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This paper argues for the benefits of bridging the debate between rationalism and constructivism to European foreign policy analysis. It is suggested that European Foreign Policy is driven by two interdependent forces, which are defined as security and normative considerations. Security policy is, in this paper, regarded as predominantly driven by intergovernmental and rationalist processes whilst norms are the focus of a communitarian and constructivist approach to European Foreign Policy. The predominance of these two processes is however constantly in a flux, depending on the foreign policy issue at hand and the behaviour of the actors involved. Many regard rationalist and constructivism approaches to foreign policy analysis as opposites. This paper seeks to argue otherwise.The EU is here seen as both an arena and an actor. Foreign policy makers are perceived to be acting along a continuum, moving from the logic of consequentialism to the logics of arguing and appropriateness, as they are been socialised into the foreign policy processes. It is however argued that this movement can in some cases be reversed in which actors move back to favouring a rationalist logic of consequentialism depending on the foreign policy interest at play. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Professor Bull has mentioned, the title of this panel is, "The New Special Relationship?: post-Gaullist France and America." The title of my paper is, "Washington, Sarkozy, and the Defense of Europe." My title is both consistent and misleading. Consistent because in some respects I treat defense issues in the paper; misleading because I go beyond that focus to mention the defense of Europe and Western civilization in a broader sense. This is partly because of my current proclivities, as manifested in my most recent book, "La Republique de Dieu," published in Paris earlier this year. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) encompass enormous resources. In addition to the member states' own military and civilian capabilities and assets, a number of other instruments have been created at the EU level, such as EU Special Representatives and the European Development Fund. Moreover, EU diplomatic initiatives, trade promotions, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and environmental policies are all instruments that can be employed by the union. However, these institutions, capabilities, resources, instruments and policies each have their own structure, logic and rationale. While some of them work well together, many others do not and may even work counter to each other. This paper argues that the EU must better coordinate all elements of the CFSP and ESDP in order to effectively employ the instruments and capabilities of the Union in a global world. EU policy vis-á-vis Macedonia will be used as an example to illustrate the need for better coherence and why Europe must become more skilled at coordinating and combining analyses and strategies in the CFSP and ESDP, between EU institutions and between member states. The issue of coherence is complex and exists at many stages and on many levels. The paper will outline a model for improving coherence in the CFSP and ESDP by drawing on EU trade policy as a blueprint. The EU has successfully negotiated with one voice for many years during bilateral talks with other countries and in organizations such as the WTO. The paper will conclude by discussing what role the position of an EU Foreign Minister and an EU diplomatic service would play in establishing more coherence in the CFSP and ESDP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The International Politics of Failing States" prepared for presentation at the "46th Annual Conference of the International Studies Association" held in Honolulu, Hawaii from March 1 to 5, 2005. The paper discusses the securitization of failed states with evidence from the U.S., Great Britain and Germany. The author says that the failed states discourse assists to create a bridge between development and security policy.

