations, like the one we studied in the Netherlands, are now able are able to use the tolerance and acceptance won in their societies, for a 'high profile' strategy to maintain and advance their societal and political influence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy has been one of the most active participants in the never ending debate on the reform of the UN Security Council. It has advocated for a long time the addition to the present Council of new non-permanent seats, to be covered, for renewable terms, by the top contributors to UN activities (a proposal which is similar to 'model B', as envisaged by the 2004 Report og the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, nominated by the Secretary-General). Recently, however, Italy has moved to a new proposal, providing for a stronger role of regional groups in the Council: the old and new non-permanent seats would be assigned to these groups, which would freely determine the rules on how to attribute them to the single states. Italy has also always supported a stronger role for the European Union in the Security Council, and this later proposal goes in that direction too. The U.S. has always held a different position: while previously backing the Japanese and German wishes for a permanent seat in the Council, itr has recently moved to a more cautious stance. The two countries can, however, find a common ground today, as the main Italian objective is to defeat German ambitions to a permanent seat in the Council, while the U.S. seems to be more worried about a reform that could render the Council more ungovernable, than wishing to promote one that would be based on its own vision. Italy and the U.S. could, therefore, converge around the line 'better no reform at all'. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]