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The paper would try to look at the India-China relations of cooperation within BRICS framework. A comparison of this stance with India and China in power struggle Asia would form another part of the paper. India has opened up new platforms on either side of the subcontinent such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical Cooperation, Chabahar port project as well as joined Shanghai Cooperation Organization as its means of outreach. This has all been a part of India’s changing role in Asia. However, it must be also kept in mind that there is a China-Pakistan angle to it. A battle for power and influence has been there in the region of South Asia even before the pandemic. Now post covid19 scenario as the western world shrinks and the power fulcrum shifting towards Asia with USA pivot to Asia program as well as the geo-political tensions between USA and China coming up there is a new role for South Asia right now. The paper would like to understand these scenarios with an eye on India-China relations in a cooperative competition relationship scenario. On one side of the paper the joint role of India-China in BRICS framework would be looked at against the Indo- Pacific Asian power struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the challenge to India from China, and the dilemmas faced by India in shaping an appropriate response. A two-level theory analysis indicates that some diminishing cooperation is possible at the global level, for example over environmental issues. However, regionally, this has been overtaken structurally by increasing sharp confrontation along the Himalayas and by rising geopolitical and geo-economic competition across Asia and the Indo-Pacific. This has been overlaid in 2020–2021 by the particularly negative effect on Indian relations with China of the clashes and casualties at Galwan and the impact of Covid-19. Given this sharpening challenge, the paper finds that India's cherished axiom of full strategic autonomy now has to be tempered in its response by balancing dictates, particularly in the light of Stephen Walt's balance of threat model. India's responses pose various dilemmas in terms of effectiveness and counter-productiveness. Geopolitically, dilemmas continue to revolve for India around how far to invoke a Tibet Card and a Taiwan Card in its One China policy; and how far India can shape an immediate web (in effect around China) through strengthening security links with Vietnam, Mongolia and South Korea. Dilemmas also follow from how far India should pursue tighter security/military arrangements with more powerful China-concerned states like Australia, Japan, France, and above all, the United States. Geo-economically, India's dilemmas revolve around how to respond to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and to China's Maritime Silk Road scheme. Looking forward, an important factor will be how far India pulls away from Covid-19 disruption to the economy, and how far it will need to divert long-term economic funding away from immediate short-term military projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the dynamics of supply chain diversification in a contested East Asia and their implications for India–South Korea cooperation in the post-COVID-19 era. Major powers have sought to restructure supply chain by designing a strategy to reduce their reliance on China-controlled supply chain. The United States–China trade and technological war, Asian regional powers' escalating conflicts with a rising China, and pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions have played key roles in driving the restructuring process. India and South Korea, Asia's two major economies, have also re-evaluated their supply chain strategies. As this paper explains, on the one hand, India has been striving to emerge as a supply chain hub for key industries by ending China's control. On the other hand, South Korea has also been aiming to diversify its supply chain beyond China under the New Southern Policy. Against that backdrop, critical developments concerning supply chain cooperation have occurred between the two countries amid the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has not only facilitated the opening of high-level political exchanges on supply chain but also brought tangible outcomes, as Korean companies have become active participants in India's quest to build an India-centric supply chain. I conclude this study by contending that the two countries are "natural partners" in reshaping the supply chain dynamics in East Asia in the post-COVID-19 era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comprising aspiring economies, significant reserves of social, human and natural capital, and witnessing the bulk of maritime trade, global as well as intra-region interests are inextricably tied to the Indo-Pacific. Since 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in exposing the fault lines in the Indo-Pacific which was already fraught with competing as well as cooperative geopolitical equations. In the context of regional and global actors being called upon to reign in the ensuing disruptions and establish alternate response mechanisms, this paper examines the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific and the evolution of India's role as a key participant and contributor to regional dynamics. In doing do, the paper analyzes intra-region