The new democracies of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been at the forefront of integration into West European intergovernmental organizations since the fall of communism. Cooperation among Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland began in the post-communist era at the 1991 summit in Visegrad, Hungary. Although states in the West encouraged cooperation, particularly as a condition for membership in the EU and NATO, national security priorities of the Visegrad states diverge due to historical experiences and geostrategic location. The three states share a common insecurity from being positioned throughout history between great powers that have pursued expansionist policies from time to time. Although the foreign policy agenda of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have been quite similar since the fall of communism, each state maintains different policy priorities and different traditional perceptions of external threats. Moreover, the three states have experienced varying degrees of security anxiety from the end of the bipolar system. The breakup of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the velvet divorce of the Czech and Slovak republics have had direct implications on security, trade, and foreign relations for each state. In neighboring East European states, military bases that once housed Soviet troops are currently being offered to the hegemonic power of the U.S. for troop redeployment consideration, and the U.S. military already has a presence as a NATO force on the Taszar air base in Hungary. This paper will examine the security postures of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland since the Visegrad Summit in 1991. What are the competing exogenous pressures that affect the security policies of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland? To what degree does cooperation impinge upon the security priorities and the sovereignty of Central European states? Can these states achieve relative gains vis-a-vis neighboring states and increase their influence with competing regional powers, or can shared norms and values from regional cooperation increase absolute gains and increase regional stability? In order to evaluate the security concerns, collective security, neoliberal institutionalism, and realism will be introduced as frameworks of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States currently plays a key role in shaping the European security enviroment and future agenda. But the events of 911 and the war on Iraq have raised fundamental questions about what role the United States sees for itself in Europe and in Europe’s role in the world. This paper examines developments in the Bush Doctrine and assesses the likely way forward in US policy and the impact this will have on transatlantic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivist theories of securitization are built on a foundation of communicative action tenets. While this represents an important and innovative advance in international relations theory, securitization ignores some of the components involved in a successful communicative act. Williams (2003) calls for securitization theory to incorporate the hitherto ignored effects of mass media and in this paper we answer this call. We first show that securitization's specification of leaders' speech acts and audiences' legitimative discourse presumes mass media actors are indifferent in how they convey leader representations and justifications of crises. We take this presumption as an empirical question and execute a study of whether the national presses of ally countries differently emphasized the frames Bush invoked in their news coverage of key September 11th speeches. We show from comparisons of chi-square distributions and regression analyses that, far from being passive conveyers of speech frames, the national presses of the US, Canada, France, Britain and Ireland (1) did not convey all of Bush's securitizing problem representations and response justifications proportionate to the extent Bush invoked them in his speeches, and (2) that for each national press factors based on professional norms and/or organizational routines increased the likelihood that a speech sentence would be conveyed in a news story. We discuss the implications of our findings for how securitization theory should conceptualize media actors when redressing this gap in its explanatory models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cumulative impact of globalization and internationalization in Europe and Asia is profound. This chapter develops its argument in several steps. Sections 1 and 2 highlight, respectively, the significance of regionalism and regionalization and of globalization and internationalization. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the different ways that globalization, internationalization and regionalization combine to create a world of open regions. They do so by investigating cultural affairs, an issue that illustrates with particular clarity the confluence of international and global factors. Section 3 analyzes cultural diplomacy, like national security, a central prerogative of the state. Internationalization theory expects persistent national differences, illustrated here by the different approaches that the Japanese and German state have taken in this policy domain. Section 4 looks at popular culture, like finance, a preferred domain for processes that are escaping state control. Globalization theory expects convergence across nations and regions. Taken together, both sections make two claims. First, different combinations of global and international effects create open regionalism in both Europe and Asia. Second, the international and global processes that create openness are not sufficiently powerful to wash away enduring regional differences that set Asia apart from Europe. Section 5 identifies these differences. In Asia the politically defining institution is the market, typically operating along ethnic or national lines. Identity capitalism is thus the characteristic practice of Asian regionalism. Europe’s defining institution is law with its primarily regulatory effects on policies and behavior. Formal political institutions are the most typical regional practice of European regionalism. The paper’s final section 6 contrasts briefly today’s open regionalism in cultural affairs with the historical experience of closed regionalism of the 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception, the Western Sahara conflict has been imbedded in a regional struggle with international implications, involving most of the key regional actors, as well as outside powers seeking to balance their interests with all parties concerned. Thus, the Western Sahara is at the center of any foreign policy toward the Maghreb region. This is the case for the US, even though the Maghreb remains peripheral, or for the European Union, mainly France and Spain as central actors.This paper will discuss the evolution of American and European policies towards the Western Sahara, in particular, and with the Maghreb, in