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This paper seeks to highlight a conceptual difficulty in Washington's perspectives toward China, exploring key grounds of the U.S. thinkers in modern history and today. It compares the views with Beijing's current thoughts and approach in initiating what Beijing once called a "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development." This paper then runs a case study of Beijing's multilateral practice in the context of East Asian regionalism in order to assess what Washington may need to refocus on. The central argument maintains that the difficulty of the U.S. to draw a practical policy toward China is attributed to a conceptual difference between Washington and Beijing in thinking of how leadership is obtained and exercised. It points out a limit on the power-oriented nature of Washington to simplify the complexity surrounding Beijing's approach; it especially highlights the insufficient attention of Washington to China's role and impact on neighboring states in the process of regional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing demand for natural resources has become an issue of primary importance in China's foreign policy, and has led many observers to argue that conflict with the United States and other states in Asia is growing more likely. This paper evaluates the historical record on that question: under what circumstances have the resource needs of previous rising powers led to conflict with other states? I propose two independent variables: the ability to extract natural resources at home and the openness of the international trade system. In cases where the rising power has a large domestic resource base, and can supplement domestic production with easy access to foreign resources through trade, rising powers are less likely to generate conflict. In situations where the rising power has a limited resource base at home and the international trade system is closed, on the other hand, are more likely to lead to war. The paper evaluates three cases. For the United States in the late 19th century, massive domestic reserves and the first great era of globalization led to a "peaceful" rise. For Japan in the 1930s, an extremely poor resource base and rising trade barriers contributed to conflict. Finally, the paper turns its attention to China and argues that this important contemporary case more closely resembles the rise of the United States than that of Japan. China's domestic resource base remains quite large, and the international trade system is unprecedented in its level of openness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. The government responded to American advances in the Pacific by selecting policies of war rather than policies of peace. Why did Japanese decision-makers choose the path of military confrontation rather than the path of diplomacy? What prompted them to confront the United States at Pearl Harbor? Was it the configuration of the international system, or the capabilities and resources of nation-states that compelled them all to choose war? Or were structural circumstances fluid enough for people to disagree, and for differences among decision-makers to reflect variations in the cognitive costs of making judgments?This paper will review Japanese decision-making dynamics in 1941, and investigate whether structural conditions or the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making best accounts for the foreign policy preferences of individual actors. It will draw attention to deliberations at several levels of government, including within the military services themselves, and consider whether the transparency of American provocations forced all decision-makers to routinely choose force, or if the ambiguity of American actions prompted some people to prefer diplomatic initiatives while others preferred military solutions. In particular, it will explore the proposition that because all individuals are cognitive misers or cognitive processing cost-minimizers who unconsciously prefer judgments that are mentally cheap to those that are mentally dear, differences between civilian and military actors predictably reflect the influence of three different cognitive cost-cutting cues: decision stage (problem definition or solution definition), decision role assignment (leader or advisor), and a decision-maker’s level of substantive knowledge (novice to expert).By examining the evolution of Japanese foreign policy over the course of several months, this paper will not only assess whether and when the cognitive calculus theory of decision-making can offer a most useful explanation for this case, it will address whether the actions of Japanese officials in 1941, like those of British decision-makers in 1938 and American decision-makers in the Cuban missile crisis, the turn toward peace in Vietnam, and the 9/11 responses of 2001 (four cases already investigated), reinforce and extend the power of the theory. It will consider whether the cognitive calculus explanation can account for the preferences of different individual actors, in different states, facing different national conditions, and different international circumstances. This paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this work for future scholarly and policy efforts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will historically and theoretically study conditions under which states develop bilateral versus multilateral security alliances. Specifically, the paper will discuss a question on why the United States built mainly bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region while it established a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early Cold War period.Understanding security alliances have been the subject of major research in international relations studies. However, there has been so far insufficient scholarly attention and rigorous archival research focusing