partnerships which have witnessed a steady expansion with New Delhi's involvement. It also underscores the key responses and adaptations of countries in the region and how India's engagement is poised to underwrite the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been tectonic shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, impacting relations among international actors, including traditionally close partners like Vietnam and India. By using the approach of realism and constructivism in international relations, this paper discusses Vietnam and India's approach to the Indo-Pacific region to expand their substantive strategic relationship. The paper finds out that geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific directly influence the bilateral relation and create challenges as well as opportunities. By using the SWOT model, the paper analyzes driving factors and challenges to the Vietnam-India relations. Through the findings, it suggests both countries need to take advantages of the regional cooperation to further Vietnam-India's strategic comprehensive partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to discuss the situation of Mauritius in the post-colonial geopolitical configuration of the Indian Ocean. The island nation, a former British colony that has been independent since 1968, is today confronted with geopolitical issues that place it within a dilemma. Its recent allegiance with India, through preferential trade partnership, makes claiming sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago which was part of its territory before independence complicated. There is in an ongoing conflict with Great Britain and, indirectly, the United States on this contentious issue. At the same time, Mauritius needs to consider China’s influence in the region since it partners with most of the independent nations on matters of economic development. Mauritius itself has established an important trading platform through Chinese assistance. Concurrently, the Mauritian relationship with the United States cannot be compromised as it has been the major trading partner since 1794 with an embassy established in 1968. Hence, trapped between economic ties from all the partners engaged in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius strives to maintain its neutrality, while also being obliged to accept that its location, size and influence might not be enough to contest against past and emerging superpowers. To this end, the power games remain as complex as ever in the Indian Ocean when seen from a Mauritian perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the changing geopolitical landscape with the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, the China-India tussle and scale of regional and global exposition has begun to display with certain consequences, which seems to shake the existing regional balance of power. A mounting political and military confrontation between these two powers as experts suggested could create a hurdle on regional-global stability and can strike on the path of globalization. With historical and existing context analysis, this paper explores that putting genuine differences aside, China and India being responsible stakeholders of the global community, can cooperate and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. This paper is based on qualitative research and explorative form in a pattern. This paper concludes that to reduce protracted political and border-related tensions, continuous institutional dialogue, regular communication, and formal-informal exchanges could be effective tools for a peaceful resolution. At this juncture, the competition and cooperation approach could be useful for fostering China-India bilateral relations, and this situation will help to address common challenges of the global community, restructure the global order, and re-adjust regional and global scenarios crippled by the Covid-19 pandemic.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of supply chain diversification in a contested East Asia and their implications for India–South Korea cooperation in the post-COVID-19 era. Major powers have sought to restructure supply chain by designing a strategy to reduce their reliance on China-controlled supply chain. The United States–China trade and technological war, Asian regional powers’ escalating conflicts with a rising China, and pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions have played key roles in driving the restructuring process. India and South Korea, Asia’s two major economies, have also re-evaluated their supply chain strategies. As this paper explains, on the one hand, India has been striving to emerge as a supply chain hub for key industries by ending China’s control. On the other hand, South Korea has also been aiming to diversify its supply chain beyond China under the New Southern Policy. Against that backdrop, critical developments concerning supply chain cooperation have occurred between the two countries amid the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has not only facilitated the opening of high-level political exchanges on supply chain but also brought tangible outcomes, as Korean companies have become active participants in India’s quest to build an India-centric supply chain. I conclude this study by contending that the two countries are “natural partners” in reshaping the supply chain dynamics in East Asia in the post-COVID-19 era.