general, i.e., the interaction of these policies with each of the regional actors, namely, Algeria, Morocco, and the SADR. The paper will also analyze the influence of other policies on the resolution of the conflict, or lack thereof, including the “war on terrorism,” as well as the process of democratization in the region and other developments in the Middle East. It will be argued that the conflict resolution if conducted to its conclusion within the UN framework would constitute for the US an example of its capacity to resolve conflict within the international system and for the EU an opportunity to affirm its intrinsic external policy, when its overall foreign policy appears scattered if not atomized by the different influences pursued by the EU Member States. However, considering the proximity of the Maghreb to Europe, and the general approach to solving issues at the European Union level, this could constitute a breakthrough for an external policy in the making, contrasting with the negligible influence of the European Union regarding the Middle East peace process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As many international organisations become increasingly institutionalised, scholars have started to ask new questions about the effects of institutionalisation. However, such effects have for most part been sought in terms of efficiency of, and compliance with, the established rules and procedures, but rarely in terms of the provision of political leadership. In this paper, it is argued that the latter is very different from the former, and the central question is: how does a “collective institution,” with the main purpose of providing political leadership, fare as it is develops more rules, more procedures and more formality? The object under study is the European Council, and the effects of institutionalisation on its capacity to provide leadership for the EU’s foreign policy. This paper builds on findings from a unique series of elite interviews with acting or former heads of state or government, ministers for foreign affairs, as well as top-level officials from national administrations and EU institutions, all with direct insights into the closed meetings of the European Council. The conclusions are pointing to some very unintended consequences of institutionalisation; while the successive formalisation of the preparatory procedures and meetings have been undertaken to increase efficiency, it has at the same time led to less intimacy, reduced confidence between the participants, and a meeting climate which is no longer conducive to the formulation of new and innovative ideas. The result has, in short, been a substantial loss of the premiers’ capacity to collectively provide political leadership for the European Union. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whilst there is an emerging theoretical consensus in critical security studies on the Bakhtinian understanding of the 'other' as an epistemological and ontological necessity for the comprehension and completion of the 'self', the response of the 'other' to the construction of its identity has generally escaped scholarly attention, not the least in the context of Central and East European states' responses to the long-time Western designation 'Europe but not Europe'. Yet, this paper argues, the experience of being framed as simultaneously in Europe and not quite European has left a constitutive imprint on Poland's and the Baltic states' current self-understandings and security imaginaries. This paper applies William Connolly's notion of the politics of becoming in order to analyse the Polish and Baltic versions of becoming a subject in the field of post-Cold War European foreign and security policy. Setting out from a Sartrean dictum 'we are what we make of what others have made of us', this paper presents a critical discourse analysis on what the representation of Central and East European countries in Western post-Cold War security debates has made of them, with a particular reference to the bifurcations of New/Old and modern/postmodern Europe. The paper thus aims to advance Bakhtin's ideal-typical model's applicability to the study of international relations by pinpointing the inevitable infusion of collective identity formation with power relations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up to date, the work of Pierre Bourdieu has been ill understood in International Relations theory. This paper will discuss some fundamental concepts and illustrate their use in international research with the example of a recent research project on security management in Europe, focussing on the restructuring of the European police and domestic security agendas. The paper will notably elaborate the use of the concept of ?fields? and the problems of its operationalisation in transnational empirical research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper utilizes anti-essentialist theories of security so as to position the private military and security industry within the historic evolution of military organization and the emerging strategic complexes of global violence peculiar to the modalities of war-making in the 21st century. For this purpose, it first examines the way a specific system of social and political differentiation historically constituted itself as an effect of changes in the European apprehension of warfare in the 17th and 18th century. The paper then proceeds to compare this modern ideal of territorial, state-centric and rule-based ?security government? to an opposing logic of decentralized and polymorphous ?security governance?, which tends to inform recent articulations of security discourse. The ongoing growth of the private military and security industry is finally explained in terms of precisely this shift in the global application and organization of military power. The de-territorialization of warfare, it is argued, exceeds a set of formative distinctions intrinsic to the historic process wherein the modern state came to realize itself as bearing the sole monopoly of violence. In particular, it thereby threatens the civil-military dichotomy implied by the Westphalian state-system and thus tends to compromise the ?civil? spaces left available for non-military action. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bourdieu?s social theory has become a new reference point in IR theory. Initially only used in New European Security Theory (NEST), Bourdieus concepts of capital, field and practice is increasingly adopted to think other transnational spaces then the field of security. Bourdieu?s concepts certainly have opened new intellectual space to think of international relations differently ? and critically. The field concept has provided an alternative metaphor to the container of the nation state. Capital has proved to be useful concept to acknowledge that there is more then one face of power ? seven, if you want. The concept of practice in its discursive and non-discursive expressions has finally made it to be a concept of analytical worth in the IR discourse, and Bourdieu might help to return practice to the linguistic turn ? to paraphrase Iver Neumann. Although, most likely Bourdieu will face Habermas? fate ? to be disciplined in the disciplinary canon (which will be proved when we see the first ?Bourdieu inspired? article in International Organizations), this paper engages with a non-disciplinary, direct critique of Bourdieu?s theory in the first place. In discussing the telling critique expressed by Bruno Latour, I will question if Bourdieu?s conceptual tools will be useful in future to think transnational spaces and a ?world society?.The paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will discuss Latour?s critique on Bourdieus use of the economic metaphor, which indicates the importance to find a balance between Bourdieus and Foucaults version of power and authority ? of having power and of being in power. From this perspective it becomes clear that Bourdieus solution for the agency-structure dilemma (the field) is problematic. Next, I will ask in what way the Bourdieuan problem has become an IR problem. In reviewing some of the ?Bourdieu-inspired? analyses of transnational spaces in IR, I will investigate in what way scholars have already fallen in the ?field trap?. As the review will reveal, (most) scholars have acknowledged the problem, and have, innovatively, added a disciplinary shot of Foucault to their studies. However, the risks still prevail and not all of the solutions are convincing. Thus, I will, thirdly, sketch an alternative of studying transnational spaces by relying on what has been called the sociology of translation. In introducing the principles and vocabulary of this school of thought, and discussing some of the parallels to existing ?relational? accounts in IR, I argue that this basic vocabulary not only prevents us from falling in the ?field trap?, but can guide research of a new type. In resisting the disciplinary obligation that every good paper needs at least an empirical case study, I will conclude by a summary of the argument and by sketching elements of an international sociology of translation. In sum, the paper questions a ?new fashion? of the disciplinary sociological turn in adding and translating some non-disciplinary thoughts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that the European approach to security is new and distinct. Its strength lies in capitalizing on international norms, institutions, and law, while converting a variety of global connections into soft power. Multipolarity has challenged would-be hegemons who no longer wield the power to impose their values on potential dissidents and enemies, by the same token creating new opportunities for soft power. Europe seeks to wield moral authority in terms of both means and ends it pursues. In the final analysis, this paper examines to what extent moral authority, as the most critical component of soft power, has become a security tool in a multipolar world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Cold War ended Europe was faced with a variety of challenges and sources of instability on its immediate eastern borders. Especially with the break up of Yugoslavia and the following bloody wars, it saw concretely what the impact of potential instability can be on the 'security regime' it had carefully created during the Cold War. Thus it successfully and rapidly started the process of including the countries on its eastern border in this security regime and its common framework of conflict resolution. When doing that it had inevitably excluded its Mediterranean partners, its neighbours on the south. Even the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established by the Barcelona Declaration and the efforts to intensify co-operation with the countries on the southern flank had not really helped these countries to turn into stable democracies unlike the Central and Eastern European countries. Thus after a reflection upon the almost 10 years of Barcelona Declaration experience, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004 with the main aim of making up for the incomplete goals that the Barcelona Declaration had decided to fulfill. This paper looks at the potential of the European Neighbourhood policy in finding solutions to the sources of instability existing in the neighbors of the EU; both in the Mediterranean and the Middle East region but also in the northern regions as well. It attempts to answer the following questions: What are the most urgent sources of security threats in the neighborhood regions? How will the European Neighborhood Policy help to find solutions for them? In what ways is it different from the Mediterranean Partnership initiative established by the Barcelona Declaration? What can be the most important deficiencies of this policy? Is an associate membership status likely to influence the reform process in these countries more than being involved in a partnership initiative with the EU? In this paper I hope to shed some light on the efforts of the EU to stabilise the regions surrounding it and analyse the success of its strategies in protecting its security regime by looking at the European Neigborhood Policy in particular. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Realism has always been considered one of the safest foreign policy strategies that a nation can follow. Focusing on one's own self interest and the interests of their countrymen has always guaranteed a level of security and consistency that has earned the favor of so many U.S. officials. Now, some of the nations that provided the United States, Great Britain, and other European powers with the most economic or regional control years ago, are the same nations that monopolize our mass media as the plague of international security today.Some of modern histories most notorious revolutions and rebellions have spurred out of years of external meddling and oppression. The Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the 1979 revolutions in both Iran and Nicaragua are the direct result of U.S. intervention and realist tactics. The United States has never had a clear foreign policy except for the cries of liberty and democracy that have carried our nation against every enemy from Nazism to Communism, from Terrorism to Despotism. However, every conflict seems to end in the same confusion surrounding the actual objective of the United States government; is the main objective oil or freedom?The solution is a new look on the workings of the world, that actual promotion of liberalism and constant support for the will of the people, rather than using realist tactics, will eventually result in greater economic and political gain for the United States. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of diplomatic and military policies of the U.S. and their impact on the EU-NATO-U.S. relationship. One of the innovations in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (NSS02) document is its implied recognition that states are not the only actors that exercise power in the world. Also discussed are interrelated issues and trends affecting the relations between the U.S. and Europe, including the unpopularity of American policy in the continent.

