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The China-India border dispute is the biggest obstacle to the development of China-India relations. The existing studies on the China-India border dispute do not pay enough attention to geographical factors and lack comprehensive analysis of multi-agent and multi-scale, so it is difficult to grasp the essential characteristics and overall situation of the China-India border issue. This paper proposes a multi-scale geopolitical analysis framework to analyze the competitive nature of contemporary China-India border dispute under the joint action of multi-scale and multi-agent. The main conclusion is that the contemporary China-India border dispute is a complex problem caused by multi-scale spatial superposition and multi-agent power game. On the global scale, the China-India border dispute is an important part of the strategic interaction be‐ tween the United States and India to contain China; At the regional scale of South Asia, China-India border dispute is a land blockade for India and its partner countries to restrict China's expansion of influence in South Asia; On the bilateral scale of China and India, India regards the China-India border dispute as a strategic fulcrum to seek land advantages over China, and tries to gain strategic advantages over China on both land and sea; At the national internal scale, the China-India border dispute is a competition between China and India in the border transformation mechanism; At the border area scale, the China-India border dispute is a competition between the two countries in terms of their ability to effectively manage border areas. The national inter‐ nal scale is the core scale that determines the China-India border dispute, but the possibility of the two countries reaching a reasonable compromise on this scale is still very small in the short term. The current situation of the global, South Asian region, and bilateral scale is not conducive to a rational solution of the China-India border dispute. The border area scale is the main focus of the China-India border dispute for a long time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By conducting discourse analysis on Chinese textual materials around 1962, this paper tries to inductively explore the national identities of Chinese people during the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict. It finds that China perceived itself as a persistent and resilient nation in the ongoing fight against invasion and oppression. The predominant social discourse around 1962 showed a strong enmity and resistance toward the imperialism which was then imposed on India. These national identities have formed a natural response as maintaining a tough stance toward incursion and repression, and have contributed to China's resolution to defense its territory with resorting to military force, even though it might not be beneficial in terms of diplomatic relations and economic interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Border issues, such as sovereignty, territorial claims, and security, play a significant role in transboundary river management. Borders can act as physical barriers that impede cooperation and coordination, and disputes over ownership and control of river resources can exacerbate tensions and lead to conflicts. Transboundary river management is a complex and critical issue that has gained increasing attention in recent years. The management of rivers that cross international borders raises numerous challenges, including political, economic, social, and environmental concerns. Effective management requires the cooperation of all countries sharing the river basin, and it involves the development of legal and institutional frameworks that promote sustainable use, equitable sharing, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. This paper aims to explore the intricate relationship between India's persistent border disputes with China and their far-reaching implications for the management of transboundary rivers. Their unresolved territorial disputes have profound implications for the shared river basins, such as the Brahmaputra Basin, and pose significant challenges to the implementation of effective transboundary river management strategies. Through an interdisciplinary examination of historical, geopolitical, and hydrological factors, this study sheds light on the multifaceted dimensions of India's border disputes with China and elucidates their detrimental impacts on the use of transboundary river resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The completion of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge marks not only a record-setting achievement in engineering, but also a materialisation of ongoing efforts by the People's Republic of China to engage in cooperative projects aimed at expanding and deepening integrative connections with the semi-autonomous Special Administrative Regions of Macau and Hong Kong. This paper explores the colonial and post-colonial social construction of Hong Kong as a political-economic island, and the implications this carries into the tensions and open conflicts that have unfolded under the One Country, Two Systems agreement. Using the bridge as a case, it critically examines the geopolitical and biopolitical dimensions of infrastructure as a practice of subnational (de)bordering. The case renders visible a contemporary moment where infrastructure occupies a central position at the conjuncture of technology, advanced governmentality and shifting geographies of sovereignty in the People's Republic of China, within subnational city-regional development plans, as well as internationally in projects, such as the geographically expansive Belt and Road Initiative. A close examination of the Bridge project highlights the constructed and contested nature