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The paper seeks answers to the puzzle, "How is that, in the face of an overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming is real, the advanced industrialized countries cannot agree on measures to deal with the problem?" The paper is guided by two intuitions: (1) national-level decision-making processes may foreclose mutually acceptable bargains between countries and (2) the ways international norms get framed may make getting on the agenda more likely but success at the decision stage less likely and The study concludes that the international arena’s early commitments froze in preferences that were too distant from those of important players in U.S domestic politics, both Congressional and larger societal (i.e. corporate interests). At the same time, as depicted by a simple spatial model, the preferences of European polities restricted the range of acceptable compromises that could be made, thus leaving the U.S. and its European allies at odds. Through the example of global warming, the paper also seeks to ascertain the gravity and significance of the foreign policy differences between the U.S. and its allies. Here, the argument emphasized the proxy nature of global warming as part of a larger European concern about U.S. unilateralism and diffidence. Implicitly, the paper favored the notion that the character of American hegemony matters for cooperation, and that the conflict with Europe over global warming and other issues may significantly undermine the capacity for Europe to cooperate with the U.S. on issues of interest to the Americans. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

US identity as a state is closely linked to its self-imposed responsibility and duty to act upon threats against international security. Howver, US unilateralism and the Iraq war seriously weakened the American global leadership position and deteriorated its relations with Europe. To revitalize or reclaim its leadership position, the Obama Administration would need to flesh out a US foreign policy in which the EU dimension of the transatlantic security community is taken into account. As argued in the paper, the multilateral security cooperation in NATO would also benefit from a strengthening of the bilateral US-EU relationship. Departing from the perspective that discourse is power, because the discourse dictates which statements and actions that are seen as possible and acceptable (and which are not), in his first month of office president Barack Obama already has set new conditions for how America will relate to the rest of the world in the pursuit of its interests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration faced serious constraints in its attempts to build a broad military coalition in the months preceding the March 2003 invasion. This paper examines the factors that contributed to U.S. authority prior to the war, which is defined here as the particular pattern of European states' consent to and dissent from U.S. requests for contributions. The central argument is that the normative component of public opinion—referred to here as domestic policy legitimacy—interacts with states' economic capabilities to determine ally states' responses to U.S. diplomatic requests, and that authority was degraded in part because U.S. policy departed from broadly accepted international norms of legitimacy—in this case, norms regulating the use of force in the international context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates in security studies in the U.S. and Europe have drifted almost completely apart. In Europe it is common to present the theoretical landscape in terms of, say, critical security studies, the Copenhagen School, traditionalism and feminism. In the U.S. it is more common to see the major debate within security studies as being the one between offensive realism and defensive realism! Previously, almost all theoretical inventions in IR were made in the U.S. Currently, distinct theories are widely associated with places like Aberystwyth (Critical Security Studies), Paris (Bigo’s Bourdieu-inspired work) and Copenhagen (securitization). The new European approaches differ not only from security studies in the US, they also stand apart from most work done in other parts of the world. Are these theories peculiarly ‘European’ and if so, why? The paper aims at explaining the emergence of these European security theories. The explanation draws partly on the political context in the different regions, and partly on features of the intellectual fields, International Relations and Security Studies. The theories are also assessed briefly as to their relevance and usefulness. To what extent are they bound to local, European problems or relevant to the issues that are addressed elsewhere and vice-versa for the theories that flourish in the U.S. and the periphery respectively? Can they travel to the other parts of the world in a helpful role? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amongst Americans, it has often been argued that, because it does not formally extend its territory, the US does not exhibit the same injustices and dysfunctionality as the old (notably European colonial) empires. William Appleman Williams' critique of America's imperialism as 'a way of life' is a highly influential counterclaim. According to him, imperialism is a posture with regard to others, and that posture is built into the American political order regardless of sovereign territorial expansion in the eyes of the international order of states. On this account, America's 'imperialism' pre-dates the appearance of the US on the international global stage in the 20th century. It is, however, the New World expression of conceptions of power, good order and the legitimacy of institutionalized force originating in thoroughly European values, notably those of the Enlightenment. 