The article considers the temporal structure of European security identity cited at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Hawaii in March 2005. It found that the dominant security discourse in Western Europe was one that depicted Europe's past as the main threat. It mentions the implications of the growth of the European Union (EU) for the Franco-German tandem. It notes that temporal structures and political identity are closely linked and resistant to time.

Looks at issues surrounding the crisis of the transatlantic security community. Example of structural changes in world politics; Analysis of the policy disagreements between the U.S. and Europe; Claims on the contemporary crisis in U.S.-European relations.

Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that has received increasing attention in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and more recently with the invasion of Iraq. However, despite its wide use, anti-Americanism is used often as a polemic term, and then often inconsistently. We attempt to provide a clearer and more consistent definition of anti-Americanism. Then, using newly released Eurobarometer data from the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003, we observe the prevalence of anti-American attitudes among the peoples of Europe, and what leads to these attitudes. We find that ideology, nationalism, attachment to a supranational Europe, the security concerns of Europeans, and U.S. behavior on the international stage are all strong predictors of anti-American attitudes. We then draw inferences about the effects of anti-Americanism. We find that anti-Americanism leads to an erosion of support for NATO and increased support for a defense arrangement led by the European Union, with no noticeable effect for support of defense led by national governments. Furthermore, anti-Americanism is increasing in Europe, which implies this trend of decreasing popular support for NATO and increasing support for an EU-led defense will continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to most predictions and contemporary analysis, innovation with regard to strategic doctrine, military posture, and institutions has left the deep structure of the U.S.-European security bargain intact. The allocation of rights and responsibilities among the contracting parties to guarantee each others? security interests has survived the end of the Cold War. The United States continues to exercise robust leadership, and the Europeans have sustained recognition of their junior status vis-à-vis the Americans, thus making transatlantic security cooperation an instance of enduring hierarchy. This paper defends this non-conventional empirical claim, and offers a logic that explains stability at the level of deep structure.To defend the empirical claim, I do two things: First, I conceptualize the transatlantic security relationship of the Cold War era as a multi-dimensional contract, whose parties have entered into a hierarchical (authority) relationship. In contrast to (Realist) advocates of the discontinuity thesis, transatlantic security cooperation served not only to collectively defend against an external threat, but provided mechanisms that allowed the contracting parties to reassure each other of their benign intentions. In contrast to recent influential contributions in the (Liberal-institutionalist) continuity school, I emphasize that the European allies conferred special rights and privileges on the United States so that its asymmetric share of the material burden went hand in hand with an asymmetric amount of (legitimate) political discretion, yielding hierarchy. After defining the status quo baseline in this fashion, I show that the contracting parties have not decisively deviated from it either prior to or since the end of the Cold War.Existing explanations for the trajectory of U.S.-EU relations fall short in three ways: First, they do not capture the assertiveness with which the United States has pushed for a strategic reorientation of the security bargain, both prior to and after the events of 9/11. Second, they neglect to reflect on the prevailing lack of intra-European consensus with regard to security and defense policies. Finally, in ignoring the dynamics just mentioned, they sidestep the actual puzzle: Why, despite a U.S. drive for change at the operational level, and a lack of unified European loyalty to the original bargain, has the status quo prevailed? I argue that the deep structure of transatlantic security cooperation has remained stable for two reasons. First, its European partners have recognized that the bargain underlying the European Union cannot be modified so as to present a functional substitute for junior membership in the transatlantic club. In fact, the vitality of the intra-European bargain, both before and after its post-1990 amendments, is structurally dependent on the preservation of the transatlantic status quo. Second, in light of Europe?s voluntary subordination, the United States recommitted to the transatlantic alliance, since it allowed for the exercise of robust European, and by extension, global leadership without the exigencies that power projection through ad hoc coalitions of the willing impose. This project contributes both to the