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Surprisingly, the cross-national diffusion of contention over political regimes has slowed down greatly over the last 200 years. Yet at the same time, its rate of success in triggering democratic transitions has increased as clearly. What accounts for these inverse trends and the negative correlation underlying them? After refuting arguments that highlight modernization and globalization, the rise of nationalism, rational learning, and the appeal of norms and values, this paper develops a novel explanation that rests on cognitivepsychological insights and invokes secular organizational developments. In the 19th century, before political parties had arisen, it fell to common people to decide on whether to join challenges to established autocrats. Short on reliable information and political experience, these citizens relied on inferential shortcuts that induced them to follow external precedents of successful regime changes rashly; yet this very rashness, which bred challenges in unfavorable situations, led to limited success. After the rise of parties, by contrast, common people take cues from organizational leaders, who command more information and experience. Before emulating an external precedent and challenging their own rulers, leaders therefore wait for propitious circumstances. For this reason, regime contention in the 20th century diffuses more slowly yet attains higher rates of success. The paper documents these arguments by analyzing the spread of the 1848 revolutions, the impact of the Russian Revolutions of 1917, and the third wave of democratization, exemplified by Chile's transition to democracy during the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the view that globalization is rendering all developed political economies hybrids, this paper argues that it is still useful to speak of distinctive varieties of capitalism. It substantiates that view by putting the process of 'globalization' in a longer historical perspective that explores the response of four political economies to changes in the international economy since 1945. The cases of Britain, France, Germany and Sweden are examined to assess how each responded to economic challenges in the 1950s, late 1960s-1970s, and 1990s-2000s with an emphasis on three types of problems: the work problem, the wage problem, and the problem of total factor productivity. The paper finds that shifts in the international monetary regime and changes endogenous to the existing institutional structure of the economy were as important as exogenous shocks in posing challenges to the economy and that existing institutions conditioned the nature of the response of firms and governments. It concludes that varieties of capitalism continue to display some distinctive features of importance to economic performance and the distribution of well-being and that those varieties can usefully be thought of as the basis for institutionally-conditioned adjustment paths. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with the main factors that influence joint Russia-Europe interactions in short and middle term perspective. It suggests several points to be further discussed. It starts from the point that contemporary Russia presents a political entity, which is not entirely compatible with western international society in cultural, institutional and structural terms. It is for this reason that the existing grounds for cooperation may have too little in common for the emergence of any joined political culture. On the other hand, Russia is already entering into the globalizing world so a balance between possible extremes can be build if domestically appreciated. Being a military power, Russian State needs to have economy that could be compatible with both its security needs and the security needs of its international partners. For the moment, however, Russian economy is, to a degree, closed within itself so a need for a more open economic space with Europe and the US could create strategic incentives. The worrying tendency, however, is that civilizational gap between Russia and Europe is, in fact, growing wider while it also could be bridged in the years ahead. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Before the early 2000s research on Europeanization and globalization developed largely independently of each other. Since, however, a limited, yet increasing, number of studies have shown an interest in investigating and differentiating between the domestic implications of European Union (EU) membership and trends, which are usually seen as having a broader global application, including, for instance, market liberalisation, the construction of global institutions and policies. The research agenda concerned with domestic change in the face of Europeanization and globalization is in itself a reflection of epistemological concerns within the Europeanization literature. However, this in-the-making research agenda is also faced with a number of methodological challenges if we are to conduct empirical research and move towards more comprehensive accounts of domestic change. This paper points to some of the methodological pitfalls and possible pathways in the study of domestic change in the face of Europeanization and globalization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cumulative impact of globalization and internationalization in Europe and Asia is profound. This chapter develops its argument in several steps. Sections 1 and 2 highlight, respectively, the significance of regionalism and regionalization and of globalization and internationalization. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the different ways that globalization, internationalization and regionalization combine to create a world of open regions. They do so by investigating cultural affairs, an issue that illustrates with particular clarity the confluence of international and global factors. Section 3 analyzes cultural diplomacy, like national security, a central prerogative of the state. Internationalization theory expects persistent national differences, illustrated here by the different approaches that the Japanese and German state have taken in this policy domain. Section 4 looks at popular culture, like finance, a preferred domain for processes that are escaping state control. Globalization theory expects convergence across nations and regions. Taken together, both sections make two claims. First, different combinations of global and international effects create open regionalism in both Europe and Asia. Second, the international and global processes that create openness are not sufficiently powerful to wash away enduring regional differences that set Asia apart from Europe. Section 5 identifies these differences. In Asia the politically defining institution is the market, typically operating along ethnic or national lines. Identity capitalism is thus the characteristic practice of Asian regionalism. Europe’s defining institution is law with its primarily regulatory effects on policies and behavior. Formal political institutions are the most typical regional practice of European regionalism. The paper’s final section 6 contrasts briefly today’s open regionalism in cultural affairs with the historical experience of closed regionalism of the 1930s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing the roles different countries play in the process of globalization, which brings to light the complexity of conditions globalization gives rise to. It specifically examines the notions of "sender" and "receiver" societies, i.e. the division between those countries that promote globalization (e.g., the U.S and Western Europe) and those countries that become involved in the process or are greatly influenced by it (e.g., Eastern Europe, Latin America). First, the paper establishes a framework for understanding the uneven character of globalization. It examines the imbalance in the timing and scope of the different facets of globalization, such as economic winners and losers, political changes, and cultural resilience. Second, the paper addresses the character and timing of global progression. It analyzes different models of globalization, such as globalization as evolution and revolution; and globalization as a purposeful or inevitable phenomenon. Finally, the paper examines a variety of responses to globalization. It identifies the diversities between and among "sender" and "receiver" societies. Most importantly, the paper draws attention to those countries that exhibit the elements of both "sender" and "receiver" societies or lie at the crossroads of influences from powerful international actors (e.g., Russia). The issue at stake is whether and how forces of globalization take over domestic processes, which allows for more precise measurements of change and complexity and for comparative treatment of diversities in response. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes within its scope the broad disciplines of Development Studies and International Relations both of which, I argue are predicated upon an implicit narrative of history that takes the state form as the locus of enunciation. That is within both broad realms of study, a narrative of history as the history of the state form, history as the history of the nation state, informs and motivates the methodologies, assumptions and categories of analysis of both disciplines. However, utilizing the arguments made within the field of postcolonial studies, this paper argues that both disciplines within the broader human sciences are also predicated upon an elision or writing out of European colonial history. Thus, from this perspective, it is the writing out of colonial history that makes each discipline and their implicit narrative of history organised around the state form possible. Recent developments within politics and sociology around the incidence of globalisation and the recent flurry of academic and popular writing around the existence of a ‘new’ form of imperialism have produced a discursive tug of war over the relevance and viability of the state form under neo-liberal globalisation. This paper argues that the confused nature of these debates stems in part from the absence of colonial history and an absence of theorisation about empire as a form of politics within the discipline of politics and IR (Hardt and NEgri notwithstanding). Subsequently, I argue that in order to yoke together within the same analytical field both European colonialism and the practice and politics of development in the Twentieth Century, a new theory of history is required, one that places colonial history and the form of empire squarely in the centre of our consideration of global politics, one that explores the connections between empire and the state form, one that theorises the history of capital together with the history of the European colonial project, one that teases out the axes of continuity between the 20th Century trajectory of development and the 19th Century colonial project. Yoking development together with colonialism in the same analytic field needs to be fore grounded by a methodology of inquiry that theorises historical continuity rather than narrative rupture. [364 words] ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Barber has portrayed Jihad and McWorld as related, yet competing, processes, there are ways in which rampant global capitalism goes hand in hand with the creation of post-modern identity