of borders, as well as the complex identities and ideologies that define them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The South China Sea dispute is developing at an extraordinarily rapid pace with six states' overlapping territorial interest, abundant untapped natural resources and more than hundreds of geological features. The regional consensus opposes coercion and favors diplomacy, but China is out of step with both the regional consensus and international norms and has posed a serious threat to the Asia-Pacific security. With this backdrop, this paper, predominantly taking the geopolitical approach, takes a stand that the South China Sea is going to be the grand chessboard of the world. The study endeavors to project that the world will never get a better place to contain an undemocratic expansionist power like China than the South China Sea. The great powers, including the US, need to take a very strongly articulated South China Sea policy, as the world is getting tired of the ambiguous policy of China from the 'Peaceful Rise' to 'Covid-19'. At the same time, the paper sheds light on the importance of South China Sea in India's strategic gambit and how this complex, potential ground is important to India to turn the Chinese dominated Asia into a multipolar Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article takes a critical look at the sovereignty claims surrounding the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The dispute has long plagued Sino-Japanese relations and is considered one of the key regional security hotspots, with the People's Republic of China mounting an active challenge to Japanese administrative control. This article reviews the case for sovereignty under both the discovery and the prescription principles. However, the article concludes that one cannot find a compelling case for sovereignty under either principle in favour of either claimants. The paper argues that this is due to the traditional insignificance of the islands prior to UNCLOS establishing exclusive economic zones. Rather, the article suggests that to facilitate a resolution to the disputes, the islands should not be classified as islands under UNCLOS as they do not meet the legal threshold for such a classification, either today or historically. If anything, the weakness of claims that contributes to the intractability of the dispute today shows that traditionally neither China nor Japan has considered these territories as islands in a manner that would be in the spirit of UNCLOS. While such a reclassification would not immediately resolve the dispute, it would be a significant step to remove incentives for the further pursuit of conflicting sovereignty over the islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Infrastructure has played an agential role in the securitisation of everyday life in the Karakoram high mountains of north Pakistan. Geopolitics bear heavily on this region where Pakistan shares borders with China, with whom it has aligned its foreign and security policy, and with India, with whom Pakistan remains embroiled in a long‐standing territorial dispute. Consequently, in the Karakoram, geopolitical anxieties have reflected inwards onto local populations through both security infrastructure and securitised infrastructure. In this postcolony frontier space, statecraft also frequently bypasses normative legal and administrative structures; such exceptions to normative law and administration have antecedents in colonial statecraft on the territorial margins of empire. This paper also argues that long cycles of military rule have allowed the military to acquire and project technocratic expertise, become custodians of state‐led development, and recently, to assume guardianship of, and to enter into joint financing with China on, construction projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become the most important vehicle for Chinese cooperation with Central Asian member states and Russia. China seeks to play an active role and exert strong influence in the SCO for both economic reasons and strategic considerations. China aims to resolve territorial and border issues with Central Asian states, maintain stability in Xinjiang, develop the economy of western areas, and ensure energy security by playing a leading role in the SCO. Analyzing China's role in the SCO and the related opportunities and challenges is the primary goal of this paper. The Chinese government uses economic cooperation to exert influence within the SCO. However, the Chinese government must still overcome numerous challenges, including reconciling mistrust and conflict among SCO member states, reducing Russian suspicion of Chinese intention, response to transformation of the SCO, and dilemmas regarding regional instability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-India relations are becoming increasingly competitive and volatile. The deep-rooted dynamic is the dysfunctioning of the previous interaction framework that had ensured relatively stable bilateral relationship for decades. This paper explores the main obstacles and dynamics of the current China-India relationship, including the border issue, economic relations and the Quad. It also shares some thoughts on what China and India should do to move forward the bilateral relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does a small power respond and adjust to a fluid and potentially dangerous strategic balancing by major powers generated by a territorial dispute? This paper observes that notwithstanding the major powers' mistrust, suspicion, and rivalry, such precarious stability in the South China Sea dispute is sustained by a balance-of-power system. This system is an offshoot of the small littoral states' (in this case, the Philippines') policy of engaging the external maritime powers (the