on the question I proposed above. The findings of the proposed paper will not only be historical and theoretical, but will also attempt to provide insights on how future Asia-Pacific alliance policy can be managed.This paper argues that the difference between the German rearmament and the Japanese rearmament is a key for solving the puzzle. The nature of the German rearmament is very much different from that of the Japanese counterpart, because the Japanese rearmament was far modest and limited in its nature and scope. The large-scale German rearmament generated more complex interdependent interactions among the United States and its European allies, while the limited Japanese rearmament created less interdependent relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the Atlantic alliance developed into NATO with multilateralism, while alliances in the Asia-Pacific remained bilateral in nature. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I tackle two puzzles in this paper: why did Japan and the United States begin to develop health insurance policies almost from scratch during WWII; and why did they adopt different systems by the end of postwar reconstruction? For the first question, I argue that the health insurance systems in both countries were developed for making war mobilization more efficient. For the second question, I argue that the differences in each country's wartime experience-the state's projection about the duration and depth of mobilization, the eventual length of the war, the sequence of war planning, and the result of the war-influenced how, and to what degree, the Japanese and American states intervened in health insurance. The goal of this paper is to construct a framework for understanding the relationship between war and health insurance by examining the cases of Japan and the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper will analyze the ways that Japan has approached nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in recent years. More specifically, in addition to the diverse approaches that have been taken by Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, my paper will examine the extent to which U.S. policies influence the disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives of the Japanese government in the international arena. Preliminary research suggests that Tokyo is placing more emphasis on nonproliferation than on nuclear disarmament, creating two major reasons for concern. First, the government of Japan, despite its continuing public campaign to promote nuclear disarmament while seeking the assistance of civil society organizations, would be especially sensitive to the policy concerns of Washington, which, as many critics argue, has developed hegemonic global interests. Second, Tokyo would be alienating itself from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations that in recent years have increased their international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Second World War killed approximately fifty million people, while it led policies and institutions to improve people’s health. This paper will ask why and how these events occur ironically at the same time, and rethink the development of health insurance policies. Scholars explain welfare state development by focusing on industrialization, labor power, culture, and policy and institutional path dependence. When they do study the impact of war, they tend to treat war as a simple and identical exogenous shock and do not address how variations in war experiences affect policies and institutions. This paper contrasts ‘Japanese’ war with ‘American’ war in terms of a war’s duration, depth of mobilization, casualties, battle sequence, and war-fighting regime. It also examines how war mobilization formed and consolidated the Japanese national health insurance policies in the 1930s and the 1940s. This paper has three contributions. First, theoretically, it shows the difficulties of existing studies to take variations in war experiences into their analyses, and suggests a necessity of further studies to understand the relationship between war and health insurance policy. Second, empirically, it examines origins and development of the Japanese health insurance that political scientists have not sufficiently addressed. Third, it sheds a new light on a frequently asked question: Why does the United States not have the comprehensive national health insurance system? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the balance of material costs and benefits of nuclear armament for Japan is sensitive to small changes in the scope and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence supports the current role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. This paper scrutinizes this assumption in terms of a constraint that is especially difficult to change: what kind of deterrent strategy can Japan implement against nuclear weapon states? I start with pessimistic assumptions about the need for an independent nuclear deterrent, and optimistic assumptions about the feasibility of building nuclear weapons, both of which are crucial for prediction and advocacy of nuclear armament. The first set of assumptions, in which the United States no longer extends deterrence, and China values victory in nuclear war against Japan, rules out a small force de frappe for Japan. Instead, Japan will need a large retaliatory force, even with an asymmetric counter-recovery strategy against energy resources, transportation, and sea power. This deterrent is not likely to become operational without a decade of investment. In short, a claim that a small nuclear deterrent is necessary and sufficient for Japan contradicts itself. Japan needs either a large nuclear deterrent, or none of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many countries use U.S. insider trading doctrine as a model, in part as a result of historical and political