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Despite a growing number of approaches and sub-disciplines interested in analysing lobbying and interest representation with a broad set of paradigms, the formation of gender interest groups has remained a marginal area of investigation. Very little has been written about women's lobbies' action in national politics, and scholars' attention has mainly addressed gender interest representation at the supranational level, and its potential consequences for the domestic scene. Regarding the new EU Member States, women's NGOs have received considerable scholarly attention as part of 'renewed civil societies' after 1989. However, these approaches have been quite confusing for analysing women's relation to politics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 'civil society' does not always mean the same thing and women's groups differ highly from each other regarding the social goals they pursue. Based on a long-term qualitative research project on Czech female political elites, this paper describes the emergence of gender interest groups in CEE countries, mainly through a case study. By identifying the emergence of a multi-level system of gender interests' representation, this paper raises two broad-based questions on which the fate of gender interest groups in East Central Europe depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant research on social movements has highlighted activists' discursive tactics to challenge the state, yet little analytical attention focuses on elite efforts to dominate the discourse arena through the deployment of oppositional frames. This paper analyzes elite oppositional framing surrounding the placement of a highway bypass in the Czech Republic. Our research examines how democratic states deploy oppositional frames and enlist elite countermovement support for their efforts to obstruct challenges. Using a range of data sources, we delineate the mechanisms used by these elite actors to vilify and stigmatize environmental activists, paving the way for more violent forms of public harassment. The concept we initiate, discursive obstruction, adds the critical dimension of power relations to analyses of both framing processes and discursive opportunity structures. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for social movement research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Copyright of Journal for East European Management Studies is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The number of finds relating to metalworking, without evidence of mining and processing facilities, is very limited. In Final Eneolith graves of specialized metallurgists that have occurred, they contain a metal‐founding or metalsmithing toolkit, whose origins were from eastern Europe (the Maykop, Yamnaya Culture). Such metallurgical tools may have reached central Europe as part of the so‐called Yamnaya Package before the onset of the Bee Beaker Culture (BBC); and unlike the Pontic region, these two types of metallurgy separated here. There are found an accumulation of metallurgists' graves in Moravia, where the complete metalworking toolkit is deposited in a predefined place in richly furnished male graves with a distinctive funerary architecture that exhibit a clear relationship to the grave goods. EDX‐analysis detected a high content of metals (Cu, Ag, Au, Au–Ag alloy) on all working surfaces of stone tools, grinders, and boar tusks used for the final treatment of their metal products. This makes us believe that the used artefacts were laid as symbolical objects in the graves of these craftsmen who perfectly knew these advanced technologies. Due to their knowledge, their social significance gradually rose and finally reached the level of social elites, who were usually buried in a spectacular manner, including the quantity of grave goods (Überausstattung) and the pars pro toto deposition in one part of the finds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The volatile and unstable party systems in East Central Europe are associated with the emergence of new parties. However, some such new parties survive and become part of the party system they entered while other newcomers fade away even after they record major electoral success or gain government participation. How can we explain the contrasting fortunes of new parties? What explains their persistence and organizational survival? In this paper, we try to find the answers to these questions by linking the organizational success of new parties to the composition of their elites. We suggest that the similarity in professional and career backgrounds contributes to par ties' organizational success by increasing party cohesion, especially at the level of party leadership. We demonstrate our arguments on three new Czech parties - Public Affairs (W), Dawn of Direct Democracy (Dawn) and ANO - with contrasting political and organizational fortunes. Using data on elites' career and political pasts we show that, unlike ANO, W and Dawn have comparatively more heterogeneous elite circles which, we suggest, make them more vulnerable to internal conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Archaeologia Historica is the property of Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to illuminate the links between culture and class in the post-socialist years in the Czech Republic. To this end, it considers the reception of two music acts—the country folk duo Bratři Nedvědi in the 1990s and the "nationalist rock" band Ortel in the 2010s—and discusses the labeling of their fans based on their social class profiles. My analysis draws on mainstream Czech media coverage of these acts, materials reflecting fans' perspectives, and broader scholarly debates about the links between music consumption and social class. One similarity between these bands lay in their decision to forsake their original subcultural fans for a more mainstream audience. A second commonality relates to the dismissal of their mainstream fans by cultural elites, who saw them as backward and out of step with the norms of liberal democracy and Western capitalism. These critics often described these types of Czech music as lowbrow and regressive. Meanwhile, the two bands continued to insist that they were making songs for "ordinary people" rather than elites: their fan bases, while not homogenous, remained largely working class. This study considers key intersections between class, age, ethnicity, and gender in Czech post-socialist society. I argue that certain kinds of local musical taste reflect class differences, which are further shaped by age, gender, and political orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from Szelenyi and Treiman's (1993) six-nation survey of Social Stratification in Eastern Europe, we replicate and extend Walder, Li, and Treiman's (2000) paper showing different paths into the Chinese urban elite for professionals and cadres. For each of six formerly communist nations (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia), we find effects quite similar to those shown by Walder, Li, and Treiman for China: education is a more important determinant of recruitment to professional positions than to cadre positions and communist party membership is a more important determinant of recruitment to cadre than to professional positions. Unlike patterns of elite recruitment in China, however, we find virtually no detectable differences in pat terns of elite recruitment over time, contrary to the conventional wisdom of students of Eastern European communism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, through an examination of the discourse by the elites and public opinion, I discuss how the Czech Republic conceived of its place and security in the world in the first five years following its independence. In doing so, I argue that how the Czechs have collectively conceived of themselves had an impact on the strategic choices the Czech Republic had to make to adjust to international change resulting from the end of the Cold War, and on the type of armed forces it decided to develop. The emerging Czech security identity and strategic culture observed during that period indeed brought connections to policy choices, and as such made NATO membership a policy priority, and the development, within evolving financial constraints, of capable armed forces taking active part in Alliance activities the number one defense priority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a comparative analysis of anti-EU politics in the newly democratising states of Eastern Europe by looking at a case where Euroscepticism is prominent and a case where it is not. The cases examined are the Czech Republic, in which anti-EU sentiments have been strongly voiced and appear to play some role in national elections, and Romania where such sentiments have been marginalised and seem to have played little role in recent elections. Several possible explanations for the appearance or absence of Euroscepticism are considered and differences emerge with regard to mass-to-elite cues, political culture and socio-economic expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Changing configurations of national elites are shaping the prospects for democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are three broad possibilities: (1) increasingly unchecked and violent power struggles between elites, with regimes oscillating between democratic and authoritarian forms; (2) restrained elite competitions in accordance with democratic game rules and tacit accommodations, with regimes gradually becoming stable democracies; (3) takeovers by ultra-nationalist elites through coups or plebiscitary victories, with regimes becoming state-corporatist in form and quasi-fascist in operation. Crucial questions are the extent and nature of elite unity and differentiation. This article identifies elite configurations and the most likely regime outcomes in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]