communities. Modern imagined communities are tied by common understandings of history, to a homeland, and through state institutions or non-state religious, political, and cultural organizations controlled by the group. Instead of any kind of hegemonic agreements of what constitutes communal identity, post-modern communities are characterized by the ability of individuals to opt into and out of groups, fashioning their self-identities from bits and pieces of cultural and communal life. Increasingly even the elements selected are not controlled by the identity community, but instead are driven by global capitalism. To explore how globalization contributes to reformulations of individuals? relationships to identity communities, this paper will examine the growing use of Islamic banking in Muslim communities in the United States and Europe. The demands for Islamic banking are increasingly met by Citigroup, HSBC, and other large multi-national banks, which are developing specific accounts, loans, and investment opportunities for Muslim customers. The paper will compare these banks with immigrant and Christian banks, trying to determine both who is using these banks and how it fits into their own self-identity as well as mapping out how globalization is impacting the banks? missions. It will also put Islamic banking into context with other expressions of post-modern identity communities, such as media targeted towards Muslims, much of which is also owned by multi-national corporations, and the role of Islamic-oriented web-sites and cyber-communities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper utilizes anti-essentialist theories of security so as to position the private military and security industry within the historic evolution of military organization and the emerging strategic complexes of global violence peculiar to the modalities of war-making in the 21st century. For this purpose, it first examines the way a specific system of social and political differentiation historically constituted itself as an effect of changes in the European apprehension of warfare in the 17th and 18th century. The paper then proceeds to compare this modern ideal of territorial, state-centric and rule-based ?security government? to an opposing logic of decentralized and polymorphous ?security governance?, which tends to inform recent articulations of security discourse. The ongoing growth of the private military and security industry is finally explained in terms of precisely this shift in the global application and organization of military power. The de-territorialization of warfare, it is argued, exceeds a set of formative distinctions intrinsic to the historic process wherein the modern state came to realize itself as bearing the sole monopoly of violence. In particular, it thereby threatens the civil-military dichotomy implied by the Westphalian state-system and thus tends to compromise the ?civil? spaces left available for non-military action. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the process of globalization and issues of economic disparity have often divided the world into the camps of North and South, there is very little substance to the conception of a monolithic "North" in terms of political economy and economic foreign policy. The North is itself highly divided amongst a number of sometimes complimentary sometimes contradictory models that do not necessarily reflect the paradigmatic neo-liberal ideology to which globalization is often ascribed. This paper shall focus upon the forces that European states and the European Union generate in the process of globalization. In essence, if there is a European alternative to an American and neo-liberal, how would this model be promoted and exported by Europe to the rest of the world? This research seeks to discover and define the European model of globalization nested within the foreign economic policies of the European states as well as the European Union. How do European foreign policies and programs unilaterally and multilaterally (through the agencies of GATT/WTO, IMF/World Bank, UN, and, of course European Union) seek to shape the direction, content, and scale of globalization? How does this differ from the dominant neo-liberal American model of globalization? Beyond analyzing European efforts through national and international foreign policy institutions, this paper also seeks to comprehend how well Europe has promoted and defended its alternate form of globalism from the onslaught of the neo-liberal, American model. While lacking a single coherent ideology or identity, can such a model hope to counter the oft-reported hegemony of the neo-liberal model? In conclusion, the paper assesses both the advantages and disadvantages to the European form as an alternate model to the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between the economic globalization, loosening of vertical intergovernmental relations and the emergence of regionalism is often discussed in the literature, particularly in European contexts. In the American context, despite the fact that the federal government has been taking devolutionary policy since the 1980s and contributing to the global economy, there has been no notable local government regionalism, except for the merger of the city of Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky in 2003. Japan has been implementing government restructuring toward neoliberal decentralization since the 1990s while globalization strained national political economy and stimulated regionalism at the local level. This paper explains that regionalism emerged in Japan because of the changing negotiation powers of the local governments against the central government and the changing importance of the local