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Presents the perspective of the Independent Group on British Aid (IGBA) 1997 White Paper on International Development. Measures for which the IGBA has been campaigning since the publication of "Real Aid: A Strategy for Britain," in 1982; Significance of the White Paper; Advice from the group regarding the White Paper on International Development.

The article reports on the significance of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland. The Act of Union between the two countries which come into force on January 1, 1800 was the outcome of immediate military necessity. It was also the outcome of decades of spasmodic thought by politicians on both sides of the Irish Sea concerning the relationship between the two islands. But while the overall intention was undoubtedly an integrative one, a failure to understand the nature of Irish politics and society together with the pressing imperatives of war with France generated a casual and shallow attitude towards administrative detail and undermined those master plans.

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1988, when the current EU Cohesion Policy was introduced, it has played an influential role in setting priorities for policies aimed at dealing with the effects of European economic integration on regional and social disparities. Although, latterly, the amount of money spent in the UK through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) has declined, EU programmes have had a disproportionate effect on the design and implementation of UK policies shaping regional and local economic and social development. This paper starts by recalling how EU Cohesion Policy has functioned in the UK, then considers how Brexit may affect regional and social development and the need for a corresponding policy response, focusing on the sorts of policies currently supported by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). The paper shows that filling the policy vacuum will be far from straightforward because complementary national policies and institutional frameworks have lacked consistency or coherence. It concludes by examining the wider policy issues arising from rethinking domestic policy outside the ESIF framework. The sub-national level, in particular, will need a fresh approach following Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concordats were established to formalize working practices between the UK government and the administrations established in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast after the devolution settlement of 1999. After an initial period of academic scrutiny the concordats have been largely forgotten in the academic literature on post-devolution intergovernmental relations (IGR) as relations between the UK and the devolved administrations settled into a relatively non-contentious pattern, perhaps the result of Labour's dominance across the UK. More recently, that non-contentious pattern has started to fray at the edges. This paper examines a set of decisions leading up to the release of the Lockerbie bomber by the Scottish Executive on 20 August 2009. It argues that IGR, for the most part, did not function effectively because of a lack of willingness on the part of the UK government to work to the letter and the spirit of the concordats. While the concordats are intended to be binding ‘in honour only’ this paper argues that until the UK government affords the Scottish Executive parity of esteem, relations between London and Edinburgh will continue to suffer from moments of turbulence. The paper concludes by calling for a formalization of the system of IGR in post-devolution UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses policy change in Britain since 2010 across the three fields of domestic welfare, migration and asylum, and analyses the association between welfare, conditionality and control through the lens of civic stratification. Drawing on the work of Richard Munch and Mary Douglas, it moves beyond existing literature in this area to show that the more complex the classification in play, and the more severe its boundary implications, the more likely the emergence of contestable margins. Informed by Munch's 'battlefield' approach, it provides a discussion of contestable margins in each of the three policy fields and outlines the nature and source of challenges that emerge within the 'institutional battlefield'. A concluding section reflects on what is revealed by viewing welfare, migration and asylum within the same conceptual frame, identifying an emergent welfare paradigm that displays recurrent problems across all three fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers how one of the ‘archipelago of contradictions’ raised by Brexit is the prospect of unconventional policy change, in so far as it includes – amongst other options – ‘returning’ to prior conventions that were scaled up from the UK to the EU, and then returned to the UK through EU directives. To explore this, the paper divides UK equality legislation into three types: (a) that which was created in the UK (b) that which flows from membership of the European Union and (c) that which reflects an outgrowth of the two. The translation of this into social policy has typically taken a patchwork approach, including a discursive public function which addresses the rights of distinct groups as well as their modes of interaction. The scope and scale of existing equality approaches have therefore become central to the kinds of social and political citizenship achieved by Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) Britons. While the dangers of Brexit rhetoric are apparent to see, we do not yet know how withdrawal from the EU revises (a), (b) or (c). The article makes a tentative attempt to shed light on these entanglements by focusing on public policies enacted to pursue race equality in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capitalist economies depend on private business investment, and all governments in similar states compete to induce businesses to invest through various policy interventions. In so doing, they compete with other governments to retain current investors and to encourage new ones from elsewhere. The implications for policy-making and, by extension, citizens, are huge. The pressure on governments to capture new investment has an impact on taxation policies, workplace regulations, legal protections, public infrastructure and social policies. However, not all governments compete for investment in the same way at the same time, and not all businesses are