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Surprisingly, the cross-national diffusion of contention over political regimes has slowed down greatly over the last 200 years. Yet at the same time, its rate of success in triggering democratic transitions has increased as clearly. What accounts for these inverse trends and the negative correlation underlying them? After refuting arguments that highlight modernization and globalization, the rise of nationalism, rational learning, and the appeal of norms and values, this paper develops a novel explanation that rests on cognitivepsychological insights and invokes secular organizational developments. In the 19th century, before political parties had arisen, it fell to common people to decide on whether to join challenges to established autocrats. Short on reliable information and political experience, these citizens relied on inferential shortcuts that induced them to follow external precedents of successful regime changes rashly; yet this very rashness, which bred challenges in unfavorable situations, led to limited success. After the rise of parties, by contrast, common people take cues from organizational leaders, who command more information and experience. Before emulating an external precedent and challenging their own rulers, leaders therefore wait for propitious circumstances. For this reason, regime contention in the 20th century diffuses more slowly yet attains higher rates of success. The paper documents these arguments by analyzing the spread of the 1848 revolutions, the impact of the Russian Revolutions of 1917, and the third wave of democratization, exemplified by Chile's transition to democracy during the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Professor Bull has mentioned, the title of this panel is, "The New Special Relationship?: post-Gaullist France and America." The title of my paper is, "Washington, Sarkozy, and the Defense of Europe." My title is both consistent and misleading. Consistent because in some respects I treat defense issues in the paper; misleading because I go beyond that focus to mention the defense of Europe and Western civilization in a broader sense. This is partly because of my current proclivities, as manifested in my most recent book, "La Republique de Dieu," published in Paris earlier this year. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the view that globalization is rendering all developed political economies hybrids, this paper argues that it is still useful to speak of distinctive varieties of capitalism. It substantiates that view by putting the process of 'globalization' in a longer historical perspective that explores the response of four political economies to changes in the international economy since 1945. The cases of Britain, France, Germany and Sweden are examined to assess how each responded to economic challenges in the 1950s, late 1960s-1970s, and 1990s-2000s with an emphasis on three types of problems: the work problem, the wage problem, and the problem of total factor productivity. The paper finds that shifts in the international monetary regime and changes endogenous to the existing institutional structure of the economy were as important as exogenous shocks in posing challenges to the economy and that existing institutions conditioned the nature of the response of firms and governments. It concludes that varieties of capitalism continue to display some distinctive features of importance to economic performance and the distribution of well-being and that those varieties can usefully be thought of as the basis for institutionally-conditioned adjustment paths. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do national parliaments regain some of their influence over policy areas that have been lost to the European Union? National parliaments influence policy as it travels ‘upstream’ to the intergovernmental level or in the ‘downstream’ implementation process. This paper presents a model that demonstrates how national parliaments could strengthen their influence over European policy in the upstream stage by minimizing information asymmetries with their representative at the European level, the national government. The containment of agency losses in the upstream process is a necessary step toward regaining policy influence, but it is not sufficient. Downstream influence is also necessary. This paper uses principal-agent theory to explain why national parliaments establish European Affairs Committees (EAC) and illustrate EAC limitations. It presents a model for the strategic interaction between national parliaments and governments over European policy. The conclusion describes possible empirical tests of the model and gives suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our earlier research on great power balancing behavior emphasized the different kinds of threats posed by land powers and sea powers and their consequences for balances and balancing. We demonstrated that while great powers have systematically balanced against land powers that approached a position of hegemony in Europe (but not against weaker leading land powers), great powers have not balanced against sea powers posing comparable threats of dominance in the global system. This paper builds on our earlier work. We examine the evolution of balancing strategies over the last five centuries of the European system and the global system. We emphasize the importance of particular structural and contextual factors, and argue that the European system and the global system for the last five centuries were characterized by a distinctive set of arrangements that are probably not generalizable to other systems. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the terms through which 'political Islam' is understood in International Relations theory and practice. European and American understandings of 'political Islam' rely upon commonly held secular definitions and assumptions about religion and politics. Secularist epistemology produces a particular kind of 'religious' subject and a specific understanding of 'normal politics' that lends a particular coloring to the politics of Muslim-majority societies. These secularist understandings of 'political Islam' condition contemporary European and American foreign policy toward 'Islamic' political actors and movements in two ways: first, the appearance of 'Islam' in 'political' practice is equated with fundamentalism and intolerance, and second, the forms and degrees of separation between Islam and politics that do exist in contemporary Muslim-majority societies either do not appear at all or appear only as ill-fitting imitations of a Western secular ideal. I conclude that 'political Islam' should be understood as a modern language of politics that challenges and at times overturns fundamental assumptions about 'religion' and 'politics' that are embedded in Western forms of secularism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a theory of decision-making based on how humans process information, and operationalizes the theory using a simulation model. Decision are affected by the surrounding ecology, information stored in memory, and the hypotheses chosen to access information in the surround ecology and memory. This theory draws on and extends existing cognitive simulation models to show that judgments, along with observed heuristics, biases and affect can be predicted probabilistically using models of memory processes. To operationalize this theory, the MEMORIS (Memory-based Ecological Model Of Relationship Interactions between States) simulation was developed, and the prototype used to model judgments of European states during the period 1885-1915, with results confirming expectations of theory and matching the historical record. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents the research paper "Where Are All the Europeans?: Collective Ideas, Nationalism, and the Limits of European Integration," by Duane Adamson. Discussions of identity; Theoretical perspectives on European integration; Nations and collective ideas.