The division of Indo-Pak subcontinent as an independent Pakistan left the long term bone of contention between Pakistan and India: The Kashmir issue. So deep were the geo-political roots of this dispute that it created grounds for the nuclearization of South Asia. This paper explores the development of Pakistan's nuclear policy under changing democratic and military leaderships, for determining its continuity, changes and pace due to domestic and regional politics. The nuclear dialogue and the negotiations on Kashmir must, go hand in hand to prevent India and Pakistan from escalating the nuclear threat in the region and the world in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of the new cooperative water development agreements in South Asia since 1996 and, in particular, the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh, this paper explores the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation between states in the joint development of large-scale river systems and current opportunities for successful development. The general problems of cooperation faced by the riparian states which share successive rivers are examined with reference to the geopolitical obstacles to cooperation in the Bengal delta since the Partition of the Indian subcontinent through which India and Pakistan gained Independence as separate states in 1947. Against the background of repeated attempts to resolve water-sharing issues between India and East Pakistan and its successor state, Bangladesh, this paper concludes that for cooperation to succeed contemporary large-scale river development has to meet a wide range of criteria which go beyond conventional engineering or economic cost-benefit analyses to include geopolitical criteria. These range from global-scale environmental concerns to micro-scale issues of mutual regional benefit. This paper proposes a major new development on the Brahmaputra and Ganges which the authors argue could break the log-jam of a zero-sum game approach to surface water development in the Bengal delta. Unlike most large-scale dam-building proposals, the barrage construction outlined would cause negligible population displacement, and making maximum use of existing river channels would minimize the environmental impacts associated with the large canal or dam construction envisaged in earlier Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) schemes. Yet the paper also recognizes that while such a proposal could bring economic, environmental and political advantages to all users in the GBM basin, new thinking on the management of international rivers is less in favour of supply-side solutions, and the case would need to be... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Research Communication examines how and why India’s interest in Arctic affairs has evolved since it became an Observer state to the Arctic Council (AC) in 2013. The paper also asks what strengths India can offer to support AC member states to resume joint scientific research involving Russia? The study is based on the analysis of reports and media texts. The graphical method is used to present research results. Our findings demonstrate that India’s interest in Arctic affairs has grown since 2013 and today, in 2023, through achievements in scientific works, India has a goal to establish itself as an influential presence within the Arctic. Since 2011 India has been conducting studies on climate change in the Arctic. After becoming an Observer state in the AC, India actively participates in meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials, contributes to the six working groups of the AC and sustains engagement with the Arctic Energy Summit, Arctic Science Ministerial and Task Forces. India’s focus on cryospheric research has helped improve Arctic oceanography, atmosphere, pollution and microbiology. The study showed that the Arctic region is crucial for India as processes in this region affect atmospheric, oceanographic and biogeochemical cycles of the Earth’s ecosystem, especially in the Himalayas, commonly referred to as the Third Pole. The Arctic and the Himalayas are interconnected and share similar concerns. In considering how India’s activities can aid the Arctic region, we found that India has one of the most advanced space programs in the world and can offer expertise in providing satellite communication in remote areas. We also paid attention to how India may contribute politically to stability between the AC states. We conclude that with India taking over the G20 Presidency in 2022 it is likely that India could potentially act as a creditable and legitimate mediator to restore stability within the Arctic region. The G20 is extremely relevant to the Arctic, as six of the eight AC Permanent members and 12 of the 13 AC Observers are represented at the G20 Forum, and the G20 Forum’s agenda includes climate change, sustainable development, and the environment all of which are threatened by the downsizing of scientific research in the Arctic.

Abstract: The Port of Gwadar is the gateway to the three most strategically important regions of South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia, with the potential to transform South Asia's geopolitics. Gwadar's deep seaport provides important strategic and financial advantages to Pakistan because of its major position at the mouth of the Arabian sea and the world's most important oil chokepoint Straits of Hormuz. Gwader is regarded as the crown jewel of recent economic paradigms, but it influences the industry in some countries and threatens political interests of others. In Gwadar Port, China intends to improve its relationship with Pakistan to maintain and retain its routes of crude oil imports and extending its links to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Pakistan and China need a forward-looking plan to involve the regional countries to ensure the initiative's most promising outcome. This paper explores political implications of Gwader port and its prospects in Persian Gulf. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to describe the regional security challenges and major threats for India in South Asia. Since 1947, India has been suffering from external security threats such as, a form of proxy warfare and terrorism from its neighbouring countries. To this purpose, the article also examines recurring issues where India has major border issues with China, in the Himalayan terrain to the eastern region of India. This article looks at the defence cooperation between India and France through the prism of India's security threats in the South Asian region. India's soft power policy reflected in a neo-realist approach and expanded its long-standing defence cooperation with France. Therefore, India has been receiving support from the French government whenever the country needs defence equipment and other assistance. The article uses empirical and discourse analysis methods to answer the questions, and to draw a proper conclusion to the study. Finally, as a result of the study, we can see that India's serious security threats in the South Asian region are pushing the country to purchase defence equipment from France. The relationship between India and France is strengthening the bilateral cooperation at a broader level and shaping a strong strategic partnership by uniting South Asia and the Indo-Pacific as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last decade, the geopolitical construct of the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) has emerged as a key strategic location in the twenty-first century. IPR has become the central point of convergence, competition, and alignment. The aim of this study is to determine Indo-French cooperation in many areas of IPR. This study focuses on investigating the Indo-French bilateral partnership and the kind of strategic autonomy that has been pioneered and accelerated by India and France in the IPR. This research relies on empirical analysis to explore the goal and objective, and the qualitative mixed method involves investigating the answers to questions. This research focuses on two research questions: the extent to which the French and Indian synergies have achieved success as a strategic partnership and why is the Indo-Pacific region so important to the bilateral partnership of both countries? As a result, the strategic partnership between India and France is on the right track, and both sides have a common understanding of working together in the IPR. Furthermore, both sides continued to increase their corridors for multiple cooperation in the IPR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks into the Russia-India energy trade potential and its strategic significance with a particular focus on the Central Asian energy trade. Russia has become a major player in the energy market and its handling of Syrian crisis has enhanced its position in the Middle East that has impact on oil market and production scenario. India has been a growing at a rate of above 5% and its energy needs have been substantial. India and Russia share a very special relationship due to long-standing cultural and political ties and this has been a facilitator to India’s energy security needs. The Central Asian Republics hold a special position for Russia and India in terms of strategic security across South and Central Asian region. The two countries not only deeply connect themselves with the region but also find it necessary to preserve the region from religious extremism and terrorism that is worsened by the narcotics and arms trade. The Central Asian republics are a house to some of the world’s largest natural gas reserves and they have been exporting it large volumes through pipelines. However, the approach has not materialised as South Asia due to the Afghanistan situation. Therefore, Russia remains an important route to access energy resources from Eurasia and Central Asia in particular. India also has high exposure to the maritime energy trade with Africa and Latin America countries that contribute to the counting opportunity cost for accessing Central Asian energy. The paper highlights the significance of energy trade between Russia, India and Central Asian countries that could contribute to geopolitical stability across the region.

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Due to Southeast Asia's geopolitical, economic, and commercial significance, world powers have focused on this region. China and India, the two neighboring nations of Southeast Asia, both with aspirations to become the dominating force in the Indo-Pacific region, have been employing all means to draw Southeast Asia into their sphere of influence. Controlling Southeast Asia would confer immense strategic gains on both nations. The goal of this study is to assess the policy of India and China toward Southeast Asia utilizing pertinent data and documents, official comments from the respective governments, and the research of Vietnamese and foreign researchers. The analysis reveals that India and China seek benefits by promoting close ties with Southeast Asia, but their methods for achieving this objective are distinct. Suppose India employs flexible diplomatic measures to develop its good relations with Southeast Asia. In that case, China has the upper hand when pursuing a diplomatic strategy that is both flexible and assertive to advance its objectives, particularly in East Sea-related problems. This provides Southeast Asia/ASEAN with difficult choices and decisions about India and China to balance their respective interests and, more significantly, to maintain ASEAN's central position in regional and international concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that India-East Asia relations are likely to enter a new phase in the post-COVID-19 era. The COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the decline of the post-Cold War liberal order that has so far promoted mutual trust and cooperation and underpinned peace and prosperity. This development has enormous implications for East Asia's international relations. Indeed, significant changes appear to have occurred in the region during the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has accelerated China's growing supremacy, but on the other hand, it has also enhanced its rivalry with all major liberal powers, including the US, India, Japan and Australia. Moreover, the geo-economic front has also witnessed drastic changes as pandemic-induced economic nationalism, economic