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This paper demonstrates that an important and overlooked guide to understanding Canadian and US Supreme Court decision making in tax cases is the "default," or the party to whom the court will decide in favour of if tax language is ambiguous. While statutory interpretation methods influence the overall manner in which courts approach tax-law decision making, the default is a more concrete guide to evaluating Canadian and US Supreme Court decisions. The paper first explores the statutory interpretation approaches referenced in Canadian and American Supreme Court tax law cases. The paper then examines the histories of defaults, including the cases in which they emerged and the rationales given for their adoption. Third, based on original research, the paper concludes that defaults have a profound effect on income tax decisions by, in Canada, the Supreme Court favouring the taxpayer and, in the United States, the Court deferring to the Internal Revenue Service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of federal judicial appointments made before 1988 discovered significant partisan ties between judicial appointees and the governments appointing them. In 1988, in response to criticism of these "patronage appointments," the Mulroney government introduced screening committees to the process. This article explores the impact of these committees. Using information gained from surveys of legal elites, we trace the minor and major political connections of federal judicial appointees from 1989 to 2003 in order to determine whether patronage has continued despite the reform to the process. We discover that political connections continued to play an important role in who was selected for a judicial appointment. However, these connections were not quite as common as those found before 1988, and the new process does appear to have prevented the politically motivated appointment of completely unqualified candidates. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that the impact of patronage varies by region and interacts with other, newer influences, in particular, concerns for group representation on the bench. The paper concludes by briefly discussing these results in the context of the relationship between judicial selection and politics with a comparative perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]