United States and Japan) to counter China's heavy-handedness in dealing with this territorial row. Apprehensive of China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea, the United States and Japan are increasing their strategic involvement in the maritime territorial row. These developments have transformed the dispute into a case of conflict irresolution. To cope with China's heavy-handedness, the Philippines builds up the deterrence capability of its armed forces and forges security partnerships with the United States and Japan. The Philippines hopes that this move will ensure the maintenance of the status quo in the regional balance of power. In conclusion, the paper considers the Philippines' policy as myopic, since it overlooks the fact that the volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea might be the proverbial 'calm before the storm.' It is crucial that the Philippines puts its house in order, economically keeps pace with its more dynamic Southeast Asian neighbors, increases its defense spending, formulates a coherent national security strategy, and concentrates on building a credible armed forces to avoid free-riding on its allies, and more importantly, to enable the country to weather the approaching storm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the growing involvement of the U.S. security establishment in declaratory United States South China Sea (SCS) policy, a trend that has been building over 2014–15 because of China's island building in the South China Sea. The focus of that policy is that China's newly created SCS islands will not constrain legal U.S. maritime activity on, under, and over the high seas. This was announced by the Secretary of Defense, not the Secretary of State, in Singapore in May 2015, and was a response to the disproportionately large scale of China's unannounced activity that was turning rocks and submerged shoals into credible military outposts. China was accused of undermining trust by introducing a military power dimension to the already complicated sovereignty disputes in the Spratly Islands. These accusations are correct. The reality is that China has changed the strategic balance in the Spratly Island chain by creating facilities on its new islands that will militarily overshadow the garrisons and defensive capabilities of the features occupied by Vietnam, the Philippines or Malaysia. Despite Chinese claims to the contrary, the U.S. military has no doubts that the island building is designed specifically for use as PLA operating bases. Among its more controversial recommendations, this paper puts forth a policy approach that puts more emphasis on deterrence. In this regard, Washington's call for Hanoi to stop improving the facilities it occupies in the Spratlys, probably to appear even-handed, seems strategically misguided. The goal should be to return some sort of strategic equilibrium to the Spratlys; Vietnam is the claimant best equipped to accomplish that. The other aspect of deterrence that will hopefully keep the peace is the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty because of its potential applicability if Filipino servicemen are harmed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China has been engaging more actively in the Arctic, as echoed by the Arctic Council's admittance of China as a permanent observer in May 2013. China's interest in the Arctic can to a large extent be explained by climate change shrinking the ice cover of the Arctic Ocean, which has sparked interest with respect to possible exploitation of natural resources and new shipping routes. One aspect of the possible exploitation of natural resources concerns the International Seabed Area. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's policy paper on China's Arctic aspirations stated that "many Chinese scholars believe that UNCLOS does not entirely safeguard China's perceived Arctic interests" concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. One scholar noted that "[i]f the Arctic states succeed in their claims to extend their outer continental shelves, the international community's and China's right to fairly benefit from Arctic resources will be weakened". This article asks whether China can act as a watchdog against excessive continental shelf claims beyond 200 nautical miles by the littoral states and shield the idea of the common heritage of mankind, as enshrined in the Area. More precisely, the article will ask whether China can bring a case before an international court or tribunal against one of the littoral states if it establishes the outer limits of the extended continental shelf beyond what they are entitled to according to UNCLOS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the conclusion in the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Case that straight baselines may not be used to enclose off-shore archipelagos unless they meet the criteria set out in Articles 46 and 47 of the Law of the Sea Convention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the Tibet question through the looking glass of Taiwan, by considering four dimensions of comparative dynamics between the two cases of Taiwan and the Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE) in relation to China: territorial, economic, ethnic and cultural. Of the four, the paper argues, Taiwan has high convergence with China in the economic, ethnic and cultural dimensions, and managed divergence in the territorial dimension. The TGIE, on the other hand, has high divergence with China in all four dimensions: territorial dispute, economic incongruence, ethnic estrangement, and cultural gulf. Further, the TGIE is ideologically and sentimentally charged by this divergence and thrives by exploiting it. It therefore should have few incentives to see the lessons of Taiwan applied in resolving the Tibet question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands has caused diplomatic deteriorations in Sino-Japanese relations. When there is extensive media coverage on news about the dispute, nationalist sentiments in both two countries would be triggered and could be expressed through detrimental behaviors towards transnational corporations (hereinafter TNCs). While TNCs play a significant political function as corporate diplomats for their home countries, they are subject to the risk of crises when their home countries are involved in political and economic conflicts with the foreign countries in which they have operations. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to examine the roles of TNCs with reference to three cases of nationalism-induced crises in China. It proposes relational principles based on which TNCs could implement strategies to mitigate the damage from nationalism-induced crises and contribute to their home countries' diplomatic goals as corporate diplomats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes between China and India are a complex historical issue. The 70th anniversary of China-Indian relations in 2020 became one of the most crucial years in the history of bilateral relations. Following the formation of a dispute between the two countries over shared borders and the creation of military posts, Chinese and Indian forces were heavily involved in battles in the Galvan Valley near Ladakh on June 15, which killed Indian and Chinese forces. The question that arises here concerns the causes of the Sino-Indian border disputes as well as their continuation. The hypothesis of the present descriptive-analytical study is that the colonial heritage and the unwillingness of the great powers to accurately determine the common boundaries in the past have led to the formation and persistence of critical conditions between the two countries. The findings of the study show that although the colonial contexts have led to border disputes between China and India, none of the parties took advantage of the opportunities to solve the problem at various historical stages and did not succeed in bilateral negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the differential impact of Chinese citizens’ use of traditional media and Internet sources on their political views about the country’s territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Chinese citizens can utilize a variety of conduits of information that allow varying degrees of government control over the way foreign affairs and other controversies are presented. Those who rely on mainstream, state-controlled television, radio, and printed media for information on the disputes, and those who turn to less-prescriptive sources on the Internet, can be expected to have distinctive political attitudes. We use original 2013 Chinese survey data to explore patterns of media consumption and citizens’ attention levels towards the Sino-Japanese island dispute, and views regarding the government’s performance in handling the issue and appropriate policy responses. Those who derive their information from traditional media tend to view the government’s performance more positively, and are more likely both to favour compromise and to oppose the use of military force. By comparison, information from Internet sources, which is more user selfselective, sustains a wider range of attitudes about the Sino-Japanese island dispute and the appropriate policies for dealing with it, including both militaristic and moderate stances. All told, we find that Chinese citizens bring distinctive predispositions to their consumption of media information on this issue, but our results also clearly reflect an ongoing, pervasive influence for China’s state-run traditional media. These findings have important implications for considering the resilience of authoritarian systems in the Internet era. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Arctic is a region of uast economic potential and a potential arena for global politics in the near future. The impact of global warming has ensured that the water routes through this region stay open for longer periods of time with euery passing year. These routes will be the focus of contention between Arctic and near-Arctic states. As a result, the Arctic Circle can be viewed as an arena Of geopolitical posturing in the near future, where border disputes and issues of sovereignty and military supremacy will dominate the discourse involving the region. Using evidence gleaned from official Chinese government sources and scholarly work on the matter, this paper seeks to answer the question of how China interprets its role within the Arctic region, and the lengths to which it will go to carue a foothold within the region. It shall discuss Chinese interests in the Arctic and discern whether China could pose a security threat to Arctic states, and whether its aims in the region are solely economic or could also be directed towards boosting its military capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Asia-Pacific has seen the emergence of a new security dilemma, as geopolitical friction increases due to escalating crises. Significant tensions between China and many of its Asian neighbors have arisen due to maritime disputes, the North Korea nuclear crisis, and a military arms race. There are three main areas of the common security challenges in the Asia and Pacific region today: Chinese military growth, the U.S. military dominance and strategic “rebalance,” and conflicts or hot spots in the region. The future way out of the Asia-Pacific's current security dilemma depends heavily on how the U.S., China, and Japan can work together. This paper seeks to examine three issues: 1) the logic of China's military growth and how serious a threat it has posed to other countries in the region; 2) the major barriers that hold back military exchange programs between China and the U.S.; and 3) the intervening factor, the strengthening of a U.S.