The balance of power is a venerable concept in international relations theory, but it is plagued by ambiguities about what the concept means and what the theory purports to explain, and the key proposition that states balance against concentrations of power or hegemonic threats is rarely if ever subjected to systematic empirical test. We argue that despite these ambiguities and disagreements, there is one proposition that nearly all balance of power theorists and their critics as well would accept as an accurate reflection of the theory and that provides the basis for a Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Big events in world politics provide students of international relations and comparative politics with the closest thing to a natural experiment. September 11th is no exception. For a political analysis of terrorism material capabilities and objective factors are typically besides the point. What matters are the political importance of processes that shape how groups and governments conceive of the use of violence, how publics perceive and interpret insecurity, and how threats are constructed politically. Such conceptions, interpretations and processes of threat construction occur largely within polities rather than between them. And domestic politics differ across countries in ways that deserve careful analysis by those interested in the international politics of counter-terrorism. The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is like a strong beam of light which gets filtered by distinct national lenses that create different political responses even in democratic, capitalist states closely allied with the United States such as Germany and Japan. September 11 supports the view of both proponents and critics of globalization. Operating within, across and alongside states, the AlQaeda network is a close approximation of the novel condition of world politics that globalization theory, with its insistence on converging practices, has illuminated. Sharp differences in counter-terrorism policies, the focus of this paper, underlines the importance of states whose policies are retaining striking differences. And distinctive national responses are embedded in different regional contexts, illustrated here by Europe and Southeast Asia. This diversity in national approaches in a plural world underlines the difficulty that U.S. diplomacy is likely to face in a prolonged war on terrorism conceived of as a clash between good and evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cumulative impact of globalization and internationalization in Europe and Asia is profound. This chapter develops its argument in several steps. Sections 1 and 2 highlight, respectively, the significance of regionalism and regionalization and of globalization and internationalization. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the different ways that globalization, internationalization and regionalization combine to create a world of open regions. They do so by investigating cultural affairs, an issue that illustrates with particular clarity the confluence of international and global factors. Section 3 analyzes cultural diplomacy, like national security, a central prerogative of the state. Internationalization theory expects persistent national differences, illustrated here by the different approaches that the Japanese and German state have taken in this policy domain. Section 4 looks at popular culture, like finance, a preferred domain for processes that are escaping state control. Globalization theory expects convergence across nations and regions. Taken together, both sections make two claims. First, different combinations of global and international effects create open regionalism in both Europe and Asia. Second, the international and global processes that create openness are not sufficiently powerful to wash away enduring regional differences that set Asia apart from Europe. Section 5 identifies these differences. In Asia the politically defining institution is the market, typically operating along ethnic or national lines. Identity capitalism is thus the characteristic practice of Asian regionalism. Europe’s defining institution is law with its primarily regulatory effects on policies and behavior. Formal political institutions are the most typical regional practice of European regionalism. The paper’s final section 6 contrasts briefly today’s open regionalism in cultural affairs with the historical experience of closed regionalism of the 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between the economic globalization, loosening of vertical intergovernmental relations and the emergence of regionalism is often discussed in the literature, particularly in European contexts. In the American context, despite the fact that the federal government has been taking devolutionary policy since the 1980s and contributing to the global economy, there has been no notable local government regionalism, except for the merger of the city of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky in 2003. Japan has been implementing government restructuring toward neoliberal decentralization since the 1990s while globalization strained national political economy and stimulated regionalism at the local level. This paper explains that regionalism emerged in Japan because of the changing negotiation powers of the local governments against the central government and the changing importance of the local economies to the central government under globalization. Under this condition, Japanese central government implemented devolution while made targeted investments in the growth pole. This uneven development policy produced regionalism and local statism in the neglected areas. From this, this paper suggests that the changing central-local government relations resulting from the political repercussions of globalization stimulates local statism and leads to the development of regionalism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops a theory of informal governance - uncodified rules of behavior running parallel to formal treaty rules - in international institutions. It builds on, and develops, rational institutionalist approaches in International Relations that explore how provisions for flexibility allow states sustain cooperation in the face of change in their strategic environment. The central argument advanced in this article is that in order to maintain a mutually beneficial depth of cooperation, governments devise, in parallel with formal rules, a "norm of discretion" prescribing that governments facing unmanageable pressure for defection be accommodated. Because some governments face incentives to exploit this norm, the task of adjudicating its use is delegated to a government that stands to lose from excessive accommodation. The norm consequently manifests itself in practices of informal governance as states collectively depart from formal rules in order to exercise discretion. The resulting mix of informal and formal governance is functional in that it renders the institution dynamic and therefore adaptable to contingent domestic demands for cooperation. The plausibility of the theory is probed using the example of European economic integration, but it can be extended to international organizations more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the relations between European and non-European states in the 19th century based on the context of international law, diplomacy and boundaries. The author argues that the mapping of geographical boundaries of international society will not help explain the relations of member and non-member states. He claims that the idea of stratification is more effective than the concept of expansion of society in assessing the boundaries between different kinds of membership in international society.