'J'accuse, je m'accuse.', one might then respond to Europeans inclined to tut-tut at US actions in the world. European and American ways of thinking have been equally 'imperialist' in a pejorative sense, even though it is the USA that, since the middle of the 20th century, has put such thinking into practice. Williams' prima facie appealing argument against American imperialism raises two kinds of issues for Europeans: *As regards the analysis of empires, it suggests that the difference between the 20th-century occurrence of imperialism centred on the Western side of the Atlantic and its disappearance on the European side should be explained by the circumstances that obtained in the two locations. For their power practices have been fundamentally the same. Empires have arisen where Western-type centres of rule have met weak opposition from those over whom they were in a position to extend their power.*As regards avoiding the potential evils of imperialism, Williams' argument suggests that we must pay closer attention to the make-up and the manner of power, rather than its formal territorial extent. That implication should give gung-ho Europeans pause for thought. If imperialism lies deep within the Western soul, then Europe should beware that its own does not sneak back into effect - for example, in the form of the EU's purportedly benign suzerainty over the western end of the Eurasian continent.I conclude that, if they are to put themselves forward as critics of the US Empire, Europeans must operate with a highly tuned sense of their own identity and its relation to that of America and American imperialism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European countries restrict hate speech, the United States does not. This much is clear. What explains this difference? Too often the current discussion falls back on a culturally rich but normatively vacant exceptionalism (American or otherwise) or a normatively driven convergence perspective that fails to address historical, cultural and experiential differences that distinguish countries and legal systems. Inspired by the development discourse of historical sociology, this article seeks to record instances where Americans or Europeans have argued their approach to hate speech laws was more "advanced" or "modern." This article focuses on two authors whose writing appears to make these claims: Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post. A German Jewish émigré fleeing Nazi Germany, Loewenstein warned Americans that fascism was a new, modern phenomenon that required a new democracy, one that could protect itself by restricting speech. Post's position on democracy is quite different - he finds hate speech restrictions largely incompatible with democratic legitimacy. While at times Post shows an exceptionalist unwillingness to judge Europe for its lack of hate speech laws, at other points he is quite willing to say that a stable successful democracy does not ban hate speech. Tracking the competing claims of Loewenstein and Post opens the door to a more fluid analysis of European and American positions on hate speech - one that is both comparative and normative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, empirical work (Dogan 1994) suggested that "nationalism" was in decline in the West. However, the 9/11 attack in the U.S. and subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere may have increased nationalism, patriotism, and national pride as well as an antipathy to outsiders. While pride may not always imply prejudice, this paper investigates the claim that often it does. It identifies the types of patriotism found within Europe and the United States, and the consequences of each type of pride for salient minority populations. Evaluating data from 21 countries from the 1995 and 2003 ISSP National Identity Survey, it finds that pride in country is a multidimensional phenomenon and only certain types of it are associated with antipathy towards ethnic minorities or distinctive outgroups, including immigrants. Chauvinists and those most proud of their country's cultural heritage are more likely to define membership in the political community in an ethnically exclusive manner and to express prejudicial views of immigrants to the country. Those, however, who express strong pride in the state, its institutions, and its social policies, are more open to immigrants and are less likely to endorse ethnically exclusive criteria for membership in the political community. Thus, pride in the state, as opposed to pride in the ethno-cultural nation, especially among titular groups, can ameliorate prejudicial attitudes about non-titular groups and immigrants. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to explain European behaviour in the American world order. Thus, I seek to answer two interrelated questions: What characterizes European behaviour in the unipolar world order? How is this behaviour explained? In order to answer these questions I begin from structural realist premises and explore how changes and continuity in relative power, relative ideology and relative security affect the European propensity to bandwagon with or balance the United States. The overall conclusion is that the European grand strategy is best characterised as hard bandwagoning with soft balancing at the margins. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the incentives of the European states to balance or bandwagon the United States. From a modified structural realist perspective, it discusses the effect of three variables, relative power, relative ideology and relative security on the European incentives to balance or bandwagon. It is argued that the Europeans have a very strong incentive to bandwagon with the United States, and that transatlantic disagreements are better seen as a reflection the consequences of a liberal ideology shared by Europe and the United States than systematic attempts at balancing. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]