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Using data from the China General Social Survey and Japan General Social Survey, this paper examines: (1) what the differences are in gender inequality in labor force participation and earnings between China and Japan; (2) if family characteristics, such as marriage and presence of preschool children and children under 18 years old, have a larger negative effect on women's employment and earnings in Japan than in China; (3) if there are differences, what factors account for the differences. The results indicate that whereas marital status and spouse's education and earnings have significant negative effects on women's labor force participation in Japan, these factors have smaller effects on women's labor force participation in China. Motherhood earnings penalty is only significant in the non-public sector, not in the public sector in Japan. In China, motherhood earnings penalty is not significant in both the public and the non-public sectors. While married men earn significantly more than single men in Japan and marital status has no significant effect on men's earnings in China, marriage earnings penalty for women in both countries exists. I discuss the effects of state policies, labor market structures, family system, and individual characteristics on men and women's labor force participation and earnings from a comparative gender stratification perspective. I also discuss the implications of these results on the gender stratification theory and on research on welfare regime and the transformation of post-socialist societies, as well as on women's labor market status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is to examine whether the industrial policy is still feasible for developing countries in the epoch of globalisation based on the comparison between the Japanese and Chinese automobile industries. Sharing the same goal of catching up with high-income countries, both Japanese and Chinese governments selected the automobile industry to achieve industrial development and build up a few large firms with international competitive capability. In the postwar period, Japan successfully nurtured its leading automobile producers such as Toyota and Nissan with protectionist industrial policies. Conversely, with the similar package of industrial policies, the Chinese state-supported large automobile producers face tough competition from the global conglomerate automakers and the domestic indigenous producers. Drawing on the success of Japan and the failure of China, intense international competition, low-level technology and institutional inefficiency are the main obstacles for automakers from developing countries to catch up with their global competitors. In the near future, it is still difficult for developing countries to utilize industrial policies to nurture “national champions” in this highly consolidated industrial sector. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid 1980’s, anti-Japanese mass protests in China have been conducted on the streets, college campuses, and, in recent years, on the Internet. While the Chinese and Japanese governments increasingly tie their fate together economically, growing rancor among the Chinese public over WWII and contemporary issues threatens to tear apart. Opinion polls conducted in China show that rampant nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is prevalent among Chinese “Generation Y” youths (Chinese citizens born between 1981-1995). Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment is not new phenomena, yet Gen Y nationalists vary from their predecessors in significant ways. This paper will (1) explore this new breed of nationalism and (2) examine the tools that Chinese youths currently use to impact the complex and conflictive Sino-Japanese relationship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the structural impediments of Sino-Japanese relations. China's dramatic rise in the past decade has greatly tipped the balance of power in East, contributing to the emergence of great power competition between Beijing and Tokyo. Ho ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the causes and consequences of dust storms called ‘yellow dragon,’ reviews efforts of regional countries (Korea, Japan, China and Mongolia) to combat the problem, and assesses the effectiveness of the current desertification regime in ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore a reasonable model for security cooperation in an “East Asian community.” Today, the countries of Asia â€" including the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan and India â€" are eag ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005 the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in Beijing and other Chinese cities. This paper explores the effects of domestic politics on Sino-Japanese relations. It argues that perceptions and misperceptions about each other's regime ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR is in search of a newer and more visionary methodological toolkit. Scenario building based on expert knowledge of historical trends and theoretically informed analysis appears to offer insights for IR scholars as well as policy-makers. This paper aims ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's and Japan's popularity campaigns toward Southeast Asia, a vital neighbor to both. It contextualizes soft power campaign in democratic and non-democratic settings and discusses their similarities and differences. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the Japan Times¡¯ seeming inattention to important events in China in 1997 is better understood as the contemporary Japanese practice of ¡Â*withdrawing for universality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the paths to Sino-Japanese reconciliation, which has yet to come more than 60 years after the war. I propose the concept of deep interstate reconciliation (DIR), which means two states share the understanding that war is unthinkable and hold generally warm feelings about each other. Realists would equate reconciliation with political and military cooperation that should occur when states share common strategic interests. But China and Japan failed to reach DIR in the 1970s-80s when they shared the security goal of counterbalancing the Soviet threat. Using the comparison of Sino-Japanese relations with German-Polish relations since the 1970s, I argue security motivations are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for DIR; the key to realizing DIR is the harmonization of the national memories between the parties involved. From the 1970s, China and Japan only brushed aside their historical legacy to make way for diplomatic normalization, only to see history disputes erupt from the 1980s that poisoned bilateral ties. In contrast, West Germany and Poland narrowed their memory divergence through restitution measures and textbook cooperation, which created a strong sense of closeness and trust. Coupled with other positive factors like European integration and Poland’s democratization, these efforts paved the way for the eventual German-Polish reconciliation in the 1990s. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Six decades after the conclusion of the World War II, China and Japan, Asia's two great powers, remain estranged from each other on the issues of the WWII memory even as their economic ties are growing at a rapid pace. This paper is intended to examine how the state and domestic forces in both China and Japan have come into terms with the difficult past at the level of bilateral relationship between the two countries. The authors criticize the prevailing opinion in both public discourse and scholarly research that memory and nationalistic sentiments are manipulated and used by the Chinese regime as a bargaining chip in the diplomatic negotiation. Instead, the authors argue that the struggle over historical issues in Sino-Japanese relations is a “two-level game” between domestic politics and international relations. The authors propose and test a theoretical model and informed by rich empirical data collected from standardized survey, textual analysis, and in-depth interviews. The evidence and the model show that Chinese and Japanese leaders must consider both the bilateral relationship as well as their own domestic politics. The state-society relationship and domestic politics have influenced the interpretations of the history as well as reconciliation process between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the major power relationship in Northeast Asia has undergone some significant transition and reconfiguration. Among other things, Sino-South Korean relations began to show some new momentum that has the potential to reshape the geopolitical environment in the region. On a series of important political and security issues, Beijing and Seoul share more common interests than their respective relations with the other two major powers in the region: Japan and the United States. On the war history issue, China and South Korea formed a united front against Japan. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the six-party talks have clearly demonstrated that China and South Korea have more in common in terms of approaches and tactics than they do with both the United States and Japan. On the core issue of China’s national interestâ€"Taiwan, Seoul’s position is much closer to Beijing than both the U.S. and Japan. On the issue of Korea’s reunification, China and South Korea are also more likely to find common ground. In additional, both China and South Korea have territorial disputes with Japan. Both China and South Korea have strong anti-Japanese and to less extent anti-American sentiment in the public. By examining the new dynamics and developments in Sino-South Korean relations, this paper tries to argue that with Japan moving closer to the status of a normal power and China’s sustainable rise, a strategic realignment in the region is inevitable in which a potential China-ROK “strategic partnership” is emerging and will be pivotal to a possible regional security framework in Northeast Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In July, 2006, North Korea conducted long range missile tests, and three months later, detonated a nuclear device. These incidents alerted Japan to the immediate threat of a nuclear capable North Korea. According to the theory of realism, Japan should militarize and obtain nuclear weapons to deter North Korea from continuing its nuclear program. Will Japan become a nuclear state? This paper examines how Japan reacted to the security crisis, and how Japan may act against military threats in the future. To investigate the current domestic debates on Japanese security issues, this study conducted a survey of the fifty-five Japanese Diet members in August, 2006. The survey analyzed diplomatic tools that Japan utilized against North Korea, and explored the future options of Japanese security policy. The survey findings showed that (1) United Nations resolutions and economic/financial sanctions are the most effective diplomatic efforts against a military threat from North Korea; (2) an uncertainty about the close relationship between China and North Korea; (3) conducting active Japanese foreign policy would be possible in some multilateral frameworks; and (4) the establishment of good relationships with other Asian nations is vital for Japanese national interests. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes over history abound in northeast Asian politics today. Whether it is Chinese and Koreans protesting “revisionist” Japanese histories of World War II, Japanese counter protests about Chinese and Korean history textbooks, or Koreans disgruntled with Chinese accounts of their shared past, history appears to be an endless source of friction in northeast Asia. Yet there has been little research seeking to systematically explore just how such historical disputes matter for international relations in the present. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of nation (China/Japan/Korea), source (ingroup/outgroup textbooks), and valence (positive/negative narratives) on measures of beliefs about the past, emotional response, hostile attribution, and threat perception in present day Sino-Japanese, Sino-Korean, and Korea-Japan relations. The study will be conducted with Chinese, Japanese, and Korean university students. A 2 X 2 X 2 design will expose randomized groups of students from each country to excerpts and pictures from false high school history textbook accounts of colonial Korea from the 1910s and 1920s, colonial Manchuria of the 1930s and 1940s, and tributary Chosun’s relations with the Ming and Qing Dynasty from 1392-1910. Implications and future research are discussed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite improved relations between China and Japan since Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister in September 2006, nationalism remains a major force in driving the future direction of bilateral relations. On the surface, both Tokyo and Beijing talk with carefully guarded diplomatic language amid strong undercurrents of antagonistic feelings from both sides that range from historical to stratigic to territorial issues. This paper explores the bottom-up anti-Japanese sentiment in China alongside the top-down right-wing views aimed against the rise of China in Japan, which thereby explains how such nationalistic agendas relate to a number of dilemmas that impact profound influences on both policy-making and long-term strategies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth of modernization in a society is intimately connected to the growth of legal evolutions related to criminalization. While the progress of modernization expands the boundaries of tolerance, diversities, and open society, it also expands the boundaries of crime and criminalization. In the the West, the advance of modern law and justice and progress in human rights have expanded the boundaries of freedom. But they have also expanded the boundaries of criminalization and victimization. One of the major areas that have rapidly expanded with modernization, particularly in the societies of the West, is the criminalization of domestic violence. During the last thirty years, series of laws have evolved that have criminalized a wide variety of behaviors related to domestic violence. This paper will examine how and what laws and statutes related to the criminalization of domestic violence have evolved in the United States, and how some of those legal developments are now spreading in other societies of the world. Data will be drawn from Japan, China, and India. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Japan and Korea there has been a movement toward increased lay participation in criminal adjudication. In both cases a significant part of the impetus for change was widely publicized miscarriages of justice. In this paper a number of these miscarriages will be examined and their implications considered. In addition, the paper will explore the trend, since the beginning of the Enlightenment, for justice system failures to be used as a justification for expanding lay participation in the criminal process. The implications of both the Asian precedents and the larger history will be explored with respect to events now transpiring in China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a rising, regional, and very influential power, China is in the process of buttressing its military forces in the Pacific rim. Realist theory predicts a growing regional and international power, such as China, will more likely be propelled to attain regional hegemony. As the only superpower today, however, the United States will hardly relinquish its naval dominance in the Pacific. The balancing act Washington must pursue?in order to create a successful counterbalance against potential Chinese naval hostility?is to strengthen ties with United States allies in the Pacific region who may not feel comfortable with Beijing?s military presence expanding throughout the Pacific rim. Washington has recently begun to strengthen its military ties with Tokyo, and has started to encourage Japan to invest more in its military infrastructure. Japan, leery of its uneasy relationship with China, has made overtures to Washington as well. The difficulty for the White House, however, lies in crafting a relationship with Japan that is not simply seen to be some sort of anti-Chinese bloc. While it may be tempting for some in the Pentagon to forge a military relationship with Japan built on the premise that China?s military rise is harmful to both U.S. and Japanese interests in the Pacific rim, this paper will argue that a stronger Washington?Tokyo bond should attempt to establish a more cooperative relationship with Beijing rather than try to contain China?s influence throughout the region, which, for all intents and purposes, is inevitable. Although establishing a cooperative relationship will not be easy among the United States, Japan, and China, it is certainly a crucial project that will require great perseverance in order to lay the foundations for a more prosperous relationship advantageous to all three nations, as well as to the rest of the world. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becomingthe biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, politicalrelations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in Chinastill concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more andmore people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growingnationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. WhileTaiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded byChinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island wasconsidered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwanhas increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, adevelopment that could be attributed to political democratization on theisland since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwanwill continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independencethat will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, bothTaiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving politicalrelations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance isbecoming a popular view in Taiwan's strategic circle, and Japanese publichave shown more sympathy to Taiwan's international isolation. Japanesegovernment even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including theTaiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Treaty. Thesedevelopments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japanhave committed to the One China policy and because the Taiwan issueused to be excluded from China-Japan relations.This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations.The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identifythe strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen therelations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-Chinarelations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will alsointerview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain firsthand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the deepening economic interdependence between China and Japan, their political relationship is deteriorating, which is frequently described as ?cold politics, hot economics? during recent years. Several incidents regarding Sino-Japanese relations had shown that Chinese netizens exercised their influence on Chinese foreign policy decision-making. This paper argues the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration held in China can be regarded as an exercise of brinkmanship by the Chinese government, which pacified the growing anger among the netizens on one hand, and tried to ask for Japan?s concession on the other hand. Because of the growing Chinese popular nationalism, Chinese government can no longer make its foreign policy totally free from public scrutiny. When the traditional state-centric realist and state-interdependent liberalist theories are inadequate to address contemporary Chinese foreign policy due to the increasing consideration of the anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese netizens, strategic approach can be another way. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea?s international position is a complex mix of pressures. Focused overwhelmingly on the last vestige of the Cold War ? its unresolved division of the peninsula into North and South ? South Korea must also manage its alliance with the United States, devise a modus vivendi with a massive and dynamic China, and resolve its relationship with Japan. To that end, over the past decade, a fairly clear South Korean grand strategy has emerged, one that emphasizes economic over military issues, accommodation rather than confrontation of China, and a slowly evolving alliance with the United States. The centerpiece of this grand strategy has been a strategy of engaging North Korea economically while downplaying the nuclear issue. This paper will make three main points. First, in terms of overall national security strategy, South Korea has committed itself to a strategy of interdependence and engagement with North Korea. As a result, South Korea?s engagement strategy will continue to have consequences for regional policy toward North Korea, for the U.S. role in the region, and for China?s influence. Second, South Korea?s development has depended on being deeply engaged in the regional and global economy, and this orientation has actually increased in the wake of the Asian financial crisis a decade ago. Indeed, South Korea ? as with many East Asian states ? has increasingly begun to look regionally for its economic partners, especially to China, and away from the United States. Third, South Korea firmly desires to continue its close relationship with the United States. However, South Korea?s national priorities are regional, and differ from Washington?s global priorities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange rate policy cannot be modeled as a simple product of domestic politics, as Jeff Frieden does in his recent work on this topic. Countries deciding whether or not to go on or off the gold standard may have been able to make these decisions separately based on domestic politics, without coordination or bargaining, and small countries may still be able to do so with regard to the dollar or euro in today's monetary regime. But big countries, including the United States, cannot make exchange rate policy on their own. It takes two to float, by which I mean that it is more accurate to model exchange rate policy as a two-level game in which two partners each seek an exchange rate regime and level that reflects domestic political interests and institutions, with the outcome determined by bargaining. The United States cannot make a decision to float vis-a-vis the renminbi without China going along. Japan has learned that it cannot devalue the yen without the United States blessing this policy. The paper lays out the two-level logic of exchange rate bargaining and illustrates it by examining several cases of United States - Asia exchange rate bargaining, including US-Japan since 1980 and US-China since 2000. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Historical memories are intricately linked with the rocky relations China and Japan have had with each other since the 20th century. While conventional scholarship is in broad agreement that history does matter, in recent years an increasing number of analysts have argued that history is a ?rational tool? that can be utilised by the Chinese leaders to bolster the legitimacy of the Communist regime. While these studies are not necessarily wrong, they give rise to a number of ethical issues. First, they downplay the extent to which traumatic memories do play a role in the peoples? minds, regardless of elite manipulation. Second, by portraying historical controversies as a product of manipulation, they inadvertently absolve the Japanese from playing any part in helping both sides overcome the historical trauma that continues to colour Sino-Japanese relations. This paper considers the role of scholarship in Sino-Japanese relations. In particular, it will seek to problematise conventional analyses of history and memory. It will attempt to suggest ways in which Sino-Japanese reconciliation can be facilitated, and what role scholarship can play in this process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between China and Japan represent an apparent puzzle. On the one hand bilateral economic interactions continue to grow significantly. On the other hand, political relations are at their lowest ebb since diplomatic normalization. In this paper we investigate the role of historical myth-making and commercial relations as determinants of bilateral political relations. We find that a gap between the two countries? collective memories as result of the instrumental use of history by elites has independently caused worsening bilateral relations, as well as increasing realist concerns about bilateral balance of power.We also develop and test a set of causal mechanisms related to commercial peace theory. Our results show that increased economic interactions have had little influence on Japanese decision-making. Further, we find that commercial interests have not been significantly harmed by bilateral political turbulence, and they have therefore not lobbied decision-makers to alter their policy position. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's changing perspectives on the evolving U.S.-Japan alliance from both the hard and soft power angles. Four sets of considerations affect how Beijing views the alliance. The first has to do with the alliance's scope and missions. While Beijing tacitly acknowledges the alliance's role in preventing Japanese re-militarization, it now sees it as an instrument for sustaining U.S. hegemony in the region beyond its original, limited missions of defending Japan. Second, China considers the U.S.-Japan alliance increasingly as a convenient cover for Tokyo to pursue ~ normal state ~ status, including the strengthening of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the dispatch of JSDF personnel overseas. A politically ambitious, militarily assertive, and economically strong Japan poses a serious challenge for China and for the region given the historical past and ongoing territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors. Third, Beijing has serious concerns about the alliance's potential interference in what it considers as its domestic affairs, namely, the Taiwan issue. Finally, Chinese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance must also be put in the broad contexts of the evolving and complex Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations. Stable and better relationships could mitigate the potentially negative impact of the alliance on China while tension and deterioration of ties heighten Beijing's concerns and worse-case assessments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The chief concern of this paper is to provide an analysis as to how the mutually-reinforcing phenomena of conflicting identities and conflicting interests have caused and are serving to exacerbate the current tensions between China and Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and China are the major powerbrokers in East Asia. Japan has the second largest economy in the world, while China is an emerging economic and military power. The nature of their relationship, whether confrontational or cooperative, will help to determine the level of peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia, and beyond. Therefore, the importance of this relationship cannot be underestimated. Yet as the two countries have become economically more interdependent, they have become politically more estranged. In fact, in recent years we have witnessed decisions by each government that have seemed designed to provoke rather than pacify one?s neighbor. I argue that the explanation for this largely lies in domestic politics. In this study, I seek to examine one aspect of this: the role of the Japanese media and public opinion in foreign aid policy towards China. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been one of the main pillars of Japan?s China policy since 1979. The form that Japan?s ODA strategy towards China has traditionally taken is one of ?long-term engagement,? or a steadily increasing stream of economic benefits to promote good relations. However, there were three times during this period when Japan?s foreign aid policy towards China strayed from its normal trajectory of engagement: economic sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, the 1995-1996 freeze of grant aid after China?s underground nuclear tests, and the 2000-2001 review and reduction of ODA to China. In my paper I will examine the interaction among media coverage, public opinion, and policymaking in each of these cases. My argument is that the media performed its role as ?trickster,? serving both the public and the state. It did this by allying with either the public or the state at different stages. The media carried out three tasks: conveying information both between and among the government and the public, mobilizing public opposition to initial government policy, and helping to convince the public of how the policy that was finally decided upon was a good compromise. In other words, it focused, escalated, and then extinguished attention.My research design combines qualitative and quantitative approaches. I will begin by conducting a content analysis of Japanese print media coverage, charting trends in items including policy position, volume of coverage, type of article (straight or opinion), and information sources (such as government or business). I will then compare these trends to those in public opinion. Finally, I will conduct a statistical analysis of public opinion, media coverage, and the evolution of policy decisions in each of these three cases, determing the degree to which there is a correlational and/or causal relationship. In examining the role of the Japanese media and public opinion in these aid policy decisions, I seek to discover the interrelationship among the media, the public, and policymaking, and shed some light on the role of domestic politics in the relationship between a status quo power and an emerging power. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 marked a new low in Sino-Japanese relations. A grassroots petition in China, South Korea and around the world gathered more than 30 million signatures in a matter of weeks. Violent demonstrations in China displayed Chinese people's deep resentment of Japan on a range of issues. Both Beijing and Tokyo have traded charges against each other while trying to control the situation from getting worse. This paper examines these developments, and focuses on how nationalism manifested itself in both China and Japan, what are behind the emotional outbursts of public sentiments, and why there is no single model that can explain the nationalistic behavior in either China or Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT #1Japan's Post-Mahanian Maritime StrategyThis paper will assess the dynamics of maritime security in Northeast Asia using the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the U.S. naval officer who, writing around the turn of the nineteenth century, contended that "sea power" was founded on the "three pillars" of international commerce, naval stations scattered along the sea lanes to support the operations of fuel-thirsty warships, and, most importantly for him, a powerful battle fleet. Mahan's works exhibited a strong geographical hue, urging the United States to build a fleet capable of defending the Caribbean sea lanes against the largest concentration of naval forces likely to be hurled against it. Only by securing the Caribbean basin, its "Mediterranean," declared Mahan, could the United States dig an isthmian canal and wrest away its rightful share of the Asia trade.We have unearthed considerable evidence suggesting that China will pursue a Mahanian maritime strategy as its diplomatic, economic, and military power waxes. Influential Chinese strategists talk of "absolute control" over China's littoral waters, through which the shipments of raw materials upon which the nation's economic growth has come to depend must pass. In so doing, they routinely invoke Mahan's writings. If indeed Beijing follows Mahan's path to sea power, it will regard the Yellow, East China, and South China seas much as Mahan regarded the Caribbean: as an expanse in which naval dominance is vital to national prosperity.If so, an increasingly assertive Chinese maritime strategy will intersect with that of Japan, which has been rethinking its own approach to the uses of sea power, in large part because it relies on the same sea lanes for its own imports of oil, gas, and other commodities. Whether Tokyo would entrust the safety of its seaborne commerce to a China jealous of its "Caribbean" is an open question. Also problematic for Sino-Japanese relations are conflicting claims to islands whose adjacent sea beds purportedly contain major oil and gas reserves.Yet few, if any, Japanese strategists look to Alfred Thayer Mahan for guidance. They do not quote Mahan; nor do they urge Tokyo to found its maritime strategy on Mahanian precepts or some distinctively Japanese derivative thereof. Why is that so? Was Mahan discredited by association with the Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s? Was he simply forgotten during the postwar years, when large segments of the Japanese populace looked with revulsion on the use of military force? Upon what maritime theories will Tokyo base its emerging naval strategy, if not those of Mahan? With what effect?By venturing some answers to these questions, the study will show how Japanese strategy may evolve over the next decade and how the strategies deployed by Tokyo and Beijing may interact. Our findings and recommendations will be of immediate use to policymakers in Tokyo, as well as to policymakers and alliance managers in Washington, which, if recent events are any guide, will depend increasingly on the U.S.-Japanese alliance to sustain its East Asia strategy in the coming years. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated in recent years, driven by clashes over the interpretation and commemoration of war history. This stands in contrast to the growth in economic ties between the two countries, and appears to run counter to liberal theories that emphasize the pacifying effects of commerce.In this paper we examine recent trends in Sino-Japanese relations utilizing the theoretical lenses of commercial peace and nationalism. We suggest that economic interdependence is a weaker factor than nationalism in determining the direction of future relations for three reasons. First, although bilateral aggregate levels of trade and investment are increasing, we argue that the structure of these economic interactions suggest that increased commercial ties may not have the pacific power posited by commercial liberal theories. Second, evidence suggests that the attempt by both states to separate economic ties from political ties has been only partially successful, and that nationalism has trumped commercial interests when the two have clashed. Third, we argue that although deepening economic interactions may have increased the costs of conflict, they have not dampened increased relative gain concerns and bilateral threat perceptions. This has generated higher expectations within each state of future militarized disputes, and raised the risk of inadvertent military confrontation in territorial and resource-driven disputes. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joseph Nye's concept of soft power has become an integral part of the IR academic discourse. Yet, any debate about the role of attraction in world politics is largely focusing on the U.S. Where is Asia in this equation?This paper will look at the concept of soft power and how it applies to Northeast Asia. Being the most powerful actors in the region, this study will focus predominantly on China and Japan. My overarching research question is two-fold: Firstly, is East Asian soft power a mere side-effect of rapid economic growth or does it exists independently? Secondly, which of the two examined nations has greater potential to influence world affairs by virtue of its soft power resources? Due to the elusive character of soft power, this analysis will cover a lot of ground. I will scrutinize the two cases along three parameters: culture, agenda-setting powers and foreign policy. Accordingly, my methodology will be based on a comparative case study.I will demonstrate how Beijing and Tokyo are formulating cultural policies to make their respective national heritage accessible and attractive throughout the region and indeed the entire world. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ?rise? of China and Japan in the international political sphere through the theoretical lens of the English School. One of the most important insights provided by the English School approach of International Relations is its notion that ?Great Powers? hold special responsibilities in the Society of States. However, studies of ?great power responsibilities? have not sufficiently problematised or historicised what exactly these ?responsibilities? entail. Building on a recent study by Roland Paris which argues that international peacebuilding constitutes the modern ?mission civilisatrice?, I argue that the English School theoretical framework can offer us a fresh perspective in understanding the political ambitions of China and Japan to play a greater political role in International Society. Moving beyond conventional explanations which trace these movements to domestic nationalism, I explore through a comparative case study of Chinese and Japanese participation in international peacekeeping whether China or Japan?s recent actions for ?a greater international political role? is informed by both states? interaction with a international normative consensus of what constitutes a ?civilised? Great Power in twentieth and twenty first-century International Society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-Japan alliance has not only survived, but also strengthened in the post-Cold War era, against some realists? predictions otherwise. However, economic reality during the same period has been reduction of Japanese dependence on the United States market and increasing integration of Japan with the Asian markets including China. Unlike the Cold War years, when Japan-Soviet economic relations were nearly negligible, this new comprehensive security environment requires a careful balancing on the part of Japan. Success of such efforts is also subject to the political leadership that can overcome bureaucratic stalemates at home. This paper will review Japan?s domestic debates about China and Japan?s strategy to deal with rising China. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact that the coming of the Internet and generational change can have, both independently and collectively, on the political economy of a major bilateral relationship in international affairs. It argues that both influences can independently exert positive impact in broadening cross-national familiarity, but that the interactive effects of these two factors can also be quite de-stabilizing. Empirically, the Internet appears to empower young people with an unprecedented access to current developments in Sino-Japanese relations. Yet that access seems to complicate prospects for the sort of elite cross-national bargains that stabilize bilateral relations between one-time adversaries. The sort of political mobilization stimulated by the Internet also inhibits otherwise non-democratic governments like that of China from making pragmatic compromises. The new entrée for non-Establishment groups produced by the Internet in Sino-Japanese relations could ultimately have major implications for bilateral geo-strategic relations more generally, and ultimately for international relations as a whole in future years, it is argued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]