This article discusses the effectiveness of the pre-accession conditionality of the European Union (EU) in prompting the alignment of the post-communist candidate countries with EU law. It focuses on two factors related to the experience of pre-accession conditionality which include a greater susceptibility of the new member states to shaming and an institutional investment into legislative capacity. It also considers the changing incentive structure after accession.

The article describes how the inclusion of religion in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was debated in the Convention on the Future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference that followed. The position of member states, supranational institutions, and other actors on the issue are presented. A few member states expressed their strong belief that the Constitutional Treaty should contain some mention of God, but the final treaty, which failed to be ratified by France and the Netherlands, was secular.

Interstate cooperation through an international institution is only one of the many options available to states to respond to foreign policy issues. When do they choose it, instead of some form of unilateral action, an extra-institutional 'coalition of the willing,' or even doing nothing? I argue that the choice of cooperation in a particular institution is conditioned on the existence both of consensus around an acceptable policy outcome and of sufficient capacity to execute that policy successfully. In the absence of one or both of these, non-cooperation outcomes are likely to occur. I test these claims by examining the case of Albania's near collapse in early 1997. Several enormous Ponzi (pyramid) schemes collapsed, and impoverished citizens rioted in the streets. The country tottered on the brink of civil war for several weeks, while Western European stated argued over what form of response to take and which institution(s) should be involved in the response. Using a method of structured, focused comparison, I examine the behavior of several European states on two aspects of the crisis. What were the states' preferred outcomes (their ideal points) on the two issues? What were their preferred strategies to obtain those ideal points - and in particular, how did concerns about the twin needs for consensus and capacity influence? How did these strategies interact with the strategies of others and with external constraints to produce the observed outcomes? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the significance of acquis communautaire to the European Union (EU) and international politics. The phrase acquis communautaire generally refers to community patrimony. Some academics, such as Philippe Schmitter, defined the phrase as the sum total of obligations that have accumulated since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community and are embedded in a number of treaties and protocols. The article also examines the key elements explaining the similarities of standard of civilization and acquis communautaire.

The article argues that, following the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became systematically engaged in the projection of a particular set of Western-based norms into Central and Eastern Europe. NATO is portrayed by conventional wisdom about international security as a military alliance, irrelevant to processes of constructing or reproducing domestic norms and institutions.

Among the many frustrations hampering cooperation between Western allies is the transatlantic gap in defense capabilities. Many analysts find little reason for hope that the gap might close in the near future due to the growing differential in aggregate defense spending between the United States and Europe. In recent years, however, Spain set an intriguing precedent for small states entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Defying economies of scale, Spain used progressive institutions at domestic and international levels along with creative geopolitics to engage both the United States and traditional powers in Europe. The result was that Spain, without dramatic increases in defense spending, still managed to narrow the transatlantic gap along vital dimensions. These included increased participation in the development of high technology defense and aerospace systems as well as a stronger, independent voice in global affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at issues surrounding the crisis of the transatlantic security community. Example of structural changes in world politics; Analysis of the policy disagreements between the U.S. and Europe; Claims on the contemporary crisis in U.S.-European relations.