factors and in part because the United States is seen as a market leader--an early adopter with a well developed, disaggregated, public securities market. Yet, despite these convergent beginnings and a general agreement on the nature of the regulated conduct (i.e., prohibiting securities trading by insiders possessing material nonpublic information), operative insider trading rules in the United States (as a rule originator) have evolved to protect different interests and regulate different specific market activities than insider trading rules in other countries. Using existing insider trading law and regulation in the United States, Germany, and Japan, this paper (a) identifies the common roots and divergent evolution of insider trading doctrine in these nations, (b) articulates ways in which differences in current insider trading doctrine may be meaningful, and (c) isolates possible reasons for the existence and persistence of the observed doctrinal divergence. Divergent political, economic, and societal histories, and differences in legal systems and traditions, are at issue in the analysis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a comparison of Japanese koenkai and American political machines in order to build an analytical framework with which to better understand reciprocal relationships between those in power and their constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War world Japanese security policy has grasped at nationalistic elements within Japanese society in attempts to "securitize" itself by means of a foreign policy independent of the United States. Working from International Security: A New Framework for Analysis by Buzan et al., this paper examines Japanese security policy in light of Japan’s attempts to securitize itself in non traditional ways that impact traditional security, while focusing on the policy implications of Japan’s ongoing failure to securitize its economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how African Americans in the trans-Pacific black communities viewed the interracial intimacies between African American soldiers and Japanese women and the intraracial gender conflicts within the African American community in Japan under U.S. military occupation. Based upon major black newspapers and magazines as primary sources, I discuss in this paper how African American men and women in both sides of the Pacific, through the debate over the black-Japanese intimate relationships, negotiated race, gender, and national identities in the larger political and ideological context of the U.S. military occupation of Japan. I argue that African American soldiers and the African American newsmen who were stationed in occupied Japan constructed the masculinist and Orientalist discourses of Japanese femininity as a discursive strategy to discipline the gender behaviors of the civilian and military African American women, who were exploring alternative gender and class identities with an enhanced social status in Japan under U.S. military occupation. Moreover, I suggest that African American men and women in the trans-Pacific black communities invested in the dominant gender/sexual ideology of "domesticity" in the larger American society during the early Cold War period as well as the contemporary African American anti-racist politics, when they debated the interracial dating and marriage between African American GIs and Japanese women in occupied Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries in the OECD have played a significant financial role in providing foreign aid for HIV/AIDS. In accounting for the convergence of AIDS funding behaviors, constructivist international relations theories w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the ever growing international human rights norm against the death penalty, two advanced industrial democracies, Japan and the United States, shy away from global collaboration to abolish this "inhuman and degrading" punishment. I ask why the international human rights norm that prohibits capital punishment seems to have little impact on the United States and Japan. Why have these two advanced democracies been averse to implementing the international human rights norm? What are the salient similarities between these two cases that may help explain their divergence from other advanced democracies? How do these similarities play out in the particular context of noncompliance? In presenting these questions, I do not purport to revisit wider historical and sociological debates about why some countries exempt themselves from international human rights provisions. Instead, I highlight several of the most important characteristics. A careful comparative analysis of the similarities of these two cases may help to illuminate the forces that are likely to be brought to noncompliance of these countries beyond the area of human rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly believed by scholars that supporting immigrant assimilation is anti-immigrant. We show thatthis does not apply in Japan, as assimilationists are more supportive of immigration. We theorize that this difference in the impact of assimilationism between countries such as the United States and Japan, derives from different national legitimizing myths. We conducted a new national sample survey in Japan to test whether and how beliefs over assimilation influence attitudes towards immigration. The results show two important conclusions. First, there is a large anti-immigrant sentiment in Japan. Second, after controlling for other known determinants of attitudes towards immigration, we find that those who are encouraging assimilation are most likely to support increasing the level of immigration, immigrant equal rights, and have more correct views about immigrant crime in Japan. Thus, the quick association often made in the United States of assimilation with racism is not generalizable to all cultures, and