economies to the central government under globalization. Under this condition, Japanese central government implemented devolution while made targeted investments in the growth pole. This uneven development policy produced regionalism and local statism in the neglected areas. From this, this paper suggests that the changing central-local government relations resulting from the political repercussions of globalization stimulates local statism and leads to the development of regionalism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This papere examines the causes of Europe's economic, monetary, and political crises and the implications upon Europe's position in the global economic order and its ability to shape governance of the international political economy. Europe is in the midst of a quadruple crisis of stagnant economic growth, monetary-fiscal-debt crisis, European political crisis beset by national squabbling, and a globalization crisis that underscores Europe's increasingly weak global positioning and competitiveness in the global economy. The pessimism over Europe's current conditions is well founded as are dire predictions regarding its future if economic stagnation continues, no major fiscal and monetary reforms are undertaken, and greater solidarity amongst the members of the European Union is not rediscovered. Yet some of the glaring issues facing Europe can be addressed with adaptive policy regimes that would relieve some of the stress upon the short and long-term viability and sustainability of the European economic models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For several centuries, behavior on the international plane, whether as a private person or a State representative, has been defined by a rather narrow set of mainly occidental norms. In recent decades, this traditional code has shifted into an unknown direction due to globalization. Since globalization calls no longer for particularly occidental, imperial or modern norms but merely for human ones, international law is urged to reflect on its normative past located outside Europe. A subsequent challenge lies in selecting those ancestral norms that could coexist with what we regard nowadays as irreversible normative achievements of humanity (such as the presumption of innocence.) - The paper reviews in a first section international norms as occurring in the ancient Near East in the last two millennia B.C. and labels them as either sufficiently basic, surprisingly advanced or shockingly primitive. The same operation is then carried out for modern international law on the basis of a slightly altered classification (surprisingly basic, reasonably advanced or unnecessarily complicated.) The third section asks how those provisions that have passed the test of the previous sections can be integrated into a coherent legal system, always accounting for the factual, technological and ideological differences between the past and the current world. Issues covered include aspects of procedural law (such as contracts, force majeure, ne bis in idem, compensation and punishment) as well as questions more genuine to international relations such as treaties, State sovereignty, self-help, diplomatic immunity and the treatment of aliens. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is based on one premise and two established facts. The premise relates regionalism and multilateralism as projects that seek a new ?order? in face of the world?s post cold war ?disorder?. The facts concern, on one hand, the mutations in the relations between the economic, social, and political levels as a consequence of the intensity of the globalization process and, on the other, the loss of legitimacy by international institutions in the post World War II period. The objective is to investigate the European regimes? repertoire, with an emphasis on the role of Community Law, in order to determine the nexuses between these regimes and proposals for a new multilateralism. The hypothesis guiding this paper is that both processes converge ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of international governance has been a central preoccupation in the field of international relations. From the theories of cooperation developed by liberal institutionalists to the theories of the internationalization of the state advanced by Neogramscians, the issue of how states formalize arrangements in order to govern social phenomena that are transnational has represented a central challenge in the discipline. This chapter explores the way politics and social relations are constantly evacuated in discussions of regimes in international relations. It argues that in focusing on the formal features of international regimes, traditional and, many critical approaches, systematically objectify regimes in a way that make it difficult to understand their socio-historical significance. It is not sufficient, when looking at the social nature of these regimes, to posit that regimes are designed according to dominant social interests (be they national interests or social interests). One also needs to situate these institutions in the context of social struggles around power. In missing this point, traditional approaches tend to exaggerate the convergence of interest around these regimes, their coherence, and their stability. More fundamentally, the paper stresses that without an analysis of social relations, these approaches cannot fully grasp the reason why cooperation emerges in certain fields and evolves in particular historical directions to take distinctive forms. After a theoretical discussion of the question of cooperation in IR and IPE, it moves in the second section to discuss the political struggles around monetary governance in the late 19th