retaliation, and supply chain restructuring have swept across the region. Hence, it is not premature to proclaim the post-pandemic East Asia will differ from the post-Cold War liberal era. That, in turn, raises important questions: How has the COVID-19 influenced India–East Asia relations? Will the post-COVID-19 era transform India's ties with East Asia? If so, how will this relationship change, and to what extent? This article, and this special issue more broadly, seek to answer these questions. In doing so, we first examine the major geopolitical and geo-economic issues between India and East Asia. Thereafter, we analyze India's relations with South Korea, China, Japan and ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the transition of Muhammad Barkatullah (1864–1927), a Muslim Indian living under British colonial rule, from an intellectual demanding imperial reform to an anti-British revolutionary. Although much of the scholarly literature has analyzed Barkatullah's revolutionary activities after the First World War, the focus of this article will be on the early period of his career from the 1880s until 1914. In examining his movements, writings, and connections with various networks in the context of major global events, this article argues, first, that his revolutionary turn took place in the context of a global conversation on race, empire, and religion from the 1880s until the lead-up to the Great War, and second, that his anti-colonial (inter)nationalism was coupled with his Pan-Islamism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relations between the two 'colonial cousins' - India and Pakistan have been on an unstable footing since the partition in 1947. These countries have become more prone to war after their nuclearization programme, compared to their pre-nuclear era - making the geopolitical situation in South Asia very unstable. The proponents of 'nuclear deterrence' argue that it is this deterrence that has been successful in averting an all-out war between India and Pakistan, despite their five military crises between 1986-87 and 2008. Nevertheless, the opponents of 'nuclear deterrence' claim that through it had some psychological effect on the crises, it has failed to avert military engagement between India and Pakistan. This article argues that, despite the role of 'nuclear deterrence', it was the function of diplomacy which prevented these two nuclear states from engaging in all-out wars. In doing so, this article examines the role of nuclear deterrence and diplomacy in the five India-Pakistan crises. It finds that diplomacy has been more instrumental in averting wars and reducing tensions in times of crises than nuclear deterrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at ASEAN’s role in the context of the three main bilateral relations among the great powers in Asia: China-US, China-Japan, and China-India. The authors argue that although ASEAN’s influence is limited in terms of geographical reach and its impact on actual security issues, Southeast Asia is potentially an important object of great power rivalry and thus the sub-region is highly relevant to Asian geopolitics. The key question with regard to geopolitical stability is how ASEAN will deal with increased great power rivalries in its own sub-region.

This article investigates how expansive new security projects have gained both legitimacy and immediacy as part of the ‘global war on terror’ by analysing the process that led to the fencing and securitising of the border between India and Bangladesh. The framing of the ‘enemy other’ in the global war on terror relies on two crucial shifts from previous geopolitical boundary narratives. First, the enemy other is described as not only being violent but also as outside the boundaries of modernity. Second, the enemy other is represented as posing a global and interconnected threat that is no longer limited by geography. These two shifts are used to justify the new preventative responses of pre-emptive military action abroad and the securitisation of the borders of the state. This article argues that in India the good and evil framing of the global war on terror was mapped onto longstanding communal distinctions between Hindus and Muslims. In the process, Pakistan, Bangladesh and increasingly Muslims generally are described as violent, irrational and a threat to the security of the Indian state. These changes led to a profound shift in the borderlands of the Indian state of West Bengal, where fencing and securitising the border with Bangladesh was previously resisted, but now is deemed essential. The article concludes that the framing of the war on terror as a global and interconnected problem has allowed sovereign states to consolidate power and move substantially closer to the territorial ideal of a closed and bounded container of an orderly population by attempting to lock down political borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over decades India and Myanmar had hardly any relations. To a large degree this was due to India's outdated model of Nehruvian ideals in its foreign policy formulation. Recent research, however, has pointed towards a shift in Indo-Burmese relations. This article analysse the reasons for such a shift, placing them in the larger context of the reframing of India's foreign policy objectives under the BJP-led NDA government in the late 1990s. These new priorities have been upheld by the Congress led government since the elections in 2004. The article argues that the primary aim for such a shift was economic, as India reassessed its position globally and regionally, putting economic relations at the centre of its foreign policy formulation and engendering India's "pipeline diplomacy". It looks in detail at the geo-politics of energy and how energy security is now playing a major role in international relations in South Asia. It then describes India's energy needs, focusing in particular on gas, which is at the origin of the pipeline diplomacy and its increasing interest in relations with nations rich in gas and oil. It ends by assessing what impact India's pipeline diplomacy could have on the wider Southeast Asian region, with special regard to ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]