may need to be re-examined in other contexts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the occurrence and frequency of election night corruption by examining the victory margins of races in Japan, Canada, and the United States. If election night corruption (the adjusting of vote totals late on election night when it is known how many votes are enought to secure a victory) occurs, we expect to see anomalous numbers of ultra close races. Our hypothesis is that election night corruption will be less likely in Canada and Japan because of the lesser levels of overall political corruption in Canada and the centralization and independence of the election bureaucracy in Japan. However, we find statistically significant evidence of election night corrution in both the United States and Canada. We also find that the net effect of the corruption benefits the Liberal Party in Canada and the Democratic Party in the United States. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people form policy preferences? A large literature stresses the non-rational nature of decision making. Rational policy preferences require learning about specific details in a competitive political environment. Yet, research shows that most people do not have the skills to understand a policy debate. One way people can understand policy is through help from their social networks. Social network influence on policy preference is largely ignored. This research tests the impact from political discussion in social networking on policy preference. We show that the likelihood of supporting a policy increases when one's social network members also support that policy, after controlling for ideology, party identification, and socioeconomic determinants. We examine data from the 2000 American National Election Study (NES) and Japanese Election Study (JES3) because unique questions asked in those surveys provide rich social network data to test. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postwar officials in Japan, like their counterparts in Germany, faced the daunting task of rebuilding their country’s relationships with other states and of placing these relations on a new foundation to replace the discredited politics of their recent past. In these circumstances, Konrad Adenauer and the CDU in Germany moved quickly to cement alliance ties with the West, to pursue broader institutional arrangements in Europe, and to commit themselves in general to arrangements that limited rather than reasserted the power of the German state. Superficially, Japan appears to have followed a similar course through its defense pact with the U.S. and its constitutional renunciation of military forces. Yet Japan’s decisive postwar Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, embraced none of these goals. Although he sought strict limits on the Japanese military establishment, he was eager to reassert the power and sovereign right of the Japanese state. Moreover, he embraced the international commitments of the Defense Treaty only with great reluctance. And, even so, he was roundly criticized for having gone too far. A constructivist analysis of language, rules, and order helps to account for Japan’s postwar choices. Trying to find its place in a new international order, Japan confronted a specific instance of a generic problem of order. Speech act theory identifies three strategic pathways for managing such problems, leading to three different cultures of order: Hobbesian (or directive), Lockean (or assertive), and Kantian (or commissive). Postwar circumstances ruled out one of these, the Hobbesian strategy, in Japan (and Germany). Despite their similar structural positions, Japan and Germany made different choices from among the remaining alternatives--choices that continue to reverberate in contemporary Japanese and German foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Conventional explanations for the formulation of the defense doctrine of individual states are based on an analysis of the international environment and the power and skill of actors within the political system to respond to this external environment. The gradual evolution of Japan's military posture towards greater capabilities and assertiveness is not the result solely of domestic political forces responding to a changing international environment, however. External actors also play an important role in how Japan crafts its defense posture, even sees itself. Foremost among such actors is the United States, as a collective entity and also as individual bureaucratic actors within this larger whole, most importantly the Department of Defense and the individual military services working through the mechanism of the U.S.-Japan alliance. U.S. pressure for Japan to share in the development challenges and costs of creating a workable ballistic missile defense (BMD) system is one case in point. Coordination with the United States in this important and costly defense initiative requires Japan to address core aspects of its Cold War security identity related to such issues as the export of weapons components, the military use of outer space, the overall defense budget, civilian control, and coordination among the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)/Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Cabinet Office, and the civilian bureaucracy. This paper examines such interaction with an eye towards its effect on Japan's evolving post-Cold War military posture and position in the East Asian security order. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT #1Japan's Post-Mahanian Maritime StrategyThis paper will assess the dynamics of maritime security in Northeast Asia using the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval officer who, writing around the turn of the nineteenth century, contended that "sea power" was founded on the "three pillars" of international commerce, naval stations scattered along the sea lanes to support the operations of fuel-thirsty warships, and, most importantly for him, a powerful battle fleet. Mahan's works exhibited a strong geographical hue, urging the United States to build a fleet capable of defending the Caribbean sea lanes against the largest concentration of naval forces likely to be hurled against it. Only by securing the Caribbean basin, its "Mediterranean," declared Mahan, could the United States dig an isthmian canal and wrest away its rightful share of the Asia trade.We have unearthed considerable evidence suggesting that China will pursue a Mahanian maritime strategy as its diplomatic, economic, and military power waxes. Influential Chinese strategists talk of "absolute control" over China's littoral waters, through which the shipments of raw materials upon which the nation's economic growth has come to depend must pass. In so doing, they routinely invoke Mahan's writings. If indeed Beijing follows Mahan's path to sea power, it will regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas much as Mahan regarded the Caribbean: as an expanse in which naval dominance is vital to national prosperity.If so, an increasingly assertive Chinese maritime strategy will intersect with that of Japan, which has been rethinking its own approach to the uses of sea power, in large part because it relies on the same sea lanes for its own imports of oil, gas, and other commodities. Whether Tokyo would entrust the safety of its seaborne commerce to a China jealous of its "Caribbean" is an open question. Also problematic for Sino-Japanese relations are conflicting claims to islands whose adjacent sea beds purportedly contain major oil and gas reserves.Yet few, if any, Japanese strategists look to Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance. They do not quote Mahan; nor do they urge Tokyo to found its maritime strategy on Mahanian precepts or some distinctively Japanese derivative thereof. Why is that so? Was Mahan discredited by association with the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s? Was he simply forgotten during the postwar years, when large segments of the Japanese populace looked with revulsion on the use of military force? Upon what maritime theories will Tokyo base its emerging naval strategy, if not those of Mahan? With what effect?By venturing some answers to these questions, the study will show how Japanese strategy may evolve over the next decade and how the strategies deployed by Tokyo and Beijing may interact. Our findings and recommendations will be of immediate use to policymakers in Tokyo, as well as to policymakers and alliance managers in Washington, which, if recent events are any guide, will depend increasingly on the U.S.-Japanese alliance to sustain its East Asia strategy in the coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's North Korea policy throughout the postwar period was dictated by its need to maintain its alliance with the United States to secure its own peace. The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework did not alter Japan's fundamental policy toward North Korea. The current nuclear crisis and the prospect of a nuclear North Korea is forcing Tokyo to review its approach to Pyongyang. Japan supports the six-party talks as a means to solve the nuclear crisis, but it is increasingly aware that the multilateral framework may not be able to produce an outcome acceptable to both North Korea (the source of Japan's security anxiety) and the United States (the most reliable security ally), as well as to the other regional powers. A nuclear North Korea would spell an end to the Pyongyang Declaration, in which Japan and North Korea stated that normalization of their bilateral relations would contribute to the broader regional peace and stability. It would force Japan to reconsider its security policy in a fundamental way, with far reaching implications for Japan's relations with the other neighboring countries. This paper will discuss Japan's current policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis and the implications of a nuclear North Korea for Japan's relations with the United States and other neighboring countries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although U.S. policy toward Asia is often articulated in terms of the emergence and political evolution of China, the U.S.-Japanese relationship has been the primary means of effecting American policy in the region for over a century and a half. If Washington is to achieve a second "Pax Americana" in this century, the relationship with Japan will continue to be a major factor as U.S. policymakers attempt to best devise and implement diplomatic and defense policy in Asia. The rapid development of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance in the past decade indicate that it will continue to be a viable and valuable policy tool in this effort, although there are several areas where it remains deficient relative to the demands placed upon it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accounts of the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan typically stress the importance of positive incentives in gaining cooperation and deterring resistance. Yet few of these accounts examine occupation policy as it was initially conceived prior to the defeat and enacted during the initial period of surrender. As such, it remains unclear whether U.S. policymakers believed in 1945 that positive incentives would be sufficient to gain compliance. This study therefore examines the overall plans for peace as well as the specific measures to enforce that peace as detailed in occupation handbooks and manuals. I argue that the positive incentives designed to win hearts and minds so often associated with the occupations came secondary to strategies emphasizing the strategic use of violence to deter post-war resistance. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]