attracted by the same inducements offered by states, highlighting the possibility that public policies shape investment strategies, just as investment strategies also shape public policies. It is its development of relatively unique and aggressive strategies to capture new investment that places the UK in a vulnerable position post-Brexit. It has successfully attracted mobile corporations to its shores, in part because it has offered a particularly favourable gateway into Europe for foreign capital. This raises questions about how the country will seek to compete for capital investment in future. This paper examines these questions with reference to both theoretical and empirical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three-sector model - encompassing the private, public and non-governmental or 'third' sectors - is important to much of the research that is undertaken on development policy. While it may be analytically convenient to separate the three sectors, the realities are more complex. Non-governmental actors and government/public sector agencies are linked in potentially important (though often far from visible) ways via personal relationships, resource flows and informal transactions. This paper seeks to understand these links by studying the 'life-work histories' of individuals who have operated in both the government and third sector. Two main types of such boundary crossing are identified: 'consecutive', in which a person moves from one sector to the other in order to take up a new position, and 'extensive', in which a person is simultaneously active in both sectors. Drawing on a set of recently collected life-work history data, the paper explores the diversity of this phenomenon in three countries. It examines the reasons for cross-over, analyses the experiences of some of those involved, and explores the implications for better understanding the boundaries, both conceptual and tangible, that both separate and link government and third sector in these different institutional contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15-20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the British foreign policy of the eighteenth century. The information about the policy has been retrieved from several archival materials. The major part has been taken from the Newcastle papers that are restored in the British Library. Some of papers of Thomas, Duke of Newcastle, are also referred. Thomas was one of the two Secretaries of State during 1724-1754, before becoming First Lord of the British Treasury. Other important collections include those of another Secretary of State as well as of the Lord Chancellor, Philip, Earl of Hardwicke. Foreign capitals provide the papers of diplomats accredited to the British court. According to these resources, a less politicized response to the apparent dynamics of international relations had been put during the eighteenth century in Great Britain. The domestic implications of policies were also an issue. These were also some instances of a more general unknowable that had affected the British foreign policy.

The idea of using American power 'for purposes which we regard as good' had been a feature of British foreign policy during the Labour governments of 1945-51. In the 1950s, however, Anthony Eden elevated 'power-by-proxy' to the status of strategy as he sought a means to maintain Britain's world role in the face of serious economic enervation. In the event, Eden's innate mistrust of the United States rendered him an imperfect front-man for the strategy -- as Suez confirmed. However, the strategy was subsequently embraced by Eden's successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who from 1957 placed Anglo-American relations at the centre of his government's foreign policy. Yet like Eden before him, the more pro-American Macmillan ultimately doubted whether 'power-by-proxy' could be accomplished by reliance on the United States. Hence, at the close of the 1950s, the strategy underwent an evolution to include a new British relationship with Europe as a complement to the original, though increasingly unreliable, American proxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a framework that combines literature's observations on traffickers' policy-based representations with International Relations (IR) theories, this paper explores the representations of traffickers and anti-trafficking government goals in policies of the United Kingdom's (UK), Scottish and Northern Irish governments. Policies were found to mostly subscribe to a Realist's viewing of human trafficking, emphasising criminal choices. Still, and despite their growing tendency to focus on a wider range of traffickers, their dominant narrative tends to revolve around trafficking stereotypes, often ignoring the full spectrum of traffickers' identities to promote total human trafficking elimination. This discourse may overstate Britain's trafficking problem, sustaining state legitimacy and intervention and narrowing down the scope of anti-trafficking efforts. Conclusively, to ensure a more effective anti-trafficking response, the UK needs to set more feasible goals and based on an in-depth knowledge of traffickers strive to further enrich the policy-promoted human trafficking narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaving the European Union (so-called ‘Brexit’) is a ‘critical moment’ for health policy reform which can pave the way to different pathways, including, a ‘critical juncture’. Given that Brexit cannot be undone without a second referendum, it opens up opportunities to elude European constraints for reform along the lines of equity, employment rights and patient choice. Brexit deepens the financial crisis of the National Health Service (NHS) by increasing hiring costs and imposing new transaction costs to accommodate patient cross-border mobility and international public health needs. Given the weak sustainability of the NHS, it could lead to major system reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of intergenerational fairness has taken hold across Europe since the 2008 financial crisis. In the United Kingdom (UK), focus on intergenerational conflict has been further sharpened by the 2016 'Brexit' vote to take the UK out of the European Union. However, current debates around intergenerational fairness are taking place among policy makers, the media and in think-tanks. In this way, they are conversations about, but not with, people. This article draws on qualitative interviews with 40 people aged 19–85 years and living in North-East England and Edinburgh, Scotland's capital