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This article examines Jardine Matheson & Co.'s (JM) response to the riots, strikes, and boycotts that the Chinese people, particularly the workers, engaged in from 1925 to 1926. The occurrence was widespread and lasted for a considerable amount of time. spreading from the south to other regions. The British were a prime target of protests, strikes, and boycotts. JM became one of the British companies that were immediately impacted by the disaster as a result. JM's business's shipping, port, and manufacturing sectors were severely disrupted and destroyed.JM suffered a large loss because of the riot's property damage. JM was also required to comply with the workers' requests for pay increases. To defend JM's position and business interests in China, JM reacted to the incident because of the circumstance. Therefore, qualitative research methods and library research were utilized to examine JM's response to episodes of riots, strikes, and boycotts that happened throughout the time covered by this paper. Primary sources for the study included letters, reports from the London Foreign Office (FO371), meeting materials and minutes from the JM Company, and British business organizations including the China Association. While secondary sources are the results of earlier research, including books and journals. Both sources were used in the creation of this article. The results of this study are expected to add to the corpus of additional knowledge in the study of modern Chinese history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Management of the South China Sea disputes must consider the "hedging" behavior of the claimant and non-claimant countries. This behavior is characterized by an insistence on not aligning with any of the competing powers, through intentionally contradictory actions to offset multiple risks, or through a continuous effort to maintain a fallback position. Indeed, in the face of China's increasingly assertive actions and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, nearly all the states in the region have avoided "balancing" (fully aligning with the U.S. to check China) and none of them have adopted "bandwagoning" (fully aligning with China for economic reasons but at the expense of autonomy and other national interests). Instead the Southeast Asian states have insisted on hedging. This paper argues that this proclivity to hedge is a result of both structural and domestic factors. Structurally, the high uncertainties surrounding China's intentions, U.S. commitment, and future U.S.-China ties have compelled the smaller states to avoid putting all their eggs in either power's basket. Domestically, for their political legitimation, the ruling elites in the states hedge to offset multiple risks and pursue mixed policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]