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Clientelism remains to be an important channel of political mobilization in some mature democracies, despite a series of political reform aimed at making politics fair and transparent since the 1990s. By examining local political dynamics mainly in Italy and Japan, this paper argues that the resurgence of clientelism is a paradoxical result of recent reform. More specifically, the introduction of majoritarian electoral rules has intensified competition in each district and, therefore, given patrons incentives to secure firm political support from their constituencies through provision of patronage. Devolution has increased authority and discretion of the local elites, who have dominated clientelist exchanges at the local level. On the demand side of clientelism, the budget constraints facing countries since the 1990s have ironically raised value of patronage. Clients, or local constituencies, might compete even more fiercely for the limited public money. In the absence of substantial policy issues in dispute, clientelism thus continues to prevail as a means to mobilize political support. The authors also point to the significant effects of local electoral institutions which have helped clientelistic practices survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]