city, to explore whether macro-level intergenerational equity discourses resonate in people's everyday lives. We find widespread pessimism around young people's prospects and evidence of a fracturing social contract, with little faith in the principles of intergenerational equity, equality and reciprocity upon which welfare states depend. Although often strong, the kin contract was not fully ameliorating resentment and frustration among participants observing societal-level intergenerational unfairness mirrored within families. However, blame for intergenerational inequity was placed on a remote state rather than on older generations. Despite the precariousness of the welfare state, participants of all ages strongly supported the principle of state support, rejecting a system based on family wealth and inherited privilege. Rather than increased individualism, participants desired strengthened communities that encouraged greater intergenerational mixing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the response of British policy-makers to American thinking on how to organise Western defence following the formation of the Western military alliance in 1949. As part of their vision, American policy-makers argued for the integration of Western European armed forces and defence production. As the British defence production base had largely survived the war unscathed, the British warfare state was better placed than other Western European governments to resist this American vision for Western defence. Seeing Britain as a major power, British policy-makers remained committed to an independent defence posture within the alliance, ignoring the disapproval of American military leaders. Convinced that its defence industry could produce technologically advanced military weapons equal to those developed in the United States, the British Government continued to maintain an independent armaments production capability rather than participate in the Western European armaments cooperation in the 1950s. When serious problems affected several military aircraft projects in the mid-1950s, the British Government nevertheless looked to the United States for models of how to improve the efficiency of its weapons acquisition process. This article argues that while never Americanised, Britain's participation in Western defence cooperation undermined the British warfare state as a techno-nationalist project from the late 1940s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The management of British diplomacy is being modernised in order to meet the challenges of foreign policy-making in a transformational age. Changing patterns of conflict and cooperation and the progressive erosion of hierarchies and their replacement by networking require that diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy be better integrated with other government actors in order to sustain its relevance and effectiveness. Focusing on the changed role of planning within the United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, this article argues that while these reforms have made some progress towards the integration of diplomats, this process has not gone far enough. It also argues that such integration should not be achieved at the expense of the traditional planning function which contributes a vital source of innovation and analysis in the policy-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the right to health care. Various expressions of this right may be distinguished. These include both individual rights and social rights which could be based upon international treaties and constitutional rights. They may be found in national health legislation and, in some cases, in jurisprudence. To analyze the consequences of limiting the right to health care, a framework for judicial review has been developed which encompasses these expressions of the right to health care. The framework was used to examine legal and health policy developments in three Western and two Eastern European countries. In Italy and the Netherlands the right to health care is protected constitutionally (but on differing legal bases) while the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. In contrast, Hungary and Poland have for many years seen the state take responsible for the provision, administration and allocation of health care services and the right to health care was guaranteed theoretically but not in practice because of the lack of (financial) means. However, the Polish Constitution explicitly anticipates possible limitations of the right to health care. What all these countries have in common is a cost containment perspective where the future will bring even tighter limits on what resources patients may consume. Despite differences in legal structure between these countries, where they seem to converge is on the consequences of putting limitations on the right to health care. The courts in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK have formulated conditions drawn from the acceptance that this right has to be judged within the context of limited resources. It may be concluded that finding a compromise between the right to health care and cost containment policies could also be an issue, Eastern European countries will have to face in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British government's position in the 1996 IGC will reflect long-standing policy positions that have been shared by both main parties. This consistency in policy was partly masked by the tone of British statements on Europe during the Thatcher premierships. However, there was a change of tone when Major came to office, and this was followed by successful British diplomacy in the 1991 IGC on political union, with the result that, on the issues that are under discussion in the 1996 IGC, Britain is largely a status quo state. The government will resist far-reaching changes to the Treaty on European Union, especially any erosion of the three-pillar structure and any further extension of the competences of the European Community. However, it will want to see institutional changes agreed that will pave the way to further enlargement. In these objectives it is likely to find allies because the European Union as a whole has been moving in the British direction since Maastricht, because of public hostility to further integration, the collapse of the federalist coalition, and the 1995 enlargement. However, the influence of Conservative backbenchers is making it more difficult for the present government to adopt the right tone in negotiations. The policies of the Labour Party do not differ markedly from those of the Conservatives, except on social policy, and if there is a change of government before the end of the IGC, the removal of the so-called 'Euro- sceptic' influence on the diplomatic tone of the government might help Britain to achieve its objectives even more successfully than the present government could. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists have long been aware of the need to improve our ability to predict the effect of divergent preference orderings on policy choices made by coalitions. More recently scholars have demonstrated the crucial role of differing assumptions about risk-taking preferences for predicting foreign policy choice. In this paper a theoretical approach for analyzing collective choice in the presence of risk and conflicting preferences is presented and then applied to a series of policy choices in Britain, France, and Germany in two historical periods: one, the three decades before World War I; the other, the decades after World War II. Although the specific cases examined all involve foreign and defense policy options that were embroiled in domestic disputes over extraction, the assumptions and hypotheses presented are designed to be applicable to collective decisionmaking in a wide variety of substantive areas. Indeed, they appear to provide a theoretically grounded interpretation for some characteristic patterns of policy choice that have long intrigued students of comparative foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the American and British attitudes toward Soviet Union. The problem is also a challenging one theoretically, because of the more basic character of some of the deeper attitudes or values that may be involved, such as the attitudes toward economic justice, economic stability, racial equality, religion, freedom of speech, independence of small nations, and solidarity of the United Nations. Any systematic approach to these underlying, value-systems should throw some light upon basic elements of attitude-determination in both national and International affairs. The United Nations was a fighting alliance, with the Soviet Union carrying the heaviest burden of the actual fighting. Most of the information about the Soviet Union in the American newspapers, films, and radio programs was favorable. Books like Mission to Moscow and One World were being widely read.

In June 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) government announced the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign Office. This decision has potential major implications for development education in the UK which has been funded by DFID since 1997. Around Europe, development education whilst primarily funded by Foreign Affairs ministries, has in some countries been closely related to development agencies. To keep governments supportive of development education requires a strong network of civil society organisations. A concern for development education is that a result of the merger of the two UK government departments could mean a move towards projects being directed towards servicing UK government foreign policy objectives rather than international development goals. A future development education strategy should aim to engage all key stakeholders including relevant ministries and civil society organisations plus academic and research bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article puts contemporary debates about the relationship between immigration policy and the welfare state in historical perspective. Relying on new historical data, the article examines the relationship between immigration policy and social policy in Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the modern welfare state emerged. Germany already had comparably strict immigration policies when the German Empire introduced the world's first national social insurances in the 1880s. Denmark, another early social-policy adopter, also pursued restrictive immigration policies early on. Almost all other countries in Western Europe started out with more liberal immigration policies than Germany's and Denmark's, but then adopted more restrictive immigration policies and more generous social policies concurrently. There are two exceptions, Belgium and Italy, which are discussed in the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues in general support of the sIRB rule, but also draws on recent empirical research to highlight several residual weaknesses in the US regulatory structure for research ethics review, and suggests ways in which these weaknesses might be addressed in future regulatory reforms to improve upon the sIRB rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The referendum vote for Remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the small majority for Leave in Wales immediately attracted much attention to the position of the devolved governments on Brexit negotiations and to the impact of Brexit on their jurisdictions. As the core of devolved powers relate to social policy, identifying the impact of leaving the EU on aspects of social policy is highly significant. This article examines the impact of EU programmes, funding, directives and regulations as delivered in recent years, noting the nature of the participation of the devolved administrations in EU decision making. The post-referendum concerns of the devolved governments and their approaches to Brexit and Brexit negotiations are explained. Also discussed are the likely major changes as well as possible changes that will take place in the operation of devolution after Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we explore the implications of Brexit for the UK and the EU's development policies and strategic directions, focusing on the former. While it is likely that the operational process of disentangling the UK from the various development institutions of the EU will be relatively straightforward, the choices that lie ahead about whether and how to cooperate thereafter are more complex. Aid and development policy touches on a wide range of interests-security, trade, climate change, migration, gender rights, and so on. We argue that Brexit will accelerate existing trends within UK development policy, notably towards the growing priority of private sector-led economic growth strategies and blended finance tools. There are strong signals that UK aid will be cut, as successive secretaries of state appear unable to persuade a substantial section of the public and media that UK aid and development policy serves UK interests in a variety of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]