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The literature that has sought to explain the affects of the economy on voting is extensive. However, these findings are for the most part based on Western democratic models. Consequently, political scientists have failed to take advantage of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to see if these models are robust. Given the changes over the past decade, this paper tests the extent to which extant theories can be used to explain election outcomes in this region of the world. In this particular study, Polish monthly public opinion data is utilized to determine more accurately whom the electorate holds accountable during periods of economic stress in semi-presidential systems?the president or the prime minister. The findings in this paper suggest that a strong determinant of electoral accountability and the allocation of blame are dependent upon whether the government is unified or divided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the conditions under which nationalist political parties in Eastern and Western Europe are able to attract meaningful electoral support in national elections. Our aim is to explore how certain objective political, social, and economic conditions that inform voters’ subjective appraisals of nationalist parties’ claims and promises drive overall electoral results. As a second order concern, we are interested in understanding if and how the dynamics of nationalist political support differ substantively as we move geographically from Western to Eastern Europe. Here, we explore whether the same kinds of variables matter for nationalist parties in the West and the East and, if so, whether these variables play the same kind of role or have the same degree of importance for countries with quite dissimilar economic conditions, political legacies, social experiences, and historical memories. We argue that a full account of the determinants of nationalist voting must take into account this breadth in nationalist political parties and the diversity of country settings; we employ two-rounds of pooled regression analysis for more than 160 political parties in 89 national election cycles in 33 countries across Eastern and Western Europe. Our preliminary findings indicate economic, institutional, social and historical variables have significant effects across Europe, but in different ways. Our findings suggest that nationalist political parties in Eastern and Western Europe do well under different conditions, and that the dynamics of nationalist electoral support are, in some aspects, geographically bounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study which examines the representation of politics at different levels of political decision making in Europe. A comparison between regional and statewide elections is provided. The interaction between the regional and the national levels of political decision making is explored.

Between 2002 and 2003, a European constitutional convention drafted a constitution for Europe. Two actors in particular influenced the negotiations in the Convention: the President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the Praesidium. We first examine how the Praesidium was able to structure the agenda inside the Convention due to the absence of voting on amendments. The Praesidium was able to conclude every particular proposal-amendment round by accepting, rejecting or amending proposed amendments. We then analyze cases which show how the Presidency was able to control the agenda of the Convention. By investigating institutions, we demonstrate that the Presidency used several tricks to manipulate the result. We find evidence that (1) the Presidency filtered proposed amendments, considering only some of them, (2) it determined consensus in the Convention without saying how many members approve of a particular measure, and (3) it juxtaposed proposed amendments and concluded that the Praesidium proposal constitutes the best compromise.The second part of our agenda-setting analysis complements these cases by examining the timing of the Praesidium proposals. Analyzing the entire set of amendments in the Convention, we show that the Praesidium structured the agenda by presenting its draft proposals in multiple sequences. While the Praesidium could have proposed the entire constitution at once, such an iterated procedure resulted in fewer amendments over time. This suggests that timing was used for strategic reasons by the Praesidium. We support our hypothesis by showing that (1) some of the most important issues were presented at the end of the Convention, and that (2) the actual timing of proposals does not correlate highly with either the initial timetable or with the final constitution. We conclude that in the absence of majority or unanimity voting, agenda control mattered and thus the possibility of political manipulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]