The change in Italy?s main regional policy (for the south) in the course of the 1990s provides a prima facie case of Europeanisation tout court for scholars of Europeanisation. A new policy was adopted that was evidently inspired by the European regional policy launched in 1988. However, examining Europeanisation only from a top-down perspective (in terms of policy outcome) provides a limited insight into the process. A bottom-up approach that evaluates the impact of Europeanisation through a temporal dimension of change, integrating the Europeanised and domestic effects, allows a more precise assessment of the degree to which Europeanisation may have caused or reinforced a process of change in Italian southern policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postwar officials in Japan, like their counterparts in Germany, faced the daunting task of rebuilding their country’s relationships with other states and of placing these relations on a new foundation to replace the discredited politics of their recent past. In these circumstances, Konrad Adenauer and the CDU in Germany moved quickly to cement alliance ties with the West, to pursue broader institutional arrangements in Europe, and to commit themselves in general to arrangements that limited rather than reasserted the power of the German state. Superficially, Japan appears to have followed a similar course through its defense pact with the U.S. and its constitutional renunciation of military forces. Yet Japan’s decisive postwar Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, embraced none of these goals. Although he sought strict limits on the Japanese military establishment, he was eager to reassert the power and sovereign right of the Japanese state. Moreover, he embraced the international commitments of the Defense Treaty only with great reluctance. And, even so, he was roundly criticized for having gone too far. A constructivist analysis of language, rules, and order helps to account for Japan’s postwar choices. Trying to find its place in a new international order, Japan confronted a specific instance of a generic problem of order. Speech act theory identifies three strategic pathways for managing such problems, leading to three different cultures of order: Hobbesian (or directive), Lockean (or assertive), and Kantian (or commissive). Postwar circumstances ruled out one of these, the Hobbesian strategy, in Japan (and Germany). Despite their similar structural positions, Japan and Germany made different choices from among the remaining alternatives--choices that continue to reverberate in contemporary Japanese and German foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ending of the Cold War and the removal of the Soviet threat uncovered serious divisions within NATO. As Michael Howard noted, ‘with the evaporation of the threat that called it into existence NATO is falling apart, and the rift between the Ango-Saxon Atlanticists and European continentalists grows steadily wider.’ An important factor in NATO’s survival that scholars have overlooked is the diplomatic effort in 1990-1991 to balance against American power by developing a rival European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as an exclusively European alternative to NATO and its transatlantic link. This research examines the heated debate that occurred between advocates of an independent European security force and the proponents of preserving NATO as the dominant security organization in Europe. The research explores key elements of this debate, such as: the London Declaration, the Dumas-Genscher joint initiative, the Bartholomew Memorandum, the secret negotiations between the White House and the Elysee, the Baker-Genscher joint statement, and the creation of the Euro Corps. This threat to NATO culminated with President Bush’s secret challenge at the 1991 Rome Summit for the allies to choose between an independent European military or American withdrawal from the continent. This study helps evaluate the ability of leading international relations theories to account for state behavior during this historic juncture in European security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of the Cold War, a number of observers suggested that the time was finally ripe for a European collective security system. Several looked for inspiration to the 19th-century Concert of Europe. Critics warned, in turn, that collective security would fail, and might lull states into complacency, preventing timely balancing against aggressors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While balance of power theory is often interpreted as a universal theory applicable to all international systems, we argue that it is bound by certain scope conditions. Its two key hypotheses - that sustained hegemonies do not form and that hegemonic threats generate great power balancing behavior - are applicable in principle to autonomous continental systems but not to trans-regional maritime systems, including the contemporary global system. In an earlier study we argued that the modern European system constitutes the "best case" for hypotheses on balancing, and found that European great powers have exhibited a strong, but not deterministic, propensity to balance when one state acquired a third or more of the total military capabilities in the system, but not at lower concentrations of power, and that higher concentrations of power have usually led to larger balancing coalitions. Given our argument that conventional balancing propositions do not apply to maritime systems, in this paper we construct and test an alternative series of hypotheses about balancing and bandwagoning for the last five centuries of the modern global system. Our general prediction is that great powers are less likely to balance against leading sea powers than against leading land powers under comparable levels of power concentrations. We also hypothesize that contrary to balance of power theory, great powers are less likely to balance against higher concentrations of maritime power and that the coalitions that do form are smaller for higher concentrations of maritime power than for lower concentrations of maritime power. With respect to bandwagoning behavior, we hypothesize that great powers are more likely to align with the dominant sea power than with the dominant land power, that the great powers are more likely to align with leading sea powers in stronger relative positions than those in weaker relative positions, and that bandwagoning alliances with the leading sea power are larger than are balancing alliances against the leading sea power. All of our hypotheses are supported by the evidence, and nearly all are statistically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a formal model of interstate bargaining, I explore the determinants of state choice between secrecy and transparency. When private information is verifiable, non- disclosure sends a bad signal. This leads to an equilibrium, in which all types disclose their information, no matter how unfavorable it is. I argue that interstate openness in the nineteenth century Europe illustrates these dynamics. I then identify three permissive conditions that lead states to choose secrecy: mixed information content, sensitive information, and implementation and domestic political costs of transparency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]