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Employing insights provided by the theory of monopolistic markets in economics and Great Power behaviour in the discipline of international relations, this paper aims to provide an alternative understanding of India's refusal to join the BRI beyond the immediate bilateral security, domestic politics, and economic considerations in Sino-Indian relations. We argue that BRI is an effort by China to position itself as the leading firm in the market for international development – a space for long dominated by Western development providers. The paper argues that India's efforts to contest the BRI can be seen as a natural outcome of other rising powers resisting China's efforts to monopolize the development market. In doing so, it provides a template of why rising powers compete with each other in providing developmental aid even when cooperation may create mutual benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China took its first tentative steps into the Antarctic around 1980, travelling South with other nations' Antarctic programs. Australia hosted the first Chinese scientists to travel to East Antarctica to conduct research in the early 1980s. China signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and became a Treaty Consultative Party in 1985. Since its first small forays, China's Antarctic activities have grown considerably: it now has two permanently occupied Antarctic stations, other Antarctic facilities and is currently building a station on in the Ross Sea region. China's Antarctic science program is broad; it has economic activities in the region include fisheries and tourism, and has expressed longer-term interest in resource extraction. In recent years, China has become an assertive participant in Antarctic governance. This paper analyses the geopolitical origins of the Antarctic Treaty, China's growing Antarctic presence, and the implications this has for the region, including the policies and strategies of Australia and key Indo-Pacific partner states in the Antarctic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolving geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially through the lens of an India–US–China trilateral/tripolar framework. At a time when ‘strategic unease’ has become a defining characteristic of the region and ‘security alignments and strategic hedging’ a prevalent diplomatic tendency, this paper captures an evolving trend of convergence in the strategic visions of the three key Indo-Pacific players – India, China and the US, and rising bilateral strategic/defence cooperation between them. Using a constructivist approach, this paper explores the feasibility of a trilateral cooperative framework among the three countries in near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 'rivalry' between India and China on the global stage is much ado about nothing. India and China both have huge potential to play a bigger role in global business than they do today. Both countries have experienced major growth domestically, which is not yet matched by their role in global business. MNEs from the two countries have been internationalizing along very different pathways, with few overlaps. Their ability to realize their potential depends on policies and institutions as well as entrepreneurial business leadership in their own country. Their future internationalization depends only to a small degree on the other of the two countries [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2021 was a watershed year for the US, Japan, India, and Australia vis-à-vis their Quadrilateral Cooperation mechanism, which successfully transitioned from a loose coordinating body to a grouping of allied actors. Reviewing the historical development of the Quad, three distinct phases can be identified: the conceptual stage, the strategy development stage, and the third phase of evolution toward an alliance. During the first two phases, the Quad was not more than a loose coordinating structure, but in the last phase, it started to take on the characteristics of an alliance-like body. The primary reason we can conclude that it has evolved into an alliance body is that the organization has started to mold behavioral norms, and it further aims to establish a monopoly over the provision of norms in the Indo-Pacific region. Three factors have played a role in driving the US, Japan, India, and Australia to build the Quad into an alliance body: first is the pursuit of general interests; second is the global situation brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on their relations; third is the formation of a shared objective. These three factors combined worked to shape the Quad into an alliance. As the Quad primarily targets China, its emergence as an alliance will have impacts on China's security environment that cannot be ignored. In response, China should implement its "neighborhood first" strategy, promote the 1 + 1 Leader's Summit on Mutual Respect with its neighboring countries, and advance the comprehensive deepening of economic cooperation between China and ASEAN. These steps can help China respond to the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific geo-political situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to Southeast Asia's geopolitical, economic, and commercial significance, world powers have focused on this region. China and India, the two neighboring nations of Southeast Asia, both with aspirations to become the dominating force in the Indo-Pacific region, have been employing all means to draw Southeast Asia into their sphere of influence. Controlling Southeast Asia would confer immense strategic gains on both nations. The goal of this study is to assess the policy of India and China toward Southeast Asia utilizing pertinent data and documents, official comments from the respective governments, and the research of Vietnamese and foreign researchers. The analysis reveals that India and China seek benefits by promoting close ties with Southeast Asia, but their methods for achieving this objective are distinct. Suppose India employs flexible diplomatic measures to develop its good relations with Southeast Asia. In that case, China has the upper hand when pursuing a diplomatic strategy that is both flexible and assertive to advance its objectives, particularly in East Sea-related problems. This provides Southeast Asia/ASEAN with difficult choices and decisions about India and China to balance their respective interests and, more significantly, to maintain ASEAN's central position in regional and international concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I examine the discourse surrounding "listening stations" (surveillance outposts) that the Indian government has built to counter Chinese infrastructural projects in the Indian Ocean. As surveillance technologies are placed on out-of-the-way islands and deep underwater, the ocean is discursively situated in the press and diplomatic circles as a site where the geopolitical and sonic 'noise' of the metropole is evaded in virtue of the seeming fidelity of the sea, thus garnering potential for the listening stations to reveal China's true geopolitical intentions. Drawing on classic securitization theory, as well as writings in the anthropology of security and sound studies, I argue that the positioning of listening stations as sites defined by listening and protection from Chinese encroachment obfuscates how they function as geopolitical speech and an expansion of Indian power. I coin the term "surveillance acoustemology" to refer to the ways that India's listening stations spatialize India's projected influence and its ability to hear its Chinese rival across the Indian Ocean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The intensification of trade exchanges alongside the identification of major security threats has turned the Indian Ocean into one of the most important geographical spaces. The emergence of China has developed growing strategic disputes within the regional powers. Although they defend different objectives, India and Australia have been seeking ways to improve their presence and focusing on possible partnerships based on shared perceptions and common interests. The reality of a Canberra-New Delhi axis remains limited considering the different visions the two protagonists have of it. On the Indian side, the exchanges with Australia are unbalanced due to the vision of the Indian Ocean as a strategic extension of the peninsula. On the Australian side, the subtle balance between strong economic and trade relations with Beijing and reaffirmed political and military relations with Washington justify a new "front" strategy in which India appears to be just one actor among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]