century which led to widespread adoption of the gold standard in Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The alternative globalization movement has been undergoing profound changes since the Seattle protests in 1999. The September 11, 2001 attacks clearly influenced the movement?s dynamics. In the United States, organized labor withdrew from the coalition and globally American foreign policy, war and peace gained prominence on activists? agenda. At the same time, the decline in the number of globalization demonstrations in the United States did not signal the disappearance of the movement. Rather the movement has shifted strategies to ones that garner less media attention, with many groups focusing on lobbying and grassroots education. Europe has continued to experience large-scale demonstrations with protesters focusing on alternatives to economic globalization and voicing critiques of U. S. foreign policy. Countries in the Global South saw the persistence of local protests focusing on structural adjustment policies that had first emerged during the 1980s. Additionally, both in the Global South and in Europe large social forums have been bringing together large numbers of activists, NGOs and academics to establish networks and explore policy alternatives to the dominant neoliberal agenda. This paper traces the evolution of the alternative globalization movement and investigates the reasons behind these clear regional differences in contention. In particular, it focuses on the influence of local political opportunities structures and historical legacies in shaping the different patterns of contestation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do Europeanization and framing divides concerning war, globalization, and democratic deficits help to explain transnational collective action seeking to influence the European Union and European policy-making on the military intervention in Iraq, in the era of enlargement? Tarrow argues that internationalization, and not so much globalization, accounts for successful transnational contention. I argue transnational collective action is indeed emerging in both Western and Eastern Europe, albeit differentially mobilized in each context. I suggest that framing divides concerning war, globalization, and democratic deficits linked to European policy-making are essential in accounting for the dynamics of transnational protest in Europe. In the European Union, a case in which internationalization has arguably progressed the furthest economically and socially, transnational collective action targeting the European Union and its member-states' policies should certainly be emergent. Additionally, if Europeanization has continued expanding during the recent enlargement phase, then transnational activism should also be expanding from Western Europe to the new Central and East European member-states.However, the most recent research on transnational contention in Europe suggests that contention in Europe has in fact remained largely domesticated, with focal points in the domestic political opportunity space exerting more impact than targets in the international political opportunity space. This research has often been focused empirically on the early onset of the anti-globalization movement, and has not yet delved into the era of the post-9/11 global anti-war movement, toward the beginning of the recent enlargement phase of the European Union.I examine the February 15, 2003 transnational anti-war protests in all the member states of the European Union, using archival research of media coverage of the protests. I explore whether transnational collective action has in fact emerged, whether there is an East-West divide in the emergent contention, and which factors account for the dynamics of contention: the occurrence or nonoccurrence of protest, mobilization levels, agents, types of protest coalitions, as well as domestic and international grievances and targets.I find that framing divides concerning Europeanization and of democratic deficits linked to Europeanization and European policy-making seem to account for many of the dynamics of contention, as much as internationalization does. Transnational protest against war does seem to be expanding to both Western and Eastern Europe, but different factors seem to distinguish the development of transnational activism in each context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do the international economy, specificallly European integration, affect the welfare state and its political parties? Do neoliberal pressures associated with an open economy and with an integrated Europe force leftist parties to moderate their positions? Do they allow rightist parties to shift further to the right? How do neoliberal pressures affect parties' preferences for further European integration? I address these questions by quantitatively analyzing leftists and rightist parties? policy programs over time, in an effort to determine whether these parties adjust their positions on the economic issues in response to economic globalization. I hypothesize that economic openness motivates leftist parties to moderate their policy positions, but that openness motivates right-wing parties to shift further towards the right. Furthermore, building on Geoffrey Garrett?s (1998) work on partisan politics and globalization and utilizing Esping-Andersen?s (1990) categorization of welfare states, I theorize that institutions mediate the degree to which structural economic variables influence parties? socio-economic policy goals. In addition to quantitative data, the research also relies on interviews with policy elites conducted during fieldwork in Germany and Austria. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]