-Japan alliance and its repercussions for China. It will provide proposals to establish a collective framework including more specific security dialogues and cooperation in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The on-going dispute over the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between China and Japan has often been ridiculed by observers as an unwise struggle for rocks. One must question, however, why so much significance has been attached to those "trivial specks" in the first place. This paper maintains that the seed of contemporary Sino-Japanese rivalry cannot be separated from the "expansion" of European international society, after which China and Japan came to be obsessed with sovereign independence and territorial integrity. Following the demise of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Qing Chinese officials realised that Meiji Japan was no longer within the borders of a once-shared civilisation, which prepared the ground for a series of violent conflicts between them, unusual in their millennium-old, largely peaceful interactions. A sustainable resolution of the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue, then, should move from calls for putting aside sovereignty differences towards a more inclusive, post-Westphalian bordering practice in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narratives of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute expose the spectrum of Taiwan's national identity. While Taiwan has long been struggling to legitimise its claim of representing China or to become an independent state, some of the Taiwanese people still welcome their former colonial master, Japan. This paper draws on academic and journalistic work on how Taiwan has responded to the islands dispute. The author also turns to the internet to examine popular sentiments in the region by examining netizens' discourse on the islands from Taiwan's largest bulletin board system (BBS), Station-PTT. This survey finds that the sovereignty dispute surfaces issues of national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, overseas Chinese students in the United States protested against Japan's claim to the Diaoyutai Islands. Emerging at a time when the rivalry between the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland to represent China was at a critical juncture, the movement soon found itself caught up in the struggle between the two sides. It was out of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement that a new ideological constituent of overseas Chinese nationalism came to light, looking to the PRC as the hope for a sovereign China. It became a predominant force among overseas Chinese activists and the movement changed its direction from defending Diaoyutai to seeking Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. The paper discusses the factors that shaped and eventually radicalized the movement. It asserts that the event was a turning point in the evolution of overseas Chinese nationalism which transformed an undercurrent into a surging tide that gave rise to a new Chinese national identity among overseas Chinese in America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has adopted a state-centered approach towards energy security to deepen political and commercial relationships with all energy producing nations and to aggressively invest in oil fields and pipelines around the world. Applying this approach to its relations with its Asia-Pacific neighbors has produced mixed results. While China's energy diplomacy has brought about opportunities for cooperation with some of its neighbors, notably some countries in Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia, it has become a source of conflict with some other neighbors, especially those with border disputes over maritime territories which may have rich natural resources. This paper examines China's state-led search for energy security and its implications for China's relations with Asia-Pacific countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts—national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan's three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo's decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between India and China, two of the oldest living civilizations had been warm, friendly and cooperative for centuries. Both nations had established greater linkages through cultural exchanges and trade throughout history. Ancient trade and religious pilgrimages had been flourishing through the ancient silk route for centuries. After independence, the civilizational relationship gains new momentum and the spirit of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai'guided a new era of the Asian century. However, the brotherhood spirit started deteriorating after the Tibetan Uprising of1959, leading to a trust deficit and subsequent border disputes. In 1962, both the neighbours engage a brief war and stand to juxtapose in many regional and global issues. Over the years, Chinese has emerged as a major international player and India's China policy has undergone a dynamic change to balance the Chinese threat. In this background, the current paper is intended to highlight the dynamics of India's China policy and analyse the changing relationship between India and China over theyears. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China's economic rise has benefited the Asia Pacific region, its military rise has been a concern among its neighbors. The U.S. in 2009 has decided to shift its strategic focus toward Asia so as to continue to maintain its influence in the region and secure its interests. The U.S.'s intention is to engage China to strengthen the regional security and prosperity. However, the U.S.'s effort in Asia could become counter-productive as its stronger presence could also embolden some regional countries to aggravate their island disputes with China. The escalation in tensions over the disputed islands between China and the regional countries could, in the worst case, drag the U.S. to confront China, and affect the overall security and prosperity of the region. This research paper strongly suggests that the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy must adopt a fine balancing act to prevent the U.S. from being dragged into a direct confrontation with China over those disputed islands in the East China and South China Seas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article draws on prospect theory to explain the variation of China's risk propensity during the 2012–14 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes with Japan. China's initial reference point 1.0 regarding the disputed islands was the 'shelving agreement' 'shelving the sovereignty dispute and a tacit acceptance of Japan's de facto exclusive control. So after Japan's 'nationalization' of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China was clearly in a domain of losses. China was thus highly risk-acceptant by intensifying maritime and air patrolling, engaging in provocative behaviors, and suspending crisis management mechanisms. Meanwhile, China's reference point evolved. Discourse analysis of Chinese official statements and media coverage indicated that regularized patrolling or joint control became China's reference point 2.0. As it started to act from a domain of gains, Chinese behaviors turned risk-averse by scaling back patrolling and resuming negotiations over crisis management mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the challenges that China faces in developing an effective command-and- control (C2) structure to support its out-of- area military operations. Beijing's expanding global interests, unresolved territorial disputes, and increasing economic opportunities necessitate a strong military presence, which China hopes to achieve through a proficient out-of- area operations force. However, the current over-centralized decision-making process within the Central Military Commission (CMC) and its Joint Staff Department (JSD) causes inefficiencies in decision making and undermines the autonomy of unit-level operations outside of the First Island Chain. The article identifies the need for improvements in interservice collaboration, theater command responsibilities, and overall global C2 infrastructure to create a more effective and autonomous force. Additionally, the article discusses China's approach to the division of labor between theater commands and services and the role of political commissars in out-of- area operations. The article concludes that unless China makes these necessary changes, it will struggle to protect its increasingly global interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes was over on July 12, 2016, with a Merits Award in Philippine favor. Beijing rejected this arbitration and abstained from submitting written and oral arguments. Taiwan actively engaged in the debate with the Philippines since July 7, 2015. Not deemed as representative of China, Taiwan was considered capable of clarifying the meaning of the U-Shaped Line it first published in 1947 when seated in Nanjing, representing China then. The biggest maritime feature in the Spratly Islands, i.e. Taiping Island (Itu Aba), has been occupied by troops from mainland China since 1946 and then from Taiwan since 1956. The legal status of Taiping Island was the key to success of Philippine Submissions. The factual information from Taiwan became vital. This paper examines Taiwan's role in this arbitration and the degree to which it could actually speak for China at such legal proceedings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates on China's rise often limit the focus on the continuity and sustenance of the United States' hegemony and the liberal global order. This debate often ignores the primacy of the regional actors, who are generally reduced to 'pawns' in great power politics, acting without agency, interests, or values of their own. Instead, this article suggests that as China rises—like any other great power of the past—it will first aim to secure regional primacy through an array of policy instruments. To test this it examines three case-studies: 1) China–Pakistan relations in nuclear proliferation; 2) China–India relations with respect to border conflict; and 3) Sri Lanka–China relations for development infrastructure. It finds that China's rise has not been benign and instead Beijing has adopted aggressive policies in its neighbourhood. This article finds that the strategic binary of balancing (interest-based containment) and engagement (constructive cooperation) does not reflect immediate realities and long-term sustainability for regional actors. Instead, it suggests the latter would be better advised looking for closer cooperation with like-minded allies in the region (and beyond) as a way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few years, China has experienced a rapid development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN.) In particular, the formation of CAFTA (the China--ASEAN Free Trade Area) will greatly encourage Chinese multinational corporations to "go out" and invest in ASEAN. However, the South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN countries have increased the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN. This paper starts with an analysis of the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes, explains how to view and assess these political risks, and then comes up with a systematic and comprehensive mechanism for coping with the political risks of China's FDI in ASEAN against the background of the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The territorial dispute in the South China Sea (SCS) affecting China and several ASEAN countries has already resulted in drawn-out political tensions in the region. However, one aspect of the dispute is rarely discussed: its influence on Sino-Russian relations and its possible role as a case study in analysing the character of these relations. While Russia moves closer to China in the dispute it still refrains from support of its territorial claims and develops close relations with some of China's regional opponents such as Vietnam and India. This article describes most recent Russian economic and political activity in the region involving these countries with the aim of clarifying whether the Russian approach to problems in the SCS can be understood as an attempt to balance, bandwagon or hedge against growing Chinese influence, or whether Moscow's approach is guided by different considerations. This article concludes that Russia's approach towards the South China Sea dispute is determined mostly by Moscow's economic interests and cannot be seen as a case of either balancing or bandwagoning China or hedging against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frequent occurrence of land expropriation disputes in rural areas of China has attracted attention of scholars to study causes. Most existing studies discuss causes from "structure-institution" level. In other words, land expropriation disputes are caused by existing imperfect institutions, regulations, and policies. Such analysis model points institutional causes, but pays little attention to policy implementation process, especially the subjective initiative of parties concerned. This paper described a decade-long land expropriation dispute case in detail. Through description of event and process and survey of reasons of actors, it revealed factors resulting in occurrence and upgrade of dispute, and analyzed factors and their interactions with the aid of Smith Process Model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new way in which China has tried to expand its control over the South China Sea for the past decade has been to engage paramilitary forces in its territorial disputes. These forces acted as auxiliary devices for the People's Liberation Army, applying tactics specific to asymmetric conflicts, such as rapid and low-intensity attacks on foreign ships. The leading role was assumed by the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia, a structure made up of civilian personnel with military training and fishing vessels equipped with surveillance technology. These actions are part of China's strategy to attribute its maritime aggression to civilian entities to hinder possible military responses from other countries and in particular from the United States. Using collective case studies, this article illustrated the dynamics of the coercive activities of the Chinese naval forces and the inability of affected states to deal with these unconventional threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes how recent fishing disputes involving China and Latin American countries have been reported by local and global media. We conducted content and sentiment analysis of media articles, coding articles according to the sentiment ("positive," "negative," or "neutral") they express toward China and the actions of its fishing fleet, based on the words used to describe the same. We also examined what topics are discussed in different media – issues that are more specific and "local" in nature or broader issues that go beyond specific incidents. According to our findings, Latin American media can be as negative in their reporting on China and Chinese actions as Anglo‐Saxon Western media but tend to focus more on local issues and specific incidents, whereas Anglo‐Saxon Western media are more likely to connect incidents to broader geopolitical issues. Deepening of China‐LAC economic relations have not reduced Latin American media's critical approach toward China. At the same time, the local media remain independent; they do not necessarily reproduce the same frames as global news platforms in their coverage of China. These findings reinforce the idea that LAC broadly does not want to choose sides in the China‐US rivalry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This study examines the impact of perceptions of young Indian adults about Chinese products in Indian markets upon their purchase behavior, especially after the border conflict in Doklam. Methodology: We have analyzed data collected from a randomly selected sample of 339 educated urban individuals (18–40 years). Binary logistic regression was conducted to estimate the likelihood of buying Chinese products given their level of acceptance among those respondents who are aware of the Indo‐China conflict. Findings: Young Indians mainly focus on quality and price while purchasing a product, and not the country‐of‐origin (COO). Those who took the social media messages to ban Chinese products seriously, concerned about the dominance of Chinese products in the Indian market, and check if the COO is China demonstrate significantly aversive purchase intention towards Chinese products. On the contrary, the odds of purchase decision making getting influenced by Indo‐China conflict is significantly lower for them who have some preference for Chinese products over its Indian substitutes. Conclusions: Feeling of animosity does not result in considerable hostility against the willingness to buy Chinese products, when price, quality, brand awareness, and non‐availability of appropriate Indian substitutes matter more. However, if the sense of animosity is utilized well, Indian manufacturers, especially the MSME sectors, can gain entrepreneurial opportunities and mileage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explains the varied interpretations of conflict, conflict resolution and boundary management. Using the multi-paradigm approach it examines the important causes of the conflict between China and India, especially the border conflict at Arunachai Pradesh. It reaffirms that Chinese diplomacy's forte is to discuss and lay out 'principles', and then Interpret them to suit Beeing's convenience, as in the case of the Panchsheel. India should not allow focus to diveit from the practical task of clarifying the Line of Actual Control to a conceptual enunciation of the principles dunngany future talks. The line of control clarification must remain the starting point to any negotiations. Failure to take a strong stand now will prove detrimental to Indian foreign policy interests in the future. It suggests some policy measures based on major theoretical models which may help preserve Indian interests in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Territorial disputes over the East and South China Sea have been an issue of growing policy concern in East Asia in recent years. These maritime territorial disputes, as the authors argue in this study, constitute a contextual factor undermining China's soft power in East Asia. More specifically, this study quantitatively demonstrates that all else equal, citizens are less likely to take a positive view of China's influence on their respective countries with maritime territorial disputes with China than in countries without such disputes with China. This key result suggests a clear international distributional implication of maritime territorial disputes overlooked in the existing literature on China's soft power. This study cautions against one-sided views on a China's soft power whether purely optimistic or skeptical, in contemporary political analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of a turbulent past of mistrust and rivalry, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are not adversaries, they are political, economic and security partners, and in the context of their common opposition to the USA and western liberalism they could even become allies in the future. Russia's war against Ukraine put China in a difficult situation, since it is a supporter of peaceful ways for solving interstate conflicts and it invested a lot in the Ukrainian economy, but cannot side with the West against Moscow. Chinese lack of criticism towards Moscow was widely seen as an indicator of the convergence of the two nations's positions on the evolution of the international security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how the structural factor of asymmetry affects China's relations with a small power. As the studies of Brantly Womack suggest, asymmetry theory is conducive to deepening the understanding of China's relations with smaller countries. We argue that an examination of China–Philippines relations from 2010 to 2020 indicates that Beijing has trouble managing its ties with Manila because of the asymmetry in the nature of the relations, which originates in the power and status gaps between them. The asymmetrical structure of this bilateral interplay inclines China to underestimate and neglect the Philippines' intentions and determination to resist, which has been made especially clear in the South China Sea disputes. As a result, their relationship experienced repeated ups and downs throughout the 2010s, in particular over the maritime sovereignty issue. This study also hints at the complicated situations surrounding China where many medium-sized and small states attempt to maneuver among great powers. Without affinities with such governments in the Indo-Pacific region, it will be difficult for Beijing to achieve a peaceful rise and acquire status as a next-generation superpower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The formal demarcation of what is today the Burma-China border began following the British conquest of Upper Burma from the Konbaung dynasty in 1885 and the signing of international agreements with the Qing Empire (1886, 1894, 1897), the process only completed in the 1960s. Around the turn of the century and into the twentieth, therefore, the highlands between British Burma and Qing (later Republican) China remained a contested 'borderland'; specifically, one over which successive lowland states had never been able to exert direct control – a space James C. Scott and others have named 'Zomia' – but toward which they had been expanding by the mid-nineteenth century (if not earlier). This article looks not at the ways in which Zomia's inhabitants contested this expanding state authority, which has been the focus of most work on this space, but how the British pressed their territorial claims over part of this contested borderland vis-à-vis the Chinese. Salt was a monopoly of both the Government of India (of which Burma was a province until 1935) and the Qing and Republican states. Smuggling – trade, to British eyes – salt from Burma into China thus undermined Chinese sovereignty qua the expression of the latter's monopoly powers. Complaints about smuggling were met with 'masterly inactivity', not only because the colonial administration was weak in Upper Burma and along the frontier, but also because it meant the British imperial state could permit the expansion of 'legitimate' trade and thereby contest Chinese sovereignty qua its territorial claims over the borderland. In contrast to other works positing that smuggling over defined borders undermined state power, this article shows how a permissive attitude to complaints about smuggling undergirded British sovereignty and was very much part of the making of the border. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]