substantive debate on transatlantic security relations, and to theoretical discussions over the relative conceptual and explanatory validity of balancing and binding models in security studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines why EU member states may or may not perceive that body as the appropriate level and institution for advancing national interests in the areas of foreign policy and defense and security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to argue that under modern international conditions it would be counterproductive for any European country to assume that it would be feasible or possible to balance against US hegemony. Such an effort would not serve the interests of those who might be so tempted: moreover it would entail the risk of reproducing the same hazardous conditions for the international system that led to the break down of peace between 1890 and 1914. However, even though this implies continued US dominance in a unipolar political system, there are other areas where the USA is not so preponderant and it in these that the greatest challenge lies for the United States in the future in its relations with Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift to unipolarity has created strong incentives for enhanced security regionalization, both for the United States as well as for regional states, each for different reasons. This logic was most clearly exemplified in Europe, with the concomitant ev ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defense Transformation has been pursued by both American and European militaries throughout the past decade. It has been at the core of the discussion what precisely the purpose of military force is in the new security environment. The direction in which ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The member states of the European Union each have different security needs. Their national security policies each member reflects not only the needs of the states, but also the goals of the public and the domestic institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evaluating the conventional wisdom about CFSP cooperation against a random sample of world events, 1994-2003 ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is no doubt that examinations of state security have been around for decades, even centuries. However, these security studies have often been narrow in focus, exploring various military strategies and foreign policies that best protect a state (or states?i.e. collective security) and its people/interests. These types of security studies have been dominant in the field of international politics, and though important and useful, only offer us a few lenses to view state security and security issues. Moreover, these ?traditional? security studies often do not critically examine the ways in which and for what purposes certain concerns are articulated as security issues. But, in the past ten years or so, there have been calls by many scholars (particularly those who situate themselves in the English School, the Copenhagen School, and/or loosely in the postmodern tradition) to expand the methods by which we study security as well as its subjects/issues. This has been undertaken primarily by scholars residing in Europe (Buzan and Waever) who often use the European Union as empirical and discursive examples for alternative approaches to security studies in order to question and problematize historical and current ?security? ?threats?. In light of the current state of security studies and the ?interventions? of alternative perspectives on security and foreign policy, new spaces are opening for interpreting ?security? issues. This piece (which is part of a bigger project on the securitization of immigration in the United States), enters these new spaces by examining the rules that govern the ways in which immigration becomes part of the U.S. national discourse on security. That is, I seek to locate the concepts, figures, narratives and codes within the U.S. national/security discourse that limit (and potentially open up) the ways in which political actors talk about immigration since September 11th, 2001. I argue that immigration (broadly defined) has been limited to a security issue?immigration articulated as a military, economic and/or societal security ?threat??in the national discourse because the immigration-security nexus resonates with the American people and the current national vision of the state post 9-11. Identifying these codes and limits enables us to better understand how and why policymakers are constrained in what they can/cannot say regarding immigration. Given this examination, I suggest that these discursive limits enter the realm of national security/foreign policy as they place well-structured constraints on the immigration policies in the United States. In other words, I argue these discursive limits aid in constructing interests and are then transformed into ?immigration as security? policies. In short, it is through these analyses that I offer an account of some current immigration policies (and how they have come to be) and propose a range of possible immigration-as-security policies that may emerge in the United States in coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]