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The establishment of centralized supervision by means of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) had to ensure the quality and impartiality of banking supervision, as well as the establishment of a supervisory system more properly aligned with the characteristics of the banking sector. The far-reaching mixed administration of the European Central Bank (ECB) and national competent authorities (NCAs) must also ensure strong and consistent supervision across the participating member states while using the NCAs' local and specific know-how. All elements indicate that a more effective banking supervision was necessary for the Eurozone. This may be challenging given the conflict between the required centralisation of supervision, on the one hand, and the far-reaching mixed administration and composite legal order in place on the other. The first years of experience with the SSM provide a multi-faceted picture of the effectiveness of centralised supervision. This paper discusses the effectiveness of centralised supervision within the context of a far-reaching mixed administration and legal order on the basis of three different elements. Firstly, the basis of supervision is discussed, i.e. the applicable substantive laws for which compliance must be ensured by the ECB, and which concerns the so-called Single Rulebook. Secondly, the organisation of supervision, in practice, is discussed on the basis of one of its most important features: the Joint Supervisory Teams. Lastly, the delineation of supervisory tasks is discussed, as well as its impact on the ECB and, based on the Dutch example, its impact on national supervisory models. These elements illustrate the many steps that have been taken to improve the effectiveness of centralised supervision. They also show how many obstacles are still left to overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the administrative remedy provided by the Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) of the European Central Bank (ECB), as part of the broader issue of the right of defence of natural and legal persons vis- à- vis ECB supervisory decisions within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). After presenting an overview of the review panels established in the financial sector in the EU, the article describes the experience with the ABoR by analysing its composition, its mandate and scope of review, the main procedural aspects and the relationship with judicial proceedings before the European Court of Justice. Particular attention is given to the substantial issues dealt with by the ABoR in its Opinions and to some of the major challenges faced in the first 2 years of practice. Among them is the assessment of the correct application of national laws implementing EU legislation by the ECB. The paper identifies two aspects giving particular cause for concern and requiring legislative reforms: (1) the assessment of the suitability of the members of management bodies (fit and proper assessment) and (2) the inclusion of bank holding companies within the scope of banking supervision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we analyze the topological properties of the network of the Euro Area banking market network, with the primary aim of assessing the importance of a bank in the financial system with respect to ownership and control of other credit institutions. The network displays power law distributions in both binary and weighted degree metrics indicating a robust yet fragile structure and a direct link between an increase of control diversification and a rise in the market power. Therefore while in good time the network is seemingly robust, in bad times many banks can simultaneously go into distress. This behavior paves the way for Central bank’s actions. In particular we investigate whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism introduced by the European Central Banks and based on banks’ total asset is a good proxy to quantify their systemic importance. Results indicate that not all the financial institutions with high valued total assets are systemically important but only few of them. Moreover the network structure reveals that control is highly concentrated, with few important shareholders approximately controlling a separate subset of banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the euro crisis, the French government has pushed to invert the rules of the Maastricht Treaty. After the height of the crisis had been overcome, one can see the success of the French government. The European Central Bank (ECB) has assumed a fiscal policy role by its extensive government bond buying, the no bailout clause has been replaced by the permanent European Financial Stability Facility and negotiations over a stronger political union have gained new impetus. This contribution traces the influence of different societal actors on the French government's preferences, which have largely shaped the outcome of the European summits. By following the domestic politics approach, it systematically juxtaposes the support or the discontent of the business community, namely that of the financial industry and the industrial interests, with the electoral pressures by the broad French public. The paper asks whether the economic interests trumped the electoral concerns and shows that the strong ties between the French financial sector with the southern periphery have been a driving factor in the first years of the euro crisis. As public opinion grew more and more disgruntled, it constrained the French government, which in turn changed its substantive position in the negotiations and sought to allot many of the responsibilities to the ECB, to avoid further